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DEFECTS,
CIVIL AND MILITARY,
OF THE
INDIAN GOVERNMENT.

BY
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL
SIR CHARLES JAMES NAPIER, G.C.B.

FOURTH EDITION.

Edited, and with an Introductory Preface written for this Edition,

BY
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR W. F. P. NAPIER, K.C.B.

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Dedication.

THE AUTHOR OF THIS WORK IS DEAD.
THE CARE OF PUTTING IT THROUGH THE PRESS IS MINE.
AND TO
THE PEOPLE OF ENGLAND
IT IS DEDICATED ;
BECAUSE IT EXHIBITS FACTION FRUSTRATING
A GREAT MAN'S EFFORTS TO SERVE THE PUBLIC ;
AND SHEWS
HOW SURELY THE DIRECTORS OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY
ARE PROCEEDING IN
THE DESTRUCTION OF THE GREAT EMPIRE
UNWISELY COMMITTED TO THEIR
MISGOVERNMENT.

W. F. P. NAPIER, *Lieut.-General.*

P R E F A C E.

FOUR years ago this work was first published, a few months after Sir CHARLES NAPIER's decease. He had designed it to be a complete exposure of the whole misgovernment of India. Sickness and death prevented the execution of that great plan, which would have been of incalculable public advantage now, when the nation must, per force, pay more attention to our Indian Empire than has hitherto been the case, or be content to lose that Empire altogether. Sir C. NAPIER was compelled to confine himself to exposing the total unfitness of the Indian system for the just government and maintenance of the Country, as exemplified under the mischievous rule of LORD DALHOUSIE; but he has shewn enough of error, of mis-government, to account for the present disastrous state of affairs. And he will be found predicting, in this work, with surprising clearness and foresight, the certain result, namely,—the revolt of the native Troops, the discontent of the

native Population, and the certain ultimate destruction of British power in the East ; at the same time pointing out the sure preventives, if adopted in time ; adding, with prophetic spirit—"but these things will not be done, and India will be lost to England." The present revolt is the awful and unhappy comment : yet it is not too late to repair past errors, if a man of genius and knowledge be set to work. Such a man is to be found in LORD ELLENBOROUGH. Will the Nation be so alive to its own interests as to call him forth, with full power to over-ride faction and folly ?

W. NAPIER, LIEUT-GEN.

July 10th, 1857.

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PART I.

PRELIMINARY NOTICE.

As this work, though designed to expose prominent evils affecting the stability of our Eastern Empire, contains a vindication of my personal conduct in resigning the chief military command—which cannot be consecutively made in the narrative—a previous brief view of that matter is here given, leaving the proofs for events as they arise.

In 1849 a mutinous spirit pervaded some thirty Sepoy battalions in march for or actually in the Punjaub. Lord Dalhousie was then going to sea in search of health, and the Commander-in-Chief remained the man of highest power and responsibility in India; if danger arose, external or internal, he was to deal with it and answer for the public safety. Great danger did arise. The smouldering mutiny began to shew itself openly at several places, notably with the Sepoys at Wuzzcerabad under Brigadier Hcarsey, and the Commander-in-Chief was to take care the public weal received no detriment.

At this crisis—Lord Dalhousie being on the

Indian Ocean—a Government Order, only locally applicable, came accidentally into operation at Wuzzeerabad; it cancelled a former order of a like nature, touching the allowances to the Sepoys, and was disparaging to those soldiers. Brigadier Hearsey thinking it would increase the discontent existing, wrote to his immediate superior Sir Walter Gilbert, expressing fear of the result. Sir Walter, taking the same view, forwarded the letter to Colonel Grant, Adjutant-General, who laid the matter before me, urging the impropriety of the order originally; and he was, *ex officio*, intimately connected with and versed in the details of the Indian Army and all Government Orders affecting it. I concurred in his opinion and that of the other two distinguished officers of the Company's Service. The matter was critical. The Governor-General was on the ocean, the Supreme Council at Calcutta, fifteen hundred miles distant; the Commander-in-Chief was on the spot, a member of the Supreme Council and especially responsible for military order—an isolated authority indeed, yet competent to deal with a great danger calling for immediate and decisive action.

My first step was a reference to the instructions of the Duke of Wellington, where I found these words:—" *On a station so distant, and of such magnitude and political importance, you must necessarily act in a great measure from your own discretion.*" This was plain sense. It was instruction which every commander of an army must have received since armies were first raised, and on which every general must act whether so instructed or not.

Now let my position be considered.

Mutiny with the Sepoys is the *most* formidable danger menacing our Indian empire. Mutiny had appeared, the Governor-General had disappeared ; the matter was urgent, the Supreme Council fifteen hundred miles off, and no answer could be received from it under a month. The General of Brigade, the General of Division, the Adjutant-General of the Company's Army were the three orthodox officers for the Commander-in-Chief to consult on details of their own service. They were distinguished men, experienced and intimately acquainted with the Sepoys, amongst whom they had passed their lives ; their opinions, all in agreement, were before me and concurred with my own. Wherefore, "*acting on my own discretion,*" I suspended the Government Order. Mark ! it is of consequence ; *suspended* it as a dangerous measure brought by accident partially into operation at a moment of great peril. But *only* until the Supreme Government should decide on the course to be pursued ; for the order of suspension was dated the 20th of January 1850, and on the same day went my report, stating facts and expressing confidence of Government support. What could I have done more ? How could I have done otherwise ?

To say this discretion was injudiciously exercised will not affect the question. That which I and the three able officers spoken of judged most fitting was done. We believed it to be within the competence of the Commander-in-Chief, or the Adjutant-General would not have so advised, and our one object was the preventing a spread of mutiny without the calamity of using force. Hence, the emergency being imminent, the discre-

tion exercised was one of right in my position, and moreover actually enjoined by the Duke of Wellington's instructions. To have shrunk from it would have been to shew myself unworthy of command.

For thus acting in a mode imposed on me, not only by the nature of the crisis and positive instructions from home, but by Lord Dalhousie himself before he went to sea—as shall be shewn further on—I was, by the same Lord Dalhousie, three months after the event, *reprimanded in the most offensive manner*. I repeat, in the most offensive manner: because a man, really designing to give support, would have written with his own hand, or by his private secretary, not as he did, through the medium of officers under my command!

On receiving this insulting reprimand, which also forbade me to use my discretion on such matters “under any circumstances” in India, where the safety of the empire and the honour of the Army might call for instant decision, I decided to give up a command, which, from that moment, would have combined impotence with responsibility, and, so degraded, could only be held for the sake of lucre. Through the Duke of Wellington Her Majesty was graciously pleased to accede to my resignation and I returned to England.

This is a succinct account of my sudden retirement, and those who only desire that explanation may shut the book; but those who, taking an interest in the affairs of India and the public welfare, read on, will find proof that I acted with prudence and success; that Lord Dalhousie's

conduct was unjustifiable; that remote causes influenced him and rendered my stay in India, while he was Governor-General, useless to the Army and dangerous to myself. With power to serve the public my office would have been retained; but that no such power was mine, a narrative of events during the two years my command lasted will prove; that is to say, two years' service with great responsibility but no authority, furnishing a peg for the Governor-General to hang his own blunders upon. Sixteen thousand a year was my pay as a scape-goat, but reputation was dearer to me.

Why I went to India a second time, notwithstanding much ill treatment before sustained in that country, and why I returned so suddenly will be found in detail further on. But here it may be noted, that to resign before the expiration of the regular term was not peculiar to me. Lord Dalhousie's own father is said to have so done on the same ground; and of thirteen Commanders-in-Chief within this century, five only have retained their posts the full term of five years—one being Lord Hastings, who united the office with that of Governor-General.

CHAPTER I.



APPOINTED to the command of the Indian Armies, against my own wish and my conviction of its inutility, I went expecting to find *war*. I found peace, and soon discovered that the absence of danger would excite and foster intrigues and secret hostility against one unfavourably regarded by the Court of Directors and the Whig Government. Amongst those governing bodies might be some who placed confidence in me, but party feelings and private enmity were active before my departure. No cause for this hostility, especially on the part of the Directors, was known to me, save my previous zealous obedience to Lord Ellenborough when he was Governor-General; for it would appear the Directors, and possibly the Whig Government, wished me, a Major-General, to disobey and thwart that nobleman. A person in office at the time, wrote to me with friendly warning to forbear any public expression of admiration for Lord Ellenborough, as likely to be injurious to my own interests!

His Lordship was then to me unknown even by sight, but, finding him just and wise, the warning received did not deter me from praising what appeared great and honourable in his conduct. Obedience was my duty, yet against a zealous performance of it *I was warned as injurious to my*

own interests! Always, however, a consideration for my own interest has led me to act honestly and abide consequences. This obedience is the only traceable cause for the great hostility constantly evinced towards me—hostility which has not, however, damaged me in public opinion; on the contrary, it damaged my enemies, and my honest conduct caused me to be sent out in despite of them as Commander-in-Chief, when those who basely vilified Lord Ellenborough were, and are still, held in contempt both by the Queen's and Company's Armies in India.

I have said the appointment was against my wish. When the Duke of Wellington first told me of it, I objected that my many enemies in India would mar its usefulness; he laughed at that, pressed the matter home, and concluded thus: "*If you don't go, I must.*" Still reluctant, from a firm conviction of the justice of my own view, I asked twenty-four hours for reflection, it was conceded, and finally a grateful sense of the public will prevailed. But scarcely was this arranged, when proof on proof arose that, with exception of Her Majesty, the Duke, the people of England, and the Armies of India, I was to expect from all other quarters that secret base hostility so proverbially difficult for honourable men to repel.

Amongst the indications leading to this conclusion was the following. Lord John Russell, at an interview, gave me to understand that doubts had arisen as to appointing me one of the Supreme Council, as all my predecessors had been. He intimated that the Directors were seeking for a precedent, and would probably find one for denying it to me. Lord John was explicitly and peremp-

torily told on the instant, that I also would seek, and if unable to *find* would *make* a precedent, for to India I would not go unless as one of the Council. Six years I had served in the East with success as a military commander, and as a civil governor; I had received the approbation of my Sovereign and the thanks of Parliament for victories which the public voice had applauded; I had been again called to command in the same country by that Sovereign and that public, and the expectation of my submitting to such an insult from the Directors was preposterous.

That a degraded command should have been so offered, or even discussed, shewed that my measure of the Directors' temper was more exact than that taken by them of mine, when they thought I would go shorn of honour which others had received: but another indication of hostility was soon furnished.

The strength of public feeling relative to the Indian command at this time must be remembered; the victory of Goojerat was unknown, all persons connected with India were cast down in spirit, and a protracted warfare in the Punjaub was expected. That province is traversed by many rivers, five of which are large and dangerous for troops; to pass them is difficult, especially in face of an enemy, and my business was to prepare in time for such operations: wherefore, having heard from Lord Ellenborough that Lieutenant Wood of the Indian Navy, an officer well acquainted with those waters, was in London, I sought him out. He was a very intelligent man, in the prime of life, knowing the rivers, and speaking the languages of the tribes on their banks, and most anxious to go if he could be of service to the Company. My

design was to enlist a body of English sailors at Calcutta, and so form a powerful bridge train, but I could get no definitive answer from the Directors, and, after I left London the Duke of Wellington, having at my instance also endeavoured to get Lieutenant Wood appointed, was refused!

This was strong evidence of an inimical spirit working to the injury of the public at a critical moment, and where it was difficult to imagine the Court could have hesitated. Why were the services of Lieutenant Wood refused! Was my application a job? That officer was to me unknown, save by Lord Ellenborough's recommendation and his own book; he made no application to be employed; he was sought out as a man who could do good service and was ready to devote himself to the public. Here then, at the outset, was not only a denial of just *support* but opposition to evident public good: an opposition calculated to shake the confidence of any commander. Of what importance could it be to the Directors to prevent a Lieutenant of their Navy going to India, when his particular qualification made his presence there of vast importance in the opinion of the Indian Commander, and that of the Duke of Wellington? My having asked for him ought alone to have been sufficient. It was so with the Duke, who applied for him and was earnest to assist me, yet could not succeed!

Pressed by the Government to hasten my departure I left England in the night of the 24th March, the anniversary of the victory at Hyderabad, reached Alexandria in fourteen days, embarked at Suez on the 11th of April, arrived at Calcutta the 6th of May, and assumed the command of the Armies in India forty-three days after quitting London.

At Simla, my first interview with Lord Dalhousie tended to confirm my suspicions that secret hostility was also at work in India. In ten minutes he told me in substance, nay, the words were, "that in letters from England he had been warned against my endeavouring to enervate upon his power, and had answered, *he would take damned good care I should not.*" This was said in a half laughing manner, but the impression made by the letters was evident; yet a little reflection might have convinced him that no Commander-in-Chief could desire to increase his own labour by usurping the powers of the Governor-General. Being resolved however, that nothing on my part should give strength to the erroneous ideas which had been so mischievously created in Lord Dalhousie's mind by others, I answered that he was quite right in his determination, but might believe there was no wish to infringe on his authority. It will appear in the sequel, that this silly phantom of my ambition haunted him to the last; yet our conversation was, on the whole satisfactory, and we went on well together at Simla. Since my resignation, it has been told me that certain persons about him tried, secretly, to excite his jealousy: this may or may not be, it was unknown to me at the time and I have never inquired who those gentlemen were.

CHAPTER II.

LESS than a month after my arrival at Simla a mutinous spirit rose among some of the Native regiments of the Bengal army—a matter which shall be here fully exposed, for on that question my command was resigned.

Lord Dalhousie told me the Native regiments, while in the Punjaub, had received an additional pay from Government, because, after passing the frontier they were considered as on foreign service; but when the Punjaub was annexed, the Sepoys there had no more right to higher pay than the rest of the Army, and he had ordered their allowances to be reduced. This was just, but it was reducing the pay of mercenaries, which is always a delicate affair and should be done with great caution through the Military Chiefs. It was not so done; yet, in justice to Lord Dalhousie, it must be said that it was a matter of detail with which he was not acquainted, nor aware of the danger it might create; it was the fault of those about him. He only acted in the ordinary indiscriminating official routine, and the measure was executed in the same spirit; that is to say, without looking into cause and effect, for some men imagine they can deal with soldiers as so many automatons devoid of feelings and aspirations like other human beings.

Official men often think, that to issue an order secures its execution. Lord Dalhousie, judging a reduction of the Sepoys' pay a proper measure, ordered it, and thought that sufficient to ensure quiet execution. He was mistaken, and his error caused great danger to the State with ruin to many brave Sepoys! He indeed treated this mutiny amongst the native troops very lightly, *after it had been suppressed*; but he, and those who like him have done so, know little of Indian interests. The ablest and most experienced civil and military servants of the East India Company consider mutiny as one of the greatest, if not *the* greatest danger threatening India—a danger that may come unexpectedly, and, if the first symptoms be not carefully treated, with a power to shake Leadenhall. Whether the mutiny in question was so treated will be seen in the following pages, in which its origin progress and suppression, together with the conduct of Lord Dalhousie are exposed.

Many military men, and others belonging to the Indian Civil Service who remember what bloodshedding there was in former mutinies of far less formidable character, still survive, and will admit that this one was successfully dealt with; for without sacrifice of life on the scaffold, or otherwise, Lord Dalhousie and India were extricated from a great peril, provoked by his inexperience in government and incapacity for dealing with armed men. That my duty was successfully done shall be maintained, yet without disputing the *right* of the Governor-General to reprimand the Commander-in-Chief: nevertheless, it is the *right* of the Commander-in-Chief to resign if the Governor-General, acting unjustly in addition to rebuke, deprives him of the power to execute the duties of

his high office, especially when sent to India under circumstances so unusual.

On the 19th of July, 1849, a letter received from Sir Colin Campbell, commanding the Station of Rawul Pindee, reported that:—" *The 22nd Native regiment of Infantry had refused to receive the reduced pay ordered by the Governor-General; and other Native regiments were equally prepared to refuse their pay, but it had not been offered because the Treasurer was short of money.*"

Sir Colin had made an official report of this through the regular channel, but as the subject was so important sent this private report direct, that it might reach me in one, if not two days sooner than it would through the head quarters of the division. This was a serious view to be taken by so able an officer, and very justly did he so regard the matter.

The soldiers had displayed no violence towards their officers, they were outwardly respectful. To be sure they were. They knew what they were about. They knew passive resistance by many thousands of armed men would force the Government to compliance, without, as they thought, committing themselves, whereas open force would bring the European troops upon them. But let this passive respectful mutiny be traced to its natural result. Armed men refuse *respectfully* to receive the pay for which they had enlisted, insisting on a higher rate. The conduct of the Government is just, the demand of these men unjust. The Government refuses, and the passive respectful mutiny goes on. But the Sepoy has no capital; *he strikes for increase of wages*, and meanwhile has no means of living save the old wages, which he peremptorily refuses to take. How long is this

to last? A bazaar is in his camp, arms are in his hands, hunger presses. Let Government give way and India goes! But armed men will not starve, and the hitherto respectful Sepoy takes food by force, making his weapon his "bread earner." The European officer attempts to maintain discipline, and then the mutineers murder him! Such is the analysis of passive or respectful mutinies, and assuredly that reported by Sir Colin Campbell was the first step towards open violent action, most dangerous in its nature.

Mutiny among the Bengal Sepoys was not new to me: a few years before, the Bengal Sepoys had mutinied in Scinde. But here we had to deal with men having a cause interesting every native soldier of whatever caste or condition, Jew or Gentoo, Christian or Heathen, for all understand the advantage of higher pay! In all mutinies some men more daring than others are allowed to take the lead, while the more wary prepare to profit when time suits; a few men in a few corps, a few corps in an army begin; if successful they are joined by their more calculating, and by their more timid comrades. So the mutiny at Rawul Pindee would have proceeded if not stifled early. But the danger on this occasion was not confined to the troops. The mutineers were in the midst of a warlike population ready to join them; only five months had elapsed since the Sikhs had been defeated; and there were other dangers. Our European regiments were scattered hundreds of miles asunder; single regiments in some places, in others only two together; and if the Sikh population rose while the Sepoys were in mutiny the danger would have been of no ordinary kind. The Affghan people also were at hand and at war with us; we had driven

Dost Mahomed across the Indus only a few months before, and he could have again taken the field. These things were to be considered, and supposing the worst to happen, what action was to be adopted? My resolution was to remain quietly at Simla till the mutiny became more developed as to the number of regiments concerned, as to its influence on the troops in the old provinces, and on the Sikhs—for their Army had only a short time before mutinied in that very province, emptied the Khalsa treasury and overturned its Government. In the ranks of that Khalsa Army also had been many Sepoys discharged from our forces, who were well known to, and even related to the mutinous men at Rawul Pindee; and who doubtless told their British friends how they had dictated to the Lahore Government the rate of pay, and what large donations they had extracted: thus precept and example enhanced the danger.

It was the time of raging heat, and scarcely had I recovered from the fatigue of a twelve hundred miles journey from Calcutta, which even young men do not like to encounter: yet I would have gone to Rawul Pindee, if Lord Dalhousie had not concurred with me in thinking such a move by the Commander-in-Chief might give unadvisable importance to the incipient mutiny: moreover, Sir Colin Campell was an officer to be relied upon, and his letter was the first intimation of a bad spirit prevailing. My reply expressed strong hope that it was only a partial ebullition of ill-temper, which would with management pass away; nevertheless, preparation was made for the worst, in remembrance of Vellore, where thirteen British officers and a hundred privates had been

massacred, as many wounded, and all the mutineers slaughtered, because a Commanding Officer would not believe that Sepoys could mutiny! That catastrophe was by some attributed to the intrigues of Tippoo Saib's family; by others to anger at a change of dress. Now the lately conquered nobles of the Punjaub were as capable as Tippoo's people of mischief; and the Rawul Pindee motive, higher pay, was of far more powerful influence than any dislike to costume. The one was local, ephemeral, limited; the other of universal interest, affecting every Sepoy of India, and believed to have been thus early entertained by no less than twenty-four battalions!

My official answer to Sir Colin Campell, dated 19th July, 1849—after acknowledging his of the 13th, describing the insubordinate conduct of men in the 22nd Native regiment—expressed sorrow that soldiers, good in other respects, should act so unbecomingly and injuriously for their own interests. He was therefore to tell them so, and if they persisted in their unfounded demand each fool was to be discharged on the spot, stripped of his arms and clothing, and turned out of the cantonment as an unworthy Sepoy and a disgrace to his regiment. But on the honest soldiers of the seventh and flank companies—reported not to have joined the insubordinate men—the Commander-in-Chief's approbation was to be bestowed; and also upon any individual soldier who had the good sense to take his regular pay, instead of provoking dismissal as a vagabond and culprit. Hopes were expressed that before these orders arrived most of the men would have repented of their folly; but if there was persistent misconduct, a report would go

to the Governor-General and an example be made of all the guilty.

A private letter accompanying this official communication, gave Sir Colin instructions how to act—yet with a wide discretion in case of a collision with the 53rd, the only Queen's regiment at the station. He was told the mutiny must not be designated by harsh names; that it should be termed insubordination; that a door should be opened for repenting culprits, and an opening left for leniency; but if aggravated misconduct followed, vigorous measures would ensue. “No wrong
“ had been offered to the Sepoys, no promise
“ broken; their conduct was unreasonnable, inexcusable and deserving of severe punishment; yet
“ the Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief
“ had agreed to follow the course prescribed in
“ the official letter, giving the men a loop-hole for
“ repentance in hope the matter might melt away.
“ Fear of worse happening was indeed uppermost,
“ and nothing beyond opening a way for retreat
“ could be conceded; but if a parcel of poor fellows
“ could be saved from punishment, it was a duty to
“ do it. If the Sepoys rejected kindness, trusted
“ to numbers, and broke into open mutiny, it was
“ certain not to be confined to Rawul Pindee and
“ must be put down by force. In that case no
“ special orders could be given from such a distance,
“ and commanders of stations must act from the
“ dictates of their abilities and courage; but Sir
“ Colin was, in the event of mishap, to retreat, not
“ on Lahore but on Peshawur, where he would
“ find three European and some Bombay Native
“ regiments in support. Open mutiny was not
“ apprehended, but if it took place, Jhelum could

“ not help and Wuzzeerabad was too far off; how-
“ ever, should the worst happen, it was thought
“ he, with the 53rd at his back, could settle every
“ difficulty.”

Soon another letter came from Rawul Pindee, transmitted by Sir Colin, but written by Captain Mitchell, commanding the 13th Native Infantry. Dated July 14th, a day later than the first report, the contents did not allay apprehensions. A Hindustanee paper had been found on the parade ground, a hundred yards from the quarter-guard, addressed to the drill and pay Havildars; it called on them by name, under penalty of cursing, to refuse any but the higher pay. Captain Mitchell had demanded from the Native officers information as to this paper and the feelings of the men, but unanimously they denied that insubordination existed: the paper had been written by some stranger, and some of them mentioned the 22nd regiment as the probable source, because the Havildars' names were known there from frequent intercourse. The following exact translation was enclosed:—

“ To Bahawul Pandey, Lalla Doarbugee, &c. &c.
The ten pay Havildars of companies, from the grenadier to the light, greeting; you are sworn that whoever of you, seeing this letter, and does not make a report to the drill Havildar of the regiment; or, if any of the other Havildars of a company, one and all, do not make a report to the officers commanding companies, that the Sepoy of all the companies of this regiment, refuse to take one farthing less than twelve rupees per mensem, may every dreadful curse that can fall upon a Hindoo's head fall upon you; and may the same

curses fall upon us, if we agree to take anything less than the above sum, viz. twelve rupees per mensem."

This paper—ominous, because the natives are most sensitive to curses and charms, implicitly believing in their occult efficiency—strengthened the evidence of a deep concerted mutiny; and the next day this view was further confirmed by a fresh communication from Sir C. Campbell. He said Captain Nesbit, commanding the 22nd regiment, had reported that his first information as to the steadiness of the light company was erroneous; with exception of the Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers the bugler and a few privates named, they had refused to accept the reduced pay. To this Captain Nesbit added, that the previous consent of the company to receive that pay had been "*a mere ruse*,"—they had never intended to accept it, and as a body stood in the same position as the rest of the regiment. Here then was further evidence of danger, supported by cunning amongst the confederate mutineers.

This new phase of insubordination occurred on the 16th of July; but though the troops remained sullen on the 16th and 17th no gross act was reported. On the 18th however, the 13th Native regiment joined in the refusal to receive the reduced pay, and Sir Colin Campbell transmitted Captain Mitchell's, the commanding officer's, report on the subject. It stated that with the same exception of commissioned and non-commissioned officers and a few men, the 13th had followed the bad example of the 22nd regiment, and given this additional proof of a bad spirit—the 22nd regiment had not heard the Government com-

munication read before their insubordination, whereas to the 13th it had been read and explained before the reduced pay was offered.

At the Rawul Pindee station were one Queen's regiment—the 53rd—and two Native regiments, both in a state of mutiny; there were also some Artillery and a regiment of irregular Cavalry; but these last, receiving a fixed sum to find themselves, their horses and arms, were not affected by the reduction, and were as safe as mercenary troops could be when a question of pay was agitated. This was however only the surface appearance. Sir Colin's first letter said the mutiny was not a sudden impulse, it had been debated amongst the men of the 22nd and 13th for some time, and been the *subject of a correspondence between them and the troops stationed at Wuzzeerabad and other places*. Now Wuzzeerabad, a large station, was fourteen marches from Rawul Pindee, and if the mutineers had communication—it was afterwards proved they had—with the four Native regiments there, they must also have communicated with the intermediate stations of Jhelum, where were two regiments of Native Infantry, and no European troops. Strong therefore, was the presumptive proof that eight regiments were mutinous, and a company, or even a single man, accepting pay, was, as Captain Nesbit said, a ruse.

With such evidence that the mutinous spirit pervaded eight regiments—it might be many more—the Commander-in-Chief's duty was to consider the danger in all its *possible* phases, because he who considers only what is likely to happen does little; it is necessary to be prepared for every exigency as far as the mind can unravel coming events.

There are, with reference to danger, two kinds of men. The one makes no preparation, or makes it only for *probabilities*. The other prepares for *possibilities*. When a crisis comes the former runs away, or meets it with confusion to perish dishonourably, exclaiming who could have foreseen this? The latter being forewarned is forearmed, and calmly encounters the peril with honour—generally with success. Here little prescience was needed. An immense responsibility had suddenly fallen on me when scarcely inducted in command; and well I knew that whatever means were adopted, whatever course was pursued, abuse unsparing would be poured on my head: but for that I was prepared, and confident also that threatening as the mutiny was it could be quelled by care or force. It did not enter my contemplation, that when all was safe the Governor-General, whose full support was not only my right but had been previously promised without reserve, would be the foremost of my assailants.

To attain a clear conception of what ought to be done previous to action, my first view of the matter was written down, purged of those minor considerations which so often encumber the mind in important affairs. Here it is given, as showing the basis of my proceedings throughout the anxious period which followed—most anxious, because war, horrible in all its forms, is worst when comrade has to meet comrade.

MEMORANDUM.

“ 1st. This mutiny is very serious. The
“ European troops are dispersed in cantonments,
“ hundreds of miles apart.

“ 2nd. In each cantonment the Queen’s troops
“ are greatly outnumbered by the Native troops.

“ 3rd. The Punjaub, newly conquered, is hostile
“ to the English rule, and contains all the material
“ of an Army, defeated yet able to rally to the num-
“ ber of some sixty thousand men. Will Goolab
“ Sing remain faithful?

“ 4th. The regular Native regiments in the
“ Punjaub amount to forty thousand men. Between
“ them and the Sikhs there is no antipathy;
“ numbers of our Sepoys were found during
“ the war on the Sutledge in the ranks of the
“ Sikhs; not deserters from us, but men who
“ belonged to the battalions which had been
“ disbanded for mutiny a few years ago by my
“ predecessor.

5th. The European troops are about twelve
“ thousand.

“ 6th. If the Native troops mutiny they will be
“ joined by the Sikhs, and we must calculate upon
“ having one hundred thousand men opposed to
“ twelve thousand European troops. This is a great
“ disparity as far as numbers go, but the moral
“ feeling will be with the twelve thousand; so will
“ the individual physical strength; so will the
“ money; so will be all the means of war except
“ numbers. The mutineers will be ruled by
“ ‘*Punchayets*,’ that is to say, a sort of native
“ ‘*Politicals*,’ such as governed the old Khalsa
“ Army: they did their work well, they destroyed
“ both Army and Government in a very short space
“ of time. These advantages would quadruple
“ the powers of the twelve thousand Europeans,
“ and reduce the chances to about two to one
“ against us.

“ But thousands more may join in this mutiny, and place the fate of British India in jeopardy far beyond any that it has yet sustained. In the present state of affairs, and at this period of the year especially, any concession to the mutineers would be full of danger ; more dangerous than a collision even, scattered as the European regiments are. We must be very gentle, but fight sooner than concede a single point.

“ I have had a conversation with Lord Dalhousie and Colonel Benson. This officer and myself were opposed. He wanted to disband the 13th and 22nd regiments of Native Infantry ; I objected, and Lord Dalhousie agreeing with me decided not to disband them. Putting the cruelty aside, I asked what we were to do if a vast number of regiments refused their pay ? We could not disband thirty or forty battalions ! What would Colonel Benson then do ? Had we dismissed those two regiments, the whole line, trusting to their numbers and knowing we could not disband an Army, would have followed the example of the 13th and 22nd regiments. In fine, no man living can tell where the danger will end, and any blunder of this kind will be ruinous. Accidents however will occur, I must be prepared for the greatest possible danger, and my resolution is to treat the cases as isolated while they can be so treated ; for if we attempt to bully large bodies, they will do the same by us and a fight must ensue.”

Such were my reflections at the time, and the system thus adumbrated was followed.

Up to the 19th of July the mutiny appeared thoroughly organized in the two regiments at

Rawul Pindee ; and therefore, while convinced that to counter-work the mutineers was the only mode of stifling the insubordination without direct force, I made preparation for that last dreadful resource, and with that view sent instructions to Sir Walter Gilbert, who commanded all the troops in the Punjaub. Dated July 19th, those instructions directed him to hold Sir Henry Dundas, now Lord Melville, with the 60th and 61st Queen's regiments and a Bombay field battery, ready to march to the aid of Sir Colin Campbell, should he demand help ; but he was to let Sir Colin know that two Bombay regiments, the Scinde Horse and a troop of Artillery, were at his disposal to march towards Rawul Pindee at once, in the hope they would suffice and spare the Europeans a movement in the heat.

On the same day, 21st of July, Sir Colin was apprised of all this. " He was to call for the aid prepared, or not, as he judged fitting ; but as his troops had been three days in a state of insubordination, reaching mutiny, and hitherto had only found the smooth edge of authority, they must, if they did not yield, have the rough edge also. Yet all must be done with caution, as mistakes might have serious consequences. Money questions interested all men. The British officers of the Company's Service had once almost mutinied on a question of this very kind, and after that, what might not be expected from Sepoys ? However, to repeat what had been before said, precise orders could not be given at such a distance ; he must act for himself ; support was prepared and placed at his disposal. Nothing more could be done ; but he must

“ remember, that as dissension in our Army would
“ be likely to give the Sikhs the heart to rise, it
“ was necessary to look far-ahead and trust to
“ chance only when it could not be helped.”

Passive mutiny and open violence being thus alike provided against, further intelligence was awaited, and in a few days, Sir Colin Campbell, writing the 21st, reported that fear had prevailed over the mutinous spirit and the men were returning to their duty. This was satisfactory as to the Rawul Pindee station, so far as it went; but confirmation was still anxiously looked for, because of the “ ruse ” previously practised by the light company: the present yielding might be only an extension of that plan. A letter of the 23rd supplied this confirmation, the mutinous feeling seemed to be waning; seemed I say, because even in this report Sir Colin Campbell, referring to his former suspicions, said, “ Thus has ended this disagreeable
“ affair, which looked serious in its character in
“ the first instance; *for there was reason to fear*
“ *that the same feeling pervaded other Native corps*
“ *stationed in the conquered territories, who were to*
“ *be affected by the order directing the change from*
“ *the field to the cantonment rate of allowances.*”

Aye! there was reason to fear, more reason than either Sir Colin or myself weened of at that time! His work was done, his responsibility was over, his station quieted, but my work was not. I commanded a large Army and my responsibility was for the safety of an empire. Other stations had been in correspondence with Rawul Pindee, and to ascertain how far the pernicious spirit had spread was from the first an anxious task. Moreover, to follow my meditated

course—making the force of Government bear only on individuals prominently guilty—it was necessary to try as ringleaders those who had been conspicuous, avoiding as long as it was possible a collision with masses. To gain time without such collision was also very important for several reasons; amongst them my recent arrival. Calcutta had been reached the 6th of May, but twelve hundred miles were afterwards to be travelled at the slow rate of five miles an hour, and the Simla head quarters were not attained before the 20th of June: hence the reins were hardly in hand when the horses began to kick!

It was an uneasy affair, but no men could have acted with more caution than did Sir Walter Gilbert and Sir Colin Campbell. From me also, while conscious of the greatness of the danger, Sir Colin Campbell felt sure of good support, and acknowledged the judiciousness of his instructions, as will be seen by the following letter, which likewise proves that from the *first* I was conscious of the danger, and treated it as a matter of vital importance to the safety of the State. Indeed it required to be so treated, seeing that all the persons cognizant of the matter and most capable of appreciating the danger of such events in India, were deeply alarmed. Lord Dalhousie has since, with equal disregard of sense and fairness, called the whole a "*Farce*." It would have been a great catastrophe if he only had dealt with it; and was assuredly a deep lamentable *tragedy* for the unhappy though guilty 66th Native regiment, whose proceedings have still to be related.

"*Sir Colin Campbell to Sir Charles Napier,*
"*Rawul Pindee, July 26th, 1849.*—Your order,

“ sent through Sir Walter Gilbert, for Dundas to
“ reinforce me with certain troops in case I
“ should require their aid, arrived here in the
“ middle of the night by express, and your private
“ letter of the 21st, adverting to that order,
“ reached me late in the afternoon of yesterday.
“ I cannot tell you how warmly I appreciate your
“ kind consideration in sending me so speedily
“ instructions for my guidance, so plain and distinct
“ that I could not err, and which provided
“ for every contingency that could possibly arise.
“ The combination amongst the men of the two
“ corps, 13th and 22nd regiments, gave way to
“ fear on the 18th, the day before your prescription
“ for bringing them to their senses was dispatched
“ from Simla.

“ I have not presumed at any period to offer
“ any suggestion as to the nature or amount of
“ punishment they may be deserving of for the
“ sake of discipline, because I do not know these
“ people well, and you do, and have had experience
“ in such affairs and in their settlement
“ before this. I would beg to bring to your notice
“ however, the fact which I learned two days ago,
“ that these two corps have been quartered
“ together almost constantly for the last five years.
“ As soon as the season will admit of their marching,
“ I think it would be advisable to separate
“ the 13th and 22nd.”

The second scene is now to be described. It changes suddenly to the City of Delhi, some four hundred miles from Rawul Pindee, thus furnishing additional evidence that a combination for mutiny had been concerted among many regiments far distant from each other. The first proof was pre-

sumptive, arising from the correspondence between the regiments quartered in the three stations of Rawul Pindee, Jhelum and Wuzzeerabad.

The second proof is direct ; but previous to entering on it a very curious circumstance must be told, belonging to this date and offering a sure measure for judging Lord Dalhousie's after proceedings touching the 66th regiment, alluded to above.

We had three irregular corps of men called *Goorkas*, natives of the hills forming the kingdom of Nepaul. Bravest of Native troops, they at the battles on the Sutledge displayed such conspicuous gallantry as to place them for courage on a level with our Europeans ; and certainly they have a high military spirit, are fierce in war, of unsurpassed activity, and possess great powers of enduring fatigue. Very low of stature, and with short limbs, they have yet enormous muscles and vast strength, and their chests are both broad and deep. These hardy soldiers profess an extraordinary attachment to our men, and are like them given to strong drink, but are said to have a dislike to the Sepoys amounting to contempt. In the Nepaul war of 1814, with inferior numbers they defeated British troops more than once, and acquaintance with them under arms in no way tended to diminish the opinion of their high character as soldiers.

Now when the mutinous spirit arose with our Sepoys, the chief leaders were undoubtedly Brahmins, and Brahmins, having a religious as well as a military character, enjoy an immense influence. All the higher Hindoo castes are imbued with gross superstitions. One goes to the devil if he eats this ; another if he eats that ; a third will not touch his dinner if the shadow of an infidel passes over it ; a

fourth will not drink water unless it has been drawn by one of his own caste. Thus their religious principles interfere in many strange ways with their military duties. The brave men of the 35th Native Infantry lost caste because they did their duty as soldiers at Jelalabad: that is, they fought like soldiers, and ate what could be had to sustain their strength for battle. There never was a stronger proof than the annoyance which this noble regiment is said to have since received from other regiments, of the injury which high caste in a soldier does, and the Brahmin is the worst. Having two commanders to obey, caste and captain, if they are at variance the last is disobeyed, or obeyed at the cost of conscience and of misery.

Military rules sit light on the low caste man, he obeys his captain. He may be, yet probably is not inferior in morals to a high caste man, and as a soldier he is superior. If caste chimes in with duty he is glad of it; if not, he snaps his finger at caste.

When it was made known that Brahmins were at the head of the insubordinate men of the 13th and 22nd, and that in the first regiment alone there were no less than four hundred and thirty, the necessity of teaching that race they should no longer dictate to the Sepoys and the Government struck me, and my thoughts at once turned for means to the Goorkas, whose motto was, "eat, drink, and be merry." Their tenets are unknown to me; it is said they do not like cow beef, yet a cow would not be long alive with a hungry Goorka battalion; they mess together, these Goorkas, and make few inquiries as to the sex of a beefsteak! These therefore were men with which to meet

the Brahmins of Bengal, and their bristling prejudices of high caste.

While reflecting on this, I was told by the commander of one of the Goorka regiments, that the residence of the Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief at Simla made the necessaries of life so dear that the very small pay of the Goorka soldiers did not afford them sufficient food—they were starving! My course of action was then clear. It was to adopt the Goorka regiments into the line, abolish their limitation of service to the hills, and give them pay and allowance as Sepoys. Now, said I, the time is come to win the Goorka's heart by money, and the red uniform which he longs to wear; and not alone the hearts of our Goorka soldiers but those of all the Nepaulese soldiery, so that in a war with that dangerous power the enemy's Army will likely come over to us. However, Goorkas will fight Goorkas readily. "No pay no Goorka," and the King of Nepaul cannot, as to money, compete with the Company. We may thus set the Brahmin at defiance if he behaves ill. The Goorka will be faithful, and for low pay we can enlist a large body of soldiers whom our best officers consider equal in courage to European troops. Even as a matter of economy this will be good; but the great advantage of enlisting these hill men will be, that with 30,000 or 40,000 Goorkas added to 30,000 Europeans, the possession of India will not "depend on opinion," but on an Army, able with ease to overthrow any combination among Hindoos or Mahomedans, or both together!

Hence, when the commanding officer of the Goorka battalion near Simla told me his miserable soldiers must desert or starve, I asked Lord

Dalhousie to take all the Goorka battalions into the line. He consented. But it was necessary at first to ask if they would volunteer for general service, and a paper to that effect being drawn up, a clever young officer of the Artillery, Lieutenant Tombs, was selected to read it to the three regiments. Lord Dalhousie approved, Tombs executed his mission, and reported, that when the men understood the proposal, and heard the *promise of high pay made by the Governor-General to them through the Commander-in-Chief*, they volunteered, not merely with alacrity but a joy, evinced said Tombs by "extraordinary screams of delight, unlike any thing he ever before heard." Poor fellows, they were starving and vehemently hailed the means of sustaining life! This happened the 7th October, 1849. Let it be borne in mind.

CHAPTER III.

ON the 22nd of October I commenced a journey of inspection, which was from unforeseen events so extended as to comprise, virtually, nearly my whole career as Commander-in-Chief; wherefore, the incidents, reports and memoirs, shall be for the most part given chronologically, laying bare all things, even to my contempt for the duplicity, miserable jealousy and weakness exhibited. This will enable the reader to travel as it were mentally with me, and comprehend the views, opinions, sentiments and feelings which governed my actions. My first design however involved only visits to Delhi, Agra, Meerut, Hurdwar and Almora, having for object to frame a careful memoir on the general defence of India.

With such a plan arranged as a guide for action, rapid movements of any portions of the vast Army at my disposal could have been made to a menaced frontier without confusion; and with due care not to weaken by inconsiderate hurry important points. The composing of it cleared and fixed my own judgment, and furnished a good mode of explaining my military notions to the Governor-General, bespeaking support, or correction if not in unison with the views of Government. My design also

was to make this memoir a ground work for great arrangements and establishments, such as permanent magazines and barracks at central points, with reference to future wars on our Northern, Southern, Eastern, or Western frontiers, which are everywhere open. And as Delhi, Meerut, Agra, Hurdwar and Almora, were important stations within convenient distances, and formed the base of my plan, a visit to them was of interest: but soon the mutinous spirit reappeared too plainly to allow of delay, and called me to the Punjaub.

On the 9th of November I entered Delhi, and sighed over its misfortunes, its magnificent palace, its degradation, ill-usage and dirt. Of the last, the worst is the puppet-king who dishonours it with his base court; for if physical filth reigns amongst those gorgeous ruins in all disgusting forms, it is surpassed by the moral filth. The palace of Delhi combines all that is horrible, disgusting and melancholy, with everything that *was* grand and beautiful! I beheld with admiration that seat of empire, that throne of the Moguls, imperial, until the insulting spoiler came in guise of Lord Wellesley's "*ignominious tyrants*," when royal splendour passed away! Nought now remains but ruin and the cherished feculence of Eastern debauchery and crime within the great and beautiful palace of Delhi!

This wretched king is upheld by the Leadenhall princes at an enormous expense. All in India now is sacrificed to mammon, yet even to mammon the Court of Directors is in one sense untrue: for by them as by all oligarchical governments the great state interests are sacrificed to the individual gain of ephemeral rulers, reckless of the

future to grasp the present profit. Sovereigns are identified with the countries they rule, but a mercantile oligarchy, like the Court of Directors, is not interested beyond the annual balance sheet during their respective tenures of power; better it is for them to clutch hundreds within reach, than by a wise outlay draw forth the wondrous resources of the great Indian Empire and turn those hundreds into millions. Like the pedlar Jew the Director seeks small profit and quick returns, understanding well his personal interest but regardless of Indian greatness or happiness. This is patent to all who have traversed India and looked at the remains of great roads, of great cities, of great palaces, of great mosques. By whom were they constructed? By the sovereigns of India. But where are the public works of the Court of Directors? For a hundred years they have milked the cow and given her no sustenance!

As their charter draws towards its close a shew of doing work in shape of canals is being made, and the railroads will be good; but railroads spring from the spirit of the age, no human power can stop their progress till the whole earth becomes bound in ribs of iron. To Leadenhall no thanks are due for railways; and if the principle on which they are being constructed is good, thanks to Lieutenant-Colonel John Kennedy, who with great ability has set them right in the East. The Court of Directors never have and never will rule India well. Take an example. Raw cotton is now to England's manufactories what Sampson's hair was to his strength. America can play Delilah when she pleases; yet our own possessions in India, capable of saving us from the danger of

such an excision, have been neglected! Look also at Scinde. Sugar, cotton, and indigo, could be produced there in great quantities and the finest quality, but no pains have been taken on that head.

Is it not strange that England should leave in the hands of a small knot of merchants her own great destinies? Acting by the letter of Free Trade while its spirit is departed from, our riches are cast into the hands of slave drivers; and the resources of our own more rich and free possessions are left dormant for want of a market! Would these things happen if India were a Royal Government? Surely not. The present mismanagement of our Colonies seems indeed to tell against this argument; but our present Colonial mis-government notoriously springs from want of ability in one minister*, and will probably be reformed by Parliament ere this work goes to press. In the close Borough of Leadenhall Street there is indeed no regenerating power, but the English people have discovered that they want the full resources of India, and are resolved to have them: they will not much longer bear "*Red Tapists*," and will insist on able administrators.

During my military tour, the usual size of the Commander-in-Chief's camp was reduced by me. The ordinary establishment, according to Colonel Burlton, late Commissary-General, was eighty or ninety Elephants, three or four hundred Camels and nearly as many Bullocks, with all their attendants, besides three hundred and thirty-two tent-pitchers, including fifty men solely employed to

* Since writing the above, Lord Grey has resigned. To name him in the text was unnecessary, his incapacity had become too notorious.

carry glass doors for the pavilion. This was reduced by me to thirty Elephants, three hundred and thirty-four Camels, and two hundred and twenty-two tent-pitchers, realising a public saving of £.750 a month while in Camp.

Canvas palaces are not necessary for a General and his Staff making a military tour, even supposing there was truth in the favourite idea of some "old Indians," that pomp and show produce respect among the Indian people. But there is no truth in that. The astute native laughs at and hates the insolence which usually accompanies the ostentatious fallacy! Indian birds are not caught with chaff, though some old European birds in India are! The respect of the former is paid to our *military strength*, in secret they deride the ostentation of temporary authority. The real Sovereign Princes and high Aristocracy of India, proud of their lineage or self-created real power, hold the ephemeral grandeur of the British in contempt and aversion; but they respect our troops from fear—we beat them! Wherefore, being a soldier and not a prince, I travelled as a soldier and not as a prince. The Indians respect truth also though they do not always speak it, and I was sensible that if their respect could not be obtained without a Lord Mayor's pageant it would not be so with one. I relied on a good horse under me, a good sword by my side, and plenty of good troops. These are what the Indians really venerate, because they know that India must be held as it was won.

How can one hundred and fifty millions of people, who hate us mortally, be ruled if the sword be sheathed and the Government given to civilians acting in the offensive manner described by

Mr. Shore, one of themselves, and an able man, able, courteous and bold. That there are many exceptions, many able civilians, is true, but the Indian judges his conquerors by the rule, not by the exceptions. However, let those who doubt read "*Shore on Indian Affairs.*" Why are the exceptions so loved? Because they are exceptions.

Having saved money for the Company by giving up Elephants and Canvas Palaces, and been well abused for abolishing that mock grandeur, which is not only contemptible but mischievous, my journey to Delhi was marked by turning out the troops at all the Stations, that the people might see them move; that the Generals and commanders of regiments might be judged of, and I learn where to put my hand for the work of war—and truly there were plenty of excellent soldiers in all ranks.

From Delhi my course was to Agra, stopping there at the house of Mr. Thomason, the able and justly popular administrator of the North-west provinces. And while expressing my respect for this gentleman, it may be allowable to notice also Mr. Edwards, the magistrate of Simla (not Major Herbert Edwards), who, as far as a not more than ordinary acquaintance gives means of judging, is a man with most able and extended views of policy; and there is no one who more stanchly protects the natives against that injustice and insult of which Mr. Shore so justly complains. These expressions of respect for two distinguished civil servants of the Company are drawn from me perforce, though foreign to my subject.

On my return from Agra to Delhi, the 9th of November, it was reported that the 41st Native Infantry had declared a resolution not

to enter the Punjaub with reduced pay. The European garrison officers thought they would persist, and the report said likewise the men were in correspondence *with twenty-four other regiments*, destined to form the new force in the Punjaub. The Army generally had not then received the usual furloughs for the year, which to the Sepoy was a serious grievance, for on their furloughs depend many family arrangements, especially with men of high caste; and the neglect was more distressing to all who were to pass the Sutledge, because of the increased distance from their families.

As this omission was caused by the war, I wrote to Lord Dalhousie, begging for an immediate order, granting furloughs to twenty-five men per hundred? there was time to do so before the day fixed for the 41st to march, and it would be likely to abate discontent and deprive agitators of influence. Meanwhile the General Officer commanding at Delhi was directed to inform the Native officers of the 41st, that the Governor-General would be moved to dismiss them if the regiment refused to march. Lord Dalhousie consented to all this, and it is an irrefragable proof that he was then as much convinced of the danger as myself, and was, until he fell into bad hands, willing to give me all due support. The 41st regiment did march, being well pleased with the additional furloughs; but a fact had transpired of no agreeable nature, namely, that *twenty-four other regiments were of the same temper as the 41st had been*, which, coupled with what had passed at Rawul Pindee, gave the mutinous spirit a more serious complexion than ever.

Meerut was the next station visited, where,

among other objects for attention, was that of ascertaining whether an unoccupied barracks would make a prison for condemned European soldiers, instead of transporting them to New South Wales. The latter is a very injudicious punishment, because an opinion is prevalent in India that a transported soldier can do well for himself with a "*ticket of leave*;" and there are soldiers so degraded as to commit heinous crimes, even felony, expressly to get transported. This they have avowed, and a greater injury to discipline can hardly be imagined than that punishment should be courted by crime; that an honourable soldier should believe the blackguard, whom he had perhaps himself brought to trial, should sail exulting in his sentence as a means of leading a healthy life with the hope of fortune. The reverse is probably the truth; those felons, most likely, spend their lives in great misery, and it would be good to send them back to their regiments for a while after their term of transportation; their dearly-bought experience would then contradict the erroneous but prevalent idea of transportation being a pleasant life.

The only cause for the notion, which has been traced, is, that soldiers in New South Wales are often employed on the "*Boundary Police*," which they, no doubt, find advantageous. There may, however be other temptations for energetic villains, and as many years must pass ere the false idea is corrected, I proposed that Government should make the unoccupied Meerut barracks a prison for felons. It is well suited for that purpose, but during my stay in India the matter was entirely neglected by the Governor-General; nor does it

appear to have been noticed since. The fault may be with Lord Dalhousie, or with the Supreme Council, or with the Military Board at Calcutta; but a great fault it is, for no commanding officer of a European regiment in India will doubt the propriety of abolishing the transportation of soldiers to Australia. And now that golden mountains have been found the desire to get there will augment. Not gold but ashes, disappointment and misery, should await the felon; yet the general opinion is different; and there must be some foundation for the error, or the regiments coming from Australia to India would certainly undeceive their comrades, if some slackness did not enable the felon to escape his punishment.

The following notes, made at Meerut, were afterwards transmitted from Lahore to the Governor-General:—

“ *Lahore, 15th December, 1849.*—Rapid travelling, and a good many other matters of a more pressing nature, prevented my telling you of my examination of the position of Delhi and its magazine.

“ As regards the magazine, the objections to it are as follows:—

“ 1st. It is placed in a very populous part of the city, and its explosion would be very horrible in its effects as regards the destruction of life.

“ 2nd. It would destroy the magnificent palace of Delhi.

“ 3rd. The loss of Government property would also be very great, especially if my views of the importance of Delhi, given in my report, be acted upon; namely, that it and Dinapore should be two great magazines for the Bengal Presidency:

“ 4th. It is without defence beyond what the guard of fifty men offer, and its gates are so weak that a mob could push them in. I therefore think a powder magazine should be built in a safe place. There is a strong castle three or four miles from the town which would answer well, but I fear the repairs would be too expensive; more so perhaps than what would be more efficacious, viz., to build a magazine in a suitable position near the city.

“ I send a sketch of the Arscnal, and some works which ought to be constructed for its security. They are not of my proposing, yet I consider them well adapted to their object and recommend their being ordered.

“ Delhi was formerly considered very healthy, but since the canal has been brought into the town has become obnoxious to fevers. It would be worth while to have a medical report made on the effects of this, and of the advantages which would arise from turning its waters from this noble city.

“ I visited Agra and the military prisons there, and consider them very good *in themselves* but utterly unfit for the confinement of Europeans, in consequence of the heat which an enclosed atmosphere acquires; and from the inquiries made I come to the decided conclusion, that no European constitution is capable of enduring a protracted imprisonment in the fortress of Agra.

“ I then proceeded to Meerut, and inspected the vacated barracks of the Sappers and Miners, which are *perfectly adapted* for the imprisonment of soldiers, European and Native; nothing can be more complete, and I am not aware of any

“ expense that would be required beyond that of
“ putting up gratings in addition to the doors—
“ prisons, places for solitary confinement, houses
“ for the governor and his deputies, guard-
“ houses, every thing necessary is there ready.
“ The advantage of making this a Military prison
“ for the Army is too evident to need any
“ explanation.”

At Hurdwar a magnificent canal was being cut, under the able superintendence of Lieut.-Col. Cautly, but whether its advantages will counter-balance the effects of malaria, which it is supposed it may generate, is a matter for much consideration.

From Hurdwar my journey was to Kalka, and through the Jullunder to Lahore, which was reached the 30th November, after crossing the Sutledge at Philor and the Beas at Beyroual; making seventeen marches in the Punjaub, where the scenery and people were so like those of Scinde it seemed to be my old quarters.

At Lahore the memoir on the defence of India was completed, and having reason to believe the honest exposition there made of my opinions offended Lord Dalhousie, unintentionally on my part, it shall be here vindicated on the following grounds:—

1st. It was right to show the Governor-General with frankness, all the dangers which might befall India.

2nd. My military experience and knowledge of the Western frontier provinces rendered it proper in me, as Commander-in-Chief and a member of the Council, to communicate my opinions to Lord Dalhousie, who had no knowledge of military matters, nor much of the people.

3rd. My confidence in the Punjaub Board of Administration, as to its military capability, was entirely shaken by finding it desirous to accumulate troops in a place called Adinanuggur, well known to be uninhabitable even for the natives at a certain season. My attention was drawn to this by a remonstrance from General Whceler, an able officer of the Company's service who knew the locality. He was right, the Board wrong; not only as to the occupation of an unhealthy post, but as to any military advantage arising from such occupation even were the spot healthy. Lord Dalhousie supported me and the troops were withdrawn: many lives would otherwise have been unnecessarily lost.

But when the Punjaub Board found it could not have troops at Adinanuggur, it tried to have some at a house called Battala, saying it was a large place fit for two hundred men. This I permitted against my judgment, and when the troops arrived there were no quarters, the house was filled with the political agent and his people! The men were thus kept for some days in pouring rain without any preparations to meet the exposure, and their officer, to save their lives, returned to his station and reported the matter. His report went to Lord Dalhousie, yet the Board were not called over the coals, and it was indeed evident that henceforth the soldier must be protected by myself. Surely indignation was here just. Ought soldiers' lives to be so trifled with by the self-sufficiency and ignorance of the Board of Administration?

4th. In military matters this Punjaub Administration was only worthy of censure, and its system of civil government appeared to me clearly tending

to produce early dislike to our rule, and possibly insurrection. Hence, as war would bring the Commander-in-Chief's responsibility into activity, my reasons were freely given to the Governor-General for thinking that, under such a system of government as that of the Punjaub Board, we could not diminish the enormous force in the province. Lord Dalhousie had called for my opinion on that point, and to say a vast Army, seventy-two thousand men, was necessary, without frankly declaring *why*, would have been absurd. The *why* was in my mind then and now, that *the Punjaub was badly governed!* There was no other reason for advising the retention of so great an Army. In Scinde, which is two-thirds the size of the Punjaub, I had offered to reduce the twelve thousand men under me to five thousand, or even three thousand, because the people were attached to our government; but there was nothing safe in the Punjaub, and the Army of Occupation could not safely be reduced.

Had Lord Grey imitated my Scinde policy at the Cape, it is probable, to use his own foul words when speaking of my battles, that his Cape war of "*unscrupulous aggrandizement, stained in the eyes of the Almighty with the guilt of unnecessary and wanton bloodshed,*" would not have arisen. He warned Parliament that if it thanked me for the victories in Scinde, "a portion of that guilt would fall on their heads." On whose head will the guilt of "*unscrupulous aggrandizement*" in Africa fall? Lord Grey is responsible for that war, in which we have lost all except military honour. If that has not suffered, thanks are only due to the soldiers led by Harry Smith and Cathcart? but their skill and courage, and all the money spent

will not obliterate the evils which his pseudo statesmanship has inflicted upon both races at the Cape.

Lord Dalhousie, notwithstanding his displeasure, left the Army in all its strength. But this cannot last for ever, and my endeavour was to show his Lordship that another system of government and a good police would enable him to reduce that large Army, which the Company cannot always support to hold one province in subjection. When the troops are withdrawn it will be known who is right who wrong. Let time decide! Meanwhile, be it said, that my memoir would not now meet the public eye but for his Lordship's after-conduct. It was not written to give him offence, the Punjaub could not be insurgent while seventy-two thousand men were in occupation, the troops appeared to have been well posted by my predecessor Lord Gough, and the only motive for the memoir was the public good. But what right had Lord Dalhousie to be offended? My opinions were not presumptuously forced upon his attention; he had desired such a memoir, which was drawn up as became an English gentleman and a responsible officer in high command, that is, *without regard to any thing but truth and sense*. Was he to be told only what was agreeable and soothing to foolish pride? Did he fancy himself Misnar, the Sultan of Eastern tale, whose archers shot down the only soldier of his Army that did not fall prostrate at command! But let the reader judge of Lord Dalhousie from the memoir itself, which will be found terminating the second part of this work.

CHAPTER IV.

AT Lahore the defence of the city occupied my attention. There were at the time disturbances on the frontier near Peshawur, and a force had marched under Colonel Bradshaw against the offending tribes—not by my orders, but those of the Board of Administration, which always sought, ignorantly, to meddle with military matters. It had also proposed to re-fortify Lahore at enormous cost; but that I opposed in the following letter to Lord Dalhousie:

“ *December 14th, 1849.*—Having just sent my letter about the barracks, I will now send one about the fortifications. I have, in company with Sir Walter Gilbert Brigadier Penny and Lieutenant-Colonel Tremenheere, thoroughly examined the fortifications of Lahore, considered its defences, and two months ago got Sir Colin Campbell's opinion, as he had so long been the Commandant in perilous times. The result is a decided opinion, that by throwing up the wall which is marked *blue* in the accompanying sketch it will complete an excellent line of defence, reaching from the *Zuralli Gate* to the *Mustee Gate*, isolating the Citadel, which com-

“mands the town, and enabling that Citadel to secure the submission of the inhabitants.

“This line of defence will resist any attack that can be made upon it.

“The expense of building the wall will be about *ten thousand rupees*, in the opinion of Colonel Tremenheere; but his estimate is *fifteen thousand*, to be on the outside. At this trifling cost the city will be put into a good state of defence against any attack short of a regular siege, to make it proof against which would not cost less than half a million pounds sterling, for every part of its fortifications would require to be rebuilt. Sir Walter Gilbert Brigadier Penny and Lieutenant-Colonel Tremenheere, all concur with me in this opinion, and so does Major Kennedy.

“I observed several parts of the walls of the town from which a considerable quantity of material can be taken; this will save some portion of the expense, an object of the greatest importance in all public works, but especially in the present state of Indian finance, and when barracks must be built for our Europeans.

“I have a letter from Sir Colin Campbell, and fear we shall have a fight. The force under Colonel Bradshaw had crossed the Cabul river, the fractious village was forty miles distant, a parapet had been formed against us across a pass, and great numbers were said to have assembled to defend it. I expect to hear of some decisive blow having been struck to-morrow.”

Several hundred thousand pounds were thus

saved to the Company, which the Board of Administration would have incurred for the defence of the Punjaub! This, with the attempt to garrison Adinanuggur and a proposal to build a fort in the plain of Kohat far from the town of that name, gave me the measure of its military talent. Boards indeed rarely have any talent, and that of the Punjaub offers no exception to the rule. In opposing these useless expenses Lord Dalhousie gave me support, but afterwards yielded to other advice; the wall referred to was indeed built, yet has been since *pulled down*! My Military Secretary, Major Kennedy, an engineer of the highest class, whose abilities were known to Lord Dalhousie; the Chief Engineer Tremmenheere; Sir Colin Campbell Sir Walter Gilbert and myself; all concurred in thinking the wall sufficient to ensure the defence of Lahore! My authority for its being rased is only an Indian newspaper, the *Lahore Chronicle*, remarkable for falsehood, but the fact is credible.

There are people in India who despise native fortifications. That is a great error. Most of the English in India laughed at the idea of Mooltan making any defence. Major Herbert Edwards said in a letter to the President of Lahore, "*I should be constrained in self-defence to keep up our prestige by taking the city.*" It is a pity he did not! He would have saved a great deal of bloodshed, no small expense, and sustained "*our prestige.*" One naturally asks why he required any constraint to take an enemy's city if it could so easily be done? That it was not to be done in so off-hand a style was however discovered by

General Whish when he joined Major Edwards: their united forces failed with a fearful loss of men, they were forced to decamp and await reinforcements. Our contempt for Indian fortifications has been terribly chastised more than once by sanguinary repulse and sanguinary success. Lahore with my wall was capable of resisting Affghanistan and all the Sikh powers banded together, and the city had a good commandant in Brigadier Tennant, an officer of the superb East Indian Artillery.

When the measures to place Lahore in a state of defence were completed, the Governor-General permitted me to give over the gates of the town, not the *citadel*, to the civil power, and so spare the garrison of the citadel some of its very heavy duties; for strange to say, though a year had elapsed since the conquest and we had been the *real* rulers of it for above three years, the police were not then sufficiently formed to take charge of the town, even with regular troops in the citadel to support them! So much for the vigour of Government, Lord Dalhousie's or the Board of Administration: which was in fault is now uninteresting to me, at that time not so, for a commander's fame is in peril who in times of danger serves a weak Government.

In Scinde the police were organised armed and in full performance of duties within *one month* after the battle of Hyderabad. Lord Ellenborough gave his orders with a wide discretion, and nothing was to be feared but want of capacity to properly execute his plans. He never shackled action. All local arrangements for the good of Scinde laid before him were sanctioned and enforced with a

vigour, indicating that his expectations must be fulfilled or my government would cease: but then zeal in the public service had from him the most grateful reward to an honest man—confidence and support.

Before quitting Lahore arrangements were made to construct good barracks for European troops, and a proper garrison was placed in the fortress of Govindghur, which, being a modern fortification, is one of the strongest in India and *the strongest* in the Punjaub; it is also of importance as commanding Umritzer, the chief seat of the Sikh religion. My advice was to place a strong Martello tower on the wall of Umritzer, within reach of the guns of Govindghur. There, on a mass of ruined ancient rampart protected by the guns of Govindghur, it could with its cannon keep Umritzer in subjection both by physical and moral force; for the Sikhs would not willingly draw a fire upon their Temple, to have its ruins fill up the sacred *Pool of Immortality*: nor in truth would any Christian who has seen that holy and beautiful edifice!

When all in my power was done to secure healthy barracks and strong defences around Lahore, I went to Wuzzeerabad, stopping on the road to examine Sealkote, which I recommended to the Governor-General as an important military station,—

1st. Because Indian princes are ever ready to revolt against the oppression of the British Civil Government when there is a chance of success; and it was well known Goolab Sing, a modern Tiberius for horrible cruelty and villainy, was prepared to join Shere Sing after the battle of

Chillianwallah. Had Lord Gough been defeated at Goojerat, or that victory been a drawn battle; had even Shere Sing's power over the other chiefs sufficed to substitute for battle his own plan, described to me by himself—crossing the Chenaub and rapidly marching upon Lahore—in any one of these cases Goolab Sing would have at once turned upon the British, and he is a man of extraordinary ability. He has a rich treasury, quantities of cannon, small arms in abundance, and no prince in India ever wants men if he abounds in money? Sealkote being in sight of Jummoo, the Maharajah's capital was therefore in my military view, an important position for a large cantonment, if found healthy.

2nd. While it holds the Maharajah's capital in check, it is on the road to Cashmere for aggressive operations on our part.

3rd. It is nearer than Wuzzeerabad to the Manjha district, which it protects; and Manjha is the most dangerous part of our new territory, being the rendezvous of nearly all the soldiers of the disbanded Khalsa Army.

4th. It covers the road from Jummoo to Lahore and Umritzer.

5th. It is supported by the garrisons of those stations.

6th. In case of a war, my arrangements would in a fortnight after it was declared enable us, from Sealkote, to attack Goolab with 20,000 men, and take Jummoo before he was prepared for such a blow. We could then pursue our success by a rapid march upon Cashmere, while supports from Lahore, Wuzzeerabad and the Jullunder, would follow close, and the advance be reinforced by a

combined movement from Jhelum upon Bimber. This would be on a plan of campaign by which intrepid troops could, when called on, subdue Cashmere in about two months after declaration of war, despite of its vast barriers of Himalayan mountains. The outline has been left with Colonel Drummond, Quartermaster-General, because in case of a war with Goolab Sing it may be of use. Sooner or later that war *must come*, and a very dangerous one it will be if the passes are properly defended, as they assuredly will if it takes place during the life of Goolab.

7th. The station at Wuzzeerabad is costly, and its healthiness doubtful, for being cultivated ground hired by Government it is in the wet season inundated. Sealkote is not cultivated, and therefore much cheaper than the ground at Wuzzeerabad.

8th. At Sealkote there are the strong walls of an old castle, which with little cost might be made defensible for a small garrison; and in case of war the public stores could be there lodged, and the soldiers' families placed in safety.

The site for a cantonment was a high piece of land with a gentle slope on all sides into the surrounding lower grounds, from whence the waters run into the River Chenaub some miles distant. On no part of this ground did dampness appear, and the neighbouring inhabitants affirmed that it was a healthy locality; nor did the looks of the children in the environs contradict the assertion; indeed the people said it wanted water, was too dry for agriculture, a fact important for health. But thinking there must be water for supply, as the wells were not deep I made an experiment and excellent water was found at about twenty or

thirty feet. My plans here were sustained. The Governor-General, though not much of a judge as to the military or political advantages of Sealkote, was alive to the drains upon the public treasury caused by Wuzzeerabad. Lieutenant Maxwell of the Bengal Engineers was set to work by me on a well-considered plan for the construction of new barracks. His abilities and extraordinary activity had been made known to me in the Booghtee Hill campaign, where his exertions, day and night, had been of great service; and here the rapid progress made in the construction of the cantonment of Sealkote again proved his character; but to infuse his energy and sense into the Court of Directors, the Governor-General, or the Military Board, was impossible. *They meddled, they reduced the height of the barrack rooms, and deprived the European soldiers of fresh air!*

That Military Board is a curse on the Indian Army. During the ten years of my connection with India it was a source of ever-flowing evil. Take whatever may be injurious to the Army in India, dissect it, and surely, directly or indirectly, the *Military Board*, will be found the cause. The members individually are honourable men; but they are members by virtue of their position, and are unable to reform their Board, for the only reform is *abolition*. Their dissensions dilatory and conflicting divisions and unfitness are an insuperable impediment to useful progress. They are necessarily incompetent to conduct the important affairs confided to them, and any business that does get through their department is probably effected by their subordinates. How should these last know what the height of a barrack should be? Why

should they care whether the British soldier has good food or bad food ; whether he lives happily or dies miserably ; whether he goes into battle strong and nourished, or weak and emaciated with fever ?

Without any direct proof, well I know the alterations made in my plan for the height of the barrack rooms—an alteration antagonistic to the principle on which they were designed—has arisen in some way with the Military Board. Why should the Governor-General wish to deprive the European soldier of fresh air by reducing the height of the barrack room ? Why should the Court of Directors wish to do that which either kills the soldier, or makes him an unprofitable charge for life upon the revenue ? “ And why,” says the English reader, “ should the Military Board wish to do so ? ” Because the Military Board having in the fulness of its ignorance and idleness once made barracks with low rooms continues to do so without regulating the necessary height ; because it never traced sickness among the troops to its causes, never inquired how much air was required for the health and comfort of the troops : in fine, made its mischievous rules without reason and it is impossible to turn the wheels out of the deep ruts in which they have run for years, jolting the public wagon to pieces—it resists all reform, and sets its face against improving either barracks or contracts for food.

There may be men in the Military Board from time to time of enlightened minds, feeling for the British soldier ! but it is a *Board*, and in a Board, as there is no responsible person, no man can do right. Wherever men are in masses the majority are deficient in knowledge and honesty ; and as

most votes carry the question folly and iniquity triumph. The Governor-General on this occasion may have only been weak in suffering the height of the barracks to be reduced, and the Court of Directors, of course, issued their orders in ignorance; but weakness and ignorance when they destroy men are not excusable. Parliamentary notice should be taken of the bad barracks in India, for it is a vital question to our soldiers, whose whole life is to be spent in them. My duty to those brave men makes me press this point on Members, because, when a Commander-in-Chief fails to obtain redress there is no other chance of forcing the Court of Directors to spare the lives, the health and happiness of the British soldiers in India. Over and over again therefore let it be said, that *bad barracks, that is to say, barracks with low ceilings, are the great cause of sickness among European soldiers in India.*

CHAPTER V.

Wuzzeerabad.

HERE the mutinous spirit had also appeared.

I was told that a young and excellent officer, when some Seapoys who were growling—as bad soldiers of all ranks whether English or Sepoys always do when the hardships of a campaign squeeze them a little—had said: “*For shame! You pretend to be soldiers! Were I the General, I would dismiss you from the Army.*” “*If you did,*” answered a Brahmin soldier, “*you should get no more! we would stop them! and what could you do then?*” This passed in the way that on a march such dialogues do pass between good officers and their men, that is half jestingly. Officers thus get acquainted with the *real* feelings of their troops, making allowance for the ill temper produced at times by severe bodily hardships.

When Lord Dalhousie heard of this, he wrote to say, that had *he* been the officer, he would have made a prisoner of the Brahmin. Most likely he would—so would any one without military ideas or knowledge of mankind—but this young officer knew his trade and comrades too well to do any thing so silly. The answer helped him to form a correct judgment of the feelings amongst those under him. To have arrested the Brahmin would have been an error, for no Court could have justly punished him: a man may be punished for persuading a *soldier* to desert, but not for advising

a *peasant* against becoming a soldier. Had Lord Dalhousie been in this officer's place he would not only have been unable to punish the fancied crime, but would have closed the door of good information. The commander at Velore foolishly disbelieved the Sepoy who told him there was a conspiracy hatching, and petulantly sent him away: he thus sealed his own death warrant with that of hundreds more! Without the good intention of the Velore Sepoy, this Brahmin, in an unguarded moment, revealed the secret designs of his sect, and the officer acquainted his commander with the fact thus unguardedly made known. It is not by petulance that a knowledge of soldiers' feelings is to be acquired.

At Wuzzeerabad the men of the 32nd Native Infantry had displayed a mutinous spirit, refusing the lower pay; and, as at Rawul Pindee, agitators had been busy; but the first appearance of insubordination had been firmly met by the officer commanding. The station contained several troops of Horse Artillery and batteries of Foot Artillery—mostly European—one European and two Native regiments of Cavalry, two European and four Native regiments of Infantry; all under Brigadier Hearsey, who, as a cavalry officer, was distinguished at the celebrated battle of Seetabuldee in 1817. He explained to me how very serious the discontent of the Sepoys had been; and the following extract from my communication to Lord Dalhousie on the occasion, gives correctly the impressions of the moment.

CAMP, 29th Dec., 1850. Extract.—“ I have
“ already informed your Lordship that the 32nd
“ N. I. also refused their pay. * * * *

“ With regard to this corps, all is, I think, right
“ now. Brigadier Hearsey was born and brought

“ up among the Natives, and speaks their language
“ as well as themselves. He is also a man of
“ great good sense, and made the Sepoys an
“ admirable speech which deeply affected them.
“ He then tried the four first who refused their
“ pay—not forty-nine as private letters averred.
“ They were sentenced imprisonment with hard
“ labour, and he ordered them out and rivetted their
“ chains on the full Brigade Parade, from which
“ they were marched to the roads and instantly put
“ to labour as felons. He then ordered the pay to
“ be issued and not a man refused. The four men
“ only refused their pay, but they are not the four
“ agitators who went from company to company.
“ I told you these last must be punished by a
“ general Court Martial, and their crime involves
“ capital punishment, which I hope the Court will
“ award; for never was there a more distinct
“ conspiracy to dictate to Government what pay
“ the troops were to receive, and I am anxious to
“ have an example made as soon as we can.

“ It appears that in the 32nd business some of
“ the young Sepoys said, “ *We had better wait till
“ three or four regiments come up, and whatever
“ they do, we will do also!*” However, I have
“ broken two *Subadars*, and if the Court will
“ sentence these four to death, or what they fear
“ more, transportation, the whole affair I hope
“ will be at an end unless war breaks out, but
“ then it will appear again as sure as fate. Soldiers
“ never let go a money question: look at the half
“ batta question. The European officers of the
“ Indian Army will never forget it! Whether this
“ pay affair subsides or not the Government have
“ been perfectly just, and this gives Hearsey’s

“ eloquent harangue such force and effect that I
“ hear Sepoys on parade hung down their heads:
“ some of them shed tears.”

Sir Colin Campbell to save time had made an unofficial report of the Rawul Pindee affair, because it was the first insubordination ; but from Wuzzeerabad came only Hearsey’s official report ; and his private views cannot be given as those of Campbell have been. His opinion was however that of every officer in the Army. “ *The mutinous spirit was very formidable.*” It was only kept down by the presence of a powerful European force.

“ *We had better wait till three or four regiments come up, and whatever they do we will do also.*” This corroborated the Delhi reports of twenty-four regiments being involved. Four Sepoys also were tried by Court Martial for having “ *begun and excited a mutiny, instigating the men of their own and other companies to take an oath not to accept reduced pay—one having quitted his guard to excite his comrades.*” They were found guilty, and sentenced to imprisonment with hard labour for fourteen years.

This sentence was revised with a strong commentary which produced a sentence of death ; a second Court then capitally convicted another Sepoy, and my comments were thus continued.
“ These five men have been justly sentenced to die,
“ but I commute their sentence into that of transportation for life. In eternal exile they will
“ expiate their crimes. For ever separated from
“ their country and their relations, in a strange
“ land beyond the seas they will linger out their
“ miserable lives! It is a change but not an
“ amelioration of their punishment: they will

" remain living examples of the terrible fate which
" awaits traitors to their colours!"

In my observation on the first sentence the Indian Army was generally and justly praised; and that praise was, afterwards, by Lord Dalhousie most disingenuously quoted as a negation of any belief in the existence of a wide-spread spirit of mutiny! But with such a spirit insidiously pervading a large Army, it would have been idiotic, when punishing convicted mutineers, to tell all other soldiers they were merely unconvicted felons! Unjust also as well as unwise; for though many regiments were known to be infected, the how many or how far the infection pervaded the tainted regiments was unknown. Abstaining from wholesale public condemnation indicates no disbelief of danger. The argument is absurd as disingenuous. Such unjust folly on my part, would have sufficed to originate a mutiny, and caused an existing one to spread!

The Army generally was faithful to its colours, the bad spirit was confined to that portion in the Punjab, where it wanted and was resolved to have more pay: but that was sufficiently formidable: for exclusive of irregulars there were 50,000 men, and strong presumptive proof that some 30,000 were mutinous. Had they succeeded all would have united, and our Indian empire have disappeared! Fortunately my knowledge in governing soldiers was greater than Lord Dalhousie possessed.

From the death of Runjeet Sing to the battle of Sobraon, the Sikh Army was governed by "*Punchayets*," or "*Punches*"—committees of the soldiery. These bodies sold the Government to the Sikh chief who paid highest, letting him command

until murdered by some one who paid higher. Between 1841 and 1845, were thus killed, Shere Singh, Pertaub Singh, Leena Singh, Dyan Singh, Heera Singh, Suchet Singh, Juwahir Singh. To these add a goodly list of friends murdered with them, their wives being burnt alive of course, and the *Red Book* of Lahore is complete for four years! The Treasury was at last exhausted, and the final Government sent the Army over the Sutlej to destroy or be destroyed by the English—a feat accomplished at Sobraon.

Such will for ever be the natural sequence of armed soldiers demanding higher pay, yet Lord Dalhousie treated as unreal this danger in our Army; not however until it had been suppressed by me. While it existed, he readily, eagerly gave me full authority to act; when it was over, he reprimanded me, and thought I would be submissive! His conduct shall have a more complete exposition further on.

The Punchayets misled the Sikh soldiers, who were essentially patriotic, for Easterns accept the man actually on the throne as the rightful sovereign; and it can hardly surprise those acquainted with mankind, that poor ignorant men should adhere to the chief who possessed the Treasury. The Sikh people had no constitution—their legitimate king was the enthroned man who gave high pay, but the Sikh kingdom was thereby destroyed! Mark! the Punchayets were put down by our disbanding the Khalsa Army in 1846-7, in that very Punjaub where the British Sepoys were now—only two years later—beginning the same system! To what extent it was secretly carried is unknown; but the four Sepoys condemned went from company to com-

pany administering unlawful oaths to insist on higher pay from a Government of a different religion and different race !

Many regiments were of the same mind, and it may be assumed that each had at least four agitators similarly employed. Moreover Hindoos do not take oaths lightly. The Hindoo sworn according to his religion loses caste if he fails. A Brahmin breaking his oath sworn on the water of the Ganges, becomes an outcast, accursed amongst men ! and of Brahmins each regiment contains a great number.

Not only was the oath taken among our Sepoys thus binding, but many had comrades and relations among the regiments of the Sikh Army when governed by Punchayets ! Dismissed from the Bengal Army for mutiny, they had entered the Khalsa force when the Punchayet system was at its height, and were among those that forced the rulers to give higher pay ; and when the British Government disbanded the Khalsa troops, these Sepoys, discharged with the rest, mixed in passing to their homes with our Army. Now the most active mutineers were in the 66th, a regiment which entered the Punjab at the time the Khalsas were discharged, and early declared,—“*They would have higher pay.*” They had also been previously at Lucknow, from whence more Sepoys come than from any other part of India, and being thus most inoculated with the Sikh Punchayet doctrines displayed the virus more openly.

This was a dangerous state of affairs. An enormous mercenary Army was to be dealt with, Punchayets had begun, and had they spread there would have been a war of races ! Only thirty regiments were supposed to be infected. What of that ? A

surgeon may cut off a mortified limb—a General cannot cut off 30,000 men, his operation is moral. Lord Dalhousie having escaped the danger pretended there was none! I who met and put it down knew it was great.

From Wuzzeerabad my march was continued on Jhelum, Rawul Pindee and Attok, to Peshawur, which was reached the first week in January. If mischief arose it was certain to be greatest at Peshawur and Attok, where Affghans and Sikhs could join the mutineers; but the troops at Peshawur being beyond the Indus, our then frontier, were entitled to the high pay and no discontent existed. For that reason it was the fitting place for the Commander-in-Chief, because he had a body of European troops there, was able to recross the Indus, join the other Europeans at Rawul Pindee, and sweep down all the mutinous stations to Lahore, or wherever Generals Gilbert and Wheeler might have formed their junction. Moreover, as rapid communication with stations would have been impossible, a subordinate General at Peshawur would wait for positive directions, and before they reached him might have a hundred thousand Affghans on his hands, while the Sikhs and mutineers held possession of Attok: but the Commander-in-Chief would have the earliest intelligence and act at once.

Lord Dalhousie has said, I had no belief that a mutinous spirit was in the Punjaub, because I left it to go to Peshawur. His military ideas are very circumscribed. Peshawur was the most dangerous point, and my showing myself at different stations, reviewing the troops and exhibiting confidence, powerfully tended to diminish the bad spirit; the influence I thus acquired over the Native regiment

forming my body guard on that long march was very great.

Here I would expatiate upon my interesting journey from Wuzzeerabad, crossing the Acesines, Hydaspes and Indus, but illness and a heavy correspondence compelled me to discontinue my journal, except at Jhelum, where some notes on the supposed site of the great battle between Alexander and Porus were written : all that hard work and debility permitted. Sickness could not wholly subdue curiosity to see that famous field ; but there was no trace of the few points which should yet exist, and it is difficult to believe those great soldiers, whose words and deeds have lived through more than two thousand years, there fought. Doubt destroys the interest of such investigations, and the following extract only offers an opinion without study as to the antagonistic sites—Jhelum and Jullalpoor—for which Alexander's victory is claimed.

“ *Jhelum, 11th January, 1850.*—Two thousand
“ three hundred years, deficient histories, and a
“ river playing as many tricks as a kitten, offer no
“ satisfactory marks for tracing the site of a great
“ battle. However, Alexander certainly crossed the
“ Jhelum and fought Porus either at this place or
“ Jullalpoor. The passes and form of the country
“ shew that in all times the communication from
“ Attok—at or near to which Alexander crossed the
“ Indus—ran in one line to Rawul Pindee and there
“ divaricated: one track leading upon Jullalpoor,
“ the other on Jhelum. Hence by one of these
“ roads Alexander marched, and the question is—
“ did he move on Jullalpoor or Jhelum when he
“ left Rawul Pindee ?

“ The banks of the river at either place cannot

“ be now as they were then ; they vary with every
“ flood ; but in favour of Jhelum are two probabilities. Alexander would for health march
“ near the mountains ; and knowing there were
“ many great rivers to pass, would rather cross
“ them near their sources than where they inundated the surrounding plains when rain fell,
“ producing fevers, with other obstacles. At
“ Jhelum also are the remains of ancient towns,
“ one on each bank of the river ; one is called
“ *Tukt i Sekundur* or the throne of Alexander,
“ to this day ; the other is on the side where the
“ battle was fought, and many Greek coins are
“ found there.”

“ *Hussein Abdal*.—This is Lalla Rookh’s garden.
“ The trees were cut down in the late wars of
“ Runjeet Sing ; but the hills, the clear stream of
“ water which runs through the plain, and the
“ form of the ground, confirm what is told of its
“ former beauty. I have no time to say more,
“ my notice is only in compliment to the memory
“ of the lady who loved it, to Fadladeen, and to
“ Thomas Moore, for genius and patriotism were
“ his, and gave to him

“ That freedom of mind which no vulgar dominion

“ Can turn from the path a pure conscience approves,

“ Which with hope in the heart, and no chain on the pinion

“ Holds upwards its course to the light which it loves.”

CHAPTER VI.

FROM Jhelum my march had been by the Bukrala Pass to Rawul Pindce, where all was then quiet; but the European officers were unanimous that the spirit of mutiny still existed; and it was said here, as at Wuzzeerabad, that an unusual correspondence was going on between the Sepoys of different stations. Indeed so many letters had passed between Wuzzeerabad and stations in India as well as in the Punjaub, that some officers of rank urged my opening them to discover the state of the mutiny, saying, that was assuredly the subject of them. This did not appear justifiable, save for the immediate prevention of bloodshed; and as instant action was certainly not then contemplated by the mutineers, the odious step would only have taken from Government the merit of fairness which had hitherto marked its conduct.

Peshawur was reached the 30th January, 1850. The garrison was very strong, because the position, four marches beyond the Indus, was delicate, and hence my first object was to examine the place and its vicinity.

That the Sutlej ought to bound our Indian possessions until they are better governed has

always been my opinion. The hostility of the Sikhs rendered that impossible, but there is no impossibility of taking the Indus as a boundary. It seems however a law of nature that civilisation shall encroach upon barbarism. The American "Go-ahead" is not indeed our cry in India—we have a modulated sound, and meekly we borrow in jest but decline repaying in earnest, and so creep on with humble expanding operations.

Peshawur, a noble town, greatly improved by the Italian General Avitabili, is well supplied, and cheaply, especially in articles coming from Russia. With prudent government we might hold it at peace with the surrounding tribes, but with the actual government of the Punjaub, it was no surprise to hear that fourteen of our men had been assassinated in the Affreedee territory. They were making a road, and when asleep at night the Affreedees severed the cords of their tent; the falling canvas held down the poor fellows, and they were cut to pieces: only one escaped to a tower with a garrison on the top of the Kohat Pass.

The Affreedees' explanation of this matter was communicated by a chief living in Peshawur. Our Government had given him money to support his influence among the Affreedee tribes; influence arising, not from his power, but that living in the town on good terms with the former Sikh Government he had become a sort of ambassador. The Affreedees, hating the Sikhs, seldom entered Peshawur then, but hailed the British, and this man's house became constantly filled with men from the hills. The expense exceeded his allowances, and he thus told his story:—

“ When my countrymen came into town I had
“ to receive them or lose my influence. To enter-
“ tain all would have been well, but if I refused
“ to see them, or receiving them did not offer
“ refreshment, it gave offence. I was called a
“ traitor, taking the English money and betraying
“ my people: every unpopular act of the English
“ was laid to me, the Affreedees thinking I could
“ have prevented it if willing. Daily my influence
“ gave way among my tribe and I relinquished my
“ allowance.

“ You ask me why the Affreedees have now
“ attacked you? This is the reason. Your
“ Government gives a certain sum yearly to be
“ distributed among the chiefs by the hands of
“ your political agent at Kohat. He is a good
“ young man, against whom I say nothing, but he
“ is inexperienced. There is living at Kohat a
“ clever man, a prince of the house of Sooja-ool-
“ Moolta, called the Shah-i-Zadah, a prince, who
“ told the political agent he could distribute the
“ money among the chiefs better than the political
“ agent could. The latter took his advice and
“ gave the money to this prince, who brought the
“ head men of some small villages and told the
“ agent they were the Affreedee chiefs. They
“ were not. They were men of no influence what-
“ ever, and only received a *per centage* from the
“ prince who kept the remainder. The Affreedees
“ got none of it!

“ The Affreedees thought it useless to complain
“ to the political agent against his favourite prince,
“ with whom he lived in habits of intimacy; so they
“ said nothing, though very discontented, as they
“ lost money and were lowered in the eyes of their

“ tribes. You began making a road through the
“ Pass in the mountains between Peshawur and
“ Kohat, a Pass the Sikhs never conquered, and
“ their overthrow gave you no right to the
“ Affreedee territory. You English conquered the
“ Sikhs, but you neither conquered the Affreedees,
“ nor had any right to appropriate this Pass which
“ is in our territory!

“ Still the Affreedees submitted in silent dis-
“ content until you put a tax on salt at the mines,
“ amounting to *more than seventeen times what was*
“ *ever before paid*—even the Sikhs did not attempt
“ such an act of tyranny as this—and as the
“ Affreedees chiefly live by the carrying and selling
“ of salt in Affghanistan, this tax destroyed their
“ traffic and starvation stares them in the face.
“ ‘It is better,’ say they, ‘to die sword in hand
“ ‘than by hunger’—so they declared war a few
“ days ago by killing your detachment.”

He then said the Affreedees were willing to be
our friends if we treated them properly—not
otherwise: that he spoke the truth, and would go
on my expedition. So he did and behaved very
well, keeping always within my reach. He con-
cluded with these remarkable words: “*You,*
“ General, ought not to go against the Affreedees.
“ You have a great name in all these countries,
“ you are greatly respected, and now you will be
“ blamed by all.”

My answer was, “As you think so do I. We
“ have acted wrongly in this matter, and had your
“ tribes waited for my arrival instead of murdering
“ fourteen soldiers, all you have said would have
“ been laid before the Governor-General, who

“ would have done you justice*. Originally in
“ the right, the Affreedees are now in the wrong.
“ They have murdered fourteen innocent soldiers
“ who had neither insulted nor oppressed any one,
“ but obeying orders, suspecting no hostility, were
“ asleep! I their Commander will do my best to
“ punish their murderers. You say there were
“ seven hundred engaged in this attack. Their
“ leaders must be given up. I will to-morrow in
“ arms demand them, and if they are not surren-
“ dered will attack you, being determined to go
“ through the Kohat Pass by fair means or by
“ force. Go then to Akore, the first village, and
“ say these leaders must be given up to jus-
“ tice.”

He went, and thus all I said to him was, according to my wish, spread through the Affreedee tribes that night. It was not however expected that they would give up their chiefs; for though every body of men has a Judas a whole people are rarely so base. Yet what could I do?

The folly of the Punjaub Government provoked my indignation, but I was helpless, and my long-fixed opinion that mischief always arises from divided civil and military power in government was confirmed. When a subaltern in 1798, I had seen that great and good soldier, Sir Ralph Abercrombie, resign command in Ireland because he could not agree with the Civil Government. In 1803 I saw General Fox resign the same command when Lord

* I have since had reason to believe he would not. Let the men of Swat and the surrounding tribes speak to that point!

Hardwick was Lord-Lieutenant; yet two men, more mild of temper could hardly have been found. In India Lord W. Bentinck and Sir Edward Barnes quarrelled; so did Lord Auckland and Sir H. Fane, though both were gentle well-meaning men. Lastly, Lord Dalhousie and Sir C. Napier, and which was right this book is to show; because the public goodwill expressed towards me, when appointed Commander-in-Chief, should not be abated by false notions as to my resignation.

The Affreede chief's story must be true in the main. There was no other cause for outrage by a people who had received us so joyfully. Knowing nothing of the smooth gentle injustice of the Directors' Government, they had viewed our occupation of Peshawur as promising profit. What, then could make them lightly war on a power infinitely stronger than themselves, when their interest told them to be at peace? Maltreatment. And Lord Dalhousie's after conduct exhibited more prominently the same incapacity for wise and just Government. Had Sir Colin Campbell, who commanded at Peshawur when I left India, been invested with civil authority he would have avoided offending the mountain tribes, who are as easily gained by justice as they are soured by injustice; but he was only suffered to act under *politicals*, and another war—on our side unjust and barbarous—arose in February 1850. It still goes on and may possibly compel us finally to abandon Peshawur; for there the French saying, "*Le jeu ne vaut pas la chandelle*" is strictly applicable. During its progress we have cruelly burned beautiful villages and devastated the land, founding our claim to do so on a nominally assumed

sovereignty of the Sikhs, who neither did nor could conquer the tribes in possession.

Lord Dalhousie has saddled the Company with a costly contest by bad administration; for he and his advisers cannot lay it on the "*predatory habits of the mountain tribes.*" Those predatory habits prevailed equally with the tribes on the Lower Indus and in the Scinde mountains, yet I subdued them by conciliation, and would, with power to act freely, have subdued those on the Upper Indus. My experience and success in dealing with such people was greater than that of any man in the Punjaub, and might have drawn more respect from Lord Dalhousie. He was indeed entitled to employ those he judged fittest for his purpose, and he did so; but an unjust cruel warfare against the Affreedees, Momunds, Eusofzyes and men of Swat has been the result, for which to God he is responsible, and should be made so to man.

Lord Dalhousie's government on the Upper, and mine on the Lower Indus may be briefly contrasted. He insulted the tribes and augmented their taxes. I treated the tribes with respect and reduced their taxes. He did not conquer the Upper Indus tribes, yet treated them as conquered when they received him with open arms! I did conquer, and by hard battle, the Lower Indus tribes, yet treated them gently. He turned friends into enemies and peace into war. I turned enemies to friends and war into peace.

Here it may be asked—"How would you have acted to insure peace around Peshawur?" This is my answer:—

1st. Assembled the chiefs to learn their wishes and accede to them if reasonable, which is scarcely

doubtful, because a weak power dealing with a strong one must be reasonable.

2nd. The tribes should have appointed, each a negotiator for the special affairs of the tribe.

3rd. The small sum given to the Affreedees should have been doubled, and paid monthly in advance, not held in arrear as it was without excuse, save the insulting one having a check on the chiefs. The Kohat defile is their territory, we had no right to pass it without paying black mail, custom dues, or whatever it may be called, because that is their chief revenue. Paying in advance would have removed discontent and produced confidence, feelings generally reciprocated, especially when the generous course is first followed by the most powerful. Here it would have saved expense by saving a war, and established a character for generosity throughout Central Asia, which the Anglo-Indian Government sadly wants.

4th. The monthly stipend should have been paid in my presence by the civil magistrate, to prevent his cutchery subordinates taking a per centage, which the ignorant chiefs would be told, and believe, was the civil magistrate's share: unhappily, there has been in India too much cause given for such belief.

5th. In return the chiefs should have been our police within their own territory, giving up all murderers and thieves, or at least the property stolen. Failing in that, the value to be deducted from the tribute, which would affect the whole tribe; perhaps other tribes also; for a Punchayet of selected chiefs from all the tribes should have decided which was to lose, and until they gave their

decision no money should be paid. This might have produced hostile feelings between the tribes, yet would have secured peace for us. But only our own subjects ought to be protected in this manner. Foreigners trading with us should win their way by paying the black mail which for thousands of years has formed the revenue of the mountaineers, and is said to be levied with more justice and a lighter hand, than is usual with the British Government in India*. Our dignity would thus have been exalted, not lowered; that dignity in support of which Lord Dalhousie talks so big, and does so little, as his Peshawur and Burmah wars attest.

To have the frontier tribes as police was a successful experiment of mine on the Lower Indus, where Wullee Chandia a noble old warrior became a faithful *Warden of the Marshes* and a friend also. For when eighty years of age he came three hundred miles to take leave when I was quitting Scinde. He asked no favour, but, thinking he owed life to me, displayed his gratitude when power was no longer mine†. Moreover, when the hill tribes were brought captives to Scinde, the lands they had previously devastated were given to them, on condition of good behaviour, and they are now among the best agriculturists in that country: many are also in the frontier police, and on more than one occasion have fought gallantly.

6th. Our treaty should have made the Affreedees find labourers, paid by us, to make a road through their territory between Peshawur and Kohat. This

* See "Shore on Indian Affairs,"

† For an account of Wullee Chandia, see "Administration of "Scinde," by Sir W. Napier.

they would have liked if the land required was valued; and besides paying their labourers liberally, they should have had monthly interest on the value of the ground for the road. Our justice and friendship would thus have been felt, and the expense would have been about the salary of *one* member of the Board of Administration! How many times that sum has the war of three years with these ill-used people cost? How many lives have been lost, how little prospect of having a quiet frontier there as in Scinde! But English ignorance of Indian character is incredible. Let those who doubt read *Shore*. Would that some able and honest Civil servant like himself would publish a compressed edition without repetitions.

7th. This salt money should not be called *Tax*. Government, having a monopoly, raised the *price* from one to twelve and eighteen rupees—that is, forbade the Affreedees to live. This imposition should have been reduced, not increased, as it was. The danger of exorbitantly taxing the Affreedees' means of living was vainly urged by the Deputy-Commissioner at Peshawur, Lieut.-Colonel George Lawrence—an officer of much merit, for whom I have a great regard. War ensued, and how the Lahore Government taxed salt is shown by the following official extract: "The old rate of tax
" was five to six bullock loads for *one rupee* ;
" which may be estimated at from twelve to
" eighteen maunds per rupee ; a maund is about
" eighty lbs. The present rate is *one rupee per*
" *maund* ! This change has been ordered to pre-
" vent the Kohat salt interfering with that from
" Pind Dadur Khan. Large quantities smuggled
" across the Indus stopped the sale at the last-

“ named place.” The folly of this proceeding again measures Lord Dalhousie’s capacity for administration.

8th. I would have paraded the troops at Peshawur whenever the chiefs were paid, to place our generosity and power in juxtaposition. All men understand the language of facts. *Justice—Rupees—Bayonets.* Between Lord Dalhousie’s system of governing and mine was this difference. By me the bayonet was shown, never used, and the rupee was put into the pocket of the native. By him the rupee was taken out of the native’s pocket, while the bayonet and the firebrand were freely applied. The result was peace in Scinde, war at Peshawur. The same cruelty and burning seems to go on in Burmah; a reward has been offered for the head of a Burmah General, and a town of three thousand inhabitants deliberately burned! “ But you censurer used the Bayonet at Kohat !” will be the cry of *honest* friends in India. Aye! and the next chapter shall show why, despite of Lord Dalhousie’s attempt to suppress that affair by putting my dispatch in his pocket, as Lord Ripon did my dispatch of the Hill Campaign. Lord Ellenborough’s Parliamentary remonstrance against the injustice towards me and the brave troops employed alone caused their production.

Mortal sickness fell on Sir C. Napier just as this work was roughly finished, and his state made reference impossible, wherefore, the following document, found amongst his papers, is inserted here as a note, shewing how justly he called his own government wise. Every responsibility of publication necessarily attaches to me. The people

of Scinde were not forced into hostility by injustice as the frontier tribes of the Punjaub were, and then afflicted by Lord Dalhousie with fire and sword for resenting wrong. Was it from ignorance or faction that Sir C. Napier's great and successful example of good government over a million of people was never alluded to, much less investigated by Parliamentary committees or Parliamentary orators, when expressly engaged to discover the best mode of ruling India? Truly our legislators are or should be heaven born. Let this however be a land-mark! When Sir C. Napier—at variance with the governing powers in India—was retiring to private life, pursued by the revilings of successful knaves, who vainly imagined they had crushed him, the Sirdars, of Scinde, those fierce Beloochees whose might in war and feudal power he had overthrown in battle and by legislation, came forward in crowds, pouring forth their riches without stint to offer the apparently fallen man a testimonial of their attachment—avowing that to him their conqueror, who had slaughtered in fight their best men by thousands, they owed freedom and happiness and security. Every feeling of wrath had fled from their hearts to make way for love and veneration; and they chose the moment when his power was gone, his fortunes low, to display their sentiments. What man of history can boast of the like? The sword of peace thus bestowed by the Sirdars, the tribute to his glory which he most prized, was laid beside his corpse when he died, and rested on his coffin when he was carried to the grave. W. NAPIER.

Document.

Cairo, February 14th, 1853.—I trust that if I

be called home my examination (by the Lords' Committee) will not be confined to those points which Lord Ellenborough's letter would seem to point at, and which could be got equally well, or better, by returns, imports, exports, and things of that kind. If I am to judge by what I saw of Sir George Clerk's examination, there are other questions opened regarding the *taking as well as the governing of Scinde*.

There is the feeling with which the conquest was looked upon *in* Scinde, which, from my intimacy with all the leading men, no one is more capable of speaking to than myself.

There are all the preparations of the Meers for war, in the shape of orders for provisions, for Beloochees marching upon Hydrabad long before you came to it, which my possession of their records enabled me to discover.

There are fictions to refute as to the amount of plunder taken from them, which the examination of the Tosha Kana [treasury] accounts enabled me to unravel.

There is the new * * * of Lord Jocelyn,—that the ladies had not carpets to sit upon; whereas they lent me more than I had use for for the Durbar when Lord Dalhousie came down.

There is the fiction of their poverty met by the fact, that Outram himself changed his resolution of handing them his share of the prize, when he found through his then friend, F. French, that they were in circumstances of wealth.

There is the abolition of slavery to speak too, and its results, a measure not yet accomplished in India itself.

There is the settlement within four years, of

all claims to estates, which twenty-six years after conquest they are only very partially working through at Bombay.

There is the early assimilation of weights and measures to the Company's standard, a point which in a great portion of the rest of India they are almost as far from as ever, and the attempt at which was met by a riot, or almost a rebellion, within the last seven years at Surat.

There is the introduction of the Company's copper money as well as silver, a measure which all their ingenuity in Bombay has never, beyond the island, been able to effect.

There is the fact of the average duration of civil suits being but two-and-a-half *days* each, while in India the average duration is of *twice as many months*.

There is a system of a per centage on civil suits in lieu of stamps, which the best writers in Bengal are in vain there advocating the introduction of.

There is the abolition of all private rights of seniorage incompatible with the administration of public justice, or injurious to the public revenue, a measure which in India they would gladly, if they could, effect.

There is a system of police which the Government of the Punjaub and the Government of Bombay have been glad to try and imitate.

There is the fact, that there never was a man confined for a political offence and never even a riot to put down, to contrast with the daily calls for troops to put down outbreaks in the other parts of India.

There are blood feuds between tribes put down

completely, which, before we took Scinde, caused an average of between two and three hundred murders annually.

There is public morality supported by putting down the infamous beasts, who, dressed as women, plied their trade in the Meer's time openly; and there is the fact to be put on record, that the chief of them were recipients of stipends from the Ameers, as the Government records I became possessed of as Collector testified.

There is child murder and abortion put an end to, to which hundreds of infants were sacrificed annually.

There is the retail trade of opium, put on such a footing, as to render the debasing results of its use to the extent formerly in practice, now impossible.

There is the barbarous exhibition of men with stumps of hands chopped off for theft put an end to, and there is the law equally enforced as regards all.

There is an agricultural system introduced which renders the plunder of the cultivator by any Belooch, to whose tender mercies he was handed over as a Jaghcedar, impossible.

There is a protection given to commerce, and an access to the head of the State opened to commercial men when they have grievances to complain of, or suggestions of improvement to make, which was before unknown.

There is a Belooch population, described in all previous works on Scinde as the most barbarous untameable ruffians in the world, exhibiting an example of order, docility and attention to the improvement of their estates in which the land-

owner in many civilized countries might find something to imitate.

There is—but why go on with the enumeration? There were more blessings conferred in Scinde, within the limited period it was under your domination, than have been effected in any cycle of ten times the term in other parts; and in the rules for the sale of land, *now, alas! put an end to*, the foundation was laid for the most extensive and the most lasting prosperity; and of every thing beneficial done since, the foundations were laid in the same period.

This is what the Committee should see and know; this is what should be put upon that permanent record. I do not know how far they have been touched upon by past witnesses, or how far it is your intention to shew them by future evidence. I have not seen the Blue book, and of your views I am necessarily ignorant—they have been told, to be sure, by Sir William Napier in his book; but I do think also that they should be told before the Committee, and that by one who knows the system in the other parts of India, and can speak the more strongly when speaking by comparison with it.

I do not know, Sir Charles, whether, in speaking so much on these points I bore you, it is possible I may,—and if so, you must forgive me; but no dog of decent breed could see a parcel of curs yelping at the heels of a nobler animal without longing to fix his teeth in the shape of a good honest English bull-dog bite in some of them; that is precisely my feeling towards the J*****, and E*****, and O*****, and all the rest of them, noble of birth or ignoble, who follow

at their cry—* * * * whom a plain tale, if there is any honesty left in England, must put down. I only pray Providence to spare you to us and to your country for some years, and if it be so, you will yet live like the illustrious man whose pall you lately bore to see your enemies and maligners discomfited, and become the loved and honoured of all. England is, in the long run, generally just to those who illustrate its history ; but painful and long, have, in nearly all cases, been the trial which envy and faction have made them first pass through. I remain &c. &c.

Was it fitting that Sir C. Napier's beneficent government, as here depicted, should have been ignored in Parliament ?

Was it fitting that the horrible rule of the Ameers, here exposed, should have been praised, its fall lamented, and efforts made to restore it ?

Let the Press of England, the People of England answer !

W. N.

CHAPTER VII.

THE old Affreedee chief's tale disclosed the motive for murdering our soldiers, a crime provoked by injustice ; still a crime to be punished, the victims not being the wrongdoers. It was necessary to re-open the Pass to Kohat, because one avowed object of my journey was to inspect that station, and the plain in which it stood could only be entered by the Pass. A personal examination was also requisite for verifying an opinion on the defence of Kohat, given to the Governor-General. That town was a very important post, isolated if the defile was not opened, and the Board of Administration had proposed to build a new fort at a distance from the place : a project opposed by me as foolish. Was it for the Commander-in-Chief to sink his opinion and avoid visiting an important post within our own territory, because a barbarian tribe denied a passage ? Such timidity would have gone throughout Central Asia as a defeat !

An old Indian officer told me he thought it "*beneath the dignity of a Commander-in-Chief to go on such an expedition.*" It would have been more so to let a tribe of Affreedees influence the movements of Head Quarters ! In India wars

arise, and Armies appear as by magic ; and when a hundred and fifty millions of people abhor a hundred thousand conquerors, of whom two-thirds are non-military, how long will power be preserved without constant vigilance ? The Commander-in-Chief should be, if possible, present wherever a shot is fired—at least such was my rule.

That a General should never incur personal danger that can honourably be avoided is another question. Certainly he should never allow his plans to be deranged by exposing himself without precaution as the unhappy Cabul political did, and so caused the massacre of a whole Army ! In Scinde the political, Outram, urged me to put myself into the hands of the Ameers, and had I been the Quixotic idiot to mind his silly mouthing, the massacre of my Army would have followed : Shakspeare has well ridiculed such folly in the Countess of Auvergne's attempt to catch Talbot.

Outram, like Sir William McNaughten at Cabul, would have doltishly lost his own life at Hyderabad, had not troops sent by me, saved him. Captain Conway commanded them, and his skilful and courageous defence of the Residency—a defence in my dispatch erroneously attributed to Outram—merits every praise ; and in acknowledging my unintentional error, I accord to that brave man what is his right, though momentarily usurped by another.

There were other reasons for going to Kohat. The newly-raised Irregular corps for the Punjaub—some eighteen thousand men—were placed by Lord Dalhousie under the exclusive orders of the Board of Administration ; a civil body, responsible only to the Governor-General and not very cognisant how

to form soldiers. The young officers at the head of these Irregular corps *drilled* them well, but the men were so equipped as to be unfit for service. Whether the fault was with Lord Dalhousie or the Board of Administration is not worth inquiry; but its magnitude would have been measured by disasters had a second rising of the Sikhs taken place.

Reviewing one of these corps under Major Coke, at Peshawur, I expected to find it moderately drilled, admirably appointed. A magnificent body of old soldiers were presented—not old men, but men whose appearance bespoke them experienced warriors, and Coke was an officer fit to command. But when their arms and appointments were examined, the military providence of the Governor-General and Board of Administration shone forth.

One soldier had a musket without a lock; another a lock without a musket. Here was a bayonet that could not be fixed; there a bayonet that could not be unfixed. One man had a weapon with a lock the cock of which would not go down; then came one which would not stand up. A fine, handsome soldier, six feet high, brawny and bronzed, a model Grenadier, his broad deep chest swelling with military pride and his black brilliant eye sparkling with a malicious twinkle, pretended to hold over his shoulder, between his finger and thumb, a flint—his only arm! He was an epitome of political military arrangement—a powerful soldier rendered useless by ignorance!

Scarcely had this noble Infantry been reviewed, with one of Irregular Cavalry under Captain Daly of the Bombay Fusileers, an excellent officer, when orders came from the Board of Administration, not

to me, but direct to them, to march to Kohat ! Daly's Cavalry were well equipped because they found themselves in everything ; but Cavalry could not fight in a mountain pass among rocky precipices ; and if these two regiments had marched Coke's unarmed Infantry would have been cut to pieces, or have joined an enemy they could not have resisted or escaped from !

To interfere and go with them in prevention of disaster was imperative ; hence, taking the spare detonating muskets from the regular troops to arm Coke's men, I reinforced my personal escort to answer any emergency of battle on my return. Including the two Irregular regiments, the expedition was made with 2436 Infantry, 700 Cavalry, and 6 guns. This force, being supported by Peshawur, was sufficient to meet all the tribes, although good information gave them some forty or fifty thousand fighting men. But they could not at once assemble all, and might be beaten then on fair ground, because we had cannon and they had none.

Expecting to enter their defile without opposition, but to be intercepted with sharp fighting on the return, fourteen days' provisions were prepared, that the consumption of food might give transport for wounded men, and abundance of food leisure for slow carriage of the severely hurt.

We marched the 9th February—but here the Chapter shall be terminated by a recapitulation of reasons for going in person :—

1st. To see the plain and town of Kohat, and in obedience to the Governor-General's orders give an opinion on that frontier, and the new fort proposed.

2nd. By escorting, to save the Irregular regiments ordered by the Punjaub Government to reinforce the garrison of Kohat.

3rd. To improve acquaintance with the Bengal troops under fire, which is more prized than parade familiarity, and gives chief and troops mutual confidence.

4th. To show the world a Commander-in-Chief's progress was not to be arrested by a miserable mountain tribe.

All these objects were effected, and the two Irregular regiments saved from the destruction prepared for them by Governmental negligence. A General gets little credit for such services; those whose blundering would but for him produce useless bloodshed and disaster, try to conceal their errors by stifling publicity. Kohat was saved, the Bengal troops learned my mode of working in face of an enemy; a way was forced through the mountains; and our arms were not insulted by having it published in Asia that a single tribe of Affreedees had frightened the British Commander-in-Chief from his avowed design!

It was effected in face of considerable danger. A Sirdar, Mahomet Azcem Khan, was in arms at Bunnoo, south of Kohat, and could have entered the Kohat plain with a large force by one of the passes through the salt range, to aid the Affreedees. My informants gave him four thousand men which were accepted as two thousand, allowing fifteen hundred for exaggeration and five hundred for men unwilling to fight; but he could quickly have assembled a large force if he had joined the Affreedees, and his operations were not to be lightly treated. All that an enemy can do should

be considered, and then counter attacks, baffling part of his plan, may render the rest more easy to deal with: it was in this view three thousand troops were employed, and my attack so suddenly made. The massacre of our men was known only at mid-day the 6th February, and at daybreak on the 9th we marched, which was as quick as the Commissariat and carriage could be organized.

Mr. McKenna, author of a "*History of British India Ancient and Modern*," says, "After they (the troops) had destroyed some villages, and killed many Affreedees, they returned to their station, having lost *two* officers (only one) and several men, *without effecting their object*." As Mr. McKenna is known to have a sincere desire to attain the truth, this correction of his error is given.

CHAPTER VIII.

FROM Peshawur the Kohat road runs fifteen miles over a plain to Mutini, a village near the entrance of the Pass of Kohat, and then through an uneven ridge projecting from the "*Suffed Koh*," or the White Mountain. Between this ridge and the Cabul river lies the plain of Peshawur on the North, and on the South, between it and the salt range, the Plain of Kohat. We marched early—baggage in front under a strong advance guard, contrary to the usual order of movement against an enemy. This was because the confusion and danger caused by the baggage of an Indian column was known to me, and our first march being over the plain with plenty of Cavalry, the enemy dared not come down from his hills to attack.

The baggage masters were inexperienced, their charge would have been long getting into march if the troops moved first, it would have reached the ground late, and then fatigue and impatience would have put the soldiers out of heart. My design was to insure a timely arrival, to instruct the young baggage masters, to let the troops see the misery of much baggage, and convince

the younger officers of the danger thus produced. A curious disorder was indeed presented; however it soon abated, and the baggage officers found they had something to do besides sitting on their horses smoking cigars, and watching the picturesque appearance of Indian baggage in confusion, which, seen through the smoke of a pipe, seems "*fait à peindre*." The troops, following with their steady pace, cursed the baggage in front, and me for putting it there; that was exactly what I wanted; their favour was regained when they found their tents pitched.

On the 10th, being only a few miles from the village of Akore at the entrance of the Pass, the baggage was placed in rear, strongly guarded; Fisher's Irregular Horse was left to secure the entrance of the defile and communication with Peshawur, and I rode to meet the chiefs at Akore. They were told our men had been murdered by the Affreedees, whom we deemed friends and paid as allies, wherefore the murderers must be given up; their tribe had closed the Pass, but we were come to open it: however no attack should be made unless they fired, but that would be considered a declaration of war. An hour was given for a reply.

The old Affreedee chief before-mentioned went into the village with the others for consultation, and within the hour returned with this answer:—" *They had nothing to do with the murders and could not give up the leaders.*" The column then moved on, a fire was opened upon the advanced guard and a sharp skirmish began. Coke's Irregulars were sent to attack the other side of the village, and the enemy was soon beaten out of it

but collected on the opposite heights. Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence, the Commissioner, here joined in the attack with a Civil force, about two thousand, acting separately and not under my command, —a sort of volunteer corps formed of natives for the occasion. The Colonel led well, but his leading was far better than the following.

In this skirmish the village was set on fire, and thinking our troops had thus disgraced their colours, my anger was strongly expressed; but Colonel Lawrence told me the Board of Administration had directed him to burn the villages. This was as impolitic as it was dishonourable to the character of British soldiers yet no power was entrusted to me, and I had been sufficiently cautioned against interfering with the Punjaub Civil authorities. Entirely deprived of command over these troops, I was compelled to witness, and in some degree aid their abominable proceeding; for without the protection of my soldiers those of the Board could not have executed their scandalous orders. The villages had been however entirely abandoned, save by fighting men, and the inhabitants had also carried away the contents of their dwellings, otherwise the orders to burn *should not have been executed!*

This complete abandonment was not difficult, the villages are only occupied during the winter; the people migrate in summer to the higher mountains. There were, however, other reasons for agreeing to the burning. On one hand little injury was done; on the other the blame of the long frontier war thus sure to be created, was as sure to be attributed to my preventing the arson. It would have been said, burning was the way to

force submission, and all the bloodshed and expense *which afterwards occurred* would have been laid on my Quixotic notions. But it was these and like shameful proceedings which did cause discontent and war, and Sir Colin Campbell has since been compelled to submit to the contemplation of far worse and more disgraceful scenes.

When the village of Akore was carried we entered the defile, having the baggage strongly guarded. An advance of six miles up the defile, the Affreedecs, as expected, tormenting the rear, brought us to a second halting-ground, where we had another fight and destroyed another village, but many of our men were killed and wounded: indeed the whole march was a sharp skirmish.

From the road on each side the rocks rose very steeply every where, in some places perpendicularly, and to get up them was climbing not walking. This under the occasional fire of the enemy, who from the summits also rolled great stones down, was very harassing to the flanking parties, and their physical exertions were great, exclusive of the danger; but this service, to show my confidence, was chiefly done by the Sepoys, and with good courage. European troops might and should have been dispensed with altogether, were it not that the Affreedecs alone could, with time, have mustered forty-five thousand men, and Coke's Irregulars though superb soldiers were composed of Sikhs, Affghans, and even Affreedecs!—adventurers from many tribes, and truth to tell, there was no surety in a severe trial against their changing sides: yet my confidence gained more than we could have lost by their enmity had they turned against us. They had here more than their full

share of fighting, and seemed to desire a monopoly of the whole.

We passed the night of the 10th under fire, being only three or four hundred yards from the summits of the surrounding heights, and several of our people were killed. Major Platt of the 23rd regiment, standing at his tent door, shot an Affreede who from the top of a rock had killed one or two of our people.

The 11th we marched seven miles, the rocks high on our flanks all the way. From their summits the enemy was dislodged by flanking parties, and at a village called Bostekail we encamped on a little circular plain surrounded by rocky hills. The Civil force again burned one or two abandoned villages, and we being in a sort of bowl sent our pickets up to its rocky brim, crowned with enemies, where skirmishing continued throughout the night; meanwhile I rode to the top of the Pass.

Hitherto the way had been up a gradual and not very steep ascent, but now it rose like a staircase. A rudely constructed tower on the summit commanded the defile, where I traced the site for a small square fort described in the replication to Lord Dalhousie's comments on my general memoir. A dozen or even six men, could thus defend themselves in ordinary times against a sudden rising of the neighbouring tribes, and the fort, besides commanding both sides of the narrow way, could with its guns sweep the ridge itself. It would have been a useful work and the materials for building were on the spot, but the plan was *mine* and it has never been built!

Next day, threading the defile, I descended by a

See
Chapter
XII.,
Part II.

precipitous road to Kohat, which is in an extensive plain—a beautiful little town surrounded by picturesque trees, with a stream of the purest sparkling water gushing from a rock. A small fort under the wall was in a state of dilapidation, yet easy to restore and certain repairs and additions were ordered but like the fort for the defile have never been executed, and for the same reason. In India also procrastination is the rule. Kohat is however so completely isolated that if those works are not completed some disaster may occur.

The Board of Administration had proposed to abandon this fort and build a new one in the plain, to the Westward, where it could neither protect the town nor command anything; nor is it clear why *any* military post should be at Kohat; but bad administration entails bad projects expense and difficulties. Had we conciliated the Affreedees in the first instance, a subordinate revenue officer would have sufficed at Kohat, and eventually a small force at Peshawur. Now such an arrangement seems hopeless.

At Kohat I visited the house where that charming and courageous woman, Mrs. George Lawrence, was kept prisoner by the Affghans, suffering much with an indomitable spirit, and commanding well-merited respect from the chivalrous warriors whose captive she was. They did their best to mitigate the austerity of her captivity; for she told me, that at one time when much straitened for provisions themselves they would not allow her to want; but the sentry at her door appeared famished. And though her own allowance was very small, yet she offered him a portion, which he devoured with avidity: they were all starving

and had with difficulty provided the little food given to her! If Mrs. Lawrence and her gallant husband, George, would describe all that passed during their imprisonment a very interesting volume would appear.

Returning from Kohat that afternoon, afflicting intelligence of a great misfortune met me. Two of our pickets on the rocky heights had been attacked and very roughly handled. We had many killed and wounded,—among the latter Lieutenant Hillier, among the former the young, handsome, accomplished Sitwell. He was first struck down by a rock hurled from above, and then slain. It is sad to see so brave a youth fall in battle at the early age of nineteen; more sad, when to a gallant spirit is added cultivated talents with great promise of social virtues: but his heroic fall has a mournful grandeur that must mitigate even parental affliction.

The enemy were now thronging round us, it was expected they would attack during the night, and a circle of pickets was posted with two guns to flank the base of the rocks.

The return march was to begin at daylight, and a knowledge of barbarian habits made me expect more dangerous attacks than had been made while advancing; we were weaker also by the two regiments left at Kohat. Wherefore to abate the coming assaults I had, when at Kohat, directed the spirited young officer commanding there, Lieutenant Pollock, to march with all his spare men in a North-Westerly direction towards a Pass West of the Kohat defile. From thence a hill road led to Buzottee and other strongholds of the Affree-

dees, in which the families flying from the villages we had burned had taken refuge.

Our enemies being all upon the heights above us could see what passed on the Kohat plain, and as Pollock was to be well advanced there at daylight I felt assured the Affreedees, seeing him in march towards where their families were, would hasten to defend the defile he menaced; and would also suppose we were going to wheel in combination with him. Major Coke had kept his men at the top of the defile to protect our rear-guard, and as the enemy—not knowing he was to remain at Kohat—took him for a part of our force, his position gave it a quiet march for a mile or two. But when he retired the Affreedees followed us; not however in full force, Pollock's feint had drawn many towards the Western Pass.

This was an important diversion. Our Government information, acquired at Peshawur, said the Oruckzie and Terah Affreedees had gathered forty-five thousand fighting men, exclusive of the warriors around us; and as all are branches of one tribe and combine in danger he must proceed bridle in hand who ventures among their mountains. To enter them is easy, to retreat difficult, to remain stationary all but impossible; for every convoy of provisions may have to fight its way through fearful straits, and the strongest Army be worn out or paralysed before an incautious commander is aware of his danger. The Emperor Akbar lost two large Armies in the Eusofzyes' country, opposite to that of the Affreedees': and the destruction of our forces in Affghanistan was another miserable catastrophe to warn impru-

dent commanders and improvident Governments.

To give Pollock's feint value we resolved to retread the defile in one rapid march, thus forestalling the return of those Affreedees who had gone to defend their Western villages. Enough however had remained to keep us warm, and the skirmishing in front flanks and rear was incessant for thirteen miles.

Several incidents worth notice occurred.

Some Affreedees had gathered on a sugar-loaf rock, terminating a spur from the precipitous hills on our flank. Being close to the road it barred progress, and the column halted. On the summit a warrior stood like Fuzeli's picture of Satan with legs wide apart and arms high in the air: waving a sword and shaking a shield he shouted and defied us! A young Artillery officer—Maister or Delane—laid his gun with a shell and the flying death whizzing through the air burst at the moment it struck the brave Affreedee! His head, his legs, his arms, flew like radii from a centre into the air and a shout of exultation burst from the troops! The amusements of a field of battle are grim. Condemn not that shout. Life was played for in the rough game, and they who won naturally rejoiced. It is however a painful remembrance.

When he fell the others fled, Maister and Delane sending shell after shell amongst them with surprising accuracy. But while this was going on a dozen or two of enemies, in the rear, crept unseen within three hundred yards, and laying their jezails on rests sent a volley against some staff officers separately assembled with spyglasses. None were

touched! Had the Affreedees been armed with muskets many must have gone down. The rifle barrelled jezail, so absurdly eulogised, is a long cumbrous weapon, nearly harmless in war; it can only be used from the summit of high rocks, whence the jezailchee deliberately fires down. The range is not equal to that of the musket; it is even a more contemptible aim than a matchlock; and this incident is one of many proofs that it would be well if the half-bred soldiers who speak of the "*deadly aim and long range*" of matchlock and jezail thought more and wrote less.

Our rear guard reached a narrow gorge, where the overturning of a gun carriage had caused a halt, and the enemy pressed on skirmishing. While Sir Colin Campbell was placing some Sepoys to cover the men about the gun the Affreedees closed gallantly, whereupon he rode forward calling for a charge; but to reach mountaineers is easier said than done. Terrified by the Sepoys' rush they fled without firing for a great distance. Campbell saved lives by this ebullition of military spirit, which he had previously more grandly displayed at Chillianwallah, when at a terrible moment he charged the Sikh guns with the 61st regiment and decided the crisis of that bloody field!

After this event the road opened on a small plain among rocks, where the enemy was ensconced and from a projecting spur smote our column. One of the young Artillery officers threw some round shot against them, and every bullet struck where the smoke of a jezail appeared; but the brave barbarians did not move. Shells were then thrown and another gun opened in vain, and

Captain Douglas of the Rifles was moving to attack, but the column then resumed its march and he was recalled.

Among Colonel Lawrence's men was a chief, Futteh Mahomed, or Futteh Alli. He was six feet four inches high, and always accompanied by his standard bearer, a tall spare man not less daring yet slight to look at near his gigantic master. This Futteh and his followers attacked a hill covered with enemies—he with his flag man conspicuously leading—the Affreedees held their ground, firing fast, but on the summit were charged sword in hand by Futteh who slew their chief with a single stroke. “*With one blow I split him down, no man wants a second from me*” was his speech and it was no empty boast—all had fallen who came within the sweep of his sword. He was certainly one of the finest men ever seen, and in honour of his bravery I made him ride into Peshawur on an elephant, with his standard bearer behind the Houdah, waving the flag over his head. That man and his people will always be faithful to the British unless we maltreat him; not an impossible event however, for the British officers at Peshawur said we had misused some Pathan chiefs who served us well in the Affghan war.

A good lesson in skirmishing had been furnished during the advance. Coke's Sepoys ascending a height, began firing though the enemy were covered by rocks. He ordered them to cease, but they said, “the enemy will then fire, and many of us will be shot down: while we shoot they are afraid!” During this conversation the firing had ceased, and the others, as foreseen, opened hotly: Coke told his

men to fight their own way and the Affreedees were soon driven from their position.

The column reached Mutini in the evening, having traversed, going and returning, thirty miles of Pass, with the loss of only twenty men killed and about ninety wounded; no baggage was missing, and all the objects of the expedition were attained. Runjct Singh at the head of a great Army had tried to force the same defile and lost a thousand men, whereas we did not *lose* above twenty!

Faults had however been committed, severe comments were issued and a Native officer was put in arrest. The aim of this rebuke was to check with the Sepoys a habit of firing without orders; it is common to all young troops when not well disciplined, but inveterate with the fiery men of hot climates, and requires vigorous repression. Had I remained in India it should have been repressed, even by military execution, being a disobedience inviting defeat.

The following are extracts from a journal, written on the evening of our arrival at Mutini.

“ 14th February, Peshawur. We have arrived
“ here after a march of eighteen miles, our loss is
“ not much when the desperate defiles through
“ which we passed, defended by a warlike race of
“ well-armed men are considered—a disproof of the
“ ordinary nonsense about mountaineers, and ‘*how*
“ ‘*unwise it is to expect success against them with*
“ ‘*regular troops.*’ Only regular troops can suc-
“ ceed against them! How few men understand
“ war. All this loss and expense has been caused
“ by the Government’s inordinate taxation of salt!
“ the Affreedees will be avenged. This country

“ is miserably governed and * * * has shewn want of abilities as an Administrator.

“ 15th February, Peshawur. Rain is falling in torrents ; had it caught us in the mountains our camels could not have moved ; but I had prepared for accidents by taking fourteen days’ provisions. Altogether it has been a good lesson in mountain warfare. The Sepoys did everything. With exception of the Artillery we made little or no use of the Europeans, keeping them in reserve in case the enemy should become more numerous than we expected, and throw up works.

“ 16th February. This day seven years I was at Muttaree in Scinde, and made up my mind to attack the Ameers whatever force they might have. I had then only two thousand men, but having full power was confident and successful. Such is the difference of being under the orders of a Lord Ellenborough and a Lord Dalhousie. We are in for plagues here. This Kohat affair is pure blundering. Lord Dalhousie thinks, and so do the members of the Board of Administration, that they are all great generals. They will get us into some fatal scrape by their folly.”

They did do so. The first blood shed was at Sugow, the 11th of December, 1849. And a “ *little war* ” has continued up to this time, February 1853 !

Previous to our march, Sir Colin Campbell had given me a curious letter from the Deputy-Commissioner at Peshawur. It was his duty to indite it, being part of the system of employing political agents to *advise* or rather to *dictate* to general officers. Nominally they had not this power, but had a right to *offer advice unasked* ;

and authorised advice coming from below, with authority from above, must be attended to. A commander is thus unnecessarily loaded with responsibility, which may confuse and distract his attention from the general arrangements with which his mind should be exclusively occupied. Those who place subalterns on a level with him forget that he can ask their advice if he requires it; but when spontaneously and authoritatively given, if not adopted, it throws upon him a very onerous and mischievous necessity of explaining his plans to subordinates over whom he has no control. And also to superiors who have control over him, and are not chary of using their power! *In the midst of transactions, demanding the calmest thought, secrecy, decision and firmness, he finds himself a member of a debating society, discussing his own measures!* It is thus campaigns are lost and Armies destroyed. It is thus the military characters of commanders are ruined. Richly however they deserve disgrace for their weakness.

A General with an enemy on his hands has enough to occupy the most powerful mind without listening to the projects of his friends. If Government select an officer for command and give him a distinct and decided notice of what is expected, and what time and means can be afforded, he has a right to act from his own judgment in making use of them. If he does not give satisfaction, supersede him! But to control him by means of subordinates in direct correspondence with superior authorities, is to show want of confidence in his ability. When their blunders produce failures he becomes a mark for public anger though free from fault, if that can be said of a

man spiritless enough to be a tool when his soldiers are being lost, and his country's arms dishonoured.

The letter or rather remonstrance runs thus:—

“ *Peshawur, 2nd February, 1850.* 1st. Having
“ heard yesterday that it is the intention of His
“ Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to withdraw
“ Her Majesty's 60th regiment from Peshawur,
“ and not having heard that any European regi-
“ ment is to be substituted for it, I deem it my
“ duty, with the utmost deference to the judgment
“ of the Commander-in-Chief, to submit for consi-
“ deration the following circumstances.

“ 2nd. The province and station of Peshawur
“ are most peculiarly circumstanced; the inhabi-
“ tants of the surrounding villages are obedient
“ and respectful, but they are so, mainly, under the
“ operation of fear.

“ 3rd. The city has 60,000 inhabitants, of whom
“ about 20,000, if not more, are Cabulees, bound
“ by religion and consanguinity to our enemies in
“ Affghanistan.

“ 4th. These and the people of the villages, who
“ are equally so circumstanced, are soldiers from
“ their birth, and can at any time muster from 60
“ to 80,000 firelocks, in the use of which they are
“ experienced.

“ 5th. The neighbouring hills are full of a like
“ description of people, but who are independent
“ of British rule and only restrained from making
“ inroads and disturbances by the terror of our
“ arms.

“ 6th. It is not alone the defence of Peshawur
“ itself that is to be considered, but also that we

“ should be prepared at all times to detach troops
“ in greater or less numbers to promptly suppress
“ any insurrectionary movement in the vicinity,
“ and with such parties there should be a considerable proportion of Europeans.

“ 7th. During our recent operations in Eusofzye, the Europeans, who were one to four, very essentially contributed to our success.

“ 8th. With every confidence in the Native troops, my experience in hill warfare of the nature of that which we should be engaged in here, induces me to believe that there should not be less than three regiments of European Infantry at Peshawur; and although there is one such corps at Rawul Pindce, still it is to be remembered that for five or six months of the year no bridge of boats could be kept on the Indus at or near Attok, during which time the Province of Peshawur must necessarily depend upon the troops within it.

“ 9th. If therefore, His Excellency the Commander-in-chief considers it necessary to withdraw the 60th Rifles, I would respectfully suggest that, that regiment be replaced by another corps of Europeans.”

This is a sample of the system. *A regimental captain advises the Commander-in-Chief of India how to distribute his troops, and teaches him how to direct his view of the state of affairs!* My comments, addressed to Sir Colin Campbell, were as follows.

“ *Peshawur, February 5th, 1850.* 1st. It is the duty of all civil and military authorities to communicate all information. Major-Generals

“ and commanders of posts, may in case of danger
“ act at once and decisively upon such informa-
“ tion.

“ 2nd. The first five paragraphs of the Deputy-
“ Commissioner's letter are very well, giving a
“ summary of the state and feelings of the people;
“ but they are not required by me, because after
“ many years of war with these people I am as
“ cognizant of them and their country as I am ever
“ likely to be.

“ 3rd. The paragraphs 6, 7, 8, and 9 contain
“ matters on which the civil officers are not called
“ upon to interfere; they are purely military
“ things, and rest entirely with the Commander-in-
“ Chief.”

To this was appended the following memorandum
for Sir Colin Campbell.

“ 1st. The Deputy-Commissioner, in his 6th
“ paragraph, supposes I have to learn the first
“ principles of the military art. Does he fancy
“ that 8000 men are placed here merely to defend
“ the town of Peshawur? I imagined every one
“ knew this not to be the case as well as I do
“ myself.

“ 2nd. *With such parties there should be a con-*
“ *siderable portion of Europeans.* This is a mis-
“ take. I admit of no such rule. In Scinde, I
“ twice sent the Irregular Horse on detached ser-
“ vice without Europeans. In 1845 I sent them
“ without Europeans to cover the gorges of the
“ Teyague and Sevistan hills. I also sent General
“ Simpson along the valley of the Teyague without
“ Europeans, and my own column had but one
“ regiment of Europeans. I had in all a some-
“ what less force than the Peshawur force, and the

“ slightest cheek would have brought a hundred thousand men upon me.

“ At Meeanee I had less than five hundred Europeans. At Hydrabad not so many, though one battle was against 35,000 men, the other against 26,000 men. I certainly do not admit the Deputy-Commissioner's rule. The Europeans are our best troops, but we are not to imagine that because on important occasions we should use Europeans, we must *always* use them and be unable to fight without them. This is a preposterous doctrine. The Bombay 25th Native Infantry at Kotra carried all before them having no Europeans but their officers. So far from thinking Europeans should be with every detachment, the reverse ought to be the rule. Detachments of the Native Infantry ought to be *habituated to act with a reliance on their own valour and discipline*, and it grieves me when I hear officers express a want of confidence in their Sepoys. This goes far to injure the self-reliance of the Native troops.

“ 3rd. As regards the 7th para. I have no doubt that a regiment of Europeans, armed with firelocks which cost five guineas a piece, as the rifles do, contributed to the success of the operations in Eusofzye; but had Colonel Bradshaw had all his force composed of Native Infantry, the result would have been equally successful, and much more useful by raising the confidence of the Native troops. The rule laid down by the Deputy-Commissioner is a deviation from sound military principles, and the prevalence of it in the Army is calculated to deteriorate, not to improve the confidence of this noble Army in its

“ own powers. These sort of errors are very
“ dangerous. Commanders of Armies should never
“ permit them to pass unchecked.

“ 4th. I do not know what the Deputy-Com-
“ missioner's experience in hill warfare may be, but
“ I have had some myself; I have, as a subaltern,
“ seen it in Ireland, in Spain, in Greece, and
“ finally conducted one myself in Sevestan as a
“ commander, with good results. I therefore know
“ something of it. I know its success depends not
“ on European troops, but upon the intelligence of
“ the commander, the drill and discipline of the
“ troops, be they what they may. The number
“ and description of these troops are points which
“ the Commander-in-Chief must decide upon to the
“ best of his judgment, and according to his general
“ arrangement. These mark his fitness or unfitness
“ for high command.

“ 5th. The necessity of another European regi-
“ ment being brought up or not, will depend upon
“ the opinion of the Brigadier, connected with
“ other circumstances. Nothing stated in the
“ Deputy-Commissioner's letter will alter my
“ arrangements. He says Peshawur has 60,000
“ inhabitants, that gives 15,000 fit to bear arms.
“ These men have their property and families at
“ stake, probably half of them are engaged in trade
“ and would be ruined by war. Danger from them
“ vanishes at a touch. But the villages in the
“ hills, the Deputy-Commissioner says, can turn
“ out from 60,000 to 80,000 matchlocks. I dare
“ say! But who is to unite and command them?
“ Who is to pay them? Who is to combine their
“ operations? No one. A year of diplomacy and
“ conspiracy among their chiefs would not unite

“ these wild tribes for dangerous operations. I
“ know them perfectly and could set them at
“ variance with ease.

“ Suppose they did unite—what then? We saw
“ Bradshaw defeat ten thousand with two thousand.
“ The eight or ten thousand I proposed to leave
“ here would by proportion be equal to fifty thou-
“ sand in a pitched battle. I won Scinde with less
“ than two thousand, of which only four hundred
“ were Europeans and *all were raw troops*, and the
“ enemy were united under a regular despotic
“ Government. The force here is composed of
“ veterans. What has it to fear? Nothing. At
“ the same time Sir Colin Campbell will of course
“ keep a “bright look out” and should circum-
“ stances arise to make *him* judge a reinforcement
“ of Europeans necessary he shall have them;
“ but I will not give way to the cuckoo cry in
“ Bengal for Europeans whenever an enemy is
“ expected.

“ I have the greatest confidence in the high
“ spirit of the European officers; and in the
“ courage of the Sepoys *if well disciplined, and the*
“ *right spirit be put into them by teaching them to re-*
“ *spect themselves*. But this mania among us of per-
“ suading them that they cannot fight except at the
“ side of Europeans, makes both officers and Sepoys
“ assume the fallacy as a truism. This is wrong and
“ dangerous. I do not know whether I can restore
“ the proper confidence of the Bengal Army in its
“ powers or not, but I will not despair. We cannot
“ now work alone with our Native forces till we
“ gradually restore the temper of their courage
“ and confidence to what it was in the days gone

“ by, when Lake fought at the head of a handful
“ of Europeans.”

My earnest desire was to encourage the Native troops of all kinds, whether under my command or that of others, and therefore to Colonel Lawrence the following letter was sent after the expedition.

“ Feb. 23, 1850. As Daly's and Coke's corps
“ are not my children I am perhaps not called
“ upon to state my opinion of them. But as I
“ reviewed them both I have great pleasure in
“ saying they are two excellent regiments. I
“ really have seen none better. We all know
“ that it takes more time to form Cavalry than
“ Infantry, and Daly has got his wild horsemen
“ into excellent order—his regiment is perfectly
“ pliable and handy and has made wonderful pro-
“ gress. Tell him to practise them to long and
“ rapid charges by small bodies at first, and thus
“ he will get the whole to charge under full
“ command. I forgot to mention this to him—
“ indeed I was quite delighted with the headlong
“ charge they made, and it is a better style of
“ charge than one held *too much* in hand as our
“ Cavalry's is, I think.

“ As to Coke's—I have seen nothing superior
“ to it in drill. It is admirable, and both you
“ and I saw how this brave corps fought under
“ its excellent leader in our five days' campaign.
“ In short I am more pleased with these two
“ young commanders than I can well express. It is
“ not to be forgotten that had they gone to Kohat
“ with the execrable arms which Coke's regiment
“ had, they would have been in danger of being

“ destroyed. It was fortunate I was on the spot,
“ and, foreseeing the danger, sent them good
“ arms. I shall take immediate steps to have
“ them armed as these brave soldiers so well
“ deserve.”

CHAPTER IX.



THE Kohat expedition acquires interest as the offspring of a mistaken system established in the Punjaub. It was an early operation in a war, caused by that system; a war which has lasted more than three years against a people willing to be our friends; a foolish, unjust, unnecessary war, which may go on for many years, and should disturbances arise in the Punjaub, the Sikh insurgents will find their former enemies of the hills converted into allies.

Condemning the Government proceedings at the time, I did not fail to give the Governor-General timely warning of the evil to be expected, and the following letter written when first military operations were commencing, will exonerate me from the charge of finding fault after the event; but Lord Dalhousie had very little experience of India or of Government, none at all of military matters, and my warning was fruitless.

“ *Lahore, 20th Dec. 1849.* Allow me to draw
“ your attention to the following circumstances.

“ 1st. The employment of regular troops to
“ collect taxes has involved the Government in
“ a war among the hills.

“ 2nd. Two combats have taken place, and much blood has been shed.

“ 3rd. We appear to have had greater numbers to encounter in the *last* battle than we had in the *first*.

“ 4th. I do not know whether we have passed our own frontier or not, but the men of Swat have fought against us ; so the war is with *external* foes as well as *internal*, and we have either invaded others or been ourselves invaded. In these circumstances I want your Lordship to lay down some plans for my guidance, and *that* with the following views of affairs on your mind.

“ If Colonel Bradshaw now goes forward his force will daily become *weaker*, his enemy will become *stronger*, he must therefore be reinforced ; this will be a matter of no small expense, and as his distance increases his convoys would need strong guards. If a hill war is to be carried on means must be found to finish it with success ; it took me six months to prepare for the hill war in Sevistan. I made friends with hostile tribes in rear of the hill robbers, and after causing dissensions among them I then attacked them in front. This I fear cannot now be done in the Eusofzye country—all in their rear is hostile to us and friendly to them.

“ If Colonel Bradshaw now *retreats* he will be pursued, and his retreat will proclaim a successful resistance to our power by rebels and their allies !

“ The question therefore arises, *where are we to stop ?* These are matters for your Lordship's consideration and orders. War does not brook

“ delays, and my waiting for instructions from Calcutta is out of the question. Not only must I be prepared with your distinct and positive instructions, but I must prepare Sir Colin Campbell, and no time must be lost; for though I have nothing to apprehend any post may tell us that there is much to fear, and for this I wish to be prepared to the fullest extent. I have no doubt that you have considered the subject of this war in all its accidents, and are prepared to support Colonel Bradshaw, or recall him.”

The danger of warring in the Eusofzye country was impressed upon my mind by history and by experience. Alexander the Great lost an Army more to the Westward—the great Akbar lost two Armies in the Eusofzye mountains, and we lost one at Cabul not very far from the same place. In the Booghtee Hill campaign I had myself, though successful, experienced the greatest difficulties, and the tribes bordering the Punjaub are said, probably with truth, never to have been conquered. They did not acknowledge fealty to the Sikhs, and the Eusofzyes and Affreedees denied our claim to sovereignty—ready to accept our friendship they rejected our rule. A fort has since been built in the Eusofzyes' country, but to what purpose? The garrison has been frequently beleaguered, and a force which marched against them only last year under a Brigadier had this result:—people were killed and wounded and the force marched back!

With a less able man than Sir Colin Campbell there would probably have been the name of a fifth unhappy commander added to those of Phar-

nuches, Zein Khan, Bir Bal and McNaughten! Yet he, one of the best officers in the service, has recently been compelled to resign his command! An exposure of Lord Dalhousie's conduct in that matter belongs to others, but he may have cause to regret Sir Colin's absence. Above a hundred thousand well armed mountaineers are around Peshawur, without including the forces of the hostile King of Cabul.

It has been said in England that the Affreedee villages were burned by me. That iniquity emanated entirely from the Punjaub Administration, and my reprobation at the time was unmeasured; unavailing indeed against the civil authorities, yet openly and officially expressed where it could avail with the troops, as the following documents prove.

To Sir C. Campbell, Jan. 2nd, 1850. " I am
" much annoyed to find by Bradshaw's report that
" *villages have been destroyed*. I cannot think he
" did this, but being resolved to know whose doing
" it was send you an official memorandum through
" the Adjutant-General. What! British troops
" destroying villages and leaving poor women and
" young children to perish in the depth of winter?
" I can hardly believe this, but will take good
" care it never happens again under my command.
" A copy of my memorandum has gone to Lord
" Dalhousie to shew him that this disobedience of
" his directions is not passed over, and that I am
" resolved to know who is in fault. Bradshaw is
" an excellent officer, he has always been held
" by me as one of the best we have in the service,
" and if he has done this I shall be vexed; yet
" who else could give any orders on the subject?

“ However I care not who, if he was my own brother he should be shewn up. I hope it has been the work of the *politicals* not the soldiers.”

“ P.S. Let me know all about this matter quickly.”

The memorandum was forwarded officially through the General of Division, that all might know such savage proceedings, so derogatory to a soldier, so injurious so destructive of discipline should not be tolerated. Troops made to act as robbers soon become robbers and are easily defeated.

Official memorandum. “ It is with surprise and regret I have seen in Lieutenant-Colonel Bradshaw’s report of his march into the Eusofzye country, that villages have been destroyed by the troops.

“ I desire to know why a proceeding at variance with humanity, and contrary to the usages of civilized warfare came to be adopted? I disapprove of such cruelties, so unmilitary and so injurious to the discipline and honour of the Army. Should the troops be again called upon to act you will be pleased to issue orders that war is to be made on men, not upon defenceless *women* and *children*, by destroying their habitations and leaving them to perish without shelter from the inclemency of winter. I have heard of no outrage committed by these wild mountaineers that could call for conduct so cruel, so unmilitary, and so impolitic.”

Bradshaw, a brave and generous man thus vindicated his character :

“ Jan. 13th, 1850. I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this date, with accompaniments No. 36 and No. 4 from the Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General of the Punjaub Division, and the Adjutant-General of the Army respectively, and in reply thereto, to enclose, for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, a copy of the instructions furnished for my guidance during the detached command in the Eusofzye country.

“ These instructions were followed to the letter, as far as lay in my power, and having done so, the amount of injury to be inflicted on the property of the foreigners and robbers, occupying the villages alluded to, rested with the political authorities.

“ *These villages were destroyed by the orders and under the personal superintendence of the Deputy-Commissioner.*

“ Having completely routed and driven the enemy from the valley, I remained there until informed by him that everything he desired had been effected, and that the presence of my force was no longer required: on receiving which intimation I immediately vacated the valley.

“ With regard to the second paragraph of the Adjutant-General's letter I beg to state that as far as I can be aware of the Deputy-Commissioner's intentions, the villages in question were destroyed in consequence of their belonging to a race of people who entertained a considerable band of mounted robbers, to the terror of the

“ peaceable villages in the Eusofzye district,
“ and that their vicinity to the hills, affording as
“ it did an easy retreat to the inhabitants, rendered
“ their destruction necessary as the only marked
“ punishment that could be inflicted upon the
“ occupants. It was ascertained that the women,
“ children and all property had been carefully
“ removed, some weeks previous, to other villages
“ in the Swat and Bujair country; and these tribes
“ with very considerable aid were thus enabled to
“ defend their position to the last with slight risk
“ of loss.

“ One day previous to my advance into the
“ valley the Deputy-Commissioners did, to my
“ knowledge, communicate with the head men of
“ these villages to the effect, that if they would
“ deliver up the mounted robbers, stolen property
“ &c. they would not be molested: of this proposal
“ no notice was taken excepting by their opening
“ a fire upon our pickets on the first opportunity
“ that presented itself.”

Colonel Bradshaw was a distinguished officer, able to sustain the highest opinion. All his comrades regret him, none more than he who pays this tribute to his memory.

The civil authorities were here, as in the defile of Kohat, the burners of villages; but Bradshaw's operations being in December left the inhabitants without shelter from the severity of winter, whereas in February, at Kohat, the cold was past and the roofing of the houses easily restored. The first caused much suffering, the last only indignation, neither produced good. I said Lord Dalhousie should be told of the *disobedience of his directions*. Those were “ If resistance should be attempted it

“ should be put down severely but without *unnecessary harshness*, and under all circumstances the head men of the villages will be brought prisoners to Peshawur.” From this it might be concluded that the burning would be rebuked and prohibited; but the orders given to Colonel Lawrence at Kohat, two months after, proved that Lord Dalhousie thought burning villages no *unnecessary harshness*.” He indirectly approved of such savage orders by thanking the civil authorities! He and his *politicals* like many other men mistook rigour with cruelty for vigour!

My dispatch to the Governor-General announcing the termination of the expedition ended thus. “ In this report to your Lordship I have confined myself to *fact*. In a separate letter I shall take the liberty of stating my opinion as to the *causes* which have produced these unfortunate events and on the state of affairs here.”

Separate letter. — “ *Hussein Abdal*, February 25th, 1850. I received your letter from Bombay dated 31st January. It was quite impossible for me to answer your minutes on my Military Report sooner than I have done. It was full of grave matter which needed all the consideration I could give it, and also that I should see the stations. However, it is now done and goes with this letter. You will see also by my dispatch that we had a most disagreeable episode to my tour!

“ As regards the Kohat affair, so far as I am able to learn from minute inquiry and from all parties, the case stands thus: an enormous increase of price was put upon salt by shutting the mines; this vitally affected the Affreedee tribes,

“ being a necessary of life ; and these people being
“ very poor, it produced great discontent and I
“ believe it to be the real and chief motive of
“ their attack upon our detachment of Sappers.

“ They who live by ‘ *black mail* ’ do not like roads
“ being made *easy*, whose *difficulty* is the robber’s
“ means of life and revenue ! We not only tried
“ to make this road in our own territory ; but we
“ began it in their territory. This was not alto-
“ gether consistent with justice ; but still not
“ very outrageously unjust ; because we paid these
“ people 6000 rupees a year for a safe passage
“ through their defiles ; and a passage is not alto-
“ gether safe where one runs the risk of breaking
“ one’s neck over precipices. Still it was not just,
“ even if we paid the black mail of 6000 rupees.
“ ‘ But,’ say the Affreedces, ‘ you did not ! ’ This
“ brings me to the third cause of this attack.
“ They say that — did not pay *them* ; he paid
“ a prince of the Sooja-ool-Moolta family, who lives
“ at Kohat and is a favourite of —. That
“ the Lieutenant gives this ‘ Shah-i-Zudah ’ or
“ prince, the money (6000 rupees) that he pockets
“ most of it and distributes the remainder among
“ a few villages situated on the road through the
“ mountains, but the powerful Affreedce tribe get
“ none of the money.

“ They say our occupying the tower and the top
“ of the Pass with Edwards’ men is an invasion of
“ their territory, and an insult ; that they were
“ never conquered, never owned allegiance to the
“ Sikhs ; that we have no right to invade them.
“ That if we pay 6000 rupees a year to the proper
“ people, they will insure the freedom of the Pass

“ to us and its safety. Now my dear Lord, I tell
“ you what I have heard and for some part I can
“ vouch, for others I cannot; but these are the
“ ostensible causes as put forth by the Affreedees.
“ I dare say the Board has another story. The
“ Depnty-Commissioner agrees with me about the
“ salt affair having been the chief cause; and he
“ is distinctly of my opinion that it is a mistake
“ increasing the price of salt; at least so I under-
“ stand him. I tell you all I can gather that
“ both sides of the story may reach you.

“ As to my opinion, it is, that it will be much
“ better to secure the free passage of the defile
“ between Peshawur and Kohat by paying the
“ tribes than by force of arms. These defiles are
“ not to be easily guarded by us, and the expense
“ will be very great; a thousand rupees a month
“ will enlist these tribes and make the Pass safe.
“ I do not think that three times that amount will
“ secure them by force: nothing can prevent
“ matchlock-men firing at the traveller from the
“ cliffs except making it the robber's interest not
“ to do so. Every murder would require an expe-
“ dition to punish the offence, and no expedition
“ would be certain of success! If any man tries
“ to make the march I did, with an inadequate
“ force he will run some risk of being cut off. I
“ do not expect that you will agree with me in my
“ remarks, because our opinions about the Govern-
“ ment of the Punjaub are so different; but I hope
“ you will give me credit for the frankness and
“ honesty of my opinion.”

The following acknowledgment by the Governor-General in Council of the Kohat service might

lead to a supposition that it had been conducted by others, not by me. My appreciation of Lord Dalhousie's military judgment and that of his Council was indeed such as to render their tacit reproof of no moment; yet my age and bad health considered, and that I had been on horseback fifteen hours each day, more or less under fire, my exertions might have been noticed: especially by a Governor-General, only thirty-seven, who had left his Government to sail about for health with no small detriment to the public weal.

"Honourable Sir,—We have had the honour to receive your Excellency's dispatch, dated the 16th February, enclosing reports of the operations against the Affreedees in the neighbourhood of Kohat—and in reply beg to express the satisfaction of the Government with the manner in which this outrage by the mountain tribes has been met by the troops in the field.

"2. The Government has much pleasure in concurring in the praises bestowed by your Excellency on the conduct of the several corps, both officers and men, who composed the force which has been employed, and who have so highly distinguished themselves throughout the operations in the hills.

"3. We request your Excellency to convey to Brigadier Sir Colin Campbell, the commanding officers, the officers, and men, the approbation of the Government of India and their thanks for the service which has been performed.

"4. The order of merit may very fitly be conferred on the soldiers your Excellency has named; and the requisite steps for that purpose,

“ shall be taken in the Military Department,
“ &c. &c. &c, (Signed),

“ DALHOUSIE, J. LITTLER,

“ F. CURRIE, J. LOWIS.

“ Fort William, 15th March, 1850.”

The following extracts from Sir Colin Campbell soon confirmed the correctness of my anticipations of mischief from provoking the hill tribes.

Peshawur, March 5th, 1850. Extract. “ Intelligence has this day been received by Lawrence, “ from Captain Coke, up to the afternoon of the 2nd “ instant—Of the Affreedees having collected in “ great numbers on the 28th ultimo, round the “ tower occupied by our people on the Kotal or “ top of the Pass—of their having obliged the “ garrison to abandon the enclosure outside and “ retire to the inside of the tower; and of their “ having got possession of the tank which supplied “ the garrison with water.

“ Coke had marched on the 1st from Kohat and “ succeeded in relieving the garrison from a “ similar position of difficulty, and introducing “ supplies of food and ammunition, of which latter “ he had not over much to spare. This operation “ cost him 12 killed or missing, and 12 wounded, “ of his regiment. The tower was closely rein- “ vested the following day by the Affreedees, and “ the communication of the garrison with the “ tank again cut off. Without water the place “ was not tenable, and it had been shown how “ easily the enemy could deprive the garrison of “ all supply. Kohat had to be cared for, and “ much ammunition had been expended in the “ previous four days by those Irregular troops, who “ cannot be prevented from firing incessantly.

“ To move from Kohat a second time with his
“ whole force, and that not a large one, to attack
“ a strong position for the purpose of throwing in
“ the few supplies the tower could contain, and
“ opening the communication of the garrison with
“ the tank, from which they could again be cut off
“ the moment he retired, and which he could not
“ accomplish without considerable loss and the
“ expenditure of more ammunition than he could
“ spare, made him think it better and more ad-
“ visable to withdraw the force from the tower, it
“ not being defensible in its present state except
“ at a great sacrifice of life, with the more than
“ likelihood of failure after all.

“ The only chance, in the opinion of Lawrence,
“ of these Affreedees being brought to proper
“ terms, is to destroy their crops, now ripening,
“ and to blow up and level every tower and house
“ in the defile between Akore and the entrance
“ of the Pass on the Kohat side. The crops will
“ not be in a state sufficiently advanced to receive
“ this injury until the beginning of April, and it
“ is yet to be seen whether this severity will open
“ the Pass permanently for us between this and
“ Kohat. As this measure is likely to be adopted,
“ and that their houses and towers could be
“ effectually destroyed at the same time, and the
“ period so near at hand when it is to be done if
“ done at all, it did not appear to me advisable, or
“ to Lawrence either, that anything should be
“ attempted from this side against these people
“ until then.

“ Supposing the houses and crops for this year
“ to be destroyed, and these people still remain
“ hostile and interrupt our communication with

“ Kohat, what is next to be done with them ? The
“ hot season will be by that time not far distant,
“ when the sun burns very fiercely in these regions.
“ In the meantime the women and children of the
“ Affreedees have found shelter and protection
“ with the families of the adjoining tribes, and it
“ is the countenance and shelter thus afforded to
“ their families by the adjoining tribes that has
“ been one reason, in my opinion, for their holding
“ out so doggedly against us.

“ They have derived from time immemorial
“ their livelihood principally, if not entirely, from
“ the sale of salt and fire-wood, both of which I
“ imagine they obtained without any cost beyond
“ the labour of their collection. The tax recently
“ ordered to be levied on the salt, upon its removal
“ from the mine, they regard as depriving them of
“ a means of livelihood they have enjoyed before
“ our arrival without any such impost, or, at any
“ rate, any such amount of impost being levied.”

On receipt of this communication my anxiety to
impress Lord Dalhousie with the danger and ex-
pense of this frontier war induced me again to
address him thus:—

Sickerala, 11th March, 1850. Extract. “ What
“ I feared has taken place ; the Affreedees so far
“ from being cowed, as Lawrence expected they
“ would be by the burning of their villages, are
“ more exasperated and have taken the Pass,
“ which can only be held by a work. The regular
“ report will of course have reached you. Campbell
“ tells me Coke lost twelve killed, and as many
“ wounded on the 2nd. The intention of the
“ Deputy-Commissioner is to make a foray next
“ month and destroy the crops of the tribe. I am

“ quite opposed to this proceeding for the following reasons. *First*.—It will cost many lives and a good deal of money. *Secondly*.—It will exasperate these tribes without any definite object, for they are not dependent on these crops, as they have plenty of room in the mountains, whence they can always reach our travellers. *Thirdly*.—It is to wage war with an enemy you cannot reach, and who, in the long run, will have the best of it. We cannot sacrifice twenty or thirty men every harvest, and every time we want to pass a convoy through this defile: I therefore have told Sir Colin Campbell that I will not consent to sacrifice soldiers in such work, unless I have positive orders from the Supreme Government.

“ I see no plan but that which I before mentioned; that is to take the Affreede tribes *into pay*, and purchase the right of passing safely through their territory. They killed some of our men and we slew a good many of theirs in return! In this state I think a man of good sense might so deal with them as to make up a peace with advantage to both parties; but if we destroy their crops I do not think this will be easily done. They will refuse peace on any terms. If your Lordship resolves on keeping the Pass by force, we must, at once, collect workmen and build a fort on the *top*. The plan is all ready, for I made Tremenhære measure, and I gave him the plan. The cost will be very great, not of the fort itself, but of assembling the workmen and guarding them. But my own opinion is, that we should be wrong. I strongly recommend that the fort of Kohat should be re-

“ paired immediately. It is fortunate that you did
“ not begin to build the fort which the Board
“ wanted in the plains of Kohat: we must have
“ either had the whole of the work destroyed and
“ lost everything, or been obliged to encamp a
“ large force for its protection. The beautiful
“ little town of Kohat would have been without
“ protection, and the inhabitants must have leagued
“ with the hill tribes in self-defence. Its own old
“ fort is exactly where it ought to be, and needs
“ very little to make it a perfect protection to the
“ town.

“ To tell you the truth I think there will be
“ great difficulty with this same Pass of Kohat, and
“ it would be better to give both civil and military
“ power to Captain Coke, who is a man of ability
“ and experience. I know nothing of young
“ — but he must have extraordinary abilities if
“ at his age he can manage these tribes, and if the
“ Affredec account be true he cannot do so. The
“ acts of the Affredec prove they believe what
“ they say, whether true or not, viz., that — is
“ deceived by the Shah-i-Zudah. I tell you these
“ things that you may form your own opinion more
“ readily.”

These suggestions passed as the idle wind. Lord Dalhousie preferred the opinions of young men of slight ability and little or no experience to mine, and that of the war-bred Sir Colin; the result has been suitable to the wisdom. But the story of the mutiny must now be resumed.

On the 25th of February, returning from Peshawur, intelligence reached me that the 66th Native Infantry had refused the reduced pay and openly mutinied! Thus the smouldering insubor-

dination among twenty-four battalions, which at Rawul Pindee and Wuzzecrabad had produced sparks, was here kindled into flame. *The crisis was come!* The 66th were in Govindghur, the strongest fortress in the Punjaub, close to Umritzer the holy city of the Sikhs. There were no Europeans save their officers in the place, which the mutineers had attempted to seize. It would have been a decisive blow, for in Umritzer or immediately around it sojourned the majority of the Khalsa Army, so recently fought with at Chillianwallah and Goojerat—men who had put us to straits in five general actions! They were supposed still to be fifty thousand strong, and known to be sullen, thirsting for vengeance, abiding events!

How was the fortress saved?

Lieutenant-Colonel Bradford, an excellent officer of the Bengal Army, returning to the old provinces with the 1st Native Cavalry had accidentally encamped outside, and was on the parade of the 66th when their shout of mutiny arose. Seeing the danger he hastily rejoined his men and led them dismounted towards the gate, whereupon the guard, hearing the tramp of his approaching troops, run with great tumult to close the massive portals, saying the Cavalry should not enter. Their European officer remonstrated, was disregarded, and improperly abandoned his post to make a report. At that moment Captain McDonald, a man of a different character, arrived, and rushed sword in hand upon the mutineers; they shrunk from the sweep of his weapon, and he, grasping the almost closed gate drew it back just as Bradford came up with his men. Thus the place was saved!

Had the Sepoys closed the gate, their European

officers must have made a desperate effort to recover the command and been massacred ; or, seeing the futility of such an attempt, remained prisoners. In ten minutes the news would have spread all over the great city of Umritzer with unbounded exaggerations ; from thence through the district called Manga, notoriously disaffected, and the first impulse of the disbanded Khalsa soldiers would have been to rise in arms !

The Sepoys at Wuzzeerabad said "*We will wait till the other regiments come from the old provinces and do as they do.*" The 66th were come, and mutinied ! What security for the Government that this would not spread from station to station ? A drop of blood spilled at Govindghur, and the Vellore tragedy would have been re-enacted ; and though Sir Walter Gilbert had as much courage and activity as Gillespie, he could not have recovered Govindghur as the latter did Vellore. For Gillespie had only the mutineers in that fortress to deal with ; Gilbert would have had fifty thousand Sikh soldiers outside on his hands, and a portion of his own troops secretly engaged to the 66th regiment.

When this news reached me I acted without hesitation. Lord Dalhousie's whereabouts was unknown, he was supposed to be at sea, but the following letter was immediately dispatched.

" Feb. 27th 1850. The mutiny of the 66th will, ere this, be known to you. I only received the Courts Martial and Court of Inquiry the day before yesterday, and gave my best consideration as to the course to take, and having decided lost no time in acting. My mind was not long in making up. The whole 66th regiment *shouted*

“ *in disapprobation* of its commanding officer,
“ when on the parade and under arms! What was
“ his crime? He had ordered a soldier to be con-
“ fined for having forced a sentry and by violence
“ led his comrades to seize the arms of the regi-
“ ment*! This shout was the act of *every com-*
“ *pany!* Well! what next? The guard, formed
“ of men of every company, endeavoured to shut
“ the gates and prevent the troops, Cavalry from
“ without, who were coming to the aid of the
“ commanding officer, from entering. That is to
“ say, this guard tried to seize the fort! This is
“ the plain English of the matter. This wholesale
“ mutiny could not be concocted without the aid,
“ or at least, without the knowledge of the Native
“ officers; yet no whisper of it was made to the
“ European officers!

“ Had the Native officers even shewn any
“ activity, any readiness to seize offenders, there
“ would, perhaps, be some cause to doubt their
“ connivance at this mutiny; but their whole
“ conduct did not exceed a passive forbearance
“ from active mutiny! Your Lordship well knows
“ my great objection to the disbanding of regi-
“ ments. I had that power placed in my hands
“ in Scinde and I used it not. But here hesitation
“ might endanger the safety of the Punjaub, even
“ of India, and I at once issued the general order,
“ copy of which is enclosed, and hope you will
“ approve of it. Each succeeding pay day might

* In the Bengal Army, the men's arms are lodged after parade under charge of sentries, and can only be taken back by order of the European officers. In the Queen's Service it was formerly the same, but the "*Bells of Arms*" are becoming obsolete. The 66th regiment was therefore in open mutiny.

“ produce a regiment in mutiny ; not an hour is
“ to be lost, and, with the Sergeant’s answer
“ to Major Chamberlain fresh in my mind, I
“ resolved to shew these *Brahmins* that they
“ cannot control our enlistment. It was neces-
“ sary to strike at once, and to strike with
“ vigour!

“ What I have done will put the Company to no
“ expense—things remain the same, and our pro-
“ mise is performed to one out of the three Goorka
“ regiments! I mean to repeat the operation if
“ another regiment mutinies, unless your Lordship
“ disapproves. The matter is a very dangerous
“ affair, and I really see no other method of sup-
“ porting the power of Government in this very
“ perilous crisis.

“ With regard to Sir Walter Gilbert, I think he
“ ought to have revised the sentence of fourteen
“ years’ imprisonment on the daring mutineers who
“ seized the gate. Your Lordship knows that I
“ only did not hang five men of the 32nd because
“ I thought transportation for life was the most
“ fearful punishment of the two! Sir Walter very
“ properly acted at once, but in this case I think
“ injudiciously. His leniency overturned the sys-
“ tem of severity which I had acted on, but the
“ thing was done, and he left me without power to
“ change it: I am not satisfied with the officers
“ of the 66th. Your Lordship will observe, in
“ reading the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry,
“ that they have tried to diminish the crime of
“ their men. They call the shout of disapproba-
“ tion raised by the armed mutineers at their com-
“ mander ‘*a murmur.*’ Look at Lieut.-Col. Brad-
“ ford’s and Lieut.-Col. Campbell’s evidence! They

“ call it by its right name, ‘*a shout of disapproba-*
“ ‘*tion,*’ I shall not let these murmuring officers off
“ without a reprimand. I like to see officers asso-
“ ciate with their men in all proper feelings, but
“ not screening mutiny, and an attempt to seize
“ the fort of Govindghur in the midst of the Sikh
“ power! Had these mutineers succeeded the
“ chances were that the Sikh soldiers might have
“ risen at once.”

The general order enclosed was written with the severity of censure called for by the crisis, but it is not necessary to repeat such censures, and the following extracts will explain the measures alluded to in the dispatch. “*The Native officers, non-*
“ *commissioned officers and private Sepoys of the*
“ *66th regiment are to be marched to Umballah,*
“ *and there struck off from the Service of the Hon-*
“ *ourable East India Company ; and his Excellency*
“ *directs that the colours of the 66th regiment are*
“ *to be delivered over to the loyal and brave men of*
“ *the Nusseree Goorka battalion, and that the 66th*
“ *regiment shall in future be denominated the 66th,*
“ *or Goorka regiment. The 66th have brought*
“ *down ruin and disgrace upon the regiment!*
“ *When a mutinous corps has endeavoured to*
“ *seize a fortress which a confiding Government*
“ *believed it had intrusted to faithful soldiers,*
“ *it is time that vengeance should fall upon the*
“ *whole.*”

After exposing and rebuking a laxity of discipline which had prevailed, eulogising Colonel Bradford and his regiment, and bestowing merited praise on Captain McDonald's energetic and intrepid conduct, the order thus proceeded.
“ *The Commander-in-Chief will take this opportu-*

“ nity of expressing his fervent hope, that the young European officers of this Army, who are full of ability zeal and good feeling towards the natives, will see the necessity of associating as much as possible with the Native Officers, and make them their comrades in every sense of the word.”

Bradford's regiment was returning to the old provinces—wherefore the pay difficulty did not affect his men's pockets, or furnish a motive for insubordination in their isolated position ; moreover, he was a firm and able commander. This it is necessary to note, because afterwards Lord Dalhousie said the 66th mutinied *“ because they were taken by surprise—that they had looked to getting higher pay, and suddenly hearing it was not to be so, in a moment of disappointment lost their discipline for an instant.”* If so, why did he not restore them to their colours and honour ? He dared not ! But utterly unfounded are these his assertions. The 66th at Lucknow had, long before they entered the Punjaub, heard the order for reducing the pay. Major Troup, their commander, had not himself read it according to regulation, *but it had been read to the Sepoys by others, and canvassed throughout the regiment.* Moreover, at Lucknow and along the march, the men had declared their determination to have the higher pay when they reached the Punjaub.

It will be recollected that the three Goorka regiments in the Company's service had been, when starving, promised through me by the Governor-General the same pay as Seyoys of the line, and that their screams of delight at the promise were astounding. That promise made 7th October, 1849, ill-

remembered by Lord Dalhousie, was not redeemed until the 22nd March, 1850, and then only with one regiment and perforce ! Such delays are constant in India touching military matters which require instant decision, and produce a discontented spirit which never exists under just arrangements. This might have been here very hurtful, was certainly blameable, and personally disagreeable, as involving me in a seeming breach of faith : wherefore the opportunity to combine a redemption of promise with a great public benefit, was eagerly seized, so far as the Nusseree Goorka battalion was concerned.

Let the whole chain of evidence regarding the mutiny now be summed up.

First—A natural desire of soldiers to keep a high pay which they had received for some time.

Secondly—The Government reducing that high pay to a much lower one.

Thirdly—Discontent manifested by mutiny in two regiments at Rawul Pindee, and reason to suppose it extended secretly to all other regiments going to the Punjaub.

Fourthly—This discontent appears again at Delhi some *five hundred miles from Rawul Pindee*, in a regiment ordered for the Punjaub.

Fifthly—It breaks out in the larger station of Wuzzecrabad nearer to Head Quarters ; but awed by a strong force of Europeans, the mutineers declare “ they will wait till more Sepoy regiments “ come up, and then act in concert.”

Sixthly—A regiment at Lucknow, *eight hundred miles from Rawul Pindee*, displays the same spirit, continues it on the march to Govindghur, and

there with open mutiny attempts to seize the gates of the fortress, containing a large treasure and magazines of ammunition.

Seventhly—An extraordinary increase in the number of letters sent through the post-offices is observed during the foregoing events.

In face of these proofs Lord Dalhousie, to justify his conduct when danger was past—indeed he could in no other mode reconcile it with sense or the appearance of justice—pretended *there was no mutiny! that I had libelled the Army!* Moreover that I believed not in the mutiny because I *praised* the Army,—both cannot stand,—but many mutineers were sentenced to death, transportation, long imprisonment, and hundreds consigned by disbanding to infamy and destitution. Were they pardoned by him as innocent! There is here only a choice between savage oppression and untruth.

Were the sentenced all of the 66th? No! There were others who had insidiously attempted to organize a wide combination for passive mutiny; that alone was proof of most dangerous insubordination, and that judicious means were taken to quell it, for it was quelled!

Let it also be noticed, that when the 66th was disbanded, the mutiny ceased entirely. Why? The Brahmins saw that the Goorkas, another race, could be brought into the ranks of the Company's Army—a race dreaded as more warlike than their own. *Their religious combination was by that one stroke rendered abortive.*

CHAPTER X.

THIS work opened with a brief outline of the causes which led to my resigning a high position with sixteen thousand a year. Such advantages could only be relinquished because it was dishonourable to keep them without corresponding services. Here are the proofs:

On the 20th January, 1850, twelve days before the 66th mutinied, when the crisis was evidently approaching, and it behoved me to act with the greatest caution, Brigadier Hearsey, writing officially from Wuzzeerabad—after the Sepoys there had declared they would await the arrival of more regiments to enforce their demand for higher pay—terminated an analysis of a *different* allowance regulation, of a partial nature; but which had just become applicable to his Sepoys. He ended with these words: “It *appears* to me to be altogether a
“ new regulation and ought to be carefully ex-
“ plained to the Sepoys on parade if it is to be the
“ rule for the future, and to be enforced, and not
“ thus introduced for the first time in a ‘*new*
“ ‘*addition of Pay and Audit Regulation.*’”

Countersigned by Sir Walter Gilbert in approval, this letter reached me when going to Peshawur,

about a fortnight after quitting Wuzzeerabad, when the mutiny there had been but just quelled. The Adjutant-General Grant laid the matter before me, expressing his entire agreement with Hearsey and Gilbert. He said, "*the regulation in question had been concocted by subordinates in office, merely to save trouble, and he did not believe the Governor-General or Commander-in-Chief of the time knew it bore hard on the Sepoy. That from its nature it only came into operation locally, and could be known but to a few regiments: to enforce it at Wuzzeerabad would be dangerous!*"

This representation guided my conduct. The Bengal regulations were different from those of the Bombay force with which I had served, and details were necessarily referred to the Adjutant-General. The regulation was said to be new, and certainly deprived the Sepoys, unjustly, of old allowances at a moment when they were mutinous for higher pay: wherefore Colonel Grant wrote as follows.

"*January 20th, 1850.*—With reference to the letter of the Brigadier commanding at Wuzzeerabad, No. 21 of the 11th instant, bearing your countersignature, bringing to notice the difference between the rates of compensation for dearness of rations to the Native troops, contained in the Pay and Audit Regulations for 1845, and those specified in the Code for 1849, I have the honour, by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, to request that you will cause instructions to be immediately issued to the several officers of the Commissariat Department concerned, to adjust the compensation in accordance with the old regulations as laid down in the Code for 1845, PENDING THE RESULT OF A REFERENCE WHICH

“ WILL BE MADE TO THE SUPREME GOVERNMENT
“ ON THE SUBJECT.”

In the same hour that reference, as given below, was made, the words printed in italics only being mine.

“ *Rawul Pindee, 20th January, 1850.*—I am
“ directed by the Commander-in-Chief to forward
“ for the purpose of being submitted to the Hon^{ble}
“ the President of the Council of India in Council,
“ copy of a letter addressed to me by Brigadier
“ J. B. Hearsey, C.B. commanding at Wuzzeera-
“ bad, No. 21 of the 11th instant, with annexments,
“ drawing attention to the difference between the
“ rates of compensation for dearness of rations to
“ the Native troops contained in the Pay and Audit
“ Regulations for 1845, and those specified in the
“ Code published in 1849.

“ By the old regulation the soldier received
“ compensation in money on each article of his
“ ration, calculated separately, when these pro-
“ visions exceeded the regulated prices. By the
“ new regulation the aggregate of the bazaar cost of
“ the whole ration is calculated, and from this the
“ Government rate, also aggregated, is deducted;
“ so that at Wuzzeerabad, as shown by the state-
“ ment of the Commissariat officer, dated 11th
“ instant, each Native soldier is said to lose one
“ anna six pice per mensem by the operation of
“ the new regulation.

“ This change in the regulation was not observed
“ by Sir C. Napier's predecessor, when the Code for
“ 1849 was sent to Army Head Quarters for any
“ comment the Commander-in-Chief might see fit
“ to make; and Sir Charles Napier is persuaded
“ that the alteration has been introduced without

“ the circumstances of the case being fully and
“ clearly explained to the Supreme Government.

“ The Commander-in-Chief considers the change
“ that has thus been made, to the injury of the
“ soldier, to be both impolitic and unjust, and he
“ feels assured that it only requires to be brought
“ to the notice of the Government to ensure its
“ immediate rectification.

“ In the mean time, confident of the support of
“ Government, the Commander-in-Chief has directed
“ that compensation shall be issued to the Native
“ troops serving in the Punjaub, in accordance with
“ the rules laid down in the old regulation; *as in*
“ *the present state of transition from Scinde pay and*
“ *allowances, to the regular pay of the troops, a tran-*
“ *sition which has produced a most unprovoked state*
“ *of insubordination in some regiments, the Com-*
“ *mander-in-Chief thinks that no cause of dissatis-*
“ *faction should be given to the troops.*”

This letter reached Calcutta the 13th February; the answer came back the 26th. *One month and seven days therefore were required for the Commander-in-Chief to communicate with the Supreme Council!* Yet Lord Dalhousie, as shall be shewn, condemned me for exercising any discretion at a moment so full of danger, and on a point so purely military! He would have had me wait for an answer; which might have come as waste paper in the midst of terrible disasters caused by the delay! Is this the way to govern? Or is it only one of many signs of personal enmity? Let it be recollected that I was of the Supreme Council as well as Commander-in-Chief—not that my rights as such were adverted to at the time; there was no reason, none imagined the pro-

ceedings could be thought an encroachment on the civil powers of Lord Dalhousie. He was far away on the Pacific Ocean, and had left me full assurance of support: but also the painful task of patching up his political blunders!

From that wonderful place the "*Council Chamber in Fort William*," the answer came, and neither Colonel Grant nor myself could repress the thought that it was dictated by the very subordinates who had originally made the alteration to the injury of the Sepoy.

"*Council Chamber, Feb. 14th, 1850.* I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 13 of the 20th ultimo, submitting copy of a dispatch from Brigadier Hearsey commanding at Wuzzeerabad, reporting the circumstance of his having noticed a difference between the regulation recorded in the Pay Code of 1845, and that laid down in the Code of 1849, relative to compensation to the native soldiery for the dearness of their rations; intimating that the Commander-in-Chief, being persuaded that the alteration in question has been made without the circumstances of the case being fully and clearly explained to Government, and considering it to be both impolitic and unjust, has ordered that compensation shall be issued to the Native troops serving in the Punjaub, in accordance with the rule published in the Code of 1845.

"2. In reply I am desired by the Hon. President of the Council of India in Council, to observe for the information of the Commander-in-Chief, that Brigadier Hearsey has wholly misled His Excellency, in stating that the rule in the Code of 1849 is 'altogether a new regu-

“ ‘lation,’ as the following brief history of the regulation on the subject will shew His Excellency.

“ 3. Compensation appears to have been first granted to the Native troops, serving at some of the Western stations, and limited to ottah whenever that article of food should be selling under fifteen seers for the rupee.

“ 4. Compensation seems to have been subsequently passed, on special application, to the Native troops at other stations of the Army, where a scarcity of ottah prevailed, but the rule was not extended to the Native soldiery throughout this Presidency until the year 1844, when Lord Ellenborough's Government in the general order No. 79, dated 12th March of that year, in defining the allowances admissible to the troops serving in the Province of Scinde, ruled that compensation should be granted, not for dearness of ottah only, as formerly, but also for the several minor articles (dholl, ghee, and salt) composing the Native soldiers' rations. This is the order entered in the Code of 1845, page 108.

“ 5. In the following year, Lord Hardinge's Government resolved to sanction a more liberal scale of allowances, and other advantages, to the troops in Scinde, and at the same time to relieve the Native soldiery generally from the expenses to which, up to that period, they had been subjected in providing their own huts, and for the wages of certain of the servants necessarily employed with Native corps, and as the rule of March 1844 had been *found in practice very troublesome and inconvenient*, as well as in-

“ jurious, inasmuch as, though at some stations
“ one of the minor articles of rations may occasion-
“ ally be more expensive, the other articles may,
“ as frequently, be procurable at rates favourable
“ to the soldier, *advantage was taken of the oppor-*
“ *tunity thus afforded to introduce the existing rule,*
“ and accordingly, in para. 3, of the general
“ order by the Governor-General in Council of
“ the 15th August, 1845, it was declared that com-
“ pensation would be granted ‘ whenever the price
“ ‘ of provisions forming the Native soldiers’ diet
“ ‘ shall exceed three rupees eight annas, the
“ ‘ aggregate of the rates for the several articles
“ ‘ as laid down in the general order of the
“ ‘ 26th February, 1824,’ for troops on service.

“ 6. It is true that this rule was published in a
“ general order fixing the allowances admissible
“ to the troops in Scinde; but seven days subse-
“ quently, on the 22nd August, 1845, in reviewing
“ a letter of instructions on the subject proposed
“ by the Military Board to be addressed to the
“ Commissary-General, the Governor-General in
“ Council caused it to be explained to that body
“ that ‘ as regards money rations that item of
“ ‘ grant will cease in Scinde from the 1st Septem-
“ ‘ ber next, compensation only being allowable
“ ‘ there, as elsewhere, whenever the price of pro-
“ ‘ visions forming the soldiers’ rations shall ex-
“ ‘ ceed three rupees eight annas, the aggregate of
“ ‘ the rates for the several articles, &c.’ ”

“ 7. And still farther to remove all doubt on
“ the subject, on the 17th December, 1847, a
“ general order (No. 389 of 1847) was issued by
“ the Governor-General in Council republishing
“ to the Army para. 3 of the order of the 15th

“ August, 1845, already referred to, declaring that
“ that para. ‘ was intended to be, and is to be
“ ‘ considered applicable to the Native troops
“ ‘ generally wherever they may be stationed.’

“ 8. The general order in question of 15th
“ August, 1845 was, previous to its publication,
“ submitted to the late Commander-in-Chief, Lord
“ Gough, and its provisions were cordially ap-
“ proved by His Excellency as appears from his
“ minute on the subject, dated 10th June, 1845,
“ on record in this department.

“ 9. The Commander-in-Chief, I am instructed
“ to state will thus perceive that the change in
“ the regulation of 12th March, 1844 made on
“ the 15th August, 1845, and explained in the
“ general order of 17th December, 1847 was not
“ ordered hastily or unadvisedly by the Supreme
“ Government; but on the contrary, after much
“ consideration on different occasions, and full
“ deliberation, that it had been in operation
“ throughout the presidency long previous to the
“ publication of the Pay Code of 1849 without
“ as far as Government are aware, a single
“ objection being offered to it, and that it was
“ adopted as being perfectly just, equitable, and
“ politic by the late Governor-General (Lord
“ Hardinge) in Council and by the late Com-
“ mander-in-Chief, Lord Gough, and, I am to
“ add, is still so considered by the President in
“ Council.

“ 10th. Under such circumstances the President
“ in Council cannot but regret that his Excellency
“ should without previous communication with
“ Government, have ordered a general regulation
“ passed by the Governor-General of India in

“ Council, to be set aside at any of the stations of
“ the Army ; but his Honour in Council does not
“ consider it expedient to do more than thus
“ explain the real state of the case, until the
“ arrival of the Most Noble the Governor-General,
“ who is shortly expected at the presidency.

“ Signed R. WYLLIE, Major &c. &c.”

This laboured sophistry shall not pass without exposure. Brigadier Hearsey is quoted as saying the rule of 1849 is altogether a new regulation. But his words were—*This appears to me.*

What have the paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 to do with the subject ? Absolutely nothing ! Except four lines in paragraph 5, here italicised, as marking why Lord Ellenborough's rule, favourable to the Sepoy was altered to one unfavourable. “ *It was found in practice very troublesome and inconvenient.* ”

With very good reason I called it unjust and impolitic. To deprive a soldier of pay once allowed is breaking a promise tacitly made when he enlists ; and to do so when four hundred thousand soldiers are interested is impolitic. It was deemed by me an alteration introduced by subordinates without being fully explained to the Supreme Government because Lord Hardinge would never, knowingly, do anything detrimental to the Sepoy. Just arrived, he had to deal with great events ; India and its Armies were to him new, and it was all but impossible to examine details as to the pounds of grain sold for a rupee, and whether a few soldiers in a few places gained or lost some half-pence ! It was not *true* that I suspended the regulation because of its injustice

and general impolicy, but that *it was critically dangerous at the moment.*

The 5th paragraph falsely implies that Lord Ellenborough's regulation was injurious to the soldier. No! "it was *troublesome*," nothing more!

Paragraph 10th. The Council regrets my acting on an emergency without previous communication with Government. All persons on the spot thought the matter too urgent for delay, and the suspension was only pending an appeal to Council—very different from setting it aside without authority.

This display of Council wisdom arrived at the termination of the Kohat fighting. Ill, and vexed at the loss of brave comrades, victims to ignorant governing, I answered my colleagues with abruptness; yet, the feelings passing in my mind and the great provocation considered, with surprising moderation! A terrible crisis for India was to be dealt with, and all my energies were engaged to avert spilling of blood with a shock to the very foundation of the empire. Was that a time to soothe silly men by humility? Thus it run. "I do not question the propriety of what Lords Ellenborough Hardinge and Gough thought upon the subject of Sepoys' allowances; nor what the President in Council thinks; nor do I know what with time to study the question in all its details I should think myself. But when every regiment in the Punjaub was in a state not far short of mutiny about the reduction of pay, it would be something like madness to enter upon a fresh subject of reduction with the troops. I am responsible for the obedience of

“ the Indian Army, both as Commander-in-Chief
“ and member of Council, and I protest against
“ any change or retrenchment being made at this
“ moment in the allowances of the Sepoy as at
“ first established. I repeat that I think the
“ enforcement of the rule in question would be
“ impolitic, unjust, and most dangerous in the
“ present critical moment. I am persuaded that
“ the Governor-General will be of my opinion
“ when he returns.

“ I enclose Colonel Grant's memorandum, which
“ shews that Lord Gough did not and could not
“ have formed an opinion on the case as regards
“ the Punjaub. His opinion applied to a different
“ state of affairs.”

Colonel Grant's memorandum. “ I beg to sub-
“ mit for your Excellency's consideration with re-
“ ference to paragraphs 3, 4, and 5, that the real
“ question is not how or under what circumstances
“ the rule to which you have objected was framed ;
“ but whether at the present time when the allow-
“ ances in the Punjaub have been reduced to the
“ ordinary province rates, it is prudent or politic to
“ enforce a rule which deprives the Native soldier
“ of even the trifling addition to the ration com-
“ pensation, to which he was entitled under the
“ older regulation framed by Lord Ellenborough
“ and published in the Pay Code, of 1845.

“ Adverting to what is stated in paragraph 8,
“ with respect to Lord Gough's cordial approval of
“ the existing rule, I would observe, that his Lord-
“ ship could only have considered the ration com-
“ pensation question, as then placed before him, in
“ reference to its bearing on Scinde, where the
“ soldier was in the receipt of the high rates of

“allowances, then and still enjoyed by the troops serving in that province.

“I am persuaded Lord Gough had no knowledge of the correspondence between the Military Board the Commissariat Department and the Governor-General, to which allusion is made in paragraph 6; and if his Lordship was ever consulted, which I greatly doubt, regarding the general application of the general order by the Governor-General of the 17th December, 1847, (paragraph 9), at all events he could not have considered it in connection with our occupation of the Punjaub, and the altered circumstances in which the Native troops serving in the new territory are now placed. Neither, I may be permitted to add, could these points have been contemplated by the late Governor-General in Council, when for the sake of *convenience and to save trouble*, as stated in paragraph 5, it was decided to enact the rule to which your Excellency has seen reason to object. P. GRANT, &c.”

It is worth noticing here the sum of money which Government lost by my suspension of the new system, £9 7s. 6d. in every thousand Sepoys, and there were not more than three or four thousand at the stations where the extra allowance was paid. Wherefore £.40 would have more than covered the whole possible loss! Had an idea crossed my mind that Lord Dalhousie would regard this as a desperate attempt to usurp his supreme civil power, willingly would I have paid the Sepoys myself, to save bloodshed and vital mischief to the community. But the principle! that is the gravamen of the question. Yes! the principle must be con-

sidered. It is precisely that which let a Spanish King burn to death in the midst of his courtiers, because the official extinguisher of fires was not present !

I returned to Simla just six months after my departure from it ; six months spent in marching and under canvass, or fighting. Little did I expect the treatment awaiting me, but before touching on that, the following letter to Lord Dalhousie will shew how little anticipation there was on my part of rebuke.

“ *March 30th, 1850.*—I dclayed answering yours
“ of the 13th instant, which reached me a few days
“ ago, because I thought you would be over-
“ whelmed with business. I now do so. I read
“ what you said about Colonel Grant’s memorial,
“ and he wishes it to be sent to the Court. He
“ says what is true, that although the ‘*extant*’
“ Secretary of War’s opinion is against him, the
“ ex-Secretary was the identical Secretary who
“ framed the warrant, he therefore decidedly
“ wishes it to be forwarded.

“ With regard to the Peshawur barracks, I am
“ sorry that the Court have a prejudice against bar-
“ racks for officers, because at Peshawur there is no
“ remedy. The narrow slip of ground which alone
“ is adapted to the barracks, will not admit of any
“ other plan than that which Tremenneere acted
“ upon.

“ In the next place it is much safer, for the
“ Khyburee men are most daring. However as the
“ plans are all gone up to the Military Board, you
“ will see how matters stand, and that all has been
“ done that is practicable.

“ There is this difference between the Lahore plan and mine, that at Lahore officers receive their rooms gratis, whereas by mine they are to pay rent to Government. Tremenheere does not see how we can alter the plan.

“ Captain Abbott did not say he had no soldiers, but that he wanted no more ; I must have expressed myself ill.

“ With regard to the Punjaub Irregular corps, they are very good, but only as to drill ; that is to say as far as the officers commanding them are concerned—but in all depending upon Government they are lamentably deficient ; indeed unfit for service and useless. I think I told you, had I not accidentally been at Peshawur, the orders from the Board for them to go to Kohat could not have been obeyed ; or had it been attempted the corps would have suffered a most severe loss, if not worse ; none of them had a musket that they could have trusted to—their appointments all equally bad, and their clothing no better.

“ The fact is they are all old soldiers, and fall into the drill at once ; how far they can be confided in I do not pretend to say ; but Coke's regiment fought the Affrèedees gallantly.

“ On going to Kohat I found the old fort admirably placed. The new fort which was proposed would have been perfectly useless. Kohat is a pretty spot—plenty of the very finest water. The old fort completely protects it, and I told Tremenheere to put it in a good state of defence. I also have written to Sir Henry Lawrence to say he should send some heavy Sikh

“ guns, which can be done by water to Kala Bagh
“ and there landed.

“ I have also told Sir Colin Campbell if there
“ are any Sikh guns at Attok to send them; all
“ the old fort requires is to have the walls loop-
“ holed, and a gun mounted on each tower, a little
“ repair and no new work, is all that is required,
“ so there will be no expense of any importance;
“ but even were it some expense, it is necessary
“ now that Kohat is cut off from Peshawur. With
“ this fort repaired there is no danger to be appre-
“ hended by the garrison of Kohat. The rabble
“ now there, called ‘Edward’s men’ ought to be
“ formed and drilled. They are good for nothing,
“ except the Artillery, which is well drilled
“ enough.

“ The new stations at Sealkote and Meean Meer
“ go on rapidly. I have twice visited Sealkote.
“ I hope we shall get all the troops well under
“ cover this summer. I feel very nervous about it;
“ but Lieutenant Maxwell and Lieutenant Glover
“ are working very hard and feel confident. The
“ Europeans are dreadfully crowded at Lahore,
“ and I applied for some buildings in the fort and
“ palace which will relieve them, for they could
“ not bear their present crowded state in the hot
“ weather.

“ The mutiny of the 66th of course rendered a
“ new arrangement necessary. It would not do to
“ trust the Sepoys at this moment with the entire
“ charge of so important a fortress, which has a
“ large treasury, commands Umritzer, and is in the
“ Manjha. So I have placed one company of Euro-
“ peans there, two companies of Sepoys, and one
“ of Artillery. By a small addition to the officers’

“ quarters I can lodge the 100 Europeans well ;
“ and there is so much brick ready on the spot
“ that the additional expense will be trifling. Tre-
“ menheere tells me there is a deadly tank in the
“ midst of the fort, enough rubbish on its banks
“ to fill it up ; and it will yield a lac of burned
“ bricks ; so I ordered these to be at once used for
“ the barracks, and the tank to be filled up. This
“ will add to the health of the fort, to the circu-
“ lation of air, and reduce expense.

“ I am quite delighted at the order, just come,
“ about the Goorkas ! It puts an end to Brah-
“ min rule ! I cannot express the pleasure it has
“ given me.

“ I have now given your Lordship as short an
“ account of my proceedings as I can till we meet.
“ I am on my way to Noorpore and Kangra, just to
“ see that frontier, and report upon it to your
“ Lordship. I expect a grilling, but for that there
“ is no help. I have taken ‘ Bentinck Castle ’ for
“ the season, where I hope soon to have the honour
“ of again meeting your Lordship, the only satisfac-
“ tion I have drawn from the mutiny, for had it
“ not been for that, I should have been far on my
“ way to England. With kind regards to Lady
“ Dalhousie, &c.

This design of going to England was founded partly on ill health, principally on the conviction, from experience, that in peace the actual though secret enmity of the Directors and Indian subordinates rendered it impossible for me to serve my country as Commander-in-Chief. That unwelcome eminence had been accepted only because a negation of personal feeling was due to the country ; and

because, expecting war, I felt strong enough to override opposition when danger pressed. I found peace and a mean malignant jealousy against which, when backed by power, honourable service is of no avail. Lo! the proof.

On the 25th of April, nearly one month after this letter, and nearly three months after the events, the following reprimand came from the Governor-General—not sent in the shape of a private communication, nor in his own hand writing, nor in that of his private secretary; but through the agency of a captain, a *Brevet-Major, in the Army under my orders!* And this to a Commander-in-Chief and member of Council, to whom Lord Dalhousie had, up to that moment habitually written personally!

“ To the Adjutant-General of the Army,—

“ Council Chamber, Fort William, 13th April,
“ 1850. Your dispatch No. 13 of the 20th
“ January, and my reply thereto No. 331, dated
“ 14th February last relative to the mode of calculating compensation for Sepoys’ rations, having
“ been duly submitted to the Most Noble the
“ Governor-General of India in Council, I am now
“ directed to acquaint you, for the information of
“ His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief that
“ His Lordship in Council entirely concurs in the
“ opinion expressed in para. 9, of my letter to
“ your address of the 14th February above referred
“ to, and views with regret and dissatisfaction the
“ orders which the Commander-in-Chief intimates
“ he has issued to the officers in the Punjaub.

“ 2. There was, I am to observe, no room for
“ doubt as to what were the intentions of the
“ Governor-General in Council on this point, if the

“ general order of 1847 had been referred to. If
“ there had been doubt, the obvious and proper
“ course for His Excellency was to have referred
“ the matter for the consideration of the President
“ in Council, and to have awaited his reply before
“ he gave an order which he had no power to
“ issue, and which did not in any respect *call for*
“ *haste*.

“ 3. The Commander-in-Chief has issued this
“ order with reference to troops in the Punjaub ;
“ His Excellency knows the difficulty of reversing
“ an order issued regarding pay ; and he must be
“ aware that that difficulty becomes an impossi-
“ bility after what has recently occurred in the
“ Punjaub. The effect therefore of His Ex-
“ cellency's act has been to re-establish in the
“ Punjaub (for the Governor-General in Council
“ will not sanction the extension of the change to
“ districts to which His Excellency's order has not
“ applied) a different rate of allowances from that
“ which will prevail in other provinces, and thus,
“ in great measure, to thwart the endeavour which
“ the Governor-General in Council has been
“ making to assimilate the soldiers' allowances
“ in every province of the presidency.

“ 4. His Excellency's orders having been given
“ they are hereby confirmed, so far as regards the
“ Punjaub ; and officers will be instructed to carry
“ them into effect.

“ 5. But the Governor-General in Council, from
“ a consideration of the papers before him, feels it
“ necessary to intimate for the future guidance of
“ His Excellency, that the Governor-General in
“ Council will not again permit the Commander-in-
“ Chief, *under any circumstances*, to issue orders

“ which shall change the pay and allowances of the
“ troops serving in India, and thus practically to
“ exercise an authority which has been reserved,
“ and most properly reserved for the Supreme
“ Government alone. R. WYLLIE, Major, &c.”

The difficulty of reversing an order, and that here it was an “*impossibility*,” was an unfounded assumption; there was no difficulty no reversing of any order, no impossibility! A regulation of the General Government, unknown *de facto* to the Sepoys, was suspended, not abrogated, and only pending the result of a reference to the Supreme Government. That reference was made without delay. Lord Dalhousie had only to say the regulation must be the rule and the thing was done! Such a false assumption to sustain an unjust rebuke is utterly contemptible.

Major Wyllie's first letter of the 14th February said, the old rule was found injurious to the Sepoys—wherefore, putting the new rule in force must have been satisfactory to them, yet in the opinion of those on the spot it was dangerously unsatisfactory!

The Council should have been referred to for orders! Why it was so; but those orders could not come in time and the danger admitted of no delay.

“ The matter *did not in any respect call for haste.*” What! No haste! When the 66th with open mutiny had nearly seized the fortress of Govindghur! Mutinies are not to be bound with red tape. When this reprimand arrived, memory recalled Diogenes. “ *They deride thee, Diogenes. Yes! But I am not derided!*” Not more cheaply did that philosopher hold the derision than I the reprimand; but a low underhand

war against me was waged by pitiful intriguers about Lord Dalhousie, my contempt did not blind me to the fact that they secretly wielded his power, and my holding office could only be disadvantageous to the public, dangerous to myself. Responsibility was left to me, nothing else ; and any moment might make me a victim to men who had shewn that neither truth nor sense were for them necessary to sustain an accusation. Moreover my high office would thus become a sinecure, shameful to hold.

Men of honest intentions are reluctant to accept the first aberration of a friend as a designed offence. With that sentiment, founded on Lord Dalhousie's former seeming cordiality, desirous also to avoid an open rupture and fixed to bend personal feeling to the public interest—thinking likewise he was misled by intriguers—I sent a private explanatory communication, having previously, as member of Council, warned him of mischief menacing the Punjaub. Both documents are given below, but neither availed. He was not to be moved to wisdom by one, or to justice by the other.

“ *Kangra, April 10th, 1850.* Having told you
“ that I have made the necessary preparations with
“ Sir W. Gilbert and Brigadier Wheeler, to put
“ down any disturbances in the Manjha, I think
“ it right to tell you what I hear, viz.—That the
“ assessment on land was based upon, and the same
“ as that levied by the Sikhs. This was satisfactory.
“ But lately the Board has added two rupees per
“ beya for water, which has produced great dis-
“ content. The sum raised by the Sikhs was cal-
“ culated on the water being given gratis ; but on
“ water bearing tax the sum is too heavy for the

“ Ryots to pay, and there seems to be a general
“ opinion that it will be resisted sooner or later. I
“ will not go into details, because I am not master
“ of them, and they are all within your reach. If
“ you are already cognizant of this matter, all is
“ well ; if not, I have done my duty in giving you
“ the information.”

“ *Simla, 26th April, 1850.* I have just received
“ from Lieutenant-Colonel Grant your two official
“ letters, both dated 13th instant, and signed by
“ Major Wyllie and Mr. Halliday, respectively.
“ The one letter is about the allowances to the
“ Sepoys ; the other about my remarks on your
“ minute. I will hereafter reply to both officially ;
“ and when your Lordship reads my explanation,
“ especially about the Sepoys' allowances, you will
“ be a better judge how far your reprimand to me
“ on the latter subject is just.

“ If with a large Army on the verge of mutiny,
“ I assumed a certain degree of responsibility to
“ secure the public safety I must take the con-
“ sequences, as every man is prepared to do who
“ thinks circumstances demand that he should
“ incur such a risk, and I can only regret that
“ you think I erred. This is a strong instance of
“ the dangerous position in which a Commander-
“ in-Chief in India may at any time be placed ;
“ viz.—liable to the most serious responsibility,
“ yet possessing no power to meet it even in
“ military matters ! The enforcement of the order
“ consolidating the Sepoys' allowances at that
“ moment would have been dangerous, and I was
“ seconded in this opinion by two of the most
“ capable judges in India, from their position,
“ their abilities, and their long experience in the

“ Indian Army—I mean Lieutenant-Colonel Grant
“ the Adjutant-General, and Brigadier Hearsey
“ who commanded the station in which the
“ mutiny had most recently made its appearance.
“ I therefore feel satisfied I was justified by cir-
“ cumstances in acting as I did; and you will see
“ by the enclosed memorandum which I wrote in
“ reply to Major Wyllie's letter to Colonel Grant,
“ dated 14th February, that I felt confident of
“ your Lordship's approbation and support! At
“ the same time I have no right whatever to
“ complain that your Lordship as the higher
“ authority should judge for yourself, and I do
“ not complain. At the same time, as Commander-
“ in-Chief in India, I cannot be expected to
“ expose myself willingly, in future, to such
“ another reprimand for exercising my professional
“ judgment in a critical moment, and when no
“ higher authority than my own was on the spot;
“ and even had the whole Supreme Council been
“ there, I much doubt whether, in a question of
“ mutiny, any of them would be so well able to
“ judge as the Commander-in-Chief of the Army.

“ With respect to the letter about my reply to
“ your minutes; I assure you that while implicitly
“ adhering to the opinions which I expressed
“ about the Punjaub, I never complained either
“ publicly or privately of want of support from
“ you! When I said that I received no infor-
“ mation, I referred entirely to the Punjaub
“ Government, not to the Supreme Government;
“ and this referred to *information*, not to support.
“ I never complained of want of support from
“ any Government, nor any individual! I was in
“ the Punjaub, I was writing about the Punjaub;

“ and when I spoke of ‘ *Government*,’ I, of course,
“ referred exclusively to the Government of the
“ Punjaub. It gave me suggestions where I ought
“ to place troops, and these suggestions were
“ ridiculous, because there was no shelter for
“ troops where they proposed to place them; and if
“ there had been I would not have complied with
“ their suggestions; for it would have been con-
“ trary to common sense to scatter troops in the
“ most dangerous part of the Punjaub, and the
“ most unhealthy, when I could keep them together
“ in masses and in a healthy country, close to the
“ supposed danger! These suggestions I said, and
“ say still, do more harm than an enemy; they
“ threw upon me the great responsibility of
“ rejecting the advice of the Government of the
“ Punjaub; and however correct and just my
“ arrangements might have been, chance might
“ have produced some mishap, and the public
“ would have naturally turned upon me, and said
“ ‘ The Punjaub Government warned you, and
“ ‘ you would not listen to it.’ Therefore I said
“ that such improper interferences are, in my
“ opinion, much more embarrassing than an
“ enemy; but I did not, either in this or in any
“ remarks, refer to your Lordship. &c. &c. C. J.
“ NAPIER.”

Having thus fruitlessly bent a stiffened neck to public and social principle, I executed my design of resigning by the following letter to the Home Military Secretary, Lord Fitzroy Somerset.

“ *Simla, May 22nd, 1850.* My Lord. I have
“ the honour to enclose to your Lordship for sub-
“ mission to His Grace the Commander-in-Chief,
“ copies of a reprimand received from the

“ Governor-General in Council, and of my reply thereto.

“ I came out to this country, as your Lordship knows, much against my inclination, and only because there was a war in which it was supposed my local knowledge of the country might be of use. I arrived just as Lord Gough had victoriously ended the war; and I have endeavoured for above a year, to maintain the discipline of this excellent Army, so that I might not deliver it to my successor in a worse state than I received it from my predecessor. This was not all together an easy task, for at the moment of my assuming the command in India, a reduction of Scinde pay became a just and necessary measure, on the part of Government. Whether the mode in which this measure was effected, happened to be the best which could have been taken by Government was a question with which I had no concern: my business, as Commander-in-Chief, was to quell the mutinous spirit with which that reduction was encountered by the troops; and, as far as we can at present judge, it is generally believed I have succeeded. The mutineers have been punished, and all is at present quiet in the Punjaub.

“ For this successful exercise of my judgment, at a critical juncture, I have, as your Lordship sees, been publicly reprimanded, and forbidden to exercise that judgment in future. I have been treated as if I had assumed the powers of Government, which I had not done! I merely acted with decision in a dangerous crisis: so dangerous, that in a few days after, the mutinous troops attempted to seize the strongest fortress

“ in the Punjaub. On that occasion also, although
“ the Governor-General publicly approved of
“ what I did, he, in a private letter regretted I had
“ not consulted the Supreme Council at Calcutta.
“ Such dangerous moments do not admit of slow
“ and undecided counsels. Yet I am reprimanded,
“ and therefore request, most humbly, that His
“ Grace will obtain for me Her Gracious Majesty’s
“ permission to resign the Chief Command in India;
“ and the more so, as being now nearly 70 years
“ of age—during the last ten years of which I
“ have gone through considerable fatigue of body
“ and mind, especially during the last year—my
“ health requires that relief from climate and
“ business which public service in India does not
“ admit. I therefore hope that His Grace
“ will allow of my being relieved in October
“ next, or as soon as may be convenient. •

“ C. J. NAPIER.”

The main affair was thus closed. Not so the underhand warfare previously commenced, and now conducted with an acrimony shewing how necessary for the public good my resignation was, and how becoming for my own character. Yet nothing was omitted by me to establish a cordial official intercourse with Lord Dalhousie, and many slights from him were borne with patience. So little disposition was there to assume undue authority while acting at a distance, that on my journey to Peshawur guiding instructions were solicited by me, were obtained, and never deviated from, though by no means in accord with my views. They have been preserved for this place, as more convenient for reference to facts in

the observations necessary to prevent some parts passing for wisdom.

Lord Dalhousie to Sir C. Napier.

“ *December 24th, 1849. 1. I have had the honour of receiving your Excellency's demi-official letter, dated 20th instant, enclosing documents relating to the operations recently undertaken against certain villages in the Eusofzye district near Peshawur. In that letter your Excellency requests distinct and positive instructions regarding the course to be pursued in the event of operations being required in the hills ; as well for your own guidance as to enable you to transmit the necessary orders to Brigadier Campbell, commanding at Peshawur.*

“ *2. I have had the honour of replying to your communication demi-officially this day ; but on a subject of so much importance I think it expedient to convey the wishes of the Government to your Excellency in an official form.*”

Observation.—What I wanted was—that my powers and those of the Board of Administration should be in some degree defined, as that Board was inclined to interfere with military matters.

“ *3. A dispatch from the Deputy-Commissioner of Peshawur dated the 15th instant, leads me to believe that the object for which the present operations were undertaken has been fully accomplished, and that the force under Colonel Bradshaw was about to return towards Peshawur.*”

Observation.—By no means “fully accomplished” no, not even in 1853 after many subsequent engagements, and abundance of bloodshed, and money lost by bad government.

“ 4. *I trust therefore that provision for ulterior measures in the present instance is not required. It is possible that the severe punishment which appears to have been inflicted on the refractory villages, and those who came to their aid, may deter them from attempting hereafter resistance to our authority, or inroads upon our territories.*”

Observation.—This severe punishment has produced four years' war! No man can say when it will end. The tribes claim independence and fight for it. Lord Dalhousie evidently approved of burning villages. The civil force did so in the Kohat expedition. Colonel Bradshaw and Sir Colin Campbell were placed under the control of politicals, who devastated a beautiful country! This is rigour, and no portion of Lord Dalhousie's administration has exhibited vigour!

“ 5. *But with a population so long inclined to turbulence as the border tribes, and so little accustomed to shew submission to any of the Governments under which they have successively passed, I conceive that we must be prepared to expect from time to time risings among the tribes over whom our rule has been proclaimed, and plundering inroads by those which lie close to our frontier.*”

Observation.—Yes! It was right to be prepared for risings. He proclaimed his rule! so he has over Pegue, and may proclaim it over China! But these tribes never acknowledged his or any person's rule. They deny ever being conquered.

“ 6. *Your Excellency is therefore requested to instruct Brigadier Campbell that in the event of any local outbreak or internal disturbance again occurring, which of course, would be forthwith*

*“ made known to the Brigadier by the local officers,
“ he will take immediate steps for its suppression
“ and punishment by measures of promptitude and
“ severity.”*

Observation.—My opinion was that these measures of severity were unjustifiable and impolitic; the result proved them so; yet worse and sadder measures followed.

*“ 7. The force under the immediate orders of the
“ Brigadier is amply sufficient for any such contin-
“ gency.*

*“ 8. If the outbreak should be of a nature of a
“ general insurrection among the hill tribes under
“ our rule, your Excellency in that event will be
“ so good as to issue orders at once, during my
“ absence, for such preparations to be made, and
“ such operations to be undertaken as your great
“ experience may suggest, or as you may judge neces-
“ sary and right.*

*“ 9. If the hostility should be external; if
“ incursions should be made upon our territory by
“ border tribes; or if they should give their aid, as
“ in the present case, to rebellion among our own
“ people, the invasion will, as a matter of course, be
“ repelled immediately, without delaying for refer-
“ ence. But I have distinctly to request that no
“ aggressive movement, either as the consequence
“ of such incursion, or under any other circum-
“ stances, may be made upon the territories beyond
“ our frontier, without a reference to the Government
“ for the purpose of ascertaining its views and
“ opinions in the case.”*

Observation.—In obedience to these orders our troops were forbade to fire unless fired upon when the Pass of Kohat was entered. His Lordship

seems very apprehensive that I, who wished to take measures for preventing war and disapproved of severities, should be so eager for war as to require a check by previous reference to a Government, which by its severities was provoking war! Our frontier indeed! How was that marked? He thinks his fiat gave a frontier line, without reference to other nations' views. Mark also, that to repel an incursion of border tribes was a matter of course, without reference, but to repel a mutiny menacing the whole empire without reference was a crime.

" 10. *It is very possible that an expedition against the border tribes beyond the frontier may at some time become unavoidable for the repression of violence and injury ; but I cannot contemplate any circumstances in which the necessity for aggressive measures should be so urgent as to over-rule the expediency of submitting to the Government such a reference as I have mentioned and receiving its instructions thereon.*"

Observation.—Here is evident fear of, and eagerness to bar, encroachment on his authority; and as I had given no cause, it may be assumed that the warning he had so energetically denounced as unnecessary, at our first interview, was working in his mind.

" 11. *The Board of Administration will be directed to transmit to your Excellency any information connected with the state of the neighbouring countries during my absence, which it may be desirable for you to know.*"

Observation.—This Board of Administration was composed of a captain of Artillery and two civilians; good, doubtless, in their callings, but

they were to send me, not *every*, but *any* information, which they judged it desirable for the Commander-in-Chief who was also one of the Supreme Council to know! Lord Dalhousie designated me as a man of "great experience," ought he then to make me in military matters, with a disturbed frontier, dependent on a captain of Artillery and two civilians? He might at least, without rashness, have directed his Board to furnish *every* information!

"12. *Should anything occur requiring your Excellency to issue such orders as are contemplated in the foregoing paragraphs, I request that your Excellency would direct the Adjutant-General to communicate them to the Board for their information.*"

My resignation, as said, closed the principal affair, but it was not transmitted without vindicating my own dignity by repelling Lord Dalhousie's unjust and offensive reprimand. Addressing him directly, his silly assertion as to the non-necessity of haste was rebutted, my right to support instead of reprimand maintained. Rebutting also the false accusation of having usurped Government powers, proof was given that the suspended regulation was, *de facto*, new to the Sepoys, and injurious to them. Arranged in 1847 it had not appeared until 1849 in the Code, and its application had been of rare occurrence. Known to Government, but unknown generally to the Sepoys, it had first come into operation in the Punjaub at Christmas 1849, when a sudden rise in price of provisions rendered it applicable at Wuzzeerabad; and as the mutinous spirit was then

very perilous a sudden reduction of allowances must have augmented the mischief. To suspend it was right; it was a measure imposed by the state of the soldiers' minds. There was a necessity for haste!

The regulation was impolitic, was unjust, would have produced bloodshed. Unjust because compensation for increased cost of living once given should not be retaken; and suddenly to do so without explanation, was to "*tamper at a critical moment with the Sepoys' money in violation of the public faith*,"—a dangerous experiment. My conduct was therefore becoming, and in like circumstances would be repeated. My judgment being good or bad was not the question—as his Lordship seemed to think—but whether the Commander-in-Chief, at a distance from the seat of Government, the highest authority being at sea, should avert imminent peril to the State by dealing promptly with mutiny in an Army of four hundred thousand men!

The Governor-General in Council had decided that on such an occasion the Commander-in-Chief should not exercise any discretion; should not act promptly; that he should lose five weeks in references, and let the smouldering fire of mutiny burst into conflagration—in fine, that the State ought not to be saved irregularly! He had reprimanded me for so saving it, and forbade my ever exercising my discretion "*under any circumstances*" in financial matters. But it was not a financial, it was a vital matter! With such shackles and such treatment to be expected from him, instead of support, in future difficulties, there was, I said, no

safety for me, and a command so paralyzed could be no longer retained.

This rejoinder drew a long recriminatory minute from Lord Dalhousie, and a series of those documents were exchanged. Although tedious, they should have found place here, were it not that my application to the Board of Control for Lord Dalhousie's last, has been refused! No doubt from prudent considerations. Failing of all, none have been given, but the following analyses of his Lordship's first attempt to justify his conduct will indicate the nature of the whole.

Misstating the question, he with a disingenuous subtlety sought to give the character of a private dispute to what ought to have been the calm investigation of a State question. The Commander-in-Chief had he said, *cancelled a Government regulation and introduced another*; whereas, as repeatedly shewn, only suspension pending a reference to supreme authority had taken place.

Laboriously he proved that the regulation, called a new, unjust, and impolitic measure, had been known and acted upon previously in the Punjaub, but that affected not the matter; for the Brigadier commanding the station, the General commanding the province, the Adjutant-General of the Company's Army, concurred in saying it was new to the Sepoys; and this discrepancy as to the fact proves that the regulation, partial and local in its nature, was but obscurely known, and consequently, though characterised by Lord Dalhousie as vital, was really of little importance as regarded the authority of Government. In this view Lord Dalhousie's laboured shewing as to the regulation not being new, in no manner affected the propriety

of my act, which rested entirely on the danger of enforcing it at the moment.

Not more available was an emphatically enforced defence of the justice and policy of the regulation. It might be abstractedly just and politic, yet involve a practical injustice and great impolicy by a partial untimely application. It certainly reduced the Sepoys' allowances when they were mutinous for higher allowances, and was therefore justly characterised as a "*Tampering with the Sepoys' money at a dangerous moment.*" But that was not, as the minute insinuated, an offensive remark, because even the appearance of injustice was dangerous at the time; the *real* injustice was however inadvertently admitted in the minute, when it asserted that the old rescinded regulation gave the Sepoys *more* than was designed; for that *more* had been enjoyed by them for seventeen months, and many had enlisted on the faith of its being continued.

The gravamen of the matter was the amount of danger. I said it was great and imminent. Lord Dalhousie in this minute, peril being past, designated it as unworthy of notice, adducing in support his own opinions, and my general orders and journey to Peshawur, which he said proved that I also slighted the danger! Let the value of these counter assertions be measured by facts. Lord Dalhousie was at sea, I was on the spot; and up to his embarking, as shall be shewn further on by his own letters, we were in perfect accord on the extent of the danger and necessity of vigorous measures. Mutinies did actually occur in succession at Rawul Pindee, at Delhi, at Wuzzeerabad, at Govindghur; and in that succession the overt acts augmented in violence—the last being an

attempt to seize the most important fortress of the Punjaub! If then my knowledge, acquired on the spot, was greater than Lord Dalhousie could acquire at sea, my proceedings also proved that the danger was not slighted by me, seeing that of two courses open the one of greatest personal responsibility was chosen.

Lord Dalhousie said he founded his judgment on "*minor evidence*," "*secret information*," and "*public records*." These last were simply the documents shewing the suspended regulation was not new. The minor evidence he did not indicate. The secret information must have been from civilians; unless one of the military officers who agreed as to the peril at the time, secretly represented the matter in a different light—a supposition not to be entertained without proof. Wherefore Lord Dalhousie's judgment, formed on such evidence could be of no value. As to my orders, it would have been insanity to proclaim that the mutineers were many and feared; that their machinations were known, and a resort to force only remained for them. My treating the affair as a partial discontent was in truth the inverse measure of the danger.

But nothing is more discreditable to Lord Dalhousie than a sneering attempt to place me on the dilemma, of acknowledging the mutiny to be slight or my journey to Peshawur a flying from danger. Peshawur was the real point of danger, and his sneer, redolent of ignorance and bad feeling, coming from a man who had gone to sea at the moment of greatest peril, should have been suppressed. No immediate outbreak was apprehended. What was feared was the secret spread of a scheme to obtain

higher pay for an Army of three hundred thousand men, by compelling Government to yield, or disband the whole, on neither of which horns could it sit and live! The disbanded Sikh soldiers and the Affghans might also have joined, and nought remain for defence but the power and might of the European soldiery—most numerous at Peshawur, which was therefore the real point both of safety and danger.

The minute adduced the final submission of the 66th regiment and subsequent quietude of the Sepoys generally, as proofs that no real mutiny was in contemplation; that is, adduced the success of my measures to suppress mutiny as evidence that no mutiny existed! The logic is equal to the generosity! If a mutinous spirit had been general, said Lord Dalhousie, the action of the 66th would have been a "spark to light the whole into a flame!" But if that spark had not been accidentally stamped out, and the immediate substitution of the Goorka battalion for the 66th had not rendered the Brahmin project of non-enlistment abortive, would not the flame have been kindled and increased to a conflagration?

Partial mutinies, said the minute, were frequent; as if that were of no consequence, instead of being fearful indications of mischief and secret dangerous discontent. Wherefore in lieu of thanking me for preventing these partial mutinies fashioning themselves into one irresistible combination, Lord Dalhousie dared to call me the calumniator of the Bengal Army!

Passing from mutiny, the minute again accused me of usurping the essential powers of Government; of changing the Government regulations; of increas-

ing the pay and allowances of the troops, of avowing a wish to grant the demand of mutineers and the more readily that they were numerous! Then dilating on the danger of such proceedings and views, it rose to enthusiastic self-laudation for holding opinions of a contrary tendency. This is contemptibly absurd. Nothing was usurped, nothing granted, nothing claimed but the right to assume responsibility at a moment of great peril, when reference to superior authority was impossible.

With the same uncandid spirit, my complaint that no support was to be expected if a future exigency demanded the like promptness, was designated as claiming that my "pleasure and discretion should be the rule of Government," thus attempting to assimilate the momentary assumption of responsible authority on extraordinary occasions, with a permanent exercise of independent power. The minute asserted that full support was given to me. So far as promises went, that is true; but no performance followed. The promise was a snare! Was there serious mutiny and danger? Then Lord Dalhousie's support was a reprimand for having saved him and the State from a vital disaster! Was the mutiny overrated? then his support was the waiting for a plausible pretext to insult, merely for over-zeal, a man of nearly twice his age, with ten times his experience and service. Finally, it might be supposed from the minute that some extraordinary irreparable invasion of supreme authority had produced terrible and permanent evil; whereas there had been only the withholding for a month a saving to Government of a few pounds sterling! The reader may now take as a true and tempe-

rate statement, of the whole matter in dispute a brief review of Lord Dalhousie's conduct placed at the end of this first part. It was drawn up at the time by a friend, my mind being then too much occupied with public business to regard private controversy.

CHAPTER XI.

*Lord Dalhousie. His Gnat and Camel.*

ONE of his Lordship's minutes concluded with this lofty peroration: "I have equal confidence that "their judgment" (the Queen's and Company's Government) "will be, that I have only done my duty "towards the Government I administer and towards those who entrusted it to me, in refusing "to allow to the Commander-in-Chief of their "Army, *a power which no Commander-in-Chief has ever enjoyed—which no predecessor of his has ever dreamed of claiming, and which no Government in Christendom could ever concede.*"

The Indian Government is not in Christendom! Let us proceed with the Gnat and Camel. The gnat so choking, as shewn in the above passage, was engendered when the Commander-in-Chief to prevent the spread of mutiny, absolutely, as it would seem from his Lordship's expression, *paralyzed* the Civil Government by locally suspending one of its regulations, and that not a very wise or just one. This was assuming a power "*no Commander-in-Chief ever before dreamed of claiming, and no Government could ever concede.*" Compose your

agitation, my Lord, and remember the camel you swallowed with the facility of a boa constrictor!

In September 1848, a little more than one year before my gnat was born, Lieutenant Herbert Edwards, of the East India Company's Army, assembled a force in the service of the Maharaja, Duleep Singh—at that time an independent Sovereign. In this force several regular regiments of the Maharaja's Army were suspected of having an inclination to join Moolraj at Mooltan. To fix their wavering loyalty, Edwards, a Lieutenant of the Bengal force, without leave from the Sikh Government, or from Lord Dalhousie, or from the Supreme Council of India, or the Directors, promised those foreign regiments, if they remained faithful to their own Sovereign, that the Governor-General would take them *out of the Maharaja's Army, into the East India Company's regular service*. This promise was approved of by Lord Dalhousie, and the regiments are now in the Company's Army!

Here was a camel glibly swallowed by Lord Dalhousie.

THE GNAT.

General Sir Charles Napier, member of the Supreme Council and Commander-in-Chief, suspended a regulation of detail, involving a sum of £.6 3s. sterling until the Government's wishes could be ascertained. This temporary measure

THE CAMEL.

Lieutenant Herbert Edwards, of the Bengal Fusileers, promised whole regiments of a foreign Sovereign to take them into the Company's Army! *This, although an act beyond the legitimate powers of the Governor-General himself, was ap-*

to stave off imminent danger to the State was counselled by three of the oldest and most distinguished officers of the Indian Army. For this momentary assumption of a slender responsibility he was, without regard to his age, his services, his high rank, or the smallness of the sum, indecently, petulantly, and unwarrantably reprimanded by Lord Dalhousie! Yet he had only exercised a discretion enjoined by the Duke of Wellington's written orders.

proved of and sanctioned by Lord Dalhousie. But then Lieutenant Edwards was also a *political*. Lieutenant Edwards may have acted wisely, and Lord Dalhousie also; yet adding whole regiments to the regular force of the East India Company's Army, without the sanction of Government, was a strong measure for a Lieutenant of Infantry!

In my case the danger was greater, more pressing; my rank far higher, and the amount of responsibility trivial even to ridicule! Why then was I reprimanded? Because Lord Dalhousie was personally jealous, and had not sufficient firmness to bear the truth! Intent to find fault, he petulantly and with bad faith seized what he fancied a good opportunity, and made a mistake for his own character. He had only three weeks before, with express reference to the mutiny, promised me "unreserved support," not conditionally nor in ignorance, but with deep alarm at the danger, though going himself to seek personal relaxation at sea. The proof of this follows, and is irre-

fragable, being under his own hand, and damnatory as complete.

It has been shewn that he gave warrant for commencing, at my own discretion, a war of devastation against the frontier tribes, slaying them and burning their habitations; he will be found equally ready to warrant my spilling blood to any extent in suppression of mutiny; but to suspend the abstraction of six pounds sterling from the Sepoys' pay for that object was an inexcusable offence! Let these things be taken as the measure of his humanity and wisdom; his reprimand as the measure of his courtesy, and his letters now given as the gauge of his faith and conscience when—the danger being over—he dared to affirm that there was no mutiny, and that I had libelled the Bengal Army by pretending there was!

Camp, Loodiana,
Sunday November 11th 1849.
1. P.M.

My Dear Sir Charles,

I received your letter of 9th (relative to symptoms of insubordination in the 41st Native Infantry at Delhi;) two hours ago.

This letter will go to you by an express which will be dispatched immediately, carrying to the general officer at Umballah, a general order granting the furlough you have suggested, for publication by him. A branch express is ordered from Umballah to Meerut and another to Delhi, which it ought to reach before the morning of the 13th.

The general order will be also sent to day to General Officers commanding in the Punjaub and to Brigadier Wheeler in Jullunder.

The general order opens by alluding to the circumstances which prevented furlough this year (on the suggestion of Lord Gough I think but I will not delay this letter to make sure) then adverts to the cessation of such necessity—gives leave to 25 men per company now as for 1849 and promises furlough for 1850, as usual on the return of those now allowed to depart.

The general order of which I enclose a copy fully carries into effect what you intend, I think. It is quite fair in itself—is no concession—and ought to be acceptable.

With respect to any dissatisfaction either in these corps or in any other on the score of the *amount* of allowances, there is no alternative of measures for us. The difficulty is one begotten of the past. Every one was prepared for the probability of its shewing itself. It must be met; and the ground on which we can take our stand is so perfectly just and reasonable and necessary, that we may thus meet the difficulty with full confidence as to the result.

I hope this may be only a passing grumble; but I think you *are very wise in preparing for its being something worse; and I am very sure of your doing everything that is right in the circumstances that may arise, whatever they may be.* The regiment with me, the 9th Native Infantry, were informed some time ago and have not said a word; but then they are well commanded.

I shall move onwards towards Lahore, where I shall probably be on 27th unless the row thickens! in which case I will regulate my plans as may be best for the service.

The necessity for getting the Court's consent to

the increase for Goorkas was vexing. The letter went by last mail. I wrote privately and urgently also, and I have no doubt of success. I have prayed the chairman to take it in hand, and to give the increase. Even though they should insist on the reduction suggested by Lord Gough in June 1848 as the condition. I hope they will not insist on that condition but will give every thing we ask.

DALHOUSIE.

P.S.—I add a postscript to observe that the services of the Goorkas anywhere are exigible from them on emergency by their present terms of enlistment. If any necessity should at this moment arise for taking advantage of what we believe to be their thorough trustworthiness, we can do so—and the Court could not then refuse the boon asked, or fail to confirm it, if I were to grant it to them by anticipation. I would do so *now* but that such an act would ensure their economical reduction of one company which you deprecate. I hope as I have said—to get the increase and yet keep the company.

D.

We had promised these Goorkas line pay if they would enter the line—they accepted the offer with joy—with what honesty or wisdom could we then order them down to the plains to quell a mutiny without performing our promise? It would have shaken their fidelity! But by the step I afterwards took, when the 66th mutinied, we shewed our confidence in them and fulfilled our promise.

Bamneewalla Camp,

24th December, 1849.

My dear Lord,

We have more trouble about the Scinde pay! It has taken place at Wuzzeerabad, and four or five men have been detected, whom I have ordered to be tried forthwith—I think they will be shot. There are complete proofs of their having gone from company to company in the 32nd Native Infantry. When I heard of their refusing the seven rupees, I ordered the regiment to be drawn out, the men singly offered their pay, and every one who refused to be instantly tried on the spot and the sentence executed. I have not yet received the report, but a private letter says that forty-nine were tried, sentenced, and instantly put in chains, and sent off to the roads. Brigadier Hearsey then made a speech to the regiment, which had great effect: the letter, I hear, says, "*it threw the regiment into tears.*" The four agitators are under trial, or will be as soon as possible, and I hope they will be sentenced death or transportation, which, I believe, has more terrors for them than death. This is a most daring attempt of these four villains to dictate to the Government what pay the troops are to have, and I trust the Court will do its duty. This seems on the first blink to be a small matter—to my eyes it is a vital one! To punish these four scoundrels, to the utmost extent of the law military, is necessary. I am so glad you did not disband the former two, it was a weak, silly, and most unjust proposal of * * * * which would have placed us altogether in the wrong, and we could not have followed it up! The Native officers and non-commissioned officers have I

hear behaved well: giving prompt information to their European officers: but my official reports have not come in yet. This matter will I hope end here—if not I will carry on the same process with every recusant corps. I have no report from Campbell! Sir H. Lawrence told Colonel Grant that it was all settled, and that his brother was punishing the garrison and putting the people to expense thereby! I think this is a queer way to govern! Punishing by wholesale makes hatred, not obedience.

The Maharaja left Lahore with only 20 Sowars under a Native officer! Not a single European with him I hear. I have not the slightest idea who is to blame for this, but I have ordered a rigid scrutiny amongst the military, and if I can find out who is to blame I will report him to you. I executed your orders exactly, till the Board's official representation of immediate danger absolutely forced me to increase the escort, at their desire as I reported to you; security was necessary; the rescue of the child would have produced war at once. But sending him with a Native officer, for I believe two marches, and an escort of only twenty natives was too bad. I fear my friend * * * * will not come out clear! However I will not condemn him, for I really have no opinion upon the matter; only I will find out that none of my red coats are culpable, or if they were they shall take the consequences; it is too serious a matter to pass over, being a gross and dangerous neglect. I wanted to send the guns only as far as Ferozepore, but the Board begged that they might go on, as it seems they consider our old "protected

"States as dangerous as the Punjaub itself," so I consented. Believe me to be always, &c. &c. C. J. NAPIER.

Camp, Mooltan,

30th December, 1849.

My dear Sir Charles,

I have just received your letter of 24th instant. The conduct of 32nd regiment distresses me much in every way. It is unreasonable on every ground and unpardonable.

The original creation of the allowances extra was a short-sighted and impolitic as well as unnecessary act, but the Government cannot allow the act and its evils to extend into futurity. *I am very sure that the course you contemplate is the truly merciful one. No punishment can be too severe for the men who deliberately instigate to mutiny, and although I am as little bloody-minded as most men, I should be quite prepared to advise, if called upon, that these men should be put to death.* It is true that 'it is said transportation across the seas has more terrors than death. I very much doubt it, and I conceive that the promptitude of the punishment, in retribution of the act, and in the presence of those who partially shared in it, would have a greater effect in repressing similar offences than the more distant punishment of banishment. *I am very glad you are where you are ; and I feel quite at ease when the conduct of measures consequent on such offences is in your hands.*

The Board has reported no such measures in Eusofzye as Colonel Grant has mentioned. They

have advised retaining a post and I believe they are right—but they have expressly said that retaining it is worth more than the revenue of the district, though not worth more than the peace of the district. Any quartering of the troops on the people would not be permitted for a day, and either Grant has misapprehended, or Lawrence has flourished.

What you tell me about the Maharaja amazes me. If inquiry shall shew it to be true it certainly is not your fault, or mine, for the 18th Royal Irish were left there, and a wing of the body-guard had arrived. The country about Umballah is more Sikh than any part of the Punjaub except the Manjha, and the great chiefs Puttecald Jhund &c. are independent though friendly—the latter quality evinced in the manner men are most unwilling to shew it in, viz. parting with their money. They volunteered to lend, and did lend me 30 lacs on the spot last war. But the people hate us of course like Sikhs.

This place is a melancholy mass of desolation.

Believe me, yours sincerely &c. DALHOUSIE.

Camp, Goojerat,
5th January, 1850.

My dear Lord,

On arriving at Wuzzeerabad, I learned from Brigadier Hearsey that the Sepoys, and especially the young ones, said “ *When other regiments come up we will do as they do—this reduction is tyranny, but what can we do alone?* ” He further said that an unusual degree of correspondence is going on between regiments, which he considered very bad, and wished that the Government could

prevent it, or appoint a person to read all the Sepoy's letters. I told him that to do this is quite impossible; that neither could Government abridge correspondence nor open private letters, except on some occasion which would bear out such an act. He also told me that, during the war, some men were grumbling, and Neville Chamberlain rebuked them, saying "You are pretty fellows to pretend to be soldiers when a few hours' hardship makes you grumble; had I the power I would dismiss you." On which another soldier, I think a Havildar, replied "*You had better not do that, for you should not get a man from the country to replace us if you did.*"

I tell you what Hearsey told me, and it marks a bad spirit. He seems to think there may be more trouble given yet as regiments enter the Punjaub. Hearsey does not want sense, and is perfectly master of the language of the men, knowing them well, Grant tells me. I know so little of him that I cannot speak from personal acquaintance. . . . However he appears to have conducted this refusing pay affair with great judgment.

Now, all that he has told me, when compared with the report among the 41st, that I heard at Delhi—of twenty-four regiments having resolved not to march into the Punjaub unless with Scinde allowances—looks bad. It is just one of those events that one can make no conjecture upon, but we must *wait*; if nothing happens all is right, but if it turns out to be preconcerted mutiny, force must be met by force; the *least concession would cost us India*. And justice has placed us on high ground, thank God! for I declare if we were not perfectly right and

just, I could not reconcile it to my conscience to do what must be done, in my opinion, to save India from the state the Sikhs were in before we quarrelled with them. I am not in the least doubtful about putting a stop to this atrocious attempt of the villains who are trying to mislead their comrades, but fear it will cost bloodshed if they succeed; for I will immediately act against all with the utmost rigour. Neither your Lordship nor myself would shed a drop of blood if it can be avoided; but a thousand lives must be taken rather than let 400,000 men dictate to their Government unjustly, nor justly either for that matter: but woe to the Government which places itself in so dreadful a position.

I cannot express what pleasure our just and honourable position gives me. If the men under trial are condemned as mutineers, I will execute them at once, which I have power to do—and now I am sure that this most disagreeable affair will open the eyes of the Directors and satisfy them that I am right in wishing for Goorka battalions; and I would, if I could, have 25,000 of them, added to our own Europeans which would form an Army of 50,000 men that, well handled, would neutralize any combination among the Sepoys! I do most seriously recommend this subject to your consideration, and whether it ought not to be seriously pressed upon the consideration of the Court? I believe your Lordship's opinion concurs with mine as to the Goorka battalions, and I wish, if so, that you would order their high pay to be issued from the 1st of January,—it will at once secure the fidelity of these brave troops, and it will bring others rapidly, if we should determine to increase

their strength. These are the small points which in times of danger govern great events. You see that I write to you frankly all I think. Believe me, &c. C. J. NAPIER.

Kotree, January 18th, 1850.

My dear Sir Charles,

I received your two letters of 5th inst. just as I was leaving Sukkur, and have been without the means of sending a reply until I reached this place.

I quite agree with you in being prepared for discontent among the Native troops on coming into the Punjaub under diminished allowances. I looked with just anxiety to the result of a measure which was indispensable from the first; and I am well satisfied to have got so far through it without violence as we have. The Sepoy has been over-petted and over-paid of late; and has been led on by the Government itself into the entertainment of expectations and the manifestation of a feeling which he never held in former times.

The General and yourself have no doubt of the perfect justice and perfect necessity of the present orders; and they must be enforced.

I would fain hope that flying rumours are exaggerated and that *your prompt and decided action at Delhi and Wuzzeerabad will check all future designs.*

I saw the 41st regiment at Mooltan. It has behaved perfectly well ever since it left Delhi; and the men, Major Halford told me, have seemed ashamed of themselves ever since.

If my hope is disappointed, *the course of action*

you indicate is the only right one—indeed it is the only possible one. A yielding or a compromise in this case would be worse than a defeat by an enemy in the field, and would make our own Army more really formidable to us than the Khalsa have been.

On this point then our sentiments are in perfect unison: *and whenever anything may occur which requires or would be benefited by the support of the Government; that support will be unreservedly given.*

All testimony has led me to form the opinion you hold of the efficiency and fidelity of the Goorka corps. If immediate increase of their pay were necessary to enable you to command the services of those corps in the event of dissaffection among the Native Infantry, I would at once issue an order for the increase; but the terms of their own contract of enlistment entitle you to call upon them to move *anywhere* on emergency; and as you can thus avail yourselves of them fully and at once if they should be needed, I think it better to wait for the reply from the Court which in another month will reach me. I will make use in the meantime of recent events for the purpose of strengthening arguments, which I feel satisfied the Court have already felt to be sufficient.

I have heard the anecdote of Neville Chamberlain and the Havildar related by others. The only thing which casts doubt on it is that Mr. C. should have passed over the threatening speech of the man without report to his commanding officer. If any man in this Army said so he should not have remained a day in it. His instant dismissal, would have been a light punishment for so treasonable a

speech, and it would have speedily served to prove the emptiness of his threat that none would be found to take their places.

Believe me, &c., DALHOUSIE.

It will be difficult for Lord Dalhousie to reconcile his reprimand with the expressions of satisfaction and promises of support given in these letters; or with the honorable observances of society. It may be more easy to reconcile them in taste and truth with his early assurance that he "*would take damned good care I did not encroach on his authority.*"

Brief review of Lord Dalhousie's conduct referred to at page 171.

" In two instances the Governor-General of India has expressed dissatisfaction with the Commander-in-Chief, for having taken upon himself the responsibility of acting in matters beyond the compass of his acknowledged powers.

" The first was that in which the Commander-in-Chief, to meet the mutiny of the 66th regiment (exhibited in their attempt to seize the fortress of Govindghur) disbanded that regiment of his own authority; filling up their place in the line by making the Nusseree Goorka battalion, the 66th or Goorka regiment.

" The Governor-General was absent from India at the time of these transactions; and on his return, approved of disbanding the old 66th; but privately disapproved of the enlistment of the Nusseree battalion without sanction of the Government at Calcutta. He however, confirmed the

“ whole of the Commander-in-Chief's steps, without
“ expressing publicly any dissatisfaction.

“ He had a right to express his dissatisfaction,
“ and in doing so privately, exercised that right in
“ a delicate way.

“ The Commander-in-Chief had no right to feel
“ personally annoyed at this. On the contrary, he
“ feels personally obliged, for the manner in which
“ dissatisfaction was expressed ; but he is bound,
“ for his own future security, to examine minutely,
“ the public grounds which compelled him to over-
“ step his authority ; and likewise the ground upon
“ which the Governor-General hesitates to express
“ his approval privately.

“ The acts of the Commander-in-Chief were two.
“ 1st. The disbandment of the 66th regiment. 2nd.
“ The enlistment of the Nusseree battalion. Both
“ were beyond his authority and the character of
“ both as regarded responsibility was precisely the
“ same. Neither was justifiable, unless the public
“ safety absolutely required it. The only grounds
“ were that it would have required 37 days to have
“ waited for the sanction of the Supreme Govern-
“ ment ; and the first reply might have required a
“ rejoinder occupying 37 days more, and thence a
“ six months' correspondence, with possibly a final
“ reference to the Court of Directors. It appeared
“ as reasonable to regulate the movements of a
“ battle, as to quell a mutiny by such a dilatory
“ process. The Commander-in-Chief had reason to
“ suppose from his intercourse with the Governor-
“ General, as long as intercourse was possible, about
“ this long smouldering mutiny, that the Governor-
“ General was as fully persuaded as himself of the
“ necessity of treating every indication of it with

“ quick decision and vigour, and they had hitherto
“ concurred in their views of the subject.

“ There was good reason to suppose that every
“ regiment in the Punjaub was imbued with pre-
“ cisely the same spirit exhibited by the 66th
“ regiment, and were determined to force from
“ Government a larger rate of pay than that fixed
“ for them, and for which they had voluntarily
“ enlisted. Hence the delay of 37 days in
“ applying whatever might be finally considered
“ as the fitting remedy, might have arrayed the
“ whole of the Native Army in the Punjaub,
“ upwards of *forty thousand men*, against their Go-
“ vernment! This too, in a country containing
“ 60,000 disbanded Sikh soldiers, with but ten
“ European regiments to resist them.

“ These considerations induced the Commander-
“ in-Chief with great reluctance, to assume the
“ responsibility.

“ Assuredly, if ever there was a case that im-
“ peratively called for prompt action, and the
“ setting aside of dilatory etiquette, this was one.
“ Had the Commander-in-Chief's moral courage
“ failed him in the emergency; and had the evils
“ which he thus arrested, been permitted to extend
“ until the Army had been in open mutiny, it
“ would have been a miserable excuse to offer to his
“ Sovereign and countrymen for the loss of their
“ richest empire, that a point of etiquette induced
“ him to delay when he could have prevented the
“ catastrophe!

“ Of the two acts, however, the Governor-
“ General approved of one, while he privately dis-
“ approved of the other, without superior sanction.
“ The first was the disbanding the 66th regiment, a

“ remedy frequently tried on former occasions of
“ mutiny, but found ineffectual. The Commander-
“ in-Chief had no confidence in the mere measure of
“ disbanding; he was exceedingly averse to that
“ system, and only employed it as a necessary pre-
“ liminary to his second act, in which he had con-
“ fidence, namely enlisting the Goorkas. This
“ step however, he was told by the Governor-
“ General he should not have taken.

“ The Commander-in-Chief had distinct proof,
“ which the Govindghur inquiry sustains, that the
“ basis of the mutiny was a general feeling
“ amongst the Sepoys, that they could control the
“ Army enlistments—that if regiments were dis-
“ banded, the same individuals or some other
“ members of their families would find their way
“ into the new regiments. This was the root of
“ the mutiny, and the first exhibition of it at
“ Govindghur was a party from each company,
“ respectfully asking for their discharge; this was
“ the principle which the Commander-in-Chief at
“ once saw must be met. He therefore disbanded
“ the 66th, not as a punishment, but in order to
“ introduce a different race of people; thereby
“ proving that the ordinary Sepoy classes could
“ *not* control the enlistment. Without this the
“ disbandment would only have caused an ex-
“ tension of the mutiny; but with it the mutiny
“ was effectually crushed! A month's delay at
“ that moment, might have lost India, after a
“ destructive collision between the European re-
“ giments, and a mutinous Native Army, sup-
“ ported by every malcontent in Hindostan. Yet
“ the Governor-General is not satisfied with this
“ happy result; and instead of cordial grateful

“ acknowledgments for having saved India at a
“ dangerous crisis, without cost either of life
“ or money, the Commander-in-Chief is told
“ that he has, in accomplishing this enormous
“ benefit, committed a breach of official etiquette!!!
“ Assuredly no Commander-in-Chief who has the
“ intellect and vigour requisite to secure the in-
“ terest of his Sovereign and his country, can be
“ safe under such controlling influence.

“ The second case in which the Governor-General
“ has expressed dissatisfaction at the Commander-
“ in-Chief for assuming responsibility, referred
“ to the suspension of a revised regulation of
“ Government, affecting the Sepoys' remuneration
“ for rations.

“ An official and excessively harsh disapproval
“ was issued by the Governor-General in Council;
“ and further an injunction has been laid upon the
“ Commander-in-Chief not, in future, upon any
“ account, to assume such a responsibility. The
“ answer again is *Salus populi suprema lex*. The
“ whole of the dangerous symptoms of mutiny
“ which had been shewing themselves for nearly
“ a year, originated in an alteration of pay for the
“ Punjaub Army.

“ In January, after several regiments had shewn
“ their feelings publicly, and before the exhibition
“ of the 66th in Govindghur, an alteration intro-
“ duced in the new audit regulations was brought
“ under the Commander-in-Chief's observation.
“ It would in addition to the previous reduction
“ of pay, have affected the allowances of the
“ Sepoys; and was described to him as a new rule,
“ a statement which he had no cause for doubting,
“ and no means of verifying without a dangerous

“ delay. It was earnestly brought before him by
“ the Brigadier-General commanding at Wuzzeer-
“ abad, where the most decided steps had just
“ been taken by the discontented soldiers; and the
“ Brigadier’s views were sustained by the general
“ officer commanding the division, and by the
“ Adjutant-General of the Army. The Com-
“ mander-in-Chief did not consider this a fitting
“ time to broach any new subject of discontent, as
“ connected with the soldiers’ allowances; where-
“ fore he directed the suspension, *but in that dis-*
“ *trict only*, of the new rule, lest it should increase
“ the mutinous spirit already sufficiently strong. If
“ he had delayed, in order to communicate with the
“ supreme Government at Calcutta, the regulation
“ must have been acted upon each recurring pay
“ day, before any authority for its suspension could
“ arrive, and the evil would have been done.

“ Notwithstanding all the Commander-in-Chief’s
“ precautions the scene at Govindghur subsequently
“ took place, which, however, by assuming heavy
“ responsibility he rendered innocuous. And now
“ when all the danger appears to have passed,
“ *in consequence of the very measures which the*
“ *Commander-in-Chief adopted, and of the very re-*
“ *sponsibilities, which in these cases he assumed, his*
“ *acts are disapproved*; AND HE IS DESIRED NOT IN
“ FUTURE TO ASSUME SUCH A RESPONSIBILITY.
“ Would the Governor-General in Council have
“ approved of his conduct if he had wasted the
“ valuable time of action in writing, leaving to a
“ mutinous Army the opportunity of driving
“ the English Government clear out of India?

“ With respect to the imperative instruction
“ conveyed to the Commander-in-Chief not again

“ to assume a responsibility with which he is not
“ vested, nothing can be more absurd in principle
“ or dangerous in practice, if the present, or any
“ future Commander-in-Chief be weak enough to
“ attend to it. The security of nations and
“ Governments has frequently depended upon sub-
“ ordinate officers, not only acting without sanction
“ of their superiors but in direct opposition to
“ their rules and orders; and perhaps in India, of
“ all places in the world, may the exercise of this re-
“ sponsibility be most required for the public good.

“ An active mutiny was to be dealt with by the
“ Commander-in-Chief thirty-seven days removed
“ from the power of consulting by letter with the
“ Supreme Government—that Commander-in-Chief
“ being second in council only to the Governor-
“ General, and having been specially selected by
“ the unanimous voices of his Sovereign and his
“ countrymen to save India in a crisis of the
“ greatest peril. The magnitude of the question
“ was such, that had the mutiny succeeded in the
“ Punjaub, it would probably have extended to
“ the whole Native Armies of Bengal, Bombay,
“ and Madras, as the subject was one of common
“ interest to every Sepoy in India, viz. the power
“ of regulating their own pay. They would thus
“ have over-ridden the British Government, and
“ produced the same anarchy which a similar course
“ pursued successfully by the Sikh Panchayets
“ had accomplished in the Punjaub. The sup-
“ pression of this mutiny was a purely military
“ question, in which the Commander-in-Chief could
“ not have received any assistance whatever from
“ consultation with the civil Government, even had
“ it been on the spot with him, and consultation

“ been possible. But consultation was impossible.
“ The Commander-in-Chief therefore, did what he
“ thought right on his own responsibility, and
“ thoroughly arrested the mutiny without bloodshed,
“ or cost. His remedy produced no inconvenience
“ whatever; but it has introduced a principle so
“ intelligible to every Sepoy in the Army, that it is
“ not being over sanguine to expect that it will
“ henceforth prevent the repetition of those muti-
“ nous attempts, which have periodically occurred
“ in the Bengal Army for many years past.

“ What has been the reward of the Commander-
“ in-Chief for thus exercising a responsibility
“ absolutely unavoidable, and producing such happy
“ results? Harshly censured, as if he had not
“ only failed but been an incorrigible and habitual
“ delinquent.

“ A Lieutenant on guard at the gate of Govind-
“ ghur, *adhered strictly to his orders*, in refusing
“ admittance to troops until he should receive his
“ commanding officer's authority, WHO WAS WITHIN
“ A FEW HUNDRED YARDS OF HIM; by this etiquette
“ he would have lost the fortress but for the vigour
“ of Captain Macdonald. He was severely censured
“ by the Commander-in-Chief and by a Court of
“ Inquiry; and narrowly escaped a Court Martial;
“ yet his error was *the not breaking* through his
“ orders in the hour of need!

“ The Governor-General's censure proved that he
“ does not understand the duties of military subor-
“ dination, and that it may be as imperative upon an
“ officer to transgress an order, as it is under ordi-
“ nary circumstances to conform strictly.

“ It now becomes requisite to examine the gene-
“ ral position held by the Commander-in-Chief in

“ India, as affecting himself, the Army, and the safety of India.

“ It is fortunate, although merely accidental, that whilst conferring a great public benefit, the Commander-in-Chief did not spill blood, or expend treasure, or cause inconvenience. Had it been otherwise, it is clear that however correct or wise his conduct may have been, he could not with the weight of Government censure for having assumed responsibility, have cleared himself from the stain thus unjustly cast upon him.

“ No man therefore, who has a character that he prizes beyond the emoluments of office, can venture to hold the appointment of Commander-in-Chief, exposed as it is, under the present system, as above illustrated ; and whoever does hold it, in conforming to the present system, must be prepared to risk the loss of character, to sacrifice the Army and risk the security of India as a British possession.

“ When the present Commander-in-Chief arrived in India, he found the Army in a state of gross undiscipline, and grievously inexpert in military movements ; and that from causes of which many were beyond his control. He found the seeds of mutiny sown in a large proportion of the Native Army, on a principle that would necessarily extend with rapidity to the whole of the Native troops. He found this, and sought with infinite labour to use the powers vested in him to mend matters : the source of the evils however, was beyond his reach. He could issue judicious orders, enunciate sound principles, and hold up to reprobation negligence or misconduct ; he could punish dishonorable or unsoldierlike con-

“ duct; and 14 hours hard labour, daily, enabled
“ him to ascertain minutely the merits of every
“ case, and execute that painful duty with strict
“ justness. But he could not introduce that ear-
“ nest military spirit which is the only sound basis
“ for discipline and military efficiency. He found
“ that the officers of the Indian Army looked at
“ their regiments merely as stepping stones to
“ lucrative civil employments; and that the obtain-
“ ing of such employments was not in any way
“ dependant upon fulfilment of regimental duties.
“ No fewer than 443 officers in the Bengal Army
“ had thus been withdrawn from their regiments
“ and placed in lucrative employments by the civil
“ authorities without any distinct recommendation
“ through the military authorities, or being based
“ on professional character. Thus the mainspring of
“ the Army was relaxed. The officers saw that the
“ posts of emoluments were not granted for military
“ duties, and military duty became a painful task.

“ The Commander-in-Chief is placed in a false
“ and painful position. Able to punish, unable to
“ reward, he cannot possibly bring the Army to
“ that efficiency which his Sovereign and his coun-
“ try have a right to expect; and he must bear the
“ blame of its defects, although those are actually
“ forced on by Government practices beyond his
“ control.

“ As regards general military arrangements in
“ India,—incompatible with the character of the
“ Commander-in-Chief the Army he commands,
“ and with the safety of the country—the mode
“ in which military expeditions are decided
“ upon, undertaken and executed, may be men-
“ tioned. One of several that have occurred since

“ the arrival of the present Commander-in-Chief in
“ India, is an illustration. The Rajah of Sikhem
“ committed some offensive act. The head of the
“ Government immediately fulminated an indignant
“ threat of punishment, and a military expedition
“ was ordered without consultation with the Com-
“ mander-in-Chief. After the troops had marched,
“ it came to the Commander-in-Chief's knowledge
“ that, on the recommendation of a civil func-
“ tionary in the Sikhem country, the force had been
“ fixed at 700 MEN; that the plan of campaign
“ proposed by this gentleman was, that they should
“ advance 80 miles into the enemy's country,
“ leaving, AT SEVERAL POSTS, detachments from a
“ main body, only 700 strong at starting! It was
“ admitted that the country was most difficult and
“ precipitous, with jungle so dense there was rarely
“ the power of seeing 30 yards in advance. That
“ there were no roads, no power to employ animals
“ in the transport of stores and baggage, all of
“ which must necessarily be conveyed on men's
“ backs. That the march must be conducted in
“ Indian file through these dangerous passes.
“ There was also a monastic establishment on the
“ line of march, whose feeling towards us was not
“ ascertained, but would naturally be hostile to the
“ invading professors of an adverse faith; and who
“ would, of course, have enormous influence in
“ stirring up the people of the country to resistance,
“ in defiles where the natives with their matchlocks
“ would be as efficient as disciplined troops.

“ The Commander-in-Chief hearing that troops
“ had actually gone forth from the Army under
“ his command without his knowledge, felt most
“ uneasy, lest disaster should befall them; and wrote

“ to the Brigadier commanding, counselling the
“ greatest possible caution. That officer was alive
“ to the danger of his position, and made such a
“ report to the Government, that, after a considerable advance, the latter wisely suspended
“ further progress; and the loud threat fulminated
“ by Lord Dalhousie remained a dead letter! It is
“ said, that by negotiation the Rajah, ignorant of
“ the strength of his position, has since conceded to
“ our Government what they required in the way of
“ reparation; but this has nothing to do with the
“ principle in which the Commander-in-Chief is
“ interested. It was a mere piece of good fortune,
“ arising out of the Commander-in-Chief's vigilance
“ —which the civil government might possibly
“ denominate officiousness—that the miserably inadequate expedition thus detached from his
“ Army by the civil government had not been
“ destroyed in the defiles of Sikhem. The world,
“ in ignorance of the principle of military arrangements in India, would naturally have considered
“ the Commander-in-Chief responsible for the disaster. Hence while such a system is in force no
“ officer who prizes his character, the lives and
“ credit of his soldiers and fame of his country
“ beyond the high emoluments of his post, can remain Commander-in-Chief in India.

Summary.

“ The present Commander-in-Chief has received a
“ severe reprimand from the Government, in return
“ for having quelled the most dangerous and extensive mutiny, that has ever shewn itself in the
“ Indian Army.

“ He has been cujoined, not, under any circum-

“ stances in future, to take upon himself a similar responsibility to that which enabled him to quell the late mutiny, when it was impossible for him to consult the Government under a month’s loss of time. That responsibility being merely the suspending a Government charge against the Sepoys of £.6 9s. for a month!!

“ The mode in which officers are at present abstracted from the Army, and placed in lucrative employment, without reference to military exertions, renders it impossible for the Commander-in-Chief to maintain the requisite degree of military spirit, discipline and efficiency, in the Army.

“ The mode in which military expeditions are got up by the Civil Government without reference to the Commander-in-Chief exposes him, the Army, and the country, to loss of character.

“ Any one of the above four causes would justify the Commander-in-Chief in resigning. The four united render it imperative upon him to resign his dangerous post.”

Simla 23rd April 1850.

PART II.



CHAPTER I.

HAVING shewn the causes of my resignation, and of the war which has tormented the North-west frontier for four years, a detailed exposition of the state of the Company's Armies shall follow; my chief object being to exhibit defects in the Indian military system, and point out the remedies. Lord Dalhousie's civil Government cannot however be separated from military matters, and frequently additional proofs must be given that my holding office under him would have been a public wrong. He was jealous and hostile, feelings assiduously nourished and augmented by persons about him, with the usual cunning of vulgar-minded men devoid of abilities. Personally this might have been despised, but the injury to the public welfare demands exposure.

The barracks for Europeans shall be first noticed, and that dreadful branch of Indian misrule treated with the frankness becoming a man bound by a sacred duty towards his fellow creatures.

The barrack system sacrifices soldiers' lives and

happiness to a fallacious dishonest economy! I charge the Court of Directors, the Military Board of Calcutta, the Government of Bombay, with shameful negligence of the soldiers' safety! And with good warrant, because they disregarded my representations when a high position and great experience gave title to attention. The completed Artillery barracks at Kurrachee, and the finished wing of Infantry barracks at Hydrabad, furnished proof that my notions were sound. Lord Ellenborough sanctioned my building the last-named healthy barracks—Lord Dalhousie forbade their completion! One forwarded improvement—the other stopped it! Lord Dalhousie at first supported me, but soon his conduct displayed official feebleness—he would not oppose the Court of Directors, or abate the folly of the Military Board.

The Colaba and King's barracks at Bombay have destroyed whole regiments; commanding officers dreaded them as pest houses; but it is said the Government has now been compelled by public indignation to put down or alter those of Colaba. It is full time. I walked through the men's sleeping rooms there, *upon planks laid in water covering the floors!* An officer who knew them well thus speaks: "The Colaba barracks it would appear are destined to be the *slaughter-houses of more thousands of British soldiers than would suffice for the winning of fifty battles!* The moment we landed, each shipload was at once attacked by cholera, and we buried 97 men! * * * * came to see us. I represented to him that disease must ever attack the troops stationed there, particularly in the monsoon

“ season, while the barracks are so low and close
“ to that Mangrove swamp, that if no more con-
“ venient site could be found on which to build
“ new ones, the present ones should be raised upon
“ strong arches 14 feet from the ground, and the
“ rooms above made high, ventilated, &c.” He pro-
mised to give all attention, but it ended in draining
and raising the roofs and ventilating, which has
indeed improved the barracks; but the evil is still
there! The men sleep and live on the ground
floor.—The floor walked over on planks!

In 1842 I was Commandant of Bombay, sickness
was at Colaba as usual, and the excellent officer
quoted above, recommended the construction of
new barracks on firm ground, with a sale of the
edifice in the swamp for a bonding warehouse;
the purchase money would have repaid many times
the cost of the new construction! A committee
composed of myself, the Quarter-Master-General,
and the Executive Engineer, chose a very suitable
site, and estimates were ordered, but without
result: death’s maw continues to be overfilled at
Colaba!

At Aden the barracks are mats—nothing more!
Better than low rooms of masonry, because they
let out foul air; but they do not protect Europeans
against the dreadful heat of a tropical sun! Is
not this a disgraceful treatment of the Queen’s
troops where the Indian Government is wasting
thousands upon fortifications?

At the Colaba and King’s barracks the soldiers
die like rotten sheep under the nose of the Council,
and where the Governor is also Commander-in-Chief,
for at Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, the Governors
possess that title; the real military heads having no

authority within those towns—an absurd rule of ancient times.

It was in 1842 the officer quoted above remonstrated. In 1852 soldiers are still immolated in those pestilential barracks! Ten years therefore our men have to my knowledge, been perishing without an excuse for the Bombay Government's cruelty; and from the first construction of those infamous pest houses they have so perished; victims to Councils, Military Boards, Committees and like irresponsible tyrannies. Would to God that Parliament had returns of the regiments quartered in those barracks from 1800, and of the British soldiers killed by them.

In the Bengal presidency the barracks are, with few exceptions, extremely bad; but more pernicious still is the number of men crammed into them. Losses by battle sink to nothing compared with those inflicted by improperly constructed barracks, and the *jamming* of soldiers—no other word is sufficiently expressive. Long experience, and consultations with men of science, medical and engineer officers, have taught me that every barrack room should in hot climates, allow, at least, *one thousand cubic feet of atmospheric air for each person sleeping in a room*. That is the minimum; with less, insufferable heat and a putrid atmosphere prevails, death is the result! The soldiers rise at night, feverish or in profuse perspiration, to sleep out on the ground amidst damp exhalations. Indian night air in the Autumn months is dangerous to all who sleep exposed; but to do so when heated by an overcrowded room is *death*! Some may escape, or merely lose health: but *to escape is the exception, the rule is death*!

Veterans, aware of this danger endure the misery, lying restless and wretched till the dawn comes, and with it the blazing sun of India—a wretched sleepless night to prepare for a burning day! Languid and unhappy they go to their duties, seeking by *drams* to sustain body and mind against overwhelming lassitude and low spirits, and this artificial excitement carries them through the day. But again the night of misery returns, the dram does its daily deadly work, and liver and brain become inflamed, fever supervenes, and the mind sinks under bodily suffering and hopelessness of change.

All bad influences being thus brought into full activity it follows that men soon die, or become drunken feeble creatures and always on the sick list, to be discharged with a pension between thirty and forty years of age, after costing the public enormous sums without equivalent service. This inhuman drain upon life, health and the public treasury, constantly goes on, and the soldiers able to remain in the ranks are but half the strong fellows they would be if properly lodged.

When Governor of Scinde I laboured for good barracks, not in vain, for Lord Ellenborough ruled. One fine barrack was built, a second half built before my departure; but then the Bombay Government and Lord Dalhousie arrested further progress, and the collected materials lie scattered about*.

When Commander-in-Chief, this matter of barracks was pressed with some effect upon Lord Dalhousie; but where Lord Ellenborough would have instantly ordered the necessary work, Lord Dal-

* See "Administration of Scinde" by Sir. W. Napier.

housie consulted the Court of Directors—so men died, and die still of *red tape*! When at Lahore, a healthy spot called Meean Meer, was selected by me, where Runjeet Singh had formerly built his barracks. Good water was found twenty feet below the surface, the air was pure, and the building forwarded with vigour by myself and an active Engineer—Lieutenant Glover. The young officers of the Indian Army are full of energy, desirous to learn and eager to work.

The scope and dimensions of these barracks were on a plan I vainly hoped to make general. The barrack rooms were only wide enough for two rows of bedsteads, a long table and two rows of forms, leaving a passage between the forms and bedsteads. The height of the rooms 35 feet to the ceiling, or, if the roof was open, to the *wall plate*: the vent above not to be included in the height. The ceilings were to be ventilated, letting the foul air out at the roof: side ventilation produces draughts, and does not let out bad air so freely as upper vents.

The object in having rooms narrow and high was to prevent the common practice of jamming. For in India the Military Board calculates how many men a barrack room can hold, *not by its cubic content of air but by the superficies of the floor*! Troops were,—until forbade by me—thus made to occupy barrack rooms of 12, 10, or even 8 feet high. Upon this diabolical calculation, soldiers were swept off by thousands; The Black Hole at Calcutta, seems to have been the Board's model! That a number of human beings should thus be deprived of pure air, many with incipient disease in their constitutions, is terrible: the result has been fever, scurvy, dysentery, death!

Narrow high rooms not only give pure air but debar crowding; that cannot then be done without such glaring indifference to the soldiers' lives as would elicit determined remonstrances from commanding officers. A medical report in my possession forcibly shews the effect, in one instance, of the low barrack rooms established by the Military Board. Murdering Board should be its name, for directly and indirectly it causes more loss of life, more extravagance than can be described, and its evil influence spreads far beyond barracks! Do the Directors know the mischief perpetrated by that body? I only became fully aware of its destructive operations when Commander-in-Chief. It kills more soldiers than the climate, more than hard drinking; and one half of the last springs from the discomfort, the despair caused by its bad barracks.

The medical report mentioned, touches only the 2nd Europeans at Sabathoo; but the crowding of men is everywhere, and that deadly exposition will equally apply to Her Majesty's 29th regiment, which was nearly destroyed at the neighbouring barrack of Kassowlie. Both buildings were in the pure air of the hills, yet from their crowded state both regiments were so ruined in 1846-7-8 that neither were fit for service in 1850! Their number, their colours, their uniform remained—the men were gone! Crowding did the mischief. Behold the proof!

At those places *the climate is of the finest in India; cool, salubrious and elevated from five to seven thousand feet above the sea!* The barracks there, built by the Military Board too, contain one battalion each, were occupied by the two regiments,

and they died like rotten sheep. *This havoc was attributed to climate ; wherefore the barracks were abandoned as unhealthy, and new constructions—begun in the vicinity at Dugshai—were stopped by order of the Military Board for the same reason.*

That Sabathoo and Kassowlie should be pestilential, while Simla, apparently so like in climate, was resorted to as a Garden of Eden, was incredible ; wherefore I visited the condemned barracks to seek the *real cause* of the terrible sickness. Easily it was found ! Only 400 cubic feet of air had been allowed for each man ! What quantity of air Suraj-ud-Dowlat allowed in the Calcutta Black Hole has not been stated, but at Kassowlie and Sabathoo a measuring tape proved that the military Suraj-ud-Dowlat was the Board. Lord Dalhousie's permission was then obtained for repairing these barracks and finishing those at Dugshai.

At this time all the European soldiers in India dreaded Sabathoo and Kassowlie, but the spell of terror was broken in this manner. While the new constructions were in progress I reached Peshawur, where the 60th regiment was suffering dreadfully from the bad site of the barracks. That was the fortune of war, they were the best to be had ; but the sad state of this fine regiment made me resolve to send it to Kassowlie and Sabathoo, notwithstanding the universal dread of those places. Men were astonished, but to Doctor Boys their surgeon, whose medical abilities merited the highest confidence, the real cause of disease at those stations was pointed out : and as his opinion coincided with mine the regiment marched—not however, to be crowded into one barrack after the

Military Board's fashion, but to occupy both barracks—a wing in each! Moreover the roofs had been raised, and the trees, which around Kassowlie were so close that the branches hung over the building, had been cleared away, in despite of strong opposition, for the support of Lord Dalhousie, was then lost: but with the aid of remonstrance from the commanding officer of the regiment—the much-lamented Colonel Bradshaw—and of the medical men, who throughout India oppose the crowding system, the opposition was overcome.

The 60th regiment entered the barracks of Kassowlie and Sabathoo with gloomy forebodings; so did the 22nd enter those of Dugshai; but when I left India both were in health not exceeded by any regiment in England! The returns of the 22nd, 19th November, 1850, gave, on a strength of 1054, only 29 in hospital, of which several were from accidents, and eleven from a complaint as common in London and Paris as in India. Not *one in fifty* were sick from climate! It was not bad air that had destroyed the soldiers—it was the Military Board's economy of wood and stone, its extravagance of life!

Nearly every barrack in India is bad as to altitude: Allahabad is of the few exceptions, but being in a fort, the air, enclosed by walls, is intolerably hot for Europeans. Allahabad is also at the confluence of the Ganges and Jumna, and when towns on the banks of great rivers decay stagnant waters are formed and spread malaria. Allahabad, said to be the ancient Palibrotha, may again become celebrated; its site is grand and central.

Following up my plan of the barracks at Lahore and Meean Meer, a construction was also begun at Sealkote; another at Peshawur; and the

greatest exertions were made to get the troops well covered before the hot weather. In India officers are not lodged in barracks, they receive money to build what is called a "*bungalow*," but at this time, foreseeing that our frontier policy would inevitably produce a war with the tribes around Peshawur, I proposed to have the officers quartered in the barracks for safety. The Court of Directors refused, the usual bungalows were built, and their occupants are now compelled to hire Native guards against the hill men! How can subalterns afford this?

When I quitted Peshawur, all persons concerned were zealous to complete the barracks before the hot weather set in, their bungalows, mess houses, billiard rooms, stables, and even a theatre were rising fast, and I, acting with sanction from the Governor-General, having given specific orders, stupidly fancied the private soldiers' barracks would arise more rapidly. This was in February, and well pleased I was to think the autumn ravages of fever would be averted. My satisfaction was short lived. In August a letter from General Campbell reported that the barracks, which ought to have been finished, had made no progress.

The public buildings necessary to save the lives of the Queen's troops had made no progress, while everything required by the officers had been rapidly completed! The engineers had made every effort to construct the barracks before the sun poured down its destructive floods of heat; the Commander-in-Chief, with discretionary powers, had done all depending on him, and every subordinate was zealous: yet no progress was made and death assailed the soldiers! The mortality was fearful.

Why was this? *The labour market at Peshawur was free, and the officers gave the wages labour could command in the market, while the executive engineer was limited by the Military Board to fixed rates, below what the working people could command, not only from British officers, but from the natives of the country!*

Was this prohibition of progress, this fiat of death for the poor soldiers, the angry comment on my habitual efforts to expose the murderous absurdities of that Board? My thoughts are free, the facts were so—the lives of many brave men were sacrificed, men who had decided the battle of Chillianwallah, and by Lord Gough personally thanked on the battle field. Those noble soldiers so ready to die when the Service demands their death! Never do they flinch from any trial called for by honour; but the Military Board, the Court of Directors, the East India Company of Merchants, with vile parsimony, selfish idleness, and ingratitude consigned them to destruction!

Here let a mournful indignant record be made of what happened to the 50th regiment.

More than decimated in the battles of Moodkee Ferozshur, Aliwal, and Sobraon, its remains entered the barracks at Loodiana under the fostering economy of the Military Board; a gale of wind arose, the edifice fell bodily, and those glorious soldiers, their wives and children, were in one horrid instant destroyed! It is said three hundred men women and children were crushed: such dreadful events do not admit of exactness, but the Military Board and Court of Directors are responsible to God and man—the first for the calamity, the second for not

having abolished the first, and augmented its corps of Engineers, instead of employing Infantry officers ignorant of the business to execute what belongs to engineers and builders. But the vile system should be reformed altogether to enable the legitimate officers to do their work with safety to the troops and themselves. They cannot do this with complicated accounts, and a ruinous balance against them for years under a delayed audit. If an engineer dies, how is that balance to be settled? How can a man labour with a will when not only his family but his honour may be ruined by a Board, which does not know or does not do its work? None can serve as they ought under protracted financial responsibility, especially in such an enervating climate.

An engineer should plan his works with all possible perfection,—framing his estimates with reference to perfect execution, and keeping within them. He should look to the quality of his materials, and rigidly enforce contracts. He should not be a mere clerk with intricate accounts for years unaudited! He should be intent on plans, estimates, superintendence—and he requires time for study.

Generally speaking the Directors treat their Army well, but they must not suppose British soldiers are unreasoning beings; that they do not ask why bungalows are quickly built by officers, and soldiers' barracks make no progress? They do not see their comrades die without feeling a just indignation. The Leadenhall people may be assured these things, aye! and *much more* is talked of in every barrack room; for in the British ranks

are officers and privates of far greater capacity than any in the Court of Directors—far better informed as regards India and its Government.

Seeing the soldiers' misery, I regulated their numbers in barracks so as to allow each a thousand cubic feet of air; the Court of Directors it is said, have ordered the height of the unfinished barracks commenced by me to be reduced! If so, thousands of soldiers are doomed men. Expecting such iniquity, the completion of one barrack at Meean Meer to the full height of thirty-five feet was secured—perhaps this also will be cut down! My hope is however that public feeling for the soldiers may be excited, and the Directors compelled to raise barrack rooms even higher than thirty-five feet, for, in despair of getting more, that was taken as a minimum.

Punkas have been lately set up in the European barracks. These are large fans slung from the ceiling and swayed by a rope to cool the air. The soldiers' health has improved where they have been used, but the Directors have awarded such scanty payment for punkamen, that where there are not canteen funds to aid, they are not used! So incurable in Leadenhall Street, is that disease,—*the doting on dividends!* Punkas will not avail, however, without rooms thirty or forty feet high, with top ventilation. High rooms, expensive once, are permanently economical, and a remedy for a dreadful evil—punkas are a mere expedient.

The fate of the barracks at Hyderabad on the Indus exemplifies the mode by which my efforts to lodge soldiers healthily were nullified. They were designed to hold a regiment, and the lamented Major Peat of the Engineers took all pains with

the plan. One wing was completed by Lieut. Burke, an able Bombay Engineer, before my departure in 1847; but *then* the building of those beautiful barracks, and everything else beneficial for Scinde left unfinished by me, was stopped under the Bombay Government. However, one wing was finished, and in 1850, half a regiment placed there was healthy, while the other wing, quartered at a more salubrious station of Kurrachee, was unhealthy. Why? At Hyderabad the men were not crowded, at Kurrachee they were.

When Commander-in-Chief, I urged the completion of the Hyderabad barracks as a *dépôt* for regiments coming from England, instead of sending them to Calcutta, where they quit the ships to be crowded in the bad barracks of that great city. The hospital soon fills there, numbers die from the union of bad lodging, fiery drink, and fiery climate, and the survivors are hurried away as quickly as possible. But that *possible* depends on various circumstances, and the young soldier, after a long voyage, and knowing nothing of Indian marching, suffers severely: the march alone shakes his constitution without the previous mismanagement. In 1850, the Queen's 87th regiment was absolutely decimated by that mismanagement.

Were all regiments destined for the North-west provinces to land in Scinde, they would find at Hyderabad a spacious airy barrack, be in a certain degree acclimatised, and finally go up the Indus in steamers to their destination. The map will show the folly of sending them to Calcutta instead of Kurrachee—it is almost as bad as attacking Burmah by Rangoon instead of Aracan; that supreme absurdity by which, in contempt of

Wellington's and of Sir A. Campbell's judgments, and the opinion of every man knowing aught of war, the Lords Amherst and Dalhousie have displayed their military genius! Would that the latter was only "*Lieutenant-Colonel to the Earl of Mar.*"

All regiments from England destined for the Northern Bengal provinces should land about the end of November at Kurrachee. That place, so decried by factious folly, will become one of the largest and most important cities of India, and every power of Government should be applied to hasten its progress. It will be the emporium of traffic by the Indus, and now offers the shortest and best line for the transmission of troops to the Punjaub, to the Northern, and the North-western provinces of Bengal.

CHAPTER II.

Commissariat.

MUCH should be said on this subject, if the Indian newspapers had not announced that the Commissariat has been taken from the Military Board and placed under a Commissary-General. A few remarks are however necessary.

The soldier is supplied with bread and meat by contractors, and whether the articles be good or bad he must pay for them; the hospitals also are thus furnished with necessary comforts, two thirds of the poor invalids' pay being deducted for the cost. The interest of the soldier and the contractor are opposed. If the latter gives bad articles the soldier complains, and shame and dishonour it would be for his officers not to listen and do him justice. The rule is that the commanding officer orders a Court of Inquiry, on whose report, if facts warrant, the Commissary is called on to change the provisions. But human nature has still its influences, and how they may act in this case is worth examination.

The Soldier.—Can he have any motive to refuse good food? His complaint must be made at breakfast or dinner time to his officer; and in India complaints of this nature take long to re-

medy; the men must therefore wait several hours for their nourishment, perhaps lose it altogether that day—a strong check. In fifty-eight years' service I have never known of soldiers making an unreasonable complaint of their food!

The Court of Inquiry.—What influence can elicit an unjust opinion from the members. Regimental officers have no visible bias for or against the soldier, or the authorities would not make them judges.

The Commanding Officer.—Nearly always he confirms the finding of the court. Married officers in command have indeed sometimes been accused of improper intimacy with contractors and commissaries; yet my long experience has never furnished an instance of a commanding officer not supporting his men as to their food.

Quarter-Masters.—It is said they often support the contractor. This does not accord with my knowledge. Yet they sometimes do declare the meat to be *wholesome* when the soldier complains. Meat may be wholesome, and hardy soldiers with the digestion of ostriches may be laughed at for complaining; they do not complain when no better can be had, but they pay for the *best quality*, and have a right to it. Wherefore Quarter-Masters and contractors should abstain from opinions as to *wholesomeness* and stick to the *contract*.

Commissary.—He generally supports the contractor. Under the Military Board he would probably be dismissed if he did not; but his support is accounted for by the troops in another manner. Men who enter the department very poor, live in a short time more splendidly than general officers. To receive presents from contrac-

tors is forbidden to the Commissary—not forbidden to his wife: and public cattle and public servants can be employed on private affairs! A house may be accidentally built, or bought by a contractor, and a Commissary may get it at a nominal rent. How do some Commissaries live so well, get so rich? Why do they lean to contractors in disputes about the soldiers' supplies? Why is it that the public eye twinkles so merrily and so maliciously when Commissaries are spoken of? Answer those who can—the way of a Commissary with a contractor may be added to the three things which Solomon knew not. Contractors however read the Proverbs, and find “a gift in secret “ pacifieth wrath.”

Jotee Persaud, to whom the Indian Government owed so much money and gratitude, for nourishing its Army in the field when the Commissariat failed, has made India ring with complaints of that Government's injustice. A legal verdict has compelled it to pay him, but an impression prevails that in a new war no great contractor will undertake to provision the troops on his terms. Persaud's contract was honourably fulfilled even to peril of his life; it was remunerative—he would be a fool else, which all India knows he is not—and doubtless many under frauds happened, for in such an immense operation he could not prevent them. He sent his agents abroad, and it was for Government servants to see that all was right. Who were the Government agents bound to prevent the frauds for which the Government sought to make Jotee Persaud answerable? English officers in the Civil and Commissariat Services!

Before us then are two classes of men.

First—Agents of the contractor, natives, having sub-contracts, all interested in giving inferior supplies, and in many instances destitute of the honour which, for aught shown to the contrary, Jotee Persaud, an Indian gentleman, possesses.

Second—Commissariat officers appointed to detect frauds, honourable men, doubtless. But a great difficulty arises. The Government proclaimed the existence of frauds which the Commissariat officers were paid to prevent, and with few exceptions those gentlemen declared that Jotee Persaud had honestly performed his contract. This was honourable, because it drew on themselves an imputation of connivance, or of being duped.

Has any inquiry been instituted as to their conduct? No! and the public opinion in India is, that if Jotee Persaud had been hard pushed he would have told strange tales of bribery. The Commissariat department is thus placed in a discreditable light, injurious even to private character. More than one officer has been heard to say he would not accept an appointment in the Commissariat, because honesty would be no protection from suspicion. This is, in a great measure, owing to the Commissariat being under the Military Board, whose long arrears of accounts make vigorous administration impossible. Jotee's unsettled claims extended so far back as 1838, perhaps farther; and a Commissariat officer, a man of honour, who served under me in 1845, said that in 1850 his accounts for that period were not settled!

The remedy is to abolish the Military Board, and appoint one Chief Commissary who can act with vigour, and whose character is involved with that

of his department. Being responsible to the Commander-in-Chief, and through him to the Governor-General, he should have great power to dismiss; and not to exercise that power with energy where corruption existed should be fatal to his reputation. He would choose for contractors men of substance, giving a fair profit, but making forfeiture for non-performance proportioned to the dreadful results which such failures produce, namely, distress, ill-health, death to the soldiers. The Military Board may think ten, or ten thousand pounds, a proper fine for the destruction of troops; but it is not so, the penalty should be as terrible to the contractor as the results are to the soldier: the great events depending on their strength should not be put in jeopardy by tenderness to a swindling contractor.

What is the course of the Military Board? It accepts from native contractors tenders for supplying the Europeans, at a price so low that it is not possible to execute the contract honestly, and every species of fraud and bribery is resorted to by the dexterous rascal who contracts.

CHAPTER III.

Discipline.

DISCIPLINE in the Bengal Army is so involved with the civil system that the errors of the last in a great measure produce those of the first, and in some degree excuse them. The interference of the civil power is extensive, constant and pernicious; but a few illustrations must suffice, and nothing here said touching the Commanders-in-Chief of the British Army should be taken as applicable to the late Duke of Wellington. Enveloped in his own splendour his word was, or ought to have been, law as to war: ordinary men only, are my mark, when drawing comparisons between them and the Indian Generals.

In England the Commander-in-Chief stands in presence of the Sovereign, which nearly extinguishes his responsibility. He is in contact with the Government, his duties are by long custom defined, and the Regulations of the Army are clearly and well laid down. If war comes it is the result of political arrangements, with which he has no concern; he has in fine, no greater responsibility than may attach to him as commander of an expedition, if he quits England at the head of one. He pro-

vides for the number and equipment of troops wanted for service ; but even then shares responsibility with the Ministers or throws it entirely on them. His slight accountability is absorbed by the powerful Government with whom he is in daily consultation during peace—when war comes the War Minister is the real commander. If the military man dislikes this, he can resign ; and though to surrender a post so honourable and lucrative requires firmness, that is all. The ex-chief puts on his hat, walks out of the Horse Guards to his club, reads his successor's name in the *Gazette*, and goes home to dinner.

The poor Indian General cannot do so with a like facility and coolness. He does it though. Of fourteen Commanders-in-Chief in India, since the year 1792, ten have resigned before their term ; and of those who did not, two were Governors-General. All the others, save two, held their commands to the last—*suffering all things*.

An Indian Commander-in-Chief is some 12,000 miles from his home, and has gone that distance on a fool's errand if he resign before his full period of service. He is not young, has probably suffered in health by going out, and having with great cost established himself, and his family, at such a distance, cannot resign his position and large salary lightly ; he suffers himself and so do others, for his personal staff are turned adrift : moreover, if in the North-west provinces, he has at an advanced age a weary journey before re-embarking for home. These inconveniences make him retain his post while he can do so with honour ; whereas in London the Commander-in-Chief has not even to pack up a carpet bag when he resigns ! Such is the differ-

ence of position as to private affairs, and with public matters it is greater.

In India *peace is never certain for a single day*. Take the four last wars. That of Cabul was so sudden as to be proclaimed only by a massacre. In Scinde war was proclaimed by a battle; and if Outram, the political agent, had been allowed to direct affairs there, as the political agent, McNaughten, was at Cabul, the same disasters would have befallen our Army. The Bundelcund war also was proclaimed by a battle; the first Punjaub war came down like an avalanche, and the second was equally sudden.

When war thus breaks out the Commander-in-Chief becomes the responsible man before the world. He lies down at night in peace, he wakes at daylight to fight a general action! On the 13th December, 1845, peace reigned in India; on the 18th a fearful battle took place at Moodkee, where sixteen British officers, with three hundred and fifty privates were laid dead! An Indian Commander-in-Chief may in a moment find himself, without preparation, responsible for the safety of the Indian empire. His position is in no way like that of the home Commander-in-Chief, on whom events so sudden and so terrible cannot burst. Therefore the former ought to have power commensurate with his vast responsibility.

Many are the examples of danger from divided power in war and the pernicious interference of civil authorities; and also of military men invested with civil power—*politicals*. Alexander the Great sent a force against Spitamenes under the orders of Pharnuches, a Lycian political, who had doubtless passed a "*splendid examination in the Persian*

"*language*," he was of course cut to pieces by Spitamenes, the Akbar Khan of those days. Come to modern times. The rival powers of McNaughten and Elphinstone had horrible results; but let those unhappy gentlemen rest in peace; be it only stated that there was a divided command and great disaster.

When the second Punjaub war broke out the Governor-General was at Calcutta, the Commander-in-Chief at Simla, 1200 miles distant; the British resident at the court of Duleep Sing was in Lahore, 300 miles from the Commander-in-Chief. Moolraj of Mooltan revolted in April 1848, and in July the Lahore resident, Sir Frederick Currie, sent a force against him. This he did in the exercise of civil power, contemptuous of the Commander-in-Chief's antagonistic opinion! Who was Sir Frederick Currie? A civilian, assuredly knowing nothing of war. Who was the Commander-in-Chief? An officer whose military exploits had won for him a peerage.

Failure followed of course, and it was by a siege of five months, with troops of unsurpassed gallantry that the political folly was redeemed in the capture of the place; moreover an accidental extraordinarily healthy season alone saved that force from being sacrificed by this unmilitary movement, made in defiance of the Commander-in-Chief. For my part, knowing how mischievous the interference of the civil power must be, and having Cabul and Mooltan before my eyes, with remembrance of my own narrow escape in Scinde from the fatuous political, Outram. I resolved to maintain firmly the integrity of military command while I could—when I could not to resign. Woe to

the country whose ruler employs subordinates to advise, to suggest, to dictate, about military matters. In India political subalterns are allowed to dictate to a General in the field, though no able minister would do so, knowing it must make a good General bad, and a bad one worse.

The Prince of Sikhim seized English travellers in his territories, and the Council at Calcutta, under Lord Dalhousie's direction, issued orders for war without letting me, the Commander-in-Chief, know of it until after the troops had reached the Sikhim frontier. There a civilian gave the plan of campaign, but the General showed so clearly the danger of attempting to obey, that the expedition was relinquished by the Council,—yet the General himself was very roughly treated for having prevented an inevitable disaster! He sent me his vindication. Had he entered the jungle mountains on the civil agent's plan, his force would never have returned.

Several other small wars were also as lightly undertaken. There was a war in Bunnoo and I knew nothing of it; another in Eusofzye and I was not consulted; a third at Lucknow which cost us an officer and 500 killed or wounded. How weak is such a system of Government! Small failures of this nature do vast injury in the East. The natives draw conclusions unfavourable to our rule, and the honour of our arms; and each affair adds to the enemy's military knowledge.

Oppressed with ill-health and great labours I had no wish to be *consulting physician with quacks about war*. To be of use was impossible. Advice from me would not have been listened to, or only so much of it taken as to insure failure and afford

an excuse to shift blame from the Governor-General's shoulders. Always ready to accept, I never sought responsibility, especially under men of contemptible abilities. These desultory wars were not necessary, and voluntarily to have meddled with them would have been folly. The public cannot benefit by such interference with military authority, and the Governor-General would do well to take counsel from my old nurse, who used to say "*mind boy never keep a dog and bark yourself.*" Until this barking ceases, the Indian Commander-in-Chief, loaded with responsibility, denuded of power, must be constantly trembling for his own fame and the public service.

The injurious effect on discipline caused by the employment of soldiers in civil duties shall now be shown; but first some notice of the patronage usurped by Lord Dalhousie will be fitting; because it is unjust that a commander should have no power to reward distinguished deeds, and the Army look for benefits to other than the man who has to enforce discipline.

Lord Dalhousie increased the Irregular force in the Punjaub by many new corps, but placed them under the orders of the Board of Administration, not under mine. Other Governors-General had before raised Irregulars, making the first appointments, but always turning them over to the Commander-in-Chief with the subsequent patronage. Long after these regiments were raised Lord Dalhousie offered the command to me, yet retained the permanent patronage contrary to custom. This would have placed the Irregulars under my authority on different conditions, viz. command and patronage of the old Irregular force, as given by

Lords Ellenborough and Hardinge to Lord Gough, and to which I succeeded—command of the new Irregular force without the patronage. I refused additional authority, without power to promote officers whose claims were strong, and surely the spirit here exhibited by Lord Dalhousie was not laudable. Nor was it confined in action to the patronage he denied, as a very cruel proceeding now to be related will prove. Perhaps the Court of Directors will yet repair this wrong to the service, and to one of its bravest young officers.

In the Pass of Kohat a Sepoy picket, descending a precipitous mountain, under fire and the rolling of large stones, had some men killed and wounded. Four of the latter, dreadfully hurt, crept under rocks for shelter; they were not missed until the picket reached the bottom, but were then discovered by our glasses, high up and helpless. Fortunately the enemy did not see them, and some Sepoys volunteered a rescue. Headed by Lieut. H. W. Norman of the 31st Native Infantry, and Ensign C. Murray 70th Native Infantry, these brave men—would that their names were known to me for record—ascended the rocks in defiance of the enemy and brought the wounded men down.

Such generous daring called for prompt recognition, and two vacant appointments in my gift were given; that of Brigade-Major to Norman, the Adjutancy of an Irregular regiment of Cavalry to Murray. The latter immediately put himself to the great expense of the Cavalry uniform, and joined; but *scarcely had I left India when this courageous young man, only known to me by his noble exploit, was deprived of the appointment he had so gallantly won!* The pretext of the Governor-

General and the Court of Directors is, that Ensign Murray must rejoin his first regiment, because he was in excess of the number of officers permitted to be absent. This regulation was *never rigidly enforced until I became Commander-in-Chief!* It had been systematically broken for years, and it would have been only becoming to favour an officer, who had by his courage contributed to save the lives of four soldiers at the imminent risk of his own!

How rarely is it the lot of a brave young soldier to distinguish himself in the view of a Commander-in-Chief. Murray braved danger and obtained glory; but for reward he has been mulcted in heavy useless expenses—perhaps involved in debt! There were other officers of his regiment employed on civil duties; could not one of those have rejoined rather than this brave young man who had behaved so gloriously? How fair and honourable was his claim for exception; how fraught with advantage as an incentive to deeds of generous courage! Military daring displayed in the noblest cause is surely worthy of reward, yet here it met with punishment, with mortification, ruinous expense and sickening disappointment.

The following passages of a letter from the commander of an Irregular Cavalry corps depicts another great evil.

“ 10th June, 1850.—I will submit my general
“ objections against the employment of Irregular
“ Cavalry on civil duties. One of my troops,
“ placed at the disposal of the superintendent of
“ the province is employed to escort treasure and
“ dāk-travellers. It furnishes orderlies who attend
“ the superintendent in his rides; and when he
“ goes into the district ten Sowars accompany

“ him. Small parties of two or three troopers, even
“ only one, are scattered about under uncovenanted
“ assistants and Native revenue collectors, sum-
“ moning and bringing in refractory landholders
“ and villagers. Here then is one troop nominally
“ at two, really at twenty-two stations! But the
“ duty most to complain of is attendance on the
“ magistratc. Besides carrying letters and orders,
“ they escort him in his rides morning and even-
“ ing; and when on a tour, relays are placed every
“ eight or ten miles to carry the post which some-
“ times is 20lbs weight. This added to the usual
“ military trappings weighs the rider to one side,
“ the horses suffer in their backs and legs, and as the
“ men buy their horses they have reason to complain.
“ Your Excellency knows the conduct of my
“ regiment, the Native officers and men are of
“ high families. Many of them have served faith-
“ fully upwards of forty years, and bear marks of
“ distinction, medals, wounds and orders of merit,
“ and their professional pride is injured if not
“ entirely lost by performing duties that, in many
“ instances, must obviously lower them in their
“ own respect and in the estimation of their
“ countrymen. I cite no particular instances; but
“ I have known of many troopers, at the disposal of
“ civilians, being taken a gallop of eight or ten
“ miles on guard, besides being subjected to de-
“ grading and humiliating tasks—even to carrying
“ bread and butter and vegetables. I have known
“ the horses sent out to different stages for a
“ gentleman's own riding; and I have known a
“ trooper sent back, after a long ride, to fetch
“ a pair of shoes for a magistrate!
“ I have served many years with this regiment,
“ have great reason to be proud of commanding it;

“ and may be permitted to say, with feelings natural
“ to a soldier, that I have taken great pains with
“ men and horses in discipline and appointments,
“ my wish ever being that in good conduct and
“ appearance they should do credit to the service
“ —*I cannot hope they can any longer be so.*

“ The breaking up of a regiment into small
“ detachments renders it unserviceable as a military
“ body; the moral feeling will be destroyed, the
“ discipline will be destroyed. Distant from the
“ supervision of their European officers, free from
“ restraint, scattered in large towns and villages,
“ young soldiers will imbibe every pernicious
“ habit; they will gamble, get in debt, and acquire
“ disgusting vices, which it will be impossible to
“ eradicate. The horses and equipments will be
“ ruined; all the labour and discipline of years
“ will have been wasted, and a fine regiment
“ turned into a crippled disorganised rabble.”

In this way corps are ruined, their commanders lose all interest in them, and disgust takes place of zeal. How could Sisyphus feel zealous? These Irregular Cavalry corps consist of natives with high military feeling, who dislike being attached to civilians, from some of whom they receive affronts. The Native soldier is often insulted also by military officers, but is more susceptible to it from civilians. This conduct is confined indeed to vulgar-minded men of both services; but that there are such, the real soldiers and real statesman of the Company's service acknowledge with regret.

Extent of Cantonments.—This evil also springs from interference of the civil power with the discipline of the Army. In Bengal the Army is widely and unnecessarily scattered. From Mulmein to Calcutta, as the crow flies, is some 900 or 1000

miles; from Assam to Calcutta about 700 miles; from Calcutta to Peshawur 1400 miles: in breadth the average may be 400 miles. Thus one million of square miles are occupied by military stations.

Great heat stimulates to luxury, high pay furnishes means for indulgence, the sites of cantonments belong to Government, there is no want of space, and an allowance in money instead of barracks enables officers to build houses with large enclosures, called *compounds*. An Indian cantonment resembles a town of villas; some are seven miles in length. And beyond the military bounds dwell civilians, having guards—another civil interference with the military—for our Indian Government is so beloved, that after ruling above a century, magistrates cannot live out of the reach of bayonets! This is the practical comment upon the assertion that “*India has become a great empire not so much by the sword as by the wisdom of its Council.*” India is sinking under such wisdom. A Wellesley, a Hastings, an Ellenborough, by their genius check the downward progress, a Dalhousie gives it impetus. His Burmah war, and discreditable contest beyond the Indus, will make it difficult for his successor to restore India to real safety.

In that excellent work, “*Shore on Indian Affairs*,” the causes of the hatred entertained by the Indian population is clearly shown; a hatred which in Bengal renders it necessary for civil servants to have guards so numerous, and at distances so great from head quarters, they cannot be relieved daily and become detachments. Discipline is thus destroyed. They mount by the week, by the month; they have been left even three months, because there were not men to relieve them! Sol-

diers hate to be constantly on guard, constantly dressed and accoutred in any climate, in a tropical one it is unendurable, and therefore evaded.

The commander of these miscalled guards having placed a sentry goes to bed; so do the rest, and when the sentry thinks it time to be relieved, he calls up the next man. Here is the origin of the general Indian custom of guards going to bed and self-relief of sentries. It is destructive to the power and safety of an Army, yet so established that the Commander-in-Chief cannot abolish it.

At regimental head quarters, although scant of men for the *necessary* military, and *unnecessary* civil duties, guards are assigned for commanding officers' quarters, for mess houses, for commissaries, for stores, for treasure. Europeans cannot take all their own guards, because Government do not build barracks which will enable their duties to be done under cover from the sun; wherefore Sepoys are furnished. Sepoy guards are substituted for locks and keys, and no mercy is shown as regards these duties: with the Sepoy it is "*Mungo here! Mungo there! Mungo everywhere!*" These innumerable guards require more men than are to be had for reliefs, and therefore become detachments for furnishing sentries.

I first sought to reduce the size of cantonments and number of guards, designing, if that could be accomplished, to concentrate the troops more and so abolish the evil. Unless this be done and all civilians, except the Governor-General, be denied military guards, the evil cannot be thoroughly remedied. None are more aware of it than the Bengal officers; yet they cannot correct it, while every commissary, almost every civil servant may

have a native guard for asking, and do ask for them, while their legitimate force, *the Chupprassees and Birkendauses, is equal in numbers to the whole Army*. Those men are paid by the public to do the duties thus thrown upon the soldiers! These Chupprassees and Birkendauses are employed by the civil servants of the Company as domestics! At least all the Indian world says so, and if not so employed what do those men do? Why are soldiers required?

Lord Ellenborough endeavoured to correct this by forming those idle functionaries into "*police battalions*." He left India before the measure was completed. Yet even the few battalions formed did, when the Sikh war began, free regiments which would not otherwise have appeared on the Sutlej. Soon however this admirable measure was stifled, as predicted by a very able civil servant, who opposed it and being questioned, replied—"The measure was a good one, but the "prejudice was so strong I knew it would sooner "or later be reversed, and the re-action be mischievous." The evil therefore remains, and the Sepoys are wearied and disgusted.

The officers of the Queen's and Bombay Armies naturally cry out, when they see sentries self relieved, and guards going to bed; but when the remote causes of this loose discipline were revealed, I saw that a partial effort to remedy would make matters worse.

The Bombay Army is superior to the Bengal in discipline—not in military spirit. This springs from the comparative smallness of the Bombay presidency. In Bombay are thirty-two regiments of the line; in Bengal eighty-four regiments; and

much more difficult it is to keep the greater number in high discipline. The Bengal regiments are spread over an extent of country far greater, in proportion to numbers, than those of Bombay. The Bengal Commander-in-Chief cannot see his Army. To visit twelve stations out of some sixty or seventy took six months.

The Bombay Commander-in-Chief can see his whole force with ease in six weeks. This alone makes an Army good, if there be any discipline at all. Sir Colin Halkett, Lord Keane, Sir Thomas McMahon, Sir Willoughby Cotton, succeeding each other at Bombay, had all this excellent Army under their eyes, except from 1842 to the end of 1847, when a large portion was under me in Scinde, where its discipline and drill was not allowed to deteriorate, and it added to its former renown. The proportion of Queen's to Native regiments influences the latter less in the Bengal state of dispersion, than in the Bombay state of concentration: the Queen's regiments mixed with the twenty-nine Sepoy regiments in Bombay furnish examples of the highest discipline and drill; but in Bengal they are less mixed with the Native corps.

Here be it remarked, that the personal conduct of the Sepoys in quarters is exemplary. The European officers of the Company's service are as ready to punish misconduct as those of the Queen's service; and there is now in both services comparatively little of the disgraceful trickery of concealing crime; yet the number of Courts Martial held on the two races of men are all in favour of the Hindoo. There were under me twenty-nine Queen's regiments, and two Company's European regiments. Of Natives some hundred and fifty

regiments, regular and irregular. Fifty European officers were tried by my orders and only twenty-eight Native officers! Of the first, three only were acquitted, and East India Courts Martial cannot be accused of harshness in their sentences; their fault lies the other way; for when discipline grows slack, conscience acts on many members of Courts Martial: feeling they cannot throw the first stone, a weakness fatal to discipline ensues.

The European non-commissioned officers are in England remarkably well-conducted men; eight were tried by me in India, two were acquitted! Of Native non-commissioned officers only twelve, and one was acquitted.

Of Native private soldiers only twenty-three were tried, and seven acquitted. No Army ever possessed better behaved soldiers than the Sepoys.

Treasure ought to be guarded by the *Birken-dauses* and *Chupprassees*, but regular troops are employed by regiments, wings, detachments; and their marches are usually in the hottest season of the year and to great distances. Sometimes they are two or three months under European officers; often young, inexperienced and unable from the heat to exert themselves. The duty is therefore done according to their bodily strength, the general relaxation of discipline in the Army, and particular state of it in each regiment—and always such fatigue is incurred in guarding treasure in the hot season, as to oppress Native as well as Europeans, officers and Sepoys.

Frequent heavy duties deteriorate discipline when the excitement of war is absent; and even then, when there is not fighting, it wears out body and mind. These treasure-guards resemble the Cape

patrols against Kaffirs as to fatigue; but the patrols are made in the finest climate of the world, whereas the Indian treasure-guards march in floods of heat, and exposed to deadly fevers. The patrol soldiers are cheered by a glory which their devotion courage and endurance merits, and of which even Lord Grey's malice cannot deprive them. The poor treasure-guard Sepoy has no glory, no moral support under suffering: he falls under fatigue, the sun and fever, unheeded and unheard of; a victim to duties not military, and which an Army of Birken-dauses and Chupprassees are paid for doing, but do not do!

Between the 1st January and the 31st October of the following year, *twenty-five thousand seven hundred and sixteen Infantry, and three thousand three hundred and sixty-four Cavalry, total 29,080 soldiers were furnished for treasure escorts alone, exclusive of all other civil duties!* Moreover, on nine occasions detachments, in two instances of whole regiments, are not included, because from accidents their numbers are not in my possession. Even this falls short of the truth. During part of that time the general relief of corps was going on, and treasure was frequently sent with relieving regiments not included above. Twenty to thirty thousand men are therefore annually employed on this one branch of civil duty, for long periods and to great distances. Such are the severe trials of the Bengal Army. Injurious to its discipline, heart-breaking to its best officers, who are devoted to the service.

This exposition of the Bengal system leads to the notice of a general order issued on the 18th October 1850. It amazed some Queen's officers, who knew my abstract opinions did not

coincide with its tenor. It was bitterly censured by one of the Indian newspapers, and in an anonymous pamphlet signed a "*Bombay Officer*" who thus speaks of it:—" *Nothing but the most deplorable ignorance and folly on one hand, or the deepest hatred and malice on the other could have given rise to such a measure.*"

After a career of ten years in India, owing everything that a successful General can owe to his troops, to bear towards those troops "the deepest hatred and malice," seems strange; but this folly, hatred, malice and virulent enmity was exhibited by the clever and experienced Bengal Lieutenant-Colonel Tucker, Adjutant-General. He composed the order, which was highly approved of by Major-General Sir Hugh Wheeler, one of the first officers in the Indian Army; and by Colonel Grant, who had previously been Adjutant-General. They can hardly have been deplorably ignorant of their own service, and imbued with deep hatred, malice and virulent enmity.

The document was issued to support the Bengal system of promotion by seniority, yet is described in the pamphlet as one fitted to destroy "*every skill, high principle, and soldier-like pride.*" Let this be examined; for it was an order of great importance, sanctioned by me for good reasons.

The East India Company's rule is, that promotion shall go by seniority with European officers; and also with Native officers and Sepoys, when not unfitted; but that unfitness must be honourably stated by their regimental commanding officers, and decided on by the Commander-in-Chief. I examined with all imaginable care the claims recommended or passed over by commanding officers;

for though the Bombay system, resembling that of the Royal Army, seems to me best, I had no right to alter the Court of Directors' rule and break Government faith with the Sepoys. This faith, respected by all my predecessors in command, was by the oldest and most distinguished officers of the Bengal Army judged not only binding but vital, and the Commander-in-Chief, who has not the right to order the change of a button in the uniform, could not alter an organic regulation.

Supposing a right, would the exercise of it have been wise; Lord Hardinge conversed with me on this subject at Lahore. He had been much occupied with the Indian articles of war, had made many inquiries as to this system of promotion, and the substance of his discourse was this: *The adherence to seniority promotion with the Native Army, the old officers looking to their pensions, is the strongest hold we have upon the fidelity of the Army*; every man looks to his promotion and pension with confidence, and this confidence ensures his faithful services. Lord Hardinge in addition to his own experience, had information from the ablest and most distinguished Bengal military men and civilians; and many of the last are intimately acquainted with military details, and with the feelings of the Sepoys.

His opinion, no light one, coincided with the opinions of *all* my predecessors in command; such high authorities, such grave opinions, could not be disregarded and the safety of India risked, because two or three inexperienced commanders of regiments wished to promote men without reference to service; passing over better soldiers than those favoured, and perhaps better than themselves!

What would those gentlemen say if the Court of Directors were to break the rule of seniority as regards Europeans? What shrieks about injustice, tyranny, would ring from station to station! But according to the "*Bombay Officer*" it is right to place the brave old Sepoy at the caprice of prejudiced, or ignorant commanding officers: and to protect those glorious veterans is to destroy "talent, skill, energy, high principle and soldier-like pride!"

This order was required to check a recent practice by regimental commanders of passing over men of long service, with one, two, three, even four medals on their breasts, and scars on their bodies. Many were thus treated, especially by the worst commanders. No less than 215 good soldiers were passed over in one regiment to make a favourite—honourable or dishonourable—Drill Corporal; and a Corporal had been made Drill Sergeant over the heads of seventeen senior Corporals. Sepoys love justice, and Colonel Tucker's order supported the public faith. Had it not been issued the Bengal veterans, ill-used and disgusted, would have nourished secret disaffection. It allowed however a margin for passing over one or two men, if the grounds for so doing would bear thorough sifting by general officers.

In the Bombay Army, to disregard seniority is the custom. This brings on Native officers and non-commissioned officers, younger, more active, and more *ambitious* than those of Bengal; and they learn as much of regimental details from the Queen's regiments as their European officers do: it is abstractedly a good custom, and there is no injustice, because the Bombay Sepoy, of an intelligent race, and enlists knowing what to expect! But

the Bengal Sepoy also enlists with a knowledge of rules and customs, and those promote him, according to his regimental number. Honourably and bravely he devotes his life to duty, under promise of a pension and decorations after long years of service. To break faith with him would be infamous! but that is no obstacle with the "*Bombay Officer*," who yet assails the character of Bengal Europeans in the following terms. "*A want of high moral tone, and the existence of a certain laxity of principle among the European officers in common with European society is general in the Bengal presidency.*" He writes to excite ill-will between the two armies, and has shown that if he really belongs to it, the Bombay force possesses in him an unsurpassed specimen of baseness.

If the Directors think a change advisable, notice should be given that the system holds good with soldiers enlisted up to that date; but subsequent enlistment would give no claim to promotion by seniority. Probably they do *not* think any alteration advisable; for many experienced officers agree with Lord Hardinge and the Bengal Generals as to the danger of alteration, which indeed cannot be effected as matters now stand. Nor has any evil of magnitude grown out of it. Under my command at various times for ten years, in action and out of action, the Bengal Sepoys never failed in zeal, courage, or activity. At Meeanee and at Dubba their 9th Cavalry advanced bravely under a heavy fire; in the Booghtec hills the Bengal Infantry behaved well under severe trials; in the Kohat Pass, Native officers and non-commissioned officers gallantly led their men up against the Affreedees. Where have they behaved ill when

properly drilled and led? It is said, that in mutinies age has abated the officers' energy. Perhaps so, but an awkward question may be asked. Might not younger men have been energetic in a wrong direction? As to the abused order, Sir Hugh Wheeler, writing to the Adjutant-General says "Upon my honour I consider the order of the 18th just issued, will do more to restore the tone and right feeling of the Native Army than any act that has been done for the last thirty years." Colonel Grant also writes "I have read the admirable order of the 18th instant. It is one of the best and most judicious ever issued to this Army, and the Commander-in-Chief and his Adjutant-General deserve the thanks of all well-wishers to our service for it."

Turning now to another subject, officers should speak the language of their men. Lately this has been strictly enforced. The idle, the stupid, those who have learned to converse, but are without energy, or perhaps time, to pass an examination, are discontented, and on a few it fell heavily; but a subaltern's duties in the best regiments gives time for study, and he hears constantly the language of his soldiers. With these advantages a young man may acquire that language in a year, however naturally ungifted with the faculty: an officer of my own regiment mastered two within six months after landing in India!

It has been asked "Why should men pass examinations when they can attain the language without passing?" There is no security that they will do so. More than one Sepoy has been brought to trial for "*insolence*;" his vehemence, in vainly trying to make his officer understand, having

been so misconstrued. Such ignorance enables the soldiers to be really insolent without discovery. The "*Bombay Officer*" says "*those who study Hindostanee books cannot study Hindostanee men*;" and that "*those who study the language necessarily know less of it than he who don't study it! This may appear paradoxical.*" Indeed!

The Directors should obtain leave to send their cadets to regiments in England for two years, to acquire the drill and discipline of the Queen's troops, which is perhaps more perfect than any, the French and Piedmontese excepted—they surpass us in some things, we surpass them in others. Having studied this subject under good masters, Abercrombie, Moore, Craufurd, Hope, Wellington, those great warriors taught me that exact drill and rigid discipline make Armies capable of great exploits; and the larger the Army the more sternly must they be enforced. In the enormous Army of India orders do not reach the distant stations in a shape to enforce obedience: under a loose system, they are only obeyed immediately about head quarters, sometimes not even there. A most important order, concocted by Lord Dalhousie and myself, was totally neglected, or rather disobeyed by *fifteen commanders of regiments*—floating with the stream of a loose discipline they were not conscious of wrong doing.

Had I remained in India, camps for improving drill and discipline should have been formed, and a vast body of instructors formed in England, namely, the British regiments at home, with which the young Indian officers should have first done duty. This would also have tended to assimilate the Queen's and Company's services, and remove

ridiculous jealousies entertained by the vulgar-minded in both Armies. The Directors might thus also ascertain through the Horse Guards the qualification of military aspirants.

The question of augmenting the Company's European regiments may here be noticed. They have neither the strict discipline nor the superior drill of Her Majesty's forces; but the Bengal and Bombay corps are nevertheless in good order, and have an unsurpassed military spirit. Historic pride clings to masses as much as to individuals, conducing to honourable conduct when rightly felt; if otherwise it cankers. With soldiers this springs from regimental traditions. The 1st Bombay Europeans, drawn originally from the Royal Army, are proud of being the source from whence spring the 1st Bengals; and both are proud that for a hundred years India has resounded with their exploits. The two second regiments are equally proud, and all are hardy warriors, who never shrink in battle. The Madras troops are not known to me from personal observation, but they bear the same character as the others. A good officer can bring such regiments into high order quickly; hence all may be considered on a par with the Queen's troops, and the question of their augmentation becomes, in a great measure, one of finance.

To augment the Company's Europeans and diminish the Queen's regiments in India would be some relief to the Company's revenue, but a great burthen to the British Treasury; wherefore the Company's Europeans should not be augmented, it would increase Directors' patronage without good results: India is as safe with six Queen's regiments

and six of the Company's, as she would be with twelve Company's and a proportionate reduction of Royal regiments. Keeping the latter there has also the advantage of inuring them to war; the troops in India and at the Cape are at this time England's best; not equal to those at whose head Wellington stood on the summit of the Pyrenees, less experienced and hardy indeed, but of the same stuff, the same courage and strength. They have fought much, can do for themselves in the field, and are devoid of the rashness of recruits who rush into fire without knowing what to do when there. They are fighting men whom England may at any time recall for a home crisis. The Directors can supply their place with Goorkas—the door for that recruiting was opened by me, and it will be wise not to close it again, but take time as the soldiers say “*by the firelock.*”

Scinde was almost my first command in India, and going there with European notions of war I thought, to separate a soldier from his wife and make him cleave to his knapsack, was a maxim of wisdom. The first was done to hand by climate. Nearly all the ladies had gone or were going away, and my own wife and children had been left at Poonah, against their will indeed, for they were amongst the few women desirous to brave the climate of Scinde, when an order to serve there was by men considered a death warrant.

In the field the Queen's 22nd regiment carried their packs—in the desert and in the battle it was on their shoulders—but experience taught me that the load is too great for young and for slight men, under an *Eastern* sun. In the *West* Indies it can

be carried without evil results: this is a mystery, but the Western sun does not act so injuriously as the Eastern.

A knapsack is made of painted cloth, which prevents air reaching the soldier's back while straps compress his chest and shoulders, tightening his cloth coat and wasting him by excessive perspiration. The pack is not now carried in India, but the quantity of necessities within it should be curtailed. They are *unnecessaries*. The following scale was made at my request, by Sir Colin Campbell, after consultation with non-commissioned officers, of whose intelligence he was sure. But even in that scale the articles marked by asterisks are not needed: one coatee or shell jacket is enough, one coat served me, and a private need not have twice as many coats as a Commander-in-Chief.

Four white jackets! "The climate is hot." Let the soldier pull off his coat. Parade! Let the soldier appear on parade in fighting trim; a battle is his greatest day's work, and he should be always prepared for action.

White trousers—six. To frighten himself and his neighbours when wounded with a display of blood. Three pair of blue cotton are enough.

White shirts, six.—What does a man living by labour, want with six white shirts? Three good check shirts are sufficient for cleanliness.

Socks, four pair.—Two are enough. Marshal Saxe says soldiers do not want stockings. I agree with him they chafe the feet and keep them damp. The Austrian soldiers wear none.

Stock and clasp.—Even before the men who invented hanging, the guillotine, the garotte and

embroidered collars to the dress coats of general officers, he who invented stocks and clasps for British soldiers should be ranked for venomous imagination in tormenting his fellow-creatures. The first three are comparatively humane, and include a provision for life; the embroidered collar is but a temporary pillory, like the legs of Sinbad's old man; but the soldier's hard leather stock and clasp is daily a bar to all enjoyment, productive of apoplexy in the Indian sun, and a great impediment in marching. It prevents the free use of the musket in battle; and, when taking to the bayonet, if the stock be not thrown away, the man is half strangled before closing in mortal strife. Let a soft cape button round the soldier's throat, over the shirt collar. If he needs warmth, some men do, he can let his beard grow and be under his shirt collar. To order the wearing of flannel shirts, is also an act of tyranny, interfering unnecessarily with a man's idiocracy.

Hair combs!—Cut the hair short, and soap and water is enough.

Sponge!—To keep his clothes wet! The great attention of commanding officers and captains should be given to soap and water not to nail brushes, sponges, hair brushes: shall we have lavender-water bottles? *Parades with bare feet, bathing, soap, scrubbing*—these are what make soldiers really clean.

List of Necessaries for a Soldier serving in India, showing the Weight of the whole as at present 1850.

No.	Articles.	No.	Articles.
1	Dress Cap.	1	Hair Comb.
1	Forage Cap.	1	Hair Brush.
1	Coatee.	1	Razor, Brush and Soap.
1	Cloth Shell Jacket.	1	Cloth Brush.
4	White Jackets.	2	Shoe Brushes.
1	Pair Cloth Trousers.	1	Knife, Fork, and Spoon.
6	Pair White Trousers.	1	Turnscrew Worm, Brush & Picker.
2	Pair Blue Cotton Trousers.	1	Holdall or case for small articles.
6	White Shirts.	1	Knapsack and Straps.
2	Check Shirts.	1	Haversack.
3	Flannel Shirts.	1	Button Stick and Brush.
2	Flannel Bands.	1	Sponge.
4	Pair Socks.	1	Set of Straps for carrying Great Coat.
1	Stock and Clasp.	1	Gun Stopper.
2	Pair Braces.	1	Mess Tin and Cover.
3	Pair Boots.	1	Regimental Box.
2	Towels.		

Weight of the whole 65lbs. including the Soldier's box.

Reduced List of Necessaries proposed for the European Soldier serving in India.

No.	Articles.	No.	Articles.
1	Dress Cap.	1	Hair Comb. *
1	Forage Cap. *	1	Hair Brush. *
1	Coatee. *	1	Razor Brush and Soap. *
1	Cloth Shell Jacket.	1	Cloth Brush.
4	White Jackets. *	2	Shoe Brushes.
1	Pair of Cloth Trousers.	1	Knife, Fork, and Spoon.
4	Pair White Trousers. *	1	Turnscrew Worm, Brush & Picker.
2	Pair Blue Cotton Trousers.	1	Holdall or case for small articles.
3	White Shirts. *	1	Knapsack.
3	Check Shirts.	1	Button Stick and Brush. *
3	Flannel Shirts. *	1	Sponge. *
2	Flannel Bands.	1	Set of Straps for carrying Great Coat.
2	Pair Socks.	1	Gun Stopper.
1	Stock and Clasp. *	1	Mess Tin and Cover.
2	Pair Braces.	1	Regimental Bag.
3	Pair Boots.	1	Haversack and Canteen.
2	Towels.		

Weight of the whole about 25lbs. including the bag.

From the first list the regimental box has recently been erased. Each box weighed 44lbs., encumbering every Queen's regiment on march with 44,000lbs. weight of wood, or more than 19 tons. The twenty-nine Queen's regiments in India could not therefore move without carriage for 551 tons weight of solid wood! The soldiers paid heavily for those boxes! A camel's average load is 300lbs., and a string of those animals occupies great length of ground. How this mere weight of wood must embarrass an Army!

In 1842 when the order for these boxes was issued by Sir Jasper Nicolls, I told my immediate superior, Sir Thomas McMahon, that it was embarrassing in respect of carriage; and if a Queen's soldier refused to pay for the box, the regulations, which wisely forbids charging the soldiers for anything not sanctioned by the Sovereign, would bear him out before a Court Martial. Sir Thomas agreed and forwarded my statement, for which I received a *reprimand* from Sir Jasper Nicolls. The boxes are now abolished—satisfaction sufficient to me for that unjust rebuke. Sir Jasper had no legal authority to make soldiers buy the boxes, and it was impossible to carry them about!

CHAPTER IV.

Want of Senior Officers with Regiments.

SUBALTERNs are constantly in command of regiments, without being, as in the Irregular corps, selected for command; they are generally inexperienced and the regiment goes to pieces. Sepoys observe all that passes, and their respect for the British officer is weakened; his courage and power are feared, he is a dangerous animal to offend and they obey, but respect him only in good regiments. Can a battalion under a young subaltern be fit for service? He may be zealous, clever; yet where is his knowledge? He thinks all is right. He meets with a Queen's regiment, and doubts; but his awakened intelligence is immediately stifled by some "*Old Indian*" who tells him the Indian Armies being of different races must have different systems; that superior wisdom has established self-relieving-going-to-bed-guards as most suitable for Bengal Sepoys. This folly is accepted, and the system is perpetuated by weak and idle men, and even by able officers, prejudiced from habit and giving authority from reputation for its continuance. The force of custom here actually overpowers a Commander-in-Chief. Government alone can reform.

Field officers and Captains should be kept with their regiments. Discipline greatly depends upon the Captains. Dull Generals, Colonels and Majors there are ; yet white hairs meet with respect, and veteran commanders know at least the routine of service. Young men have indeed commanded well, but the average of good regimental commanders is in favour of the aged ; they may be inert, but their grey beards inspire respect when young men would be overborne, especially if there be a sarcastic fellow amongst their companions ; if too zealous to be thus cowed, they are apt to become *Martinets*, of all military pests the worst.

Experienced Captains are the pillars of discipline, but scarce in Native regiments, the best being taken for staff or civil employments, which generally turns a good Captain in to a bad " political." There is a remedy. Form a staff corps of officers, having no more pay than in the line, and no extra advantage than allowance for horses, according to rank. Government would save ; but to save is not the object ; *it is to prevent regimental officers being tempted by high pay to apply for staff situations.* With low salaries the staff could only be sought for by men conscious of ability and ambitious of distinction. Such real soldiers, seldom encumbered by families, would compose a staff more effective than at present : yet the Company has excellent staff officers. Exchanging into marching regiments should be allowed. The civil service and general staff would thus be well furnished, and the line suffer no damage.

European officers are now more numerous than formerly, and associate apart. This creates in the Native officer secret dislike, and the European loses

the best opportunities of becoming familiar with Native character, customs and language. The Sepoy officer is degraded, and his military pride, which Easterns are as susceptible of as Europeans, is deeply wounded. Many able officers have said "*Look at the superiority of the Irregular Cavalry and Infantry, to the Regulars ; yet they have but three European officers to a regiment.*" But the few officers of Irregulars are selected for energy, talent and activity. Young they are, yet the late wars have given them experience. To select for a large Army is impossible. Officers must be taken as God made them, as the Directors send them—they must be taken as wives are taken. Some men sell their wives, and it is said the Directors sell *cadetships*, but they cannot sell *cadets* ; they can select officers for the *Irregulars*, they cannot do so for the *Regulars*.

Each company should have a Captain. Sir Thomas Munro reckons one European officer per company enough, and he was one of the greatest men the Anglo-Indian Service ever possessed, civil or military. With hesitation I differ from him ; but had he seen the present state of the European and Native officers he would probably have admitted more Europeans. A grand lesson was given by the Company's European officers at Mecanee, when leading their men to shock the enormous mass of Beloochees before them. Each regiment on reaching the summit of the river bank, which had before hidden their enemies, staggered back as that vast Belooch multitude, in terrible array, met the sight. Intrepidly then the British officers stood, and the Sepoys rallied, but

it seemed as if, wanting that example, they would have broken!

It is said, "if the Europeans were fewer, they *must* mix with and improve the Native officers." They do not do so now, and it is a great error. All old officers of name in the Company's service, including Sir Thomas Munro, have complained that the younger race of Europeans keep aloof from Native officers; showing thereby want of foresight, and casting away, as of no value, the strong attachment those natives are so susceptible of forming for them. How different this from the spirit which actuated the old men of Indian renown, whom smaller men should take as guides! The desire to converse with the Sepoys would alone have induced me to study their language: neither age nor want of will stopped me, but my public duties gave no time.

That young men, having the great examples alluded to, should avoid the society of their Indian comrades is incomprehensible, coupled with the enthusiasm they evince for the honour and glory of the Sepoys; yet so it is—old officers to a man say the Native officer is neglected. Some maintain there are too many Europeans, but to that is opposed the example of Meeanee. The actual state is certainly the worst possible; so many Europeans as to form an exclusive society, yet too few for duty, unless the natives are raised to social equality and self-respect!

Munro would have a Commandant, an Adjutant, and ten company officers. At present there are six Captains, ten Lieutenants, and five Ensigns; but the actual number doing duty do not exceed one

per company. For besides staff and civil drafts, the quick passage to England tempt applications for sick leave; and medical men grant it more readily than when the journey was long. Formerly, on a two years' furlough, six or ten months were spent in an uncertain dangerous voyage; now one month by the Red Sea suffices, including a tour through Italy and down the Rhine. The old voyage was a desperate effort to save life; the modern one a pleasant excursion sought by men of taste, who with beer have swelled their livers enough to relieve a doctor's conscience: it is safer practice to let a bilious man go to Europe than to risk manslaughter by keeping him in India. Sir Thomas Munro's establishment of one European officer per company, would leave very few indeed for duty. The right of furloughs, sickness, staff appointments, and civil employments would not leave three officers, on an average, in each regiment.

Every band of armed men requires a chief, and there should be a Captain for each company to pay them, discipline them, protect and lead them to battle. The modern habit, in Queen's regiments, of numbering companies instead of, as formerly, calling each by its Captain's name is to me offensive. The numbering may be convenient for War Office returns, for the useless endless books and reports introduced into the orderly room, which have nearly turned the commander of a regiment into a clerk; but the Captain's name gave military pride, and moral elevation. He was proud of a company bearing his name, and sought to distinguish remarkable men. The soldier thought to act ill was a personal insult to his Captain, who would not

quit his company, unless for the Grenadiers or Light Infantry, it seemed abandoning his family. This fine military attachment is passing away. Who cares for No. 1, No. 2, No. 3? The modern, mercantile, expression is, that a young gentleman "has charge of No. 1." He does not command, he is in charge, as if it was a pound of tallow candles! And he expects his *Captaincy* not his *Company*.

Native regiments should have ten Captains, unless the Directors choose to reduce the number to eight, abolishing the flank companies. That I do not recommend. They are valuable in war to brigade and place under select officers. This, in my opinion, is better than regiments of Rifles, Light Infantry, Fusileers and Grenadiers. They have advantages possibly, but put me in mind of a story. Several regiments were in line, all had titles except the 45th, or Nottingham regiment. One commanding officer addressed his regiment as Fusileers! Another King's Own! A third Buffs! A fourth, Queen's Royals! At last the old warrior who commanded the 45th, provoked at these titles his own regiment having none, shouted in a voice of thunder "*Stocking Weavers! Shoulder arms!*" To this day the regiment bears the name; and good weavers they are, having woven on their colours a glorious wreath recording thirteen great battles!

The having flank companies is opposed by some able men, who think selecting flank companies deteriorates the spirit of the battalion-men. And that ten companies are too many for one man to command in action. Conversing with the celebrated Marshal Ney on our organization, he told me

“ he did not like ten companies; eight was the
“ proper number, as being more square, more in
“ hand for movements.”

My predilection for flank companies remains. If the Grenadiers and Light Infantry of a brigade or division be united, they can be given to some man of superior abilities without offence. Major-General Sir Fiddle Faddle, having a brigade, cannot complain that a corps of Grenadiers and Light Infantry is placed under Major Genius. The old General has a sharp Brigade-Major, the young Major a temporary command. The Major harrasses convoys; the Major-General leads in battle, waving his hat, his thick bald head shining through the smoke, and looking as if a cannon shot would glance off it as from a Martello tower.

The Light Infantry should be composed of men *below* 5 feet 6 inches; the Grenadier of men *above* 5 feet 10 inches—thus equalizing the battalion companies, which would then have the finest men, while choice emulative corps could be formed and worked hard, as their casualties could be filled up instantly from their regiments. In the American war the flank battalions were called the best troops; that is they were most frequently engaged under the cleverest commanders; these influences might be effectually combined by the use of flank companies, which should never be placed in line. The general opinion is against them, but much may be said for them, especially in India, where a seniority service collects so many men of Methuselah vitality in the higher grades! These men will not budge, and cannot be trusted with operations in war.

Some officers who would not let soldiers chew

food in their own way, have been gradually introducing bad customs. A private soldier is forbid to address his officer except in full dress and accompanied by a non-commissioned officer, likewise full dressed! This is injurious and even dangerous; it digs as it were, a ditch between the company officer and his men! When I was a Captain any man could speak to me if so minded, at any time about his affairs. If he complained he was told to bring the opponent up, and both stories were heard. When commander of a regiment, my rule was, that complaint must first be made to the Captain; and if satisfaction was not obtained the aggrieved man came with his officer, dressed or undressed.

This new rule places men at the mercy of non-commissioned officers who will oftentimes oppress. A soldier frequently wants advice, or to obtain indulgence, which enables the officer to discover his character and encourage or correct him. The new ceremony cuts them off from this beneficial familiarity, and confidence is checked—nay! changed for disgust. Except in moments of great anger, when the private goes with a red-hot complaint, he will not speak to his officer *at all*! How are company officers to study men's characters, when none dare address them but in full dress and in presence of a non-commissioned officer?

This system abates the real respect and affection which is habitual to our troops, for the spirit of aristocracy is strong with them, and they are entirely disposed to honour their officers. *Martinetts*, who leave nothing to human nature, disgust soldiers with the service. Formerly moral discipline was left much to the Captain; for while to some men license may be granted, others must be held at

arm's length, and the Captain's intimacy made him the best judge: it might be proper to say to a dirty or saucily-disposed man, "Never come to me unless "you are in full dress;" but to have the whole regiment so trussed up in rules, is to treat the soldiers as inclined to offend and insult, which none known to me in a long life ever were. No Army in the world is more replete with a cordial feeling between all ranks than the Army of England!

Now returning to the social condition of the Native officers, it is to be observed that a certain class of Europeans in India treat them with a lightness and contumely which, exclusive of its vulgarity, is undeserved. They forget what marvellously able men have been among these Eastern races: Akbar, Baber, Aurengzib, Sevagee, Hyder Ali, Runjeet Sing, Goolab Sing, and many more; such as the extraordinary Nanue, who, if what is written of him be true, must have been one of the most perfect of human beings. The Eastern intellect is great, and supported by amiable feelings; and the Native officers have a full share of Eastern daring, genius, and ambition; but to nourish these qualities they must be placed on a par with European officers.

The veteran Soubadar (Captain) and Jemadar (Subaltern) must not be commanded by a fair-faced beardless Ensign, just arrived from England, with a gold laced cap hanging over his ear but entirely ignorant of military matters. This youngster will lead an assault like a devil incarnate, and under fire will stand like a rock, or go on like a rocket, exactly as he is ordered; he has the *makings* of a first-rate soldier, so have the Native Indian gentlemen at his age, but to give him command over the dark veterans of thirty, forty, or fifty years' service is the

imposition of conquerors; one which the Native gentlemen feel deeply and silently resent.

Ambition and love of military glory is strong in the hearts of the Sepoys till long service renders them desirous of rest; and when it comes they reflect on the bitter disappointments of their youthful ambition. Between them and military honours there has always been a bar. The superb Colonel Skinner alone, acquired a Companionship of the Bath, and to obtain that for him required the honourable and strenuous exertions of Lords Lake and Combermere. We give Sepoys peculiar decorations indeed, but they burn to share *ours*! And why not? They have shared the danger!

Some European officers think it would be good to abolish the Native officers altogether. They do not cast their thoughts back; they see those Native officers almost passive, and judge them as *they are*, not as *they ought to be*, as *they once were*, and as *we may be sure they will be again ere many years pass*! The spirit of the age is to improve. Old villainies are passing away; Ireland is not now crushed by bad laws; the abolition of slavery in the West Indies has given that hell-born abomination a wound in America, which the genius of the glorious woman, Mrs. Stowe, is likely to render incurable. The rising spirit of justice in England towards the misgoverned people of the East will soon teach the latter how to display strength; the "*Purdah*" or curtain, behind which the old ladies of Leadenhall Street, with Zenana-like modesty, conceal their intrigues, is being roughly torn away. *Association* in India means *combination*, and when one hundred and fifty millions combine, the game is over.

Our best men have said the natives should be

associated with us in the civil service, and they are dropping in one by one; ere long the influx will be great, and in the general advance the Army will not lose its place. The Sepoys have not however been ill used by their European officers. The simple and just military Code which governs our own troops, also rules the Indian Army; and, saving our European pretensions to superiority, there is little to complain of. But civilians, all powerful, and frequently insolent, trammelled by no fixed rules, ignorant of English as they are of Indian law, with a slender, or no knowledge of the language, have so bullied the people of the East, that it is evident they are resolved to bear it no longer. These censures of the civil service are supported by Munro, by Shore, and Norton.

Although the Sepoy has not many evils to complain of, he has that great one already noticed—*his officers do not take rank with ours*. Those who would abolish the Native officers should consider that it will blast the hopes of 200,000 armed men; for every soldier in the Indian Armies looks forward to be an officer. The abolition of the Native officers would go through the whole Army like an electric shock; every man in it would think he had lost the pension of a Soubadar: hope would fly and mutiny take its place. Equality between Native and European gentlemen is being ceded in the civil service; so it must be for the military. There is danger, but it is better to encounter that with justice than with a coward conscience. It is true that with Indian gentlemen as officers, ranking with Europeans, the seniors among the Havildars and the Sepoys could not easily get commissions;

but danger menaces every way. It may however be met by three important measures.

Enlist 30,000 Goorkas—that will give force.

Proclaim that no man enlisted after a given period shall be promoted for seniority, but may be for merit—that will be justice.

Let every Havildar, after a certain age and service, have a liberal pension, higher than that now given—that also will be just.

With these precautionary measures Native gentlemen may be employed, taking rank with Europeans. There would still be danger, but nothing to what will be if Indian officers *demand* equality of rank, which is by no means impossible with the active young non-commissioned officers, so greatly vaunted in the Bombay Army.

There are people to say, “*This should not be put into their heads.*” It is in their heads already! It is talked over in every guard room and bazaar in India, and has been for years! The objection is of a piece with that against the great Duke’s letter. “*It taught our neighbours how weak England’s defences were.*” Danger is not removed by concealment, but by preparation, and that noble justice which makes power scorn exclusive privileges, and gives to weakness all its rights.

Lord Ellenborough made two Native officers his Aides-de-Camp, and I, although ignorant of this, also appointed two, Meerza Khan, and Ali Beg of the Scinde Horse, who as a non-commissioned officer commanded my escort in the battle of Meeanee. Very painful it was to hear those brave men lost their pay when I left India, remaining only extra Aides-de-Camp to my successor, he was probably

embarrassed by pre-engagements: however the honour remains. Many Native officers merit the Companionship of the Bath. Those who doubt their high qualities as men, or daring as soldiers, are woefully in error.

The Indian staff appointments require reform. In 1849, there were 686 regimental officers of the Bengal Army detached, having civil or military appointments, of which 443 were made by the Governor-General or some civil authority, without any recommendation from their military chiefs; the remaining 243 were staff appointments emanating from the Commander-in-Chief, who however could only recommend, not appoint. Thus more than a third of the Bengal officers held lucrative detached employments, nearly two-thirds of which were selected by the civil Government without reference to the military authorities! The effect is destructive to military feeling and discipline.

It was natural for those officers to seek lucrative appointments, and as most of them were obtained from the civil authorities without regard to the discharge of military duties, it was natural that great indifference to the latter should prevail. High station and emolument were to be obtained by influential supplication; the military course demanded earnest and constant attention to details, tiresome and uninteresting, unless a high soldier-spirit be cultivated. The result was great efforts to procure unmerited appointments, and the smallest possible attention to those duties which raise a man in the estimation of his military superiors. Regimental duty became a tread-mill, from which every one was to fly when he could.

To counteract the demoralising tendency of this civil patronage, which included numerous military as well as civil appointments, it was made known to the Army, that all appointments in my power should be distributed with strict reference to military claims and qualifications. Periodical regimental returns were called for, setting forth by comparative numbers each officer's regimental services, campaigns, actions, wounds and proficiency in the native language. Of these numbers four were for having passed the interpreter's examination, and two for the Hindostanee examination. Commanding officer's classification as to efficiency and zeal in regimental duties was also required. 1st class to be worth four, 2nd class two, 3rd class 0.

To compare accurately the merits of different persons is difficult, but to enforce regimental duties and details absolutely necessary, and this was a safe approximation; because all the points, except one, touched matters of fact which could not be misrepresented. The arbitrary one, giving weight to the commanding officer's opinion of his officers was limited, the reports were to be public, and to bear the scrutiny of Brigadiers and Generals of Division before reaching the Commander-in-Chief.

CHAPTER V.

Of the Company's Artillery.

SECOND to none in the world. Incessant practice in war for fifteen years has produced perfection. But there are not enough officers, the Horse Artillery is too numerous, and kept complete at the expense of the Foot Batteries; there is not above *one* officer to each company of Foot Artillery, and many are too young to command.

To convince Lord Dalhousie of the injury to the service, caused by the overproportion of Horse Artillery—it is the number not the arm that is objectionable—I asked for reports; but he had not vigour to make the presidencies of Bombay and Madras give them; *red tape* baffled my effort to diminish the expense, and increase the efficiency of the Company's Artillery. The saving would have placed the whole on a good footing.

An Infantry General can only speak of Artillery as affecting his operations by its weight and calibre, the quantity of ammunition with the troops and in reserved parks, the beasts of burden and of draught, and their forage. The calculations and details imposed on a Commander by his Artillery are many, but it repays the trouble

if judiciously applied ; if not, horses and mules and men eat up his supplies, and heavy carriages, tons of useless brass, wood and iron, paralyze his movements.

It was a great object to ascertain the qualifications of the Indian Artillery officers. They were generally full of regimental pride, with all requisite science ; quick and true marksmen, and abounding in resources to overcome obstructions ; there was also a great emulation between the services of the three presidencies. Of the Madras corps my knowledge is only hearsay—all in its praise however, and principally from that excellent officer Captain Oakes, who fell at Rangoon. The officers of all three regiments pressed me to assimilate them in details, especially in the mode of driving and construction of carriages ; but there was not sufficient power to do it effectually, and unless so done, 'twere better let alone. Nor was there time. It would indeed have been a very troublesome affair ; for the officers were so enamoured of their own systems, that assimilation meant with each, admission of superiority, and as all were good there was no danger in leaving well alone.

The chief difference between the Bengal and Bombay Artillery is in their mode of driving, which they denominate single and double driving.

Single driving is one rider to a pair of horses. Its chief advantages are : 1st. The guiding is directed by one will, at least so said by the Bombay officers. This may be true on an English road, with well trained horses ; it may be doubted as to the wild driving of a campaign, with half-trained horses and no roads. 2nd. The off-wheel horse has less severity of work, having no rider to carry ; but the

draught will not be equal. These and other objections do not, however, seem to be well ascertained; for the horse which suffers from carrying the man can be relieved by changing him to the off side; and though this also is disputed by the opponents of single driving it is certain, the man who rides one horse and drives the other, must be well trained and experienced for a country full of bogs, nullahs and broken ground.

Double driving, used in Bengal, is having a second rider on the off-draught horse. The advantages are: 1st. The wheel horses have an equality of labour. 2nd. The second rider helps to work the gun. 3rd. There is more simultaneous movement, each rider imparting his will easily to the horse he bestrides; and emergencies dictate a simultaneous impulse to both riders—the sight the voice and hearing act together. 4th. If an obstacle impedes a gun, and each horse is led by a man on foot, they may be unable to get the gun over; but let those men mount the four horses and the increased weight and simultaneous effort instantly succeeds. An instance of this occurred under my command in the Booghtee hills. 5th. If one man is struck by a shot, another remains to conduct the horses. 6th. A driver, bringing a gun into heavy fire, obtains moral support by having a comrade, and they drive daringly.

On these advantages and disadvantages the ablest and most experienced Artillery officers differ.

Poles and shafts offer a more practical question, yet are disputed with so much tenacity that it would be hazardous to give an opinion.

The wood of the gun carriages is also a subject of dispute. The degrees of durability and tenacity is important, and the Court of Directors ought to have it decided by experiments at Woolwich, where there would be no prejudice; and where the sagacity of the Bengal Military Board, as evinced by the following Madras report, would be duly estimated.

“ The Bengal Government by the advice of the Military Board, ordered one kind of carriage for all the Artillery of India, a carriage unsuited in its dimensions to the wood procurable for the Madras Artillery; and in its weight and construction to the horses supplied to the Madras regiment. *Saul wood*, which they use in Bengal, cannot be found in Madras; but the order of the Bengal Government compels exactly the same dimensions with teak, a very inferior wood, though of immense strength and toughness. The consequence has been a great and useless expenditure; the wheels on the Bengal pattern are quite unserviceable when built with our wood. The carriages ordered for general use by the Bengal Government were brought into the Madras service and fairly tested; after deliberate consideration and ample trial, they were returned into store, as our horses were unequal to the draught. This the Bengal Military Board stated to the Government was not a ‘ serious objection.’ ”

The horse is not able to draw the gun, but that is not a serious objection ! Oh ! the Board !

The Madras Artillery prefer brass. The Bombay iron the Bengal wooden naves. The iron nave is condemned, as liable to break, and not to be repaired or easily replaced; it is not so with brass

naves, but the wooden ones are more easily replaced than either. There are other disputes as to the construction of carriages which could also be better decided at Woolwich than in India. Not that the Indian Artillery officers are less scientific; but at Woolwich conclusions were arrived at after a long war by men who had served throughout that war, and some of very distinguished abilities still remain.

Let me now observe, that well-horsed field batteries are sufficient for all the exigencies of a campaign. No one wants to see guns making charges. Field batteries can always accompany Cavalry *before* a charge, and be brought up *after* one, ere the horsemen can accomplish all their work.

To descend from charges to leather breeches may seem a step from the sublime to the ridiculous; but the Court of Directors have taken from the Horse Artillery their leathers, and substituted cloth pantaloons, to the great displeasure of the drivers, with extravagance for the Company. Great pains I took to ascertain the cause of this, knowing leather breeches to be, for riding, cooler in Summer warmer in Winter, and more economical than any other material. The result was a conviction that some cloth merchant, or tailor, who was a Director or cousin to a Director, or was, as Lady Emmeline Stuart Wortley would say, *slantingly connected with Leadenhall Street*; or who had some influence in the Military Board of Calcutta, was at the bottom of the cloth pantaloons. Whether the drivers will ever get into their leathers again is for prophecy; but for hard work and long marches in India, "there is nothing like leather."

Three or four troops of Horse Artillery would not be amiss, but there are thirteen troops in the Bengal Army; six in the Madras Army, four in that of Bombay. The Artillery regiments of the three presidencies should form one corps, with head quarters in a central position, and the projected railways from Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay should give it a communication with those presidencies. All disputes would thus be swept away.

This chapter on Artillery shall be closed with an official correspondence and report—mere formalities being suppressed—relative to removing the present head quarters of the Indian Artillery to some station in the North-west provinces—a subject of considerable interest.

The annexation of the Punjaub induced me to advise the head quarters of the Bengal Artillery being removed to Meerut; and the following extracts are from the answer.

“ His Excellency proposes to move the head
“ quarters of the Artillery from Dum Dum to
“ Meerut. The Governor-General regrets that he
“ is precluded from assenting to this proposal by
“ recent orders from the Court of Directors.

“ The late Governor-General Lord Hardinge
“ submitted a similar proposal to the home
“ authorities, shortly before the Marquis of Dal-
“ housie's arrival in India. The Court of Directors
“ declined to assent until further cause should be
“ shown. The Governor-General is therefore
“ unable at the present moment to accede to His
“ Excellency's wish: but, advertng to the changes
“ which have subsequently taken place by the
“ addition of the Punjaub, His Lordship will

“ be happy to receive a full communication of His
“ Excellency’s views on this head, and to transmit
“ to the Court a fresh application from the Govern-
“ ment of India thereupon.”

This dispatch enclosed extracts from a communication by the Directors on the subject, to which I returned the following answer—

“ October 18, 1849.—There is no difficulty in
“ removing the head quarters of the Artillery
“ from Dum Dum to Meerut or Delhi; but I
“ proceed to what the Court calls very justly, the
“ two ‘*practical questions*.’

“ To the first I answer *Yes*. The Commandant
“ should be with the mass of his regiment, and
“ that ought to be at Delhi or Meerut.

“ To the second, that all the recruits and cadets
“ ought to be sent to Meerut, or *anywhere* except
“ Dum Dum.

“ I see no loss to the Artillery in having an
“ officer of that corps belonging to this, in my
“ opinion injurious body, removed; his removal
“ would be a small reduction of a great evil;
“ [The Military Board] the Court probably will
“ not concur in that opinion, and my answer is
“ that taking into consideration the value of the
“ Military Board, the Commandant of Artillery’s
“ services at said Board, the expense of a hired
“ member, should the Commandant be withdrawn,
“ and any views which the Commandant may
“ take of his duties, still the advantages admitted
“ are sufficient to overrule all these objections.

“ I know nothing about Madras, but at Bombay
“ there can be no better place for the head
“ quarters of Artillery than the capital. There

“ the Arsenal and Artillery head quarters are
“ handy to Scinde, handy to Goojerat, handy to
“ Cambay, handy to the coast, north and south,
“ and central to the interior: therefore ‘no
“ ‘*complaint has been made by Bombay. Nor*
“ ‘*till the present time from your presidency.*’
“ No! When Lord Lake was beaten at Bhurt-
“ poor, and Gillespie slain in the Dera Doon,
“ there was no *need* to bring up the head
“ quarters of the Artillery; it was near enough;
“ it could then be in no better place! But
“ Peshawur is as far from Bhurtpoor, as Bhurtpoor
“ is from Calcutta! Our Armies are on the Indus,
“ not on the Jumna. The frontier was then six
“ hundred miles from the Artillery head quarters,
“ and in no small danger of being nearer! Now
“ the frontier is twelve hundred miles from the
“ Artillery head quarters, and in no danger of
“ retrograding.

“ This distance is too far; it is attended with
“ danger and inconvenience much too obvious to
“ every soldier, to be balanced by the service of
“ Brigadier * * * * in the Military Board;
“ or by any view that can be taken by a Com-
“ mandant of Artillery of the importance of his
“ position; indeed that importance would be
“ much increased at Meerut, Delhi, or any central
“ position.

“ As to the expense of a paid Artillery officer to
“ take his place at the Military Board at Calcutta,
“ it is a *dream*! Any accountant could prove that
“ to the Court.

“ I agree with the Court that it is a good
“ rule not to break up old systems; still a giant

“ cannot be kept in his childish clothes, and from
“ the Burrampootra river to the Indus is too wide
“ a space for leaving the Artillery head quarters
“ at Dum Dum; this is not my single opinion, it is
“ universal.

“ The Court admits that Meerut is more advantageous than Dum Dum, both as to air and
“ morals, and strength; I go wholly with this
“ opinion. India is not unhealthy. Climate is
“ made to bear the sins of *gin and crowded barracks*.
“ Both flourish at Dum Dum.

“ As to expense. Move the head quarters first,
“ without all the establishment, move the latter
“ gradually. There may be much moved without
“ any expense at all; the reduction of some
“ troops of Horse Artillery would cover the
“ whole. I could do it and save the revenue.
“ If the Military Board are intrusted with the
“ operation it will cost some lacs. The Military
“ Board is the greatest enemy to economy in
“ India, as regards military expenses.”

In this state matters remained till June 1850, when the following communication came from the Government Secretary through the Adjutant-General.

“ *Simla, 18th June, 1850.* In transmitting to
“ you for submission to the Commander-in-Chief,
“ the accompanying extract of a letter from the
“ Honourable the Court of Directors respecting the
“ removal of Artillery head quarters to Meerut
“ or Delhi, I am directed to request that you will
“ move His Excellency, in order to enable the
“ most noble the Governor-General to reply to
“ the requirements of the Honourable Court, to
“ be so good as to communicate to his Lordship

“ full details of the arrangements which Sir Charles Napier wishes to recommend in connection with the proposed removal of the Artillery head quarters from Dum Dunn.”

This request produced the following memorandum.

Memorandum.

“ I would remove the King and the gunpowder out of Delhi. The first to Futtypoor-Sikree, and the last to an old castle near Delhi, the name of which I forget; but it must be either Shumsheer or Toglakabad.

“ To put this castle in complete repair would be costly; but a comparatively small sum would make it a magazine and a guard house. It would also hold large stores, so as to lighten the demand for room at the Artillery head quarters by placing in the castle cumbrous articles, rarely required, but which must be in reach of head quarters, such as carriages, &c.

“ The present danger to Delhi from the gunpowder would be removed, its palace turned to use and preserved; two points of vast importance to humanity and public pride; for, assuredly, if any city has just cause for pride in its public buildings Delhi has a right to exult in the grandeur of that marvellous palace! As matters now stand, some accident will cause the powder to blow up; and then the King, the palace and the population, all go into the air together! To prevent such a catastrophe must be considered to be a matter of deep importance and worth a considerable expense, even were no other advantage to be gained.

“ The palace and present Arsenal would hold

“ the Artillery head quarters. It would also hold
“ the Military Board, which would be better placed
“ there than at Calcutta.

“ It is said Delhi is unhealthy. If this be a *fact*
“ there is no more to say; but a rigid police to
“ keep the town clean, sound sanitary rules about
“ irrigation from the canal, which runs much too
“ rapidly to produce malaria if the banks are kept
“ clean, would perhaps make Delhi as healthy
“ as any part of India.

“ In most parts of India the effects of man's im-
“ prudence is attributed to climate! If a man
“ gets drunk the sun has given him a headache, and
“ so on. Every garden at Delhi, if not kept clean,
“ becomes a morass, weeds flourish, filth runs
“ riot, and Delhi is unhealthy. The result is, that
“ the grandest city in India has the name of being
“ insalubrious, though it does not appear to have
“ any natural cause to produce sickness, no natural
“ swamps which would require vast labour, science,
“ and sums of money to overcome. Nothing evil,
“ in short, that does not appear to be of man's
“ own creation! Yet Delhi is said to have an
“ unhealthy climate. I cannot persuade myself
“ Delhi is so unfortunate, and that care and clean-
“ liness would not make it as healthy as Meerut,
“ or any place in India. The soil is said to be
“ sterile, and a sterile soil is not naturally unhealthy
“ in a hot climate; a fertile soil usually is
“ unhealthy. The general objection is, that
“ unhealthiness reigns at the foot of hills, but it
“ is also evident what is the cause of this. The
“ water comes down and lodges at their base, there
“ forming swamps. This is a matter so easily
“ remedied that it needs no more notice in an

“ age when drainage is becoming well understood.

“ I prefer Delhi to Meerut because

“ 1st. Its fame is not a matter of indifference.

“ 2nd. It is fortified.

“ 3rd. It is safe.

“ 4th. It has a ‘prestige’ about it: its renown gathers people and adds to its naturally important position. A great establishment being there formed would add to the splendour of Delhi, improve the population, make the city more safe and more cleanly; in short give strength and vigour to this grand capital of India, which must always maintain a vast influence in the East.

“ If Delhi be unhealthy what made it such a grand city? Emperors do not build palaces in unhealthy places! Men do not congregate in unhealthy spots! Great cities do not rise in unhealthy positions! In their fall they become unhealthy, for as they perish they grow filthy: neglected ruins, dirt and squalid want, produce ill-health.

“ There is another strong reason in favour of placing the head quarters of the Artillery at Delhi. It will be the terminus of the railway from Calcutta, and this will make it much more convenient than Meerut for a great Arsenal.

“ The Delhi King within the palace is a mere effigy; yet he forms a moral rallying point, round which gather the dreams of discontented princes, feeding upon prophecies! Such prophecies and traditions as those about Delhi often-times work out their own fulfilment. In the present case they are only rendered dangerous

“ by the existence of the phantom King, whom we
“ there maintain at vast expense.

“ I prefer Delhi to Meerut as the head quarters
“ of Artillery for another advantage, which it
“ would possess, viz. there is no large river between
“ it and the Sutlej; whereas all heavy guns and
“ stores collected at Meerut have the Jumna and
“ the Hindoun rivers to cross ere they can reach
“ Umballah: this is a great inconvenience, for
“ I believe that neither of these rivers can be
“ bridged.

“ Such appear to me to be the advantages of
“ Delhi over Meerut; but still, if Delhi is really
“ unhealthy I have no more to say. That point
“ is however doubtful; the fact might be ascer-
“ tained from its former history, and from the
“ reports of medical officers. Its advantages over
“ Meerut are great, and to purify and render the
“ renowned City of Delhi salubrious would be
“ a work worthy of the Government of India.

“ The Governor-General asks what arrange-
“ ments are proposed for the transfer of the head
“ quarters from Dum Dum, to whatever place the
“ Government please to decide upon for the future
“ chief station of the Artillery?

“ Those arrangements consist of two parts. The
“ *first* in the preparation of the locality, and the
“ buildings, repairs, &c. The *second* in the march
“ when the first has been done.

“ The first must be arranged by the Military
“ Board, the Engineer's Department, and the Com-
“ mandant of Artillery. The second, like the
“ march of any other corps. Both are so simple
“ as hardly to require notice, but the following is the
“ usual mode of proceeding.

“ The Commandant should make his general
“ arrangements at Dum Dum preparatory to the
“ move of his establishments, and leaving the
“ minor arrangements to be executed by his second
“ in command and other subordinates proceed in
“ person to Delhi, or Meerut, accompanied by the
“ Chief Engineer officer and another member of
“ the Military Board. These three would form a
“ committee, which ought to have full power to
“ make the necessary preparatory arrangements at
“ Delhi. The first officer being a member of the
“ Military Board, should decide what is required
“ for his corps. The second, also a member of the
“ Military Board, should execute the same ; and
“ the third, also a member of the Military
“ Board, should attend to the expenditure and
“ accounts.

“ They should first get ready the barracks, then
“ prepare for whatever part of the establishment
“ the Commander of Artillery thinks it right to
“ have moved first, and let the preparation of that
“ portion be rapidly completed ; then that part
“ should be ordered to leave Dum Dum, and so
“ on in succession, getting each portion of barracks
“ completed in itself at Delhi or Meerut, before
“ its occupants are ordered to leave Dum Dum.

“ The next in command at Dum Dum must in
“ the meantime be preparing for the embarkation
“ of his various departments, to proceed by water
“ to whatever point is fixed upon for landing ; at
“ which point a third officer will be posted to
“ arrange their debarkation, and march to their
“ final destination.

“ The Commissariat will arrange the carriage by
“ land and water.

“ Such is the outline of the general arrangements, and the minor details will, of course, be executed by those employed under the orders of their immediate superiors.

“ Finally, there is little doubt, if the air permits the removal, that the establishment of the head quarters of the Artillery at Delhi will be less expensive and more complete than at Meerut; and it must be recollected that a broad view of the subject should be taken; that is to say, not a few healthy or unhealthy years, but the general qualities of the ground, and what depends on nature, and what on accident. I have heard that for many years Kurnaul was reckoned one of the healthiest spots in India. Why is it not so now? Ignorant of the details and locality, I cannot answer the question; but it shows that a broad view of these subjects is necessary, or otherwise an epidemic, or the fatal results of bad barracks, bad arrangements, and other accidental sources of ill-health will be assumed to be fixed, unconquerable evils, and without remedy!

“ With regard to the observations of the Court of Directors contained in paragraph 14, viz. ‘ That the Court would entertain very serious objections to removing the whole of the European Infantry from Fort William to Dum Dum,’ I entirely concur in the opinion of the Honourable Court. It would be an error to leave the safety of that important fortress in doubt. If it be necessary to expend money to improve its salubrity it should be done; but the defence of the capital must not be neglected for a moment. For the same reason a strong Artillery force ought always to be maintained at Dum Dum. I

“ consider the force of Artillery now there as too
“ weak, but cannot reinforce it, until the question
“ is settled whether the head quarters are to move
“ or not.

“ Here observe, that a barrack ought to be
“ built at Calcutta for the lodgment of every
“ regiment on first landing from Europe. Such a
“ barrack is much required, and would be also
“ useful if any circumstances were to arise which
“ made it necessary to increase the garrison of
“ Calcutta. As matters now stand, when a regi-
“ ment lands it is crowded, becomes sickly, and
“ loses numbers, which is accounted for by some
“ people saying, *that a new regiment is not accli-*
“ *mated.* This appears to me to be a fallacy. The
“ sickness arises from bad lodgment and drinking,
“ to which even good and generally sober soldiers
“ often have recourse, when ill accommodated
“ and uncomfortable. Want of comfort on first
“ arriving in the capital causes a great loss of
“ soldiers, which always take place on new regi-
“ ments coming to Calcutta.

“ The Honourable Board says, If I will suggest
“ a more efficient system for the Military Board
“ His Lordship will gladly give my statement and
“ suggestions his best consideration. To do this
“ would require more time than is at my disposal ;
“ but it would be one of mere time, and no other
“ difficulty ; for the Honourable Court may be
“ assured that the defects of the Board are very
“ glaring ; and for a sample look to a memorandum
“ in answer to a question from the Governor-
“ General relative to this subject.

“ The Board is too far removed from its work
“ not to impede the public service. It should be

“ placed either at Agra or Delhi, if not abolished.
“ I must be excused for differing from the Court
“ of Directors as to its 17th paragraph. Whatever
“ may be the principle of the Military Board’s
“ powers of *sight*, that Board’s powers, *in fact*,
“ are immense and most injurious to the service;
“ and it would be to fail in duty to the Company
“ if I did not say so. The Military Board should
“ be abolished, and a Chief Engineer, with two
“ deputies, both Engineer officers, appointed, and
“ made responsible for the whole of the Board’s
“ duties: to him all the subordinate Engineers
“ should report, and he should receive all his
“ orders from the Commander-in-Chief, who, in like
“ manner, would receive his from the Governor-
“ General in Council.

“ The Chief Engineer would forward all accounts
“ to the Auditor-General. He would report pro-
“ gress in all military works to the Commander-
“ in-Chief, the latter forwarding the same to the
“ Governor-General in Council, to whom also His
“ Excellency would be responsible for their pro-
“ gress. Each district Engineer should have a
“ treasurer attached, by whom all accounts should
“ be settled. The district Engineer should sign
“ every voucher, and be responsible for seeing, in
“ company with the treasurer, every payment
“ made honestly to his workmen, without the
“ deductions which subordinates are apt to make
“ when they can: but he should not have to make
“ up accounts, or have anything to say to them
“ beyond seeing the actual payments made, and
“ signing the vouchers for such payments.

“ The sanction of the Governor-General in
“ Council should accompany every order for ex-

“penditure. It should be sent to the Chief
“Engineer by the Commander-in-Chief, as the
“sole authority for any expenditure; and the
“Chief Engineer, the Auditor-General, and Ac-
“countant-General should be held responsible,
“that the accounts were made up and closed
“monthly, the district Engineer having an *acquit-*
“*tance*.

“By this arrangement every military expendi-
“ture would originate with the Governor-General
“in Council.

“The Commander-in-Chief could propose any-
“thing, but originate nothing. He would see that
“the works ordered were executed well and with
“proper rapidity.

“The Chief Engineer would receive and check
“all plans and estimates, forwarding the same to
“the Commander-in-Chief, who would forward
“them to the Governor-General in Council for
“final sanction.

“Thus the Governor-General would order the
“plans and estimates, and then approve or alter
“them and finally give his sanction.

“*Knowledge and responsibility* would be applied
“to the vast expenditure on public works, and
“thereby reduce it.

“With the system of the Military Board neither
“knowledge nor responsibility is applied to such
“works. The Board orders this, and forbids that,
“at its pleasure, and the results prove its incom-
“petency. One natural result is an enormous
“unnecessary expenditure; and as to the respon-
“sibility of this Board it would be absurd to talk
“of it: it is imaginary.

“Such are the best views which, without enter-

“ ing into details, I can take of this subject
“ generally; and, having resigned the command
“ of the Army, I can have no other motive to
“ influence me than that which has all along
“ guided me—the interest of the East India Com-
“ pany, and early preparation for that storm which
“ may some day burst upon its possessions; a
“ storm which can only be met by a rigid well-
“ regulated economy to which, it is my opinion,
“ the Military Board is diametrically opposed.—

“ C. J. NAPIER, &c.”

“ P.S.—There is another piece of bad arrange-
“ ment which ought to have been noticed; the
“ common practice of changing Engineers, who
“ have begun the execution of a work. This
“ should never be done. Every man at all ac-
“ quainted with public works knows perfectly well
“ that the Engineer who begins a work grows
“ interested in it, and labours to do it well;
“ whereas when exchanged for another, both work
“ with disgust. Their pride is mortified, and they
“ neither do nor can work with the same ardour.
“ The Court of Directors would do well to prohibit
“ this, and their works would be carried on with
“ much advantage. This changing is also a
“ source of great expense, and bad work, of which
“ every one conversant with such work is aware.”

CHAPTER VI.

On the Cavalry.

WHILE I knew of Indian Cavalry only by reading, the *entire horse* appeared to be necessarily the most perfect for war; his fire, energy, endurance, power of all kinds, must make him, for battle, little inferior to the biped upon his back, and in truth he is a noble animal! But experience showed him to be a wild untameable warrior, too excitable for the fortitude and discipline acquired in modern tactics; the hard-working, much-enduring gelding is the horse for Eastern warfare.

Not less than eighteen reports on Eastern horses were obtained by me from Cavalry and Artillery officers; and from two Infantry officers, known to the Indian public for unrivalled judgment—Sir Walter Gilbert* and General George Hunter. The last was many years at the head of the Company's stud; the first, apart from his military renown, celebrated for equestrian knowledge and equestrian exploits.

All these reports concurred with one another;

* My lamented friend Sir W. Gilbert has died since the above was written.

and with my own opinions, namely, that mares and geldings are the proper animals to employ in the Indian Cavalry and Artillery services. Several of the reports were sent by Sir George Berkley, Commander-in-Chief at Madras, who from various experiments came also to the conclusion that geldings were best for military purposes.

In the field the shrill neighing of the perfect horse is incessant, and at night Cavalry can never be concealed from an enemy. The commander of a Horse brigade wrote thus to Sir Walter Gilbert, "The very noisy disposition of the entire horse renders him almost useless upon out-post duty at night, and serves more to point out your own position than to be a look out upon the enemy. This I found everywhere, but more particularly at Ferozshur on the night of the 21st December, where, after taking up my position in rear of your own division, the horses of my brigade became so noisy and troublesome that they plainly pointed out our position to the enemy, who immediately opened upon us, and I was obliged, with the Commander-in-Chief's permission, to change my ground during the night."

At certain seasons the entire horse is constantly restless; after the hardest day's work his anxiety will frequently prevent his feeding and throw him out of condition; he is then troublesome to manage, and so dangerous to ride that accidents are constantly happening,—so constantly as to destroy the rider's confidence! The troopers cannot dismount to link their horses and act as Infantry; each horse must have his man, and the commander, quoted above, continues thus, "The difficulty is great of securing the entire horse

“ when in the field, and the consequent privation
“ of rest to the rider during short halts, or night
“ bivouacs, in presence of an enemy. This I found
“ particularly at Ferozshur during the night of
“ the 21st December, where the brigade, when
“ dismounted, were for the most part obliged to
“ stand to their horses’ heads, and were conse-
“ quently totally deprived of rest. The difficulty
“ of unbitting the entire horses to feed under
“ similar circumstances must be added. Witness
“ Ferozshur, where for this and other causes the
“ horses of my brigade were without food or
“ water for forty-eight hours.”

Oh a terrible night that happened! A night, when the Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief, with adamantine firmness, resolved to abide the coming morn and save India, or die sword in hand. And this was the Cavalry preparation for the mortal struggle!

In actual battle the danger augments. Men are shot down, horses get loose, hands cannot be spared to catch them, and they interrupt the movements. The excellent report of the above Brigadier again says “ This I experienced, particularly at Moodkee,
“ where after passing through the first body of the
“ enemy, we came in contact with and were in the
“ midst of the Sikh Army; and when our safety and
“ success so much depended upon our compact-
“ ness we were impeded, in reforming for further
“ action, by the number of fighting loose horses
“ from my own and other brigades that we could
“ not get rid of.”

At Chillianwallah a Sergeant of the Artillery or Light Dragoons, a man of large stature, one of the finest men in India, got mixed with the enemy in

a charge; his horse, one of those vicious brutes so common in our ranks, attacked an enemy's horse—the beasts bit, struck, and kicked, fighting so furiously, that the noble soldier, though a powerful swordsman, was unable to use his weapon; he could neither manage his frantic horse nor defend himself, and both his arms were lopped off! In hospital he said to his officer, “Oh Sir, if it had not been for my horse I could have cut down a dozen of those fellows.”

That was a peculiar case, but the loss of life from unmanageable horses happens in every battle. Nor is this the greatest evil, because a few deaths more or less may not affect the result of a combat; but riders going into action, conscious that their horses may become unmanageable lose that confidence which troopers should have; they will charge, but not with headlong fury and the single thought to lodge their swords in the bodies of their enemies; fear of their own steeds tightens the rein, slackens the spur, and checks the fierceness of the shock!

With geldings heel ropes are not needed, and good judges think them injurious, especially when cold winds and hot suns induce the horse to turn for shelter.

A man mounted on a perfect horse cannot lead another horse, the animals would fight directly. Not so with the gelding, who will also work until he drops; whereas the entire horse when fatigued often becomes obstinate and vicious. This is particularly characteristic of the stud horses, which are the worst. They have, however, one all-saving virtue. They fail under their riders, they refuse to drag the cannon in battle, but they never sink under the load of *patronage*, placed on their backs

by the Court of Directors—superintendents, 1st class assistants, 2nd class assistants, sub-assistant, assistant-surgeons, veterinary surgeons, remount depôt, with its assistant-superintendents, its officers in “medical charge,” its veterinary surgeons, its riding masters, and its assistant riding masters! All are carried! A stud horse bearing SIR PRIVATE PATRONAGE, with Leadenhall lance in rest, and “*Coute qui Coute*” for motto, makes unrivalled charges, rolling over all other horses, Arab, Australian, Cape horse, Persian!

But even the stud horse with his ponderous knight may come to the earth; and to help the good work here is Sir Walter Gilbert’s reasoned summary of several officers’ opinions, together with his own; to which I have joined others, furnishing irresistible evidence against the stud system.

“Lahore, Sept. 12th, 1850.—I have now the honour to forward for submission to the Commander-in-Chief a letter dated 25th July last, No. 1033, from the Brigadier commanding at Peshawur, giving cover to an amended return, in duplicate, of all the horses admitted to the service by the Standing Committee at that station; and to a report, also in a duplicate, on the description of horses purchased since the formation of the Committee as called for, and returning the documents received in your dispatch No. 8, of the 15th May last.

“I beg to avail myself of this occasion to offer a few observations for the consideration of His Excellency and Government, on the present system of supplying the mounted branch of the service with remounts, and the expense incurred

“ for this purpose; and also on the comparative
“ merits of the animals supplied.

“ The average number of horses annually re-
“ quired for the mounted service is estimated at
“ 1200; namely 13 troops of Horse Artillery 200;
“ 12 Horse Field Batteries 100; 3 regiments of
“ Dragoons 150; and 10 regiments of Light
“ Cavalry 750. These 1200 horses are supplied
“ from the Government stud chiefly, though some
“ are from New South Wales, very few from the
“ Cape, and from the countries to the West and
“ North-west of India; they are admitted to the
“ service through the instrumentality of Com-
“ mittees, and eventually allotted to the several
“ corps in the order above noted as regards priority
“ of selection.

“ The cost of stud horses on an average of five
“ years is reckoned at rupees 758 : 12 : 3½ each
“ in the ‘stud accounts’ from which it is inferred
“ that they have cost the State this amount when
“ they leave the stud for the remount depôt,
“ where they are retained till five years old, and
“ are partially broken in and trained. If to this
“ be added the expense of their transit from the
“ stud to the remount depôt, their keep there,
“ and transit thence to regiments, it will be found
“ that each stud horse costs the State little if any-
“ thing less than one thousand rupees.

“ Of the colonial horses, those from New South
“ Wales cost from £.15 to £.20, and those from
“ the Cape of Good Hope from £.18 to £.25., the
“ freight from either colony, the distance being
“ about equal, together with other incidental
“ expenses, would be £.20 or £.25 per horse, so
“ that the average cost in Calcutta would be, New

“ South Wales £.43, and Cape horses £.47. The
“ 100 horses purchased at the Cape by Major
“ Bower of the Madras Army average £.45 5s. 7d.
“ each.

“ The enclosed reports of the Peshawur Com-
“ mittee exhibit 71 Northern horses purchased at
“ an average of 370 rupees for Horse Artillery and
“ Light Cavalry, and 260 rupees for those for
“ Light Field Batteries. The average price of the
“ Candahar horses, purchased by General Hunter
“ at Sukkur for Major Dawes’ Light Field Battery,
“ was 300 rupees; and the average of 99 horses
“ purchased by Major Edwardes at Mooltan for
“ General Courtland’s Artillery was 216 rupees.

“ The average price of the Arab probably does
“ not exceed 500 rupees at Bombay, taking one
“ branch with another.

“ I have heard it very generally remarked by
“ judges of horses, and my own opinion entirely
“ coincides with theirs, that the stud horses have
“ very greatly deteriorated within the last twenty
“ years; and that they are in every respect inferior,
“ for all military purposes, to the colonial and
“ Arab, and, as regard light field batteries, to the
“ Northern horses.

“ Even the best stud horses—those the first
“ selected for the Horse Artillery—are too often
“ bad tempered and of insufficient substance for
“ Horse Artillery; and when they meet with any
“ obstacle which they cannot immediately sur-
“ mount, they become sulky and will not renew
“ the effort, and manual labour must be had
“ recourse to, not merely to aid, but often in sub-
“ stitution of the horses. This was repeatedly
“ noticed not only by me but by Brigadier H. M.

“ Wheeler, C.B. and other officers during the late
“ military operations in the Punjaub ; it was also
“ noticed during the operations in Affghanistan ;
“ and hence, when it becomes necessary to
“ manœuvre troops in the presence of an enemy,
“ no commander can place the confidence he ought
“ to have in his Artillery. Had the teams of
“ Lieutenant-Colonel Lane's troop been Cape, New
“ South Wales, or Arab horses, it seems to me very
“ probable that his troop would not have lost the
“ gun left on the bank of the Chenaub, at Ram-
“ nuggur.

“ Whilst the first pick of the stud horses are
“ to a considerable extent deemed inadequate to
“ Horse Artillery purposes, how can it be expected
“ that those left—after the Dragoons and Light
“ Cavalry have had their choice also—should be
“ equal to light field battery draught, when it is
“ recollected that the six-pound Horse Artillery gun,
“ with carriage and ammunition, weighs $32\frac{1}{2}$
“ cwt., and the nine-pound light field battery gun,
“ with carriage and ammunition, weighs 42 cwt.
“ The injudiciousness of so greatly underhorsing
“ the heavier gun (by ten cwt.) was nearly ex-
“ emplified in Major Boileau's battery, which, but for
“ the exertions of Colonel Gowan, of the Artillery,
“ in collecting all the spare horses he could find to
“ aid it, might have been left on the heavy sandy
“ plain at Buduwal, and must always be a source
“ of anxiety in the field.

“ The capabilities of the large powerful and
“ docile Cape horse for Artillery and Cavalry pur-
“ poses cannot be doubted ; but were it so, the
“ question would be set at rest by the result of
“ the trial of the one hundred horses purchased for

“ the Madras Army, purchased last year by Major Bower.

“ In 1837 the late Lieutenant-Colonel Havelock purchased sixty-five Cape horses at £.25 each, for the 4th Light Dragoons. They were considered the best horses in that regiment, and worth twice the sum given for them, as they stood the march to Cabul better than horses of any other description. Thirty-one of them were subsequently made over to the 14th Light Dragoons in 1841, and from being remarkably fine horses were much prized in that regiment also; two still remain, the casualties of the others occurred as per margin. Of the sixty-five horses, ten were selected as officers' chargers, a contrast to the result of my inquiry in 1848, when only one officer in the Sirhind had a stud bred charger; the officers invariably preferring Arabs or colonials. Major Bower's able report to the Commissary-General of the Madras Army, dated 29th November, 1849, from the Cape, furnishes very valuable information, in detail, regarding the horses of that colony.

“ Horses from New South Wales have been under trial in the Bengal Army for three or four years past, and the result of extended inquiry leads me to believe that they are much approved of, especially as draft cattle for the Artillery. A reference to the quarterly report of officers commanding mounted corps, in reply to the Adjutant-General's circular letter No. 314, of the 8th February, 1847, would establish this point.

“ That there is a great difference between the horses bred in the neighbouring districts, and occasionally even between those bred by different

“ owners in the same district, is well known to
“ those who have given attention to the subject ;
“ and of the New South Wales horses, those from
“ Van Diemen's Land, South Eastern and Western
“ Australia (the latter possessing the very great
“ advantage of being the nearest to and having the
“ easiest communication with India of any of the
“ Australian districts) may be considered the best,
“ as regards both breeding and docility ; and those
“ from Sidney the least suited to military purposes,
“ from the mares and colts in that district being
“ allowed to run wild in the bush, which renders
“ the colts difficult to break in and uncertain in
“ pedigree.

“ The qualifications of the Arab as a Dragoon or
“ Light Cavalry horse are so universally known,
“ and his superiority to the stud bred horses is so
“ generally admitted, that it does not appear neces-
“ sary to enlarge on the subject. The teams of
“ Lieutenant-Colonel Blood's troop of Bombay
“ Horse Artillery, employed with the Army of the
“ Punjaub in the late campaign, were all Arabs.
“ This troop marched early in the cold season from
“ Scinde to Mooltan. At the close of the siege it
“ proceeded with Major-General Whish's force, to
“ join the Commander-in-Chief, and was engaged
“ in the battle of Goojerat. It accompanied the
“ force which followed up the Sikhs and Affghans
“ to Peshawur ; and, at the end of the campaign,
“ its horses were in admirable condition, as were
“ also the horses of the 14th Light Dragoons, 140
“ of which were Arabs and 169 Persians.

“ In the pursuit of the flying enemy at the close
“ of the action at Goojerat, this troop kept up with
“ the 3rd Light Dragoons till the pursuit termina-

“ ted beyond the village of Sainthul; and towards
“ the end of the pursuit, I witnessed it gallop
“ over two miles of ploughed ground; while, from
“ the horses being knocked up, several troops of
“ Bengal Horse Artillery had been left at a deep
“ nullah after passing Jellalabad. In the march
“ from Goojerat to Peshawur the Arab teams took
“ their guns and wagons up the difficult passes
“ (Buckralla, &c.) with ease, and without hesitation;
“ while the teams of stud horses were obliged to
“ be taken out, and their places supplied by manual
“ labour with drag ropes, to surmount the same
“ obstacles. These circumstances show the supe-
“ riority of Arabs over stud horses, as draught
“ cattle.

“ The Northern horses, (from Persia, Turkistan,
“ Herat, Candahar, and Caubul) from their mus-
“ cular strength and fulness of body are superior to
“ stud horses, and equal to Arabs as draught cattle,
“ while they resemble the Arab in good temper
“ and docility, as shown in Lieutenant-Colonel
“ Fordyce's comparative report enclosed, and in
“ which I concur. The large horses above 14.2
“ are well adapted for either Horse Artillery or
“ Cavalry, and the capabilities of those from 14 to
“ 14.2 for field battery draught have been proved
“ by the teams attached to Major Dawes' battery
“ (No. 17) in the last campaign. After the battle
“ of Chillianwallah, including a previous march of
“ about eight miles, the horses of this battery
“ brought their guns and wagons out of action,
“ not only laden with the wounded, but having
“ also several of the enemy's captured guns attached
“ to their own. These were Candahar horses, pur-
“ chased at Sukkur by Major-General Hunter

“ at an average of three-hundred rupees per head.

“ In the last march into Ramnuggur I remarked on the beauty of a pair of pole horses in No. 3 light field battery, to a young Artillery officer who replied that they were ‘Candahar horses,’ and had not been one day spared since leaving ‘Delhi;’ or in other words, that since then they had been in draught daily and not been led one day in three as stud horses require to be. The horses of this battery (with the exception of thirty-two furnished from the Kurnaul dépôt when on the march to join the Army of the Punjab) were purchased by Major-General Hunter in Scinde, and turned out remarkably well. No. 6, or Captain Abbott’s battery was horsed at Candahar with the small stout horses of the country called yaboos. It served with the Army throughout the Affghan campaign, and accompanied Sir R. Sale’s force to Jellalabad, where it was constantly employed on the heavy sands in that neighbourhood, and was always the admiration of every one for its efficiency.

“ In the power of enduring privation, the stud horse is far inferior to either the Arab, the Northern, or Colonial horse. Where grass and forage are difficult to procure, or inferior in quality, the stud horse immediately loses condition, and it requires great care, rest, and an abundant supply of forage to bring him round, even when under ten or twelve years of age; but if above ten or twelve years old, he is hardly ever again brought into good condition. With the Arab or Northern it is different; they will thrive on the worst forage, and when grass

“ is not procurable, will readily consume leaves of
“ trees, thatch of houses and such like food, which
“ a stud horse, if almost starving, would refuse;
“ and with a little care and attention when forage
“ becomes plentiful they will quickly recover their
“ condition, even when fifteen or eighteen years
“ of age. In the last campaign I noticed Colonial
“ horses also kept their condition under such
“ privation, while the stud horses became thinner
“ daily.

“ The stud horse is not only greatly inferior to
“ the Arab in temper and docility, but also in constitutional freedom from disease; and I have
“ strong reasons for believing that Bursottee exists
“ to a most injurious extent, and has become proportionally constitutional amongst stud horses.
“ This disease, peculiar to India, is incurable; the
“ sores spread in rainy or damp weather until the
“ animal is unable to work; and in the meantime
“ every horse in the same stable, whose skin may
“ receive a scratch, is liable to become diseased,
“ from the flies carrying the matter from one sore
“ to another. Out of 260 stud horses sent to Nos.
“ 11 and 15 light field batteries in October 1848 a
“ very large number had Bursottee. Four have
“ been cast from No. 11 battery on this account
“ and sixteen for bad constitutions. The total
“ casualties in less than two years have been thirty
“ horses in this battery only.

“ I have no account of those in No. 15 battery;
“ but I perfectly recollect inspecting the whole
“ batch of 260 when they arrived at Umballah, under
“ charge of Lieutenant Stokes of the Artillery, and
“ a worse lot I never saw. The number of horses
“ with Bursottee was so great, that had it not been

“ that the Army was then assembling for the Sutlej campaign and the attention of the Commander-in-Chief and Government fully occupied,
“ I should have brought the state of these 260 horses to notice in an official report.

“ For the satisfaction of Government I would strongly recommend that Veterinary-Surgeon Hurford, H.M.'s 9th Lancers, or Veterinary-Surgeon Harris of the 6th, (both officers of high professional attainments and very many years experience in India, and the former of whom submitted a report on the present state of stud horses, forwarded to your address in my letter No. 805 of the 1st August 1849,) may be deputed to inspect the remount dépôt, and the several establishments of the stud, for the purpose of reporting upon the horses as to their state of health, the causes of sickness or disease that may exist, or have prevailed at the several dépôts within the last few years, and as to their general soundness, and constitutional tendency to, or freedom from disease; and particularly as to the extent to which Bursottee exists amongst the stud cattle.

“ I would also suggest that whenever horses are to be passed into the service either from the remount dépôt, the stud, or elsewhere, a veterinary surgeon, entirely unconnected with the stud, should always attend the Committee, or officer receiving the horses; and should, at the foot of the roll, certify that he had examined the horses noted in it, and that they were free from disease, sound, and fit for the branches of the service to which they had been allotted.

“ When horses are sent to regiments from the
“ depôt, or the stud, they should be accompanied
“ by a Native farrier and sullotree, either from the
“ depôt or regiment furnishing the troopers sent
“ with them.

“ From the foregoing observations it would
“ appear, that the horses procurable from the
“ Cape, Arabia, and the country beyond our West
“ and North-West frontier, and Australia, are not
“ only superior as regards temper, docility, consti-
“ tutional freedom from disease, power of enduring
“ privations, and muscular power for draught to
“ the stud horses, but can be purchased for half the
“ cost ; so that, if the stud horses cost 1000 rupees
“ each, 1200 required annually would amount to
“ 1,200,000 while the same number of horses pro-
“ cured elsewhere would, taken one with another,
“ not cost more than 450 rupees each, or 540,000
“ rupees annually, by which 660,000 rupees would
“ be saved to the State. Even if the stud horses
“ cost but 760 rupees each on joining a regiment
“ (and not as supposed from the stud accounts, on
“ merely leaving the stud for the remount depôt,)
“ or 912,000 rupees per annum, still there would
“ be a saving of 372,000 rupees annually, and
“ withal far better horses introduced into the
“ service.

“ I feel persuaded that the chief requirement to
“ ensure the well working of the arrangements for
“ supplying the remounts from the colonies is a
“ judicious selection of resident agents. The
“ appointment of Major Bower of the Madras Army
“ to the Cape was most fortunate in this respect,
“ and were an officer of equal judgment deputed
“ from Bengal to Van Diemen's Land, and each of

“ the officers assisted by a veterinary surgeon from
“ his own service, I should have no doubt of an
“ excellent supply of remounts being furnished at
“ an average rate even lower than I have
“ mentioned.

“ That the number of colonial, Arab, and Nor-
“ thern horses required for the Indian Armies
“ annually, can be obtained, does not appear to
“ me to admit of a doubt, as the supply would
“ increase with the demand.

“ The circumstance of the sources from whence
“ the remounts would be drawn, being external
“ and not internal, I do not conceive to be of such
“ moment as in any way to impede the having
“ recourse to those sources, instead of continuing
“ to depend on so expensive an establishment as
“ the stud for inferior cattle.

“ In respect to the colonial horses, the sources of
“ supply although external, are nevertheless, parts
“ of the same empire, which would materially
“ benefit by the demand, both as regards the
“ landed and shipping interests.

“ The trade of the Cape and Australia, and also
“ with the Persian Gulph, I presume to be of
“ sufficient importance to require naval protection,
“ especially in time of war, so that there would
“ be little risk of the communication being cut
“ off.

“ Should Government prefer the system of con-
“ tracts, I have no doubt a call for tenders from
“ the Cape or Australia would be speedily answered
“ by parties in those colonies, fully competent to
“ supply the State with the number of horses
“ required annually, and at a price much below the
“ cost of our stud horses, for all passed into the
“ service by a committee; the horses rejected by

“ the committee continuing the property of the contractors, and at their disposal.

“ The people of the countries from whence the Northern horses are brought, are poor and, excepting horses and fruit, have little to offer to India in exchange for broad cloths, cotton goods, indigo, hardware, &c., which they purchase out of the produce of their own exports. To increase the demand for their horses is, therefore, in reality to increase the amount of exportations to the countries beyond our West and North-West frontier; for it is well known that the amount realized on imports from beyond that frontier is not taken back in money but in merchandise. In promoting the extension of our commerce with the countries beyond the British frontier, we adopt one of the measures best calculated to ensure the peace of that frontier; hence it would appear to be politic not only to let them share in supplying the Government demand for horses, (especially as the state would never be dependent on those countries only) but also to lower the duty on their horses to a very low figure, if not to remit it entirely, with the view of opening a more extended market.

“ In conclusion I would strongly urge attention to the present mode of supplying remounts; for the stud horses not only have deteriorated within the last seventy years, but, in my opinion, will continue so to do, from causes explained in a letter from Veterinary-Surgeon Hurford, H.M.'s 9th Lancers, forwarded in my letter of the 1st of August, 1849. W. R. G.”

Look now at our practice. We assume as the type of Cavalry horses, the charger on a Hounslow Heath parade. Well fed, well groomed,

well trained, he goes through a field day without injury, although carrying more than twenty stone weight; he and his rider presenting together, a kind of Alderman centaur. But if in the field, half starved, they have at the end of a forced march to charge an enemy! The biped, full of fire and courage, transformed by war work to a wiry muscular dragoon, is able and willing; but the overloaded quadruped cannot gallop—he staggers! This is the picture which should regulate the dress of horsemen; bearing also in mind the wasting sun, which in India enervates man and beast.

Our poor horses, thus loaded, are expected to bound to hand and spur while the riders wield their swords worthily. They cannot, and both man and animal appear inferior to their Indian opponents. The active vigour of the dark Eastern horseman is known to me; his impetuous speed, the sudden volts of his animal, seconding the cunning of the swordsman as if the steed watched the edge of the weapon, is a sight to admire; but it is too much admired by men who look not to causes. The Eastern warrior's eye is quick, yet not quicker than the European's; his heart is big, yet not bigger than the European's; his arm is strong, but not so strong as the European's; the slicing of his razor-like scimitar is terrible, yet an English trooper's downright blow splits the skull. Why then does the latter fail? The light-weighted horse of the dark swordsman carries him round his foe with elastic bounds, and the strong European, unable to deal the cleaving blow, falls under the activity of an inferior adversary!

Look at our officers, mounted or on foot. Look

at the Infantry British soldier with his bayonet ! What chance has an Eastern against them in single combat ? Neville Chamberlain, Robert Fitzgerald, Montague McMurdo, Edward Marston, John Nixon, Francis McFarlane, and many more have, hand to hand, slain the first-rate swordsmen of the East. Oh ! no ! there is no falling off in British swordsmen since Richard Cœur de Lion, with seventeen knights and three hundred archers, at Jaffa defied the whole Saracen Army, and maintained his ground. Why then is the Englishman inferior to the Eastern horseman in India ?

1st. The black man's horse is his own property ; and private interest beats the Commissary in feeding ; the Eastern's animal lives better than the Englishman's. 2nd. The hardships of war are by our dressers of Cavalry thought too little for the noble animal's strength ; they add a bag with the Frenchified name of " Valise " containing an epitome of a Jew's old clothes shop. Notably so if the regiment be Hussars, a name given to Hungarian light horsemen, remarkable for activity, and carrying no other BAGGAGE than a small axe and a tea kettle to every dozen men. Our Hussars old clothes bag contains jackets, breeches of all dimensions, drawers, snuff-boxes, stockings, pink boots, yellow boots, eau-de-Cologne, Windsor soap, brandy, satin waistcoats, cigars, kid gloves, tooth brushes, hair brushes ; dancing spurs ; and thus a *light* Cavalry horse carries twenty-one stone.

Hussars our men are not. A real Hussar, including his twelfth part of a kettle, does not weigh twelve stone—before he begins plundering. The heavy Cavalry horse, strange to say, carries less than the light Cavalry—only twenty stone !

A British regiment of Cavalry on parade is a beautiful sight; give it six months hard work in the field and, while the horses fail, the men lose confidence; the vanity of dress supersedes efficiency. Take eight or ten stone off the weight carried and our Cavalry will be the most efficient in the world.

It is not pleasant to speak of military dress, because the nonsense published on the subject, must have sickened the public. Some general principles may however be laid down.

Climate must influence dress, and it may be assumed the people of a country wear that best adapted to their climate.

Armies must be composed of men uniformly dressed, and uniforms should be regulated by climate; warm for cold climates, light for hot climates.

On these general principles the light loose dress of the Native Cavalry is, for horse and man, better suited for the Indian Regular Cavalry than the English tight fitting cloth jacket, into which our own Dragoons, and the poor Sepoy Troopers are alike stuffed—the latter being men who pass half of every day with only a small cloth tied round their waist! No more of *Cavalry* dress.

Cavalry Arms.—This is a subject on which as much nonsense has been printed as upon clothing, yet general principles also apply.

Courage, a quick eye, and strong arm, make a man dangerous in fight. Engraved on a small Spanish blade is this legend "*If your courage is good neither my size nor temper will fail you.*" Every man wishes however for the best weapon to give effect to his courage, and he should choose his

own blade, because confidence in his choice makes it the best for *him*.

To arm Cavalry Sepoys with heavy English swords of one weight, one shape, one length is a mistake. The Indian swordsman's skill is produced by constant practice with a sabre, which gives him a matchless sleight of hand; every Indian horseman should therefore be suffered to purchase his own sabre. It will be what he feels himself best capable of wielding, and impart a moral courage, which the English regulation-sword—hated and despised—deprives him of in an equal degree. In the first case he believes his weapon will make up for his deficiency of strength; in the second, *he* must suffer for the deficiencies of his weapon.

As to the intrinsic qualities of European and Indian swords respectively, there are finely tempered blades and very badly tempered blades in both; pistols should be replaced by carbines in all regiments; and as a straight sword gives a more desperate drawing-cut than a sabre, while a stab with it is more dangerous than a cut, and a weak man may use it with nearly as much effect as a strong one, it would be well if Indian soldiers looked to the superior qualities of that shaped blade. Marshal Saxe — himself a celebrated swordsman—thought the advantage of thrusting so great, that he proposed arming Cavalry with strong rapiers of a three-cornered shape, like a bayonet, to *prevent* cutting. The Cavalry steel scabbard is noisy, which is *bad*; heavy, which is *worse*; and it destroys the weapon's sharp edge, which is *worst*. The native wooden scabbard is best.

The Native Regular Cavalry are made to use English saddles and ride with long stirrups. To change these saddles was beyond my power, but my intent was to abolish the egregious folly of long stirrups.

These observations on Cavalry may be concluded by remarking that the East Indian people are not only masterly horsemen, but masterly in Cavalry movements. On one occasion a body of that justly renowned regiment, the 3rd Light Dragoons, under Captain Unett, charged superior numbers of Sikh horsemen, who purposely gave way in the centre, while the flanks wheeled inward, closed, and assailed his rear, leaving his front unopposed; for their apparently broken centre soon followed the wings, and all fell on the men of the 3rd before they could come round. Unett a distinguished officer, was desperately wounded, and many men were killed in this fight; nevertheless he brought the rest off with honour. Our Native enemies daily improve in war and are not to be despised!

CHAPTER VII.

*Infantry.*

Dress. — The Sepoys are encumbered with breeches; their former dress, leaving bare the legs, was better; yet now that we make war in the Northern regions of India warm clothing must be provided for them; they cannot bear cold, and on the whole perhaps their clothing is reasonable; the stiff stock round their necks always excepted, it is bad enough in England, scarcely to be borne in India.

Fire Arms.—The European musket is too heavy for the Sepoy. Ten years of constant attention to this point makes me counsel the Directors to have a lighter weapon. A British soldier goes through the musket exercise with a steady body, only his arms move, and their muscular strength is sufficient. Observe the Sepoy. He sways his body from side to side to assist his weak arm; he does not remain steady like the European soldier: his *musket is too heavy!* This overweight is still more apparent on long and forced marches.

The bore of the musket should not be diminished, but its weight reduced in the lock brass-work and wood; it should be a more finished weapon, both in the Queen's and Company's service; and one important improvement, hitherto unnoticed, might be made by every regimental armourer. At the muzzle, the edge of the barrel is sharp, being filed across at right angles to the bore, and in quick loading the soldier striking the edge with his ramrod gives it ragged inward projections, which catch the bullet as it leaves the bore and cause divergence, generally making the ball rise. The ragged edge is usually on the lower side of the barrel, but the whole inner rim should be *rounded off* which will also facilitate the entrance of the cartridge.

Rifles should be abolished — I speak of the weapon, not the gallant men in whose ranks I once was and whose exploits have never been surpassed—but the weapon is not good for war; and as to Minie rifles, they will in my opinion destroy that intrepid spirit which makes the British soldier always dash at his enemy. In close countries they are of no advantage, because men then get near an enemy before they see him, and in open countries he *must* be rushed upon, or battles will not be decisive. Exposed to Minie rifles Generals cannot reconnoitre, except from long uncertain distances, and battles will become great skirmishes, lasting many days and producing no great results, save the wasting of ammunition, and making the soldier think how he can hide himself from fire, instead of how to drive a bayonet into his enemy's body.

The Minie rifle will not do so much execution as is expected. Its long range requires high elevation, giving a lofty parabolic curve; it will therefore only strike where it falls, all under the curve are safe. To attack a position defended by Minie riflemen, our English mode of lines will be safest; its use will however probably render the attack in lines general. The close razant fire of the musket at thirty paces, aiming at the knees, is terrible. I have seen musketry at five paces distant, every shot told, the slaughter was unprecedented, the battle decisive.

It is said, "the musket changed into a Minie rifle does not lose its character as a musket, it may be used with the common spherical bullet if needs be." This is condemnation, small arms requiring two kinds of ammunition are bad. Being able to use a musket ball with the Minie rifle does not indeed compel its use; but then where is the advantage? We can load with anything, from brad nails to gold rings. Alli Pasha of Joannina fired doubloons upon the Turks besieging him, when grapeshot failed—the avaricious old villain knew his hour was come!

To send a ball straight you must abate windage; the long range is founded on the *absence of windage*, that is the principle of the Minie rifle. Grant it accurate projection and length of range, there are other principles still to be considered in war.

Powder, especially when bad, fouls the barrel, and every discharge gives a new layer of that foulness until the ball will not enter the bore. Here the Minie rifleman, if his enemy be rushing on, is

in a fix, like his ball, which by main force he has jammed two or three inches down the barrel: thus he loses all confidence in the weapon.

If the same windage be given as to a musket-ball the character of the piece is changed, and it has all the defects of the musket which are admitted; but then, "out of the thistle danger" "we pluck the flower safety"—the short range and very uncertain flight of shot from the musket begets the necessity of closing with an enemy, which the British soldier's confidence in superior bodily strength, due to climate, pushes him to do; he takes his stand in line of battle, thinking the *ne plus ultra* of glory is a close volley and a charge of bayonets, with his terrific shout of battle. Stop that and he is a common man. Frederick the Great encouraged his troops to charge first and fire after the bayonet had done its work; modern generals are seeking by the Minie rifle to do away with the employment of the bayonet.

The principle of the musket is to have plenty of windage, because however bad the powder the ball goes down freely; the firing is quick, and if low also, the ball will do mischief somewhere. Exact aim is not required; the smoke, the noise, the excitement, prevent it; the man aimed at is missed but his neighbour is hit, and every step forward the British soldier reckons an approach to winning the battle with his bayonet. It is said the Minie Riflemen can constantly retire, striking down at 800 yards an advancing enemy where muskets will be of no avail. An Army always retiring will soon get into confusion and fly!

An enemy flying from the bayonet flies broken,

routed! An enemy flinching from distant fire retires in order, will rally and with distant fighting close the day. Next morning he is again firing with his Minies at 1200 yards distance—that is, if he can load, for they must be first spunged to let the ball go down. It must however be admitted that if the Minie gives the same windage as the old musket, until ignition expands the cup, it is a complete weapon. Let it however be proved with masses of men and Infantry officers; not by Woolwich experiments, with gunsmiths, poachers and pigeon-shooters, whose deadly aim would, as the soldiers say, “knock out a midge’s eye at a hundred yards.” But then the execution of the Minie will be sure at 800 yards, and within that distance no Cavalry can draw up, no guns unlimber, no general reconnoitre; battles will be fought by guess, with small arms only. Who will gain by that? Certainly the most numerous infantry, and the English must always be fewer on the continent. The Minie rifle, perfected, will ring the knell of British superiority. The charging shouts of England’s athletic soldiers will no longer be heard, or, if heard, no longer heeded in the battle—and when were French soldiers ever beaten by fire only?

The Directors should lessen the weight of their musket to meet the Sepoy’s weakness; preserving the bore*. A musket beautifully finished, and carrying very truly, whose barrel is 3 feet 2 inches, and whose weight is only 5 pound 10 ounces is now on my table; and beside it is a Spanish musket 3 feet 10 inches in the barrel, weighing

* See my “Letter on the Defence of England by Volunteers and Militia.” Publisher, Moxon, Dover Street.

only 9 pound 4 ounces. All muskets should be reduced to six or seven pounds weight.

Drill.—Having little personal knowledge of Madras drill, the Bengal and Bombay systems only shall be noticed. The Bombay Army is compact, and its present chief, Lord Frederick Fitzclarence, qualified by an intimate knowledge of military details to render its drill equal to the Queen's Army. The greatest defects are the Seapoys' inveterate habit of talking in the ranks, and firing without orders—defects implying fault in commanding officers.

In Bengal drill is a matter of great difficulty from the dispersion of the troops, which paralyzes the officer's zeal and abilities. Long I sought, mentally, for a remedy and finally borrowed from that great man, Sir John Moore, who first reformed the drill and discipline of the British Army at *Shorn-Cliffe*. He was supported by the Duke of York, to whose honour be the fact recorded. Sir David Dundas had previously compiled, chiefly from the works of Saldern and Guibert, the book of manœuvres which bears his name, but the system may be traced to the Potsdam lessons of Frederick the Great. Before its appearance the British Army had no fixed system; every officer commanding a brigade, a regiment, or an Army, had his own peculiar mode, and all was confusion. Dundas had not however capacity to rise above compilation, and the Duke of York laid a fortunate hand on Moore to form model troops.

Moore was allowed to select regiments, the design being to train men and officers, and gradually furnish from the latter commanders for other corps. Dundas's manœuvres were there im-

proved, and alterations were adopted which have since become general without their origin being known. There a fine interior regimental economy was arranged, and a peculiarly zealous spirit infused into officers; there the ridiculous clubs of hair, so incommodious to the soldiers, were cut off, and the long gaiters and pipe-clay breeches replaced by trousers and half-boots; there the polishing of gun-barrels was abolished, brown barrels introduced, and the bayonet fastened by a spring instead of the defective zig-zag; there the ranks were reduced from three to two, and the only really sure, and always practicable square, by wheeling up of sections at quarter distance, was invented; there a knapsack was composed, on so good a pattern that every deviation from it has since proved a failure; there the balance-step, ridiculed by the "*fool who rushes in*," yet the source of all easy and compact movements was devised, and with it the measuring pace-stick, the pendulum, and timing-tap of the drum, the gliding march and free carriage—for Moore always sought to assimilate the soldier's post and carriage as much as possible with nature, removing useless restraints.

At Corunna the British Army lost that great master, who had so improved its power, but not until he had shown that his genius for leading was as great as for forming troops. His lessons survive. The Duke of Wellington composed the celebrated Light Division of the Shorn-Cliffe regiments, placing it under the first disciplinarian of his Army, Robert Crawford, and it became what all the world knows: Moore's system though perhaps now deteriorated, is still that of the British Army.

With full knowledge of a practice originating

with Frederick, improved by Moore, and adopted by Wellington, the mode of reforming the Bengal Army was not a difficulty; but Lord Dalhousie and the Directors were to be dealt with instead of a Duke of York; and my plan, though only involving the marching of a few regiments was sure to be objected to by them. It was simply to establish a camp of instruction for ten or twenty thousand men, at some great station, chosen as the head quarters of the Indian Army, where drill during the winter months would have been constant, and discipline throughout the year. Adjutants and commanders of other regiments should have been permitted to attend two winter months without losing their allowances; and any officer at his own expense. The regiments should have been changed every second year, and the Bengal Army would thus have been in time supplied with well-instructed regimental commanders.

CHAPTER VIII.

Baggage Corps, and Fighting Camel Corps.

THE first of these realized in the Mooltan Campaign all my expectations of its utility; further experience has confirmed that proof, and if Major Maughan the Commander would write a memoir of its services on the march from Kurrachee to Peshawur in 1848 and 1849, it would be very useful. The corps has been since disbanded by the Directors, for no known reason, if it be not that it was authorised by Lord Ellenborough!

On my arrival in Scinde, Sir Richard England's baggage came pouring into that country—out of the Bolan Pass—a huge disorderly mob; my conviction was instantaneous, that without a baggage corps no Indian Army could manœuvre with rapidity and just power. It has been sometimes called the camel baggage corps, but camels have only to do with it as being the beasts of burthen in Scinde; it might be composed of elephants, horses, mules, or asses. Baggage corps means organization—*method instead of confusion*, that does not suit peculating Commissaries, or dishonest Contractors; it would impede the enemy's *capture of vouchers and*

prevent public animals being used for private purposes. The officer commanding the baggage corps, and his subalterns, all holding commissions, would protect alike the baggage and the public accounts. In the Commissariat, honest men would then be distinguished from those who would be averse to a baggage corps as inconvenient.

Formerly a great speculator, the Jotee Persaud of his time, contracted for conveying baggage; to receive so much daily while moving, so much when halting; he had officers and sub-officers graduating downwards, and all duties and responsibilities were defined. That was a baggage corps founded on interest, excellent, yet inferior to mine, because it required large bodies of troops to guard it; discipline could not be so well maintained, and the countries through which it passed were not protected from plunder. In those days people say, there was no Commissariat; if there was, it put the public to unnecessary expense, as it did in the Chillianwallah and Goojerat Campaigns, where Jotee Persaud, not the Commissariat, saved the Army from starvation.

Lord Gough complained that his unwieldy baggage shackled his movements, which would not have happened with a baggage corps. In Burmah General Godwin's Army has been crippled by want of carriage; but if Major Maughan's corps, instead of being disbanded, had been sent to that country as a partisan body, it would have collected baggage animals if any were to be found; and being well drilled and armed would have required no aid. The baggage corps has been disbanded by men knowing nothing of war—but times will come to make men justly appre-

ciate and restore the corps, in dcspite of the false notion that it is expensive.

Camel Fighting Corps.

The organization of this body was the result of experience. When the Scinde war began, a *raid* in the Desert to capture Eamaum Ghur was undertaken. It was an operation of danger and difficulty; for only a few troops could be employed, and it was necessary to carry water. The Queen's 22nd were mounted on baggage camels, using the uneasy baggage saddle. However we did our work, and the plan of forming a camel corps of men mounted on swift camels with proper saddles entered my mind. The men's bedding was to form a soft seat, their provisions to hang from the bow, and thus a body of Infantry able to march a hundred miles at a stretch would be formed. This was afterwards executed, and a corps for partisan warfare organized under Captain Fitzgerald whose unusual bodily strength, intrepidity and ability, made him a suitable leader. In the hill campaign it was of great use*, and would have been of much greater in extended military operations under a general who knew how to use it.

When I became Commander-in-Chief the mischievous Bombay Government ordered it to be disbanded, but Lord Dalhousie was persuaded to absorb it in the Bengal Army; it has since done good service in the Derajat, under Captain Bruce, who succeeded Fitzgerald and thoroughly understands its nature.

* See "Civil Administration of Scinde," by Sir W. Napier.

CHAPTER IX.

Bombay Briberies.

THE third edition of a pamphlet thus headed, and signed Indus, has recently appeared. Being well acquainted with the characters there justly held up to public scorn Indus has told me nothing new, I could add to his information; but I will not give the Lord Chief Justice occasion to show that he can make his law *insufficient to protect an honourable man against libels, yet sufficient for the protection of such characters.* Lord Campbell from the bench, sneeringly advised me, when vainly seeking justice at his hands, to write my own commentaries in imitation of Cæsar! The first chapter shall be headed with the following remarks made by Lord Denman upon Lord Campbell's decision in that case.

" *Lord Campbell's law is not the law of England.*
" *It gives a licence for any slander. No public*
" *servant has any protection from libel under such*
" *law. It is not the law of England. And if Sir*
" *C. Napier is not satisfied with the article in*
" *'The Times' commenting on the trial, I have no*

" *hesitation in advising him to go to another Court where Lord Campbell's law will not prevail.*"

That Lord Denman's authority is great, from his superior probity as a man and a judge, and from his cautious temper, Lord Campbell cannot gainsay; for on the 7th of July 1853, when enforcing a point of law in the House of Lords, he said " *I have the good fortune to agree on this subject with Lord Denman, who was not in the habit of giving his opinions rashly*.*"

But previous to writing my commentaries, pains must be taken to ascertain a few passages of Lord Campbell's private life and connections, when he was, to use his own description of himself, on the hustings—" *Plain, honest John Campbell!*" An expression which caused universal laughter at the time; yet the merriment turned to gloom, when *Plain honest John Campbell became, by Whig favour, Lord Chief Justice of the King's Bench!* I say his *private* life shall be inquired into, because a man who offers uncalled for and impertinent advice, gives the advised a right to ascertain the worth of his self-constituted Privy Counsellor!

Indus has dealt only with direct unscrupulous bribery, but there are various ways in which money may be officially obtained. The following papers came to my hand in a private, not a secret mode, and broadly they show what manner of men the Scinde Quarter-Master-General Major McMurdo, and myself, had to deal with at Bombay, in defence of the public interest. The transaction took place a few weeks after my departure.

* See "Times," 8th July 1853.

“Bombay 15th November 1847. *I have been desired* to write to Colonel Dundas, as you will of course see that *the Government are desirous* of using the private steamers for troops in preference to country vessels, even if the charge should be higher. They are now only commencing and will have more steamers out soon, when I hope we shall be able to dispense altogether with the clumsy beastly country boats. I hope you will lend your aid as far as possible and in case you have not *concluded* a contract for boats for the 18th regiment, see if you can send them down by two companies at a time on the private steamers, and the same with the 7th Native Infantry. I do not expect the aid of another of the large steamers for some time to come, if at all, and the letter I have sent to Colonel D. will warrant your acting as I propose.

“Signed J. HOLLAND.”

The expression “*I have been desired*” gives this letter a demi-official character; and, as the writer is the Bombay *Deputy-Quarter-Master-General*, it must be taken as coming from the head of that office. “*The Government are desirous*” is another plain indication of the original source of the transaction. Now at that time Willoughby and Reid, whom *Indus* has made such prominent characters, were Members of Council, and chiefly directed the Government of Bombay; and here we find that Government, through the Quarter-Master-General's department, striving to force Colonel Dundas, now Lord Melville, the Commander at Kurrachee, and Major McMurdo his Quarter-Master-General, to ship the troops in *private steamers*, and break off

their transmission by native boats between Kurrachee and Bombay.

The stern official answer follows:

“ *Kurrachee, 23th Nov. 1847.* I am directed by
“ the officer commanding in Scinde and Cutch
“ to acknowledge the receipt of your letter
“ No. 1849 of the 13th instant relative to the
“ transport of troops on board the vessels of the
“ Steam Navigation Company, and to state that
“ however expedient and desirable it may be that
“ these vessels should be used in the transport of
“ parties of troops occasionally to and from Scinde,
“ and especially of Europeans; Colonel Dundas considers that in dispatching any considerable body of
“ Native troops from Scinde, the employment of
“ country craft is more expedient in point of time and
“ expense, for the following reasons, viz.—1st. As
“ regards time: a Native regiment can embark
“ in boats at Kurrachee and reach Bombay in
“ from four to five days, when the whole regiment may land effective; whereas, by adopting
“ the transport by the Steam Navigation Company’s
“ steamers, not more than two companies could
“ embark together, which would occupy a period
“ of five weeks in the transport of one regiment to
“ Bombay.

“ 2nd. As regards expense: the 18th Native
“ Infantry now under orders to Bombay may be
“ taken as an instance: the tonnage by boat
“ required for this corps will amount, probably, to
“ 3545 candies, which at 10 annas a candy will
“ cost 2215 rupees; whereas in sending the
“ regiment as proposed, the cost would be
“ as follows:

7 European officers at 107 rupees each	=	749
892 Native officers and non-commissioned rank and file at 8 rupees each	. =	7136
75 Public followers at 8 rupees each	. =	600
165 Wives at 8 rupees each	. . . =	1320
155 Children at 4 rupees each	. . . =	620
3 Horses at 25 rupees each	. . . =	75

The Native Infantry would cost rupees = 10,500

“ Under these circumstances I am desired to say
 “ the contract for the supply of boats for the con-
 “ veyance of the 18th and 7th regiments will not
 “ be relinquished. M. McMurdo, &c.”

This attempt to have troops transmitted by a *private company*, with great loss of money, greater loss of time, and other public injuries, without a single counteracting advantage, is a proof either of gross ignorance or reckless disregard of the public good. But Messieurs Reid, Willoughby, Campbell, and Holland, have spent their lives in their respective departments, and such a degree of ignorance is incredible even in them. Yet a motive there must be. Why were those gentlemen so zealous for a private company's emoluments, to the great injury and loss of the public? The answer involves another question. Were Messieurs Reid, Willoughby, Campbell, and Holland, *all large holders of shares in that private company?*

While awaiting an answer to the last question it will not be impertinent to show how Willoughby and Reid have dealt with my Moonshée Ali Akbar, whose treatment has been before alluded to in the comparison between Lord Dal-

housie's Government of the Punjaub and my Government of Scinde.

Ali Akbar was attached as moonshee, or native writer and interpreter to the political establishment of Scinde, when in 1842 it was made over to me by Lord Ellenborough; and he was strongly recommended by my predecessor in the political agency. At my side during all the subsequent war his character developed itself very favourably. To a powerful frame and the staunchest courage he joined a frank and loyal disposition, was patient in difficulties, physically and mentally very enduring, and zealous in the discharge of his duties. He won my regard in the field, and retained it in after years during the civil administration of the country. The Supreme Government rewarded his services with the order of merit. This was his ruin. The Bombay Council marked him for a victim, through whom to strike at me; there is no other way of accounting for the remarkable character of the proceeding instituted against him by Messieurs Willoughby and Reid of the Bombay Council: they hoped to find means of concocting evidence against *me* by persecuting *him*, and at all events pain me by his ruin. Thus they proceeded.

Mr. Pringle, my successor in the Government of Scinde, was ordered to make an inquiry into the alleged fact, that Ali Akbar had in the years 1842-43 remitted large sums of money to his banker and agent at Bombay—Aga Mahomed Rahim. Extraordinary exertions were then made to obtain accusations; the country was scoured for evidence; and the Lieutenants of Police at the principal towns in Scinde were required to *post public notices inviting accusers to appear against the moonshee!*

The result of all this was embodied in a report from Mr. Pringle, which, for the sake of brevity has been condensed as follows:

“ Ali Akbar, accounting for his property, states that 35,170 rupees was derived from inheritance. 30,000 was the property of Mahomed Hoossein, with whom he had agreed in 1843 to proceed to Arabia. The remainder consisted of earnings in the Affghan campaign, and two-thirds of the profits of a joint trade carried on for five years and a half with one Hajee Allec, from funds derived from inheritance, 29,000 rupees: but Ali Akbar had no active part in the concern.

“ *The evidence procurable is consistent with Ali Akbar's statement.* The parties to some of the bills decline giving evidence indeed; which may however be attributed to fear of a breach of mercantile confidence, though the conduct of the parties at Hyderabad in thus declining is unsatisfactory.”

Here I must remark that nothing will induce a native merchant in Scinde to show his books. On two occasions Captain Rathborne, my collector at Hyderabad, wanted to see the books of some merchants, but they positively refused. Bred up under the Ameer's rule they are accustomed to think, that if Government gets acquainted with their accounts spoliation must follow. When the Ameers got hold of a banker's books the next day brought a demand of “ *the loan of the balance credit!*” Certainly they would not show their books. The mere fact of their doing so would have injured their credit all over Asia.

“ Mr. Pringle is of opinion that Ali Akbar is entitled to credit, in the absence of proof to the

“ contrary beyond the suspicion arising from the
“ magnitude of the sum. The only accusers
“ against Ali Akbar have been *common defamers*,
“ who were never able to make their charges in a
“ specific form.”

“ Mr. Pringle is of opinion that nothing should
“ be done to Ali Akbar, derogatory to his respecta-
“ bility or injurious to his fortune. His position
“ in Scinde has invested him with a certain
“ influence, and he recommends that his services
“ be transferred, or that he be pensioned.”

What was the conduct of the Bombay Govern-
ment on receipt of this honest report? Was Ali
Akbar honorably restored, or was he pensioned?
Neither! Baffled by the scrupulous integrity of
the British inquiring officers, and enraged at the
simple candour with which Mr. Pringle expressed
his opinion, Mr. Willoughby cast the report aside,
and adopted a course best described in an extract
from Lord Falkland's minute.

“ For some time prior to the above (Mr. Pringle's
“ report) reaching Government, several lawsuits
“ against Aga Mahomed (the man to whom Ali
“ Akbar remitted the money) had been pending in
“ H.M. Supreme Court, and amongst them one to
“ which the moonshee Ali Akbar was a party, as a
“ claimant on Aga Mahomed's estate. It therefore
“ occurred to Government that in the course of the
“ proceedings, the moonshee must have been
“ examined upon oath with regard to his transac-
“ tions with Aga Mahomed, and also have put in
“ an account current of those transactions, and have
“ proved in what mode his remittances from Scinde
“ had been effected.”

I will presently show that it was not for any

statements of Ali Akbar on this trial that the Government sought for copies of the proceedings, but for the *perjured evidence of the bankrupt swindler on whose estate Ali Akbar had a claim.*

The papers alluded to were delivered up to the Government by the Chief Justice, not however without a remonstrance against so "*novel a course,*" and the declaration that "*it must be presumed the documents asked for would be used for only proper purposes.*" Of that the public shall now judge.

The evidence of the documents thus obtained goes to prove, that Aga Mahomed had been the moonshee's guardian and trustee when a boy, and his banker in later years, but that he was become bankrupt; that in September 1845, Ali Akbar, having heard damaging accounts of his banker's circumstances, wrote to demand his money of him, and Aga Mahomed, unable to meet the call resorted to the usual Eastern practices of evasion and treachery, with a view to get rid of his principal creditor. While pretending to make over certain houses and lands in satisfaction of the debt, he secretly told the Government that Ali Akbar had remitted suspiciously large sums to him about the time that "*Scinde was plundered.*" His object was to ruin the poor moonshee, and how he succeeded shall shortly be shown.

Subsequently Aga Mahomed was declared a bankrupt, and his estates were sequestered by the Sheriff of Bombay, including the property that had been previously made over to Ali Akbar, in the manner before described; and it was for the recovery of this property from the Sheriff that Ali Akbar became involved in the law-suit.

It would have been fruitless to have searched

through such an inextricable mass of perjury as an Indian money law-suit presents, for any real solution of the question of Ali Akbar's integrity in Scinde; and that was *not* Mr. Willoughby's object. He only longed for Aga Mahomed's evidence, no matter how palpable the perjury, for he knew it would be in opposition to Ali Akbar's statement, and the ruin of the latter was accomplished upon the following "*grounds for suspicion*" a term Lord Falkland used to justify the act. Aga Mahomed's evidence run thus:

"When Ali Akbar went to Scinde he *had no property of any amount. When he sent large sums down, then I suspected, and wrote that letter to the Government.*" Now "*that letter*" to Government was addressed to myself in *October* 1845, at the time the writer, Aga Mahomed, being in difficulties, wished to evade Ali Akbar's call to pay up; it was only at that convenient time for himself that he began to *suspect* Ali Akbar, though the remittances he mentioned were *made in* 1842-43!

In "*that letter*" Aga Mahomed explained his position with respect to Ali Akbar. "I was his father's agent, who was in the service of Government for upwards of twenty-three years; he always deposited his savings with me, and he was a man of wealth. The moonshec (Ali Akbar) from *time to time drew from me almost all his money*, which was to the amount of nearly 35,589 rupees. I beg to enclose your Excellency the list and copies of vouchers from different persons in *whose favour he drew the cash.*"

Aga Mahomed then added his account current

with Ali Akbar, in which, among other items are the following:

" Account rendered to his de-		
ceased father	-	- 35,589 rupees.
" Cash received after his death	1,151	"
" Furniture sold by auction	- 1,203	"
&c. &c. &c.		

Can black and white differ more than this man's two statements made within eighteen months? The Moonshee went to Scinde without property, yet he drew large sums from funds left in the hands of this very fellow! When the moonshee drew large sums *Aga suspected* and wrote that letter; yet two or three years had elapsed between the drawing and that letter! Even in this perjured evidence he was inconsistent before the Court, for on his examination he admitted that Ali Akbar "*traded out!*" With what? He must have had the means—he could not trade without capital and profits, and Aga Mahomed was his banker. All this was nothing to a Government resolved upon the ruin of the unfortunate man. Mark the conclusion.

" *We the Council have no positive proof of the fact being as Aga Mahomed states in the above evidence, he surmised it to be the case; but, altogether, I consider that such strong corroborative grounds for suspicion exist against Ali Akbar that I cannot bring myself to believe in his innocence.*" And so he was ignominiously dismissed the service! This was not all: he had been for above a year previously suspended from his office, without pay or means of subsistence. Why even condemned felons are fed! Now

ruined by the law, crushed and insulted by an unjust Government, he goes forth a beggar!

Had this very cruel conduct been continued by the Bombay Government against a servant so distinguished, it would probably have added his death to the pecuniary ruin which it has inflicted upon him, as the reward of signal service during a long course of years. This once athletic man's health was broken down by the persecution; and a letter received from Kurrachee in 1849 contained these words "*The news of your appointment has saved the moonshee's life.*" And it is a very strong indication of the nature of the proceedings of the Bombay Government, that the instant the news of my nomination as Commander-in-Chief reached Bombay, the moonshee was in haste condemned on Lord Falkland's "*suspensions!*"

Thus because Willoughby and Reid raised his Lordship's "*suspensions*" an old and faithful servant of the public, distinguished for zeal and activity in peace, and gallantry in the field, is to be ruined for ever—this makes the blood boil. Lord Falkland does not know the moonshee—I know him perfectly. He is an honest man, and the whole of this shameful business has been a dishonourable contrivance, to which Lord Falkland has lent himself, in ignorance it is to be hoped.

The Bombay Government put forth public notices through the Police at the three principal towns in Scinde, viz.: Kurrachee, Hyderabad, and Shikarpore to *encourage natives to accuse the moonshee!* Every body at all acquainted with India must be aware of the turpitude of this act. It was to invite false-swearing and every sort of

foulness: a more grossly flagitious act never was committed by a British Government. Messrs. Reid and Willoughby expected to produce a host of accusers against the moonshee, and thus obtain colour for concocting some charge against me. And with this vile motive prosecuted these vile proceedings against him for a year and a half, and finished by depriving him of his appointments, because Lord Falkland "considers" that he has "*grounds for suspicion!*" A suspicion of what? Of having taken presents!!! It were better not to examine too minutely into such questions in Bombay, if *suspicion* is to be taken as proof. Suspicion! Why Willoughby and Reid are not only pointed at, but absolutely and distinctly declared by natives of Baroda, to be the recipients of bribes from the Gwcowar, and that declaration, with the sums specified, are to be found in the Parliamentary Book on Baroda affairs!

CHAPTER X.

Scinde Prize Money.

EVERYTHING relative to prize money has always been, and ever will be interesting to nations and to fighting men. The prize money of crowned heads and Republics consists of territories, contributions, cities, arsenals, revenues. Formerly if soldiers spared life it was for ransom, and Generals had great difficulty to prevent cruel plundering and devastation, which indeed they rarely wished to do, for the hopes of plunder brought daring men to their standards. Sovereign and people then gained by victory, and the soldier would not be denied his profit. But standing Armies made him a paid servant of the Crown, to which appertained all spoil of war, and Sovereigns now resign this right of booty to reward bravery: wherefore whatever may be said on the immorality of war the soldier is not touched thereby, he only obeys the orders of his legal rulers, and they reward him for profitable victory.

This reward, called prize money, is honestly gained, notwithstanding the doctrines of those who interpret to "Render unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's"—as meaning "*Render unto robbers*

"*the things which are yours.*" Soldiers hold by the original reading, and render unto Cæsar *obedience according to the laws of their country.* It was this doctrine—reinforced by the natural rights of self-defence against intended massacre—that authorised me to war in Scinde. Victory followed, and the Queen voluntarily gave the booty to the Army; it was not applied for, or even looked for by me. The Court of Directors, influenced by avarice and anger, attempted to defraud both the Queen's and their *own* troops of this booty, and appropriate it to themselves, but the Royal Government stepped in to bar that discreditable proceeding. It was not their first attempt to perpetrate such a wrong. In the third volume of the "*Lives of the Lindsays*" will be found a letter from Lord Wellesley, denouncing the Directors for offering him £.100,000 to connive at defrauding the troops who stormed Seringapatam.

In my case, with intrigue they got themselves appointed trustees for the distribution of the booty in place of Lord Ellenborough, who was first designed for that charge. This, said a lady, was making "*the cruel uncle trustee for the babes in the wood.*" Was she wrong? No! They cheated us of a considerable sum; and that should have been proved in a court of law, if Chief Justice Campbell had not, to the astonishment of the bar, and amidst its ill concealed derision, refused a *rule*,—that is refused a *trial*, though driven, in vindication of that refusal, to assert that the General of an Army which had gained two great victories, was *neither an officer nor a soldier of that Army!* Such was his legal acumen—or something else!

The Directors having failed, thanks to her Majesty, in intercepting the bulk of the soldiers prize money, endeavoured to deprive me singly of the full share, which the regulated division of booty assigned to my rank; giving what they called "*a decision*" adverse to my claim. They had only the dishonour for their pains. The Royal warrant admitted of appeal to the Lords of the Treasury, and one was made by counsel, Mr. John George Phillimore. The Lords also got the written opinions of the Duke of Wellington, the Earl of Ellenborough, and Viscount Hardinge—all emphatically given in my favour. The Directors then supported their "*decision*" by what they called "*precedents*," that is they withheld all the really governing precedents and adduced inapplicable and inconsistent cases; but Mr. Phillimore discovered the existence of the last, and the Lords of the Treasury compelled the Directors, despite of their reluctance, to produce them. The following memorial was then addressed to the Treasury and produced a final decision in my favour.

Memorial.

As the Directors of the East India Company have disputed the claim of Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Napier to one-eighth of the prize money taken in Scinde by the Army under his command, the reasons by which that claim is supported should be stated on his behalf; and to reduce this statement within the narrowest limits, the propositions concerning which there is no question between Sir Charles Napier and the Board of Directors shall be first laid down.

On the one hand it is admitted that there are cases in which the commanding officer is entitled only to one-sixteenth; and it is admitted that there are cases in which the commanding officer is entitled to one-eighth.

On the other, the rank of the commanding officer, the circumstance of there being, or not being, any superiors in military rank to whom he must give an account of his operations, and by whom he is liable to be controlled; the fact of his being the first of several general officers, each of whom is entitled to a share of the prize money—these are the tests constantly appealed to by the East India Directors by which the validity of such a claim must be determined.

If the person claiming the eighth of the prize money does not hold the rank of General; if he have superiors in military rank by whom he is liable to be controlled, and to whom he is responsible for his operations; or if, though first in rank, he be one of several general officers, all of whom are entitled to a share of the prize money, it may be admitted for the purposes of this inquiry (notwithstanding some more liberal precedents in the records of the East India Company) that the claim of the Commander-in-Chief to one-eighth cannot be supported.

Again, if there be no military officer to whom he is responsible, or who has any power to control, or in any way to interfere with his operations; if the force which he commands cannot, with any regard to the usual sense and common acceptation of language, be considered as a detachment from a greater Army, but is to all intents and purposes an Army of itself, pursuing an independent object, and governed by an independent head,—if above all the

commander be the sole general officer claiming a share of the prize money—that is, if he be the sole representative of that class to which according to all rule and precedent one-eighth is due—then it is evident from the principles deliberately laid down and often insisted upon by the East India Directors, that the claim made by one so situated to an eighth of the prize money is valid, and, without overturning all analogy and running counter to the whole current of precedent, cannot be rejected.

Now Sir Charles Napier, during his command in Scinde, combined every circumstance enumerated in the latter category.

1st. He was appointed by Lord Ellenborough directly and immediately as Governor-General of India to a separate, distinct, and independent command.

2nd. The Commander-in-Chief of the forces in India had no share whatever in this appointment, nor was he privy to it, nor was any portion of the authority of Sir Charles Napier as Commander in Scinde delegated from him, or from any other military officer at any of the presidencies in India.

3rd. Sir Charles Napier communicated as to his military operations directly with the Governor-General of India, and with him alone. He made no report whatever concerning his military operations to any military officer. His command was as independent in Scinde as that of Lord Wellington's in Spain, and his reports of the routine of military duties was exactly analogous to those made by Lord Wellington to the Duke of York, during the time of his command in the Peninsula.

4th. The command of Sir Charles Napier had a distinct and specific object, with the execution of which he alone was entrusted, and the knowledge

of which was communicated to no one besides himself.

5th. He was the sole general officer in command, the representative of a class to which one eighth was unquestionably due, and this circumstance, as will be shown by extracts from the Archives of the East India Company is precisely that which is appealed to by the Directors as furnishing a clear and decisive test as to the validity of the claim.

To prove that Sir Charles Napier was not the commander of a detachment, but the leader of an Army, irresponsible to any one besides the Governor-General, it will be sufficient to refer to the minute of Lord Ellenborough, by which, and not by any resolution of the Bombay Government he was appointed to his command, August 26th, 1842.

The whole transaction is exactly conformable to this letter. Letter after letter is written by Lord Ellenborough and Sir Charles Napier to each other, without the least allusion from which the possibility of any intervening authority could be surmised: and with countless passages which are irreconcilable with the existence of any such authority. Among many other letters, one written by Lord Ellenborough to Sir Charles Napier from the camp at Nalaghar November 25th 1842, contains the following expressions. "It is desirable that in the event of your moving you should have all the troops near the Scinde frontier at your disposal. I therefore enclose letters directing the officers commanding at Deesa and in Cutch to obey any orders they may receive from you. I shall acquaint the Bombay Government that this authority has been given you."

By this dispatch of the Governor-General's, all

authority over the officers at Cutch was actually taken *from* Sir Thomas McMahon and transferred *to* Sir Charles Napier; yet it would seem the Court of Directors argue that the authority of Sir Charles Napier was delegated from Sir Thomas McMahon in the face of a document showing so unanswerably that Sir Charles Napier's authority was given by the Governor-General, and that the powers of Sir Thomas McMahon were diminished and controlled by the Governor-General in order (for the sake of attaining more effectually the object he had in view) to make the powers vested in Sir Charles Napier more independent and extensive—such an interpretation of so plain a state of facts is unnatural, even extravagant.

Whatever independent authority it was in the power of the Governor-General of India to give to a General in command, was given, by Lord Ellenborough, to Sir Charles Napier; and in opposition to testimony so direct and decisive, that the appointment of Sir Charles Napier was made originally and exclusively by the Governor-General, it is strange to find the Court of Directors doubting—as if it had the remotest possible bearing on the present inquiry whether Sir Charles Napier's command was a subordinate or a principal one—a resolution of the Secret Department of the Bombay Government which, as far as Sir Charles Napier's command was concerned, might just as well not have existed at all, which is nothing more than a notification of Sir Charles Napier's appointment,—a mere registration of the command of the Governor-General in which the Government of Bombay, approving or disapproving, was bound at once to acquiesce without hesitation or interference.

The Bombay Government did not select, and had no power to select Sir Charles Napier for the functions assigned to him by Lord Ellenborough. It had no power to agree to, or to dissent from that selection. Its resolution was entirely collateral to the instructions received by Sir Charles Napier from the Governor-General. It had no effect whatever on his office, which was created solely by Lord Ellenborough, nor did Sir Charles Napier derive from it the slightest portion of authority. It is however more surprising that the Court of Directors, though they have omitted to notice the minute by which Sir Charles Napier was appointed to the command as well as the subsequent correspondence between Lord Ellenborough and himself, should actually quote a merely formal and technical document from the Bombay Commander concerning Courts Martial!

In the first place, as we are advised, the date of that document is subsequent to the period when the prize money was captured. Again, if any inference can be drawn from a paper so irrelevant to the object of the present inquiry, it can only be one strongly in favour of Sir Charles Napier—because the warrant of the Bombay Commander-in-Chief relates only to the Bombay troops, whereas not troops from Bombay only, but from all the presidencies were under the command of Sir Charles Napier. Lastly—the delegation was, as the most superficial knowledge of military proceedings shows a mere act of routine, implying no subordination on one side and no authority on the other; and therefore in no sense touching the question whether the command of Sir Charles Napier in Scinde was a principal or a subordinate

one. These two papers however so entirely misconceived, and which a moment's examination suffices to put in a proper light, are the only documents cited by the Court of Directors as tending to invalidate the claims of Sir Charles Napier.

It would be waste of time to dwell longer on topics which serve only to cloud the real nature of the case. The error which led to their insertion in the minute of the Directors does not require refutation. It could result only from a confusion of terms, and must vanish the moment that confusion is dispelled. The argument then as to the nature of Sir Charles Napier's command may be concisely stated thus; was it in the power of the Governor-General in India to confer an absolute independent command? And if it was, how could it be conferred more effectually and unequivocally? Are the letters written by the parties, viz. by the Governor-General and Sir Charles Napier, evidence of the relation in which they stood to each other? If so, the passages quoted above, and many more which might be cited demonstrate, as plainly as it is in the power of words and of conduct explaining, and in exact conformity with those words to demonstrate, that the command of Sir Charles Napier was not subordinate but a principal and independent command.

Is the testimony of the Governor-General as to his own intention in making the appointment conclusive? If so, it is sufficient to refer to the minute above quoted, and to a letter written by Lord Ellenborough since his return to England, and annexed to this memorial. To whom did Sir Charles Napier address the communication of the victory of Meanee? To Lord Ellenborough. In-

stead of all these facts, had the circumstances been directly the reverse, had Sir Charles Napier not been appointed by a despatch of the Governor-General, had he corresponded with and received instructions from a superior military officer; had there been no correspondence between the Governor-General and himself; had no troops been under his command but those of the Bombay presidency; and if instead of having the officers in Cutch within the Bombay presidency, by the express command of the Governor-General, actually taken from the command of Sir Thomas McMahon the Commander-in-Chief at Bombay, and placed under his own, Sir Charles Napier had been subject to Sir Thomas McMahon and responsible to him for his proceedings—if such had been the state of facts, the assertion of the Court of Directors that Sir Charles Napier was not Commander-in-Chief of the forces in Scinde (for they mean that or nothing) might have been supported by something like a plausible argument. But as the premises are in diameter contradictory to those which would give any colour to such reasoning, they must lead to an opposite conclusion, and it is therefore submitted with the utmost confidence that so much of the case of Sir Charles Napier as turns upon the nature of his command, and as to the authority from which that command issued is established beyond all shadow of doubt or controversy.

This question being then disposed of—and taking it for granted that the command exercised in Scinde, by Sir Charles Napier was independent and exclusive as well as that he was the sole general officer employed on that occasion, it remains to see how his case stands under the circumstances as a matter

of usage, and what the rules are which the East Indian Directors lay down as applicable to the prize money due to claimants so situated.

In the instance of the Chinsurah prize money, July 1781, when the capture of the Dutch settlement was effected which, to use the very words of the East India Directors, "*was neither the effect of meritorious service nor of capitulation*, the place being defenceless and ceded on requisition—an act of formal accommodation not of military occupation,"—one-eighth of the prize money was set apart for the commanding officer; and after the claim of General Hibbert, which seems to have been altogether without foundation, was withdrawn, one-eighth of the prize money thus acquired, was, with the express sanction of the Court of Directors and after inquiry, awarded to Captain Chatfield the commanding officer on that occasion—that is—a subaltern who had not performed any "*meritorious service*" received without dispute the share to which, after the battles of Meanee and Hyderabad, Sir Charles Napier's title is disputed.

The case of Serampore (1812) is in a contrast no less remarkable with the present conduct of the Directors. Serampore was a small Danish settlement within sight of Calcutta. It neither did nor could make any resistance against a small detachment of four or five companies of Infantry under the command of Colonel Carey. There was no more danger incurred—no more skill exhibited than on parade—not a shot was fired—yet upon that occasion one-eighth of the whole (360 shares) prize money was allotted to Colonel Carey.

A case follows, of still more importance, on which the attention of the Directors was especially

fixed, in examining which they state the principles by which the distribution of prize-money in India should be regulated, to which they systematically appeal afterwards as the rule of their proceedings. This case is precise in favour of Sir Charles Napier! It is that of Seringapatam. Had Sir Charles Napier's Advocate been called upon to select expressions which would set his Client's demand beyond the reach of cavil, it would not be easy for him to find any more appropriate than those employed on that occasion by the Directors of the East India Company. On the taking of Seringapatam one-eighth of the prize-money was awarded to General Harris. This share General Harris received and kept. It is while censuring this distribution, that the Directors make use of expressions which, if hostile to the claim they then endeavoured to impeach, are strongly in favour of that against which they are now contending.

Letter to Fort St. George 24th August, 1804.

“ Upon the share of one-eighth as claimed by
“ General Harris, however strongly impressed that
“ officer may have been with the justice of his
“ own demand, upon the fullest investigation we
“ are decidedly of opinion that, according to the
“ undoubted usages of the British service, the Com-
“ mander-in-Chief not being sole General was not
“ entitled to an eighth; had there been only one
“ General serving under his orders, he would have
“ been entitled to two-thirds of an eighth; but
“ there being more than one general officer the
“ share of the Commander-in-Chief ought to have
“ been one-sixteenth and no more. Such we
“ conceive to have been the indisputable limits of
“ General Harris's share according to the rules

“ and usages of the British service, nor can we
“ find any case of distribution even in India which
“ could warrant the General’s claim as Commander-
“ in-Chief to one-eighth, he not being at the time
“ sole General. Were it possible to adduce a
“ precedent of remote date in support of such a
“ principle of distribution we cannot admit that it
“ would prevail in opposition to the scale of dis-
“ tribution established in 1793 by His Majesty’s
“ proclamation, and the Act of Parliament for the
“ regulation of Naval Prize,—the principles of
“ which Act have ever since governed the distri-
“ bution of prize in both services.

“ We are ready to allow that in by far the
“ greater number of cases of prize which have
“ occurred in India, the officer in command of the
“ forces shared one-eighth part. These precedents
“ can in no degree justify the late distribution, yet
“ we deem it due to General Harris to notice the
“ fact, as we can well conceive that in the view
“ the General took of his own claims he might
“ have been misled by not sufficiently advertng to
“ the distinction between the share of a Com-
“ mander-in-Chief being sole General, and that of
“ a Commander-in-Chief, as in the present case,
“ having several general officers to share that
“ eighth with him.”

Is not the validity of Sir Charles Napier’s claim a direct corollary from the principles here laid down? If the claim of General Harris to one-eighth would, in the opinion of the Court of Directors, have been valid had no general officer been entitled to share in the prize money of Seringapatam, Sir Charles Napier’s claim must be valid now, as there were no general officers

entitled to share in the Scinde prize money. If General Harris was wrong because he did not “advert to the distinction between a sole General and one who has several general officers to share with him,” Sir Charles Napier, inasmuch as the distinction which was adverse to General Harris makes altogether in his favour, is in the right. That this and no other was the real point kept in view by the East India Directors is especially manifest from their subsequent despatch in the case of the Mahratta prize money.

Sir Arthur Wellesley who commanded a detached body of troops on that occasion received one-eighth of the prize money. The Court of Directors find fault with that distribution, and for this reason because the rule insisted upon in the case of Seringapatam was not complied with,—in other words because there were other general officers to share with Sir Arthur Wellesley. They do not say, as the fact was, that Sir Arthur Wellesley’s command was not independent, that he was not Commander-in-Chief, that he was only a Major-General but that (*Letter to Bengal July 12th, 1804*) “with regard to the orders relative to corps entitled to share in the principles laid down on the letter from the Commander-in-Chief to the President of the Prize Committee, we have no observation to offer; but as to the distribution of shares resolved on by that Committee it appears to be inconsistent with the regulations prescribed by His Majesty’s orders, and to the sentiments contained in our letter to *Fort St. George* on the subject of the Seringapatam prize money of the 24th August, 1804 founded thereon, copy of which has been transmitted to you. In all

" *future distinctions* of prize money in India *these must* therefore be acted upon as far as circumstances will admit." This amounts to an express confirmation of Sir Charles Napier's claim.

In the distribution of the Hattrass prize money, 1817, the same principle was acted upon under the express sanction of the East India Directors. The principle is thus stated, "*to the general officers one-eighth.*" Not only were the general officers allowed one-eighth on that occasion, but Lieutenant-Colonel Prother who commanded a separate detachment was allowed one-sixteenth, a claim which according to the principles now contended for by the East India Directors would be wholly untenable. The precedent of Hattrass is referred to in the Concan case as the best guide, 31st May, 1820, and in the opinion of Sir Charles Colville Lieutenant-Colonel Prother was entitled to one-eighth.

The case of the Concan prize money is also emphatically in Sir Charles Napier's favour. In that case it must be observed that there was no general officer at all in command, Lieutenant-Colonel Prother, Colonel Kennedy, Captain Imlach, and Captain Morrison commanded separate detachments. Lieutenant-Colonel Prother (who received one-sixteenth in the Hattrass case—this is mentioned to prevent confusion) claimed one-eighth. One-sixteenth was paid at first to the claimants. With regard to the other sixteenth the question was submitted to the Court of Directors and in their letter to Bombay, dated 8th October, 1828, they authorise the proper authorities by whom the question was submitted to them to pay "the *reserved* sixteenth to the estate of Lieutenant-Colonel Prother and to the other officers com-

“ *manding detachments* who were similarly situated.” No precedent can be imagined stronger or more conclusive. The officers claiming the eighth had not even the rank of General. The Directors in the very documents by which they ratify their demand, call them “ *commanders of detachments*,” and yet they grant to them what they refuse to Sir Charles Napier. In order to remove all doubt, and to show that each commander of a detachment received for himself one-eighth of the whole, the very words in which the question was submitted to the Court of Directors are annexed. “ Question submitted as to the appropriation of one-sixteenth of the booty taken by the force under the late Lieutenant-Colonel Prother in 1817-18. That officer having only been paid one-sixteenth under a doubt whether he should receive one-eighth of the whole, the widow of that officer now submits her claim to receive the reserved sum. There were three other detachments to which a similar arrangement applies, commanded respectively by Lieutenant-Colonel Kennedy, Lieutenant-Colonel Imlach, and Captain Morrison.”

In the next case the distribution of the Kittoor prize money, 1824. The system of distribution adopted was that of the Concan prize money 1821 (extract Bombay General Order 1821,) and the attention of your Lordships is particularly solicited to this fact which, if it stood alone, would be conclusive in Sir Charles Napier's favour, viz. that according to that scale one-eighth of the whole was specifically allotted to the Lieutenant-Colonel commanding.

In the Khelat case Sir Thomas Wiltshire (not being a general officer) commanded a small force

on its return from Candahar to the Indus. He only commanded a small detached corps under specific orders from superior authority. He was no more a Commander-in-Chief than Lord Hill was at Arroyo Molinos; yet as the capture of Khelat was the result of this expedition grave doubts existed whether the claim preferred by Sir Thomas Wiltshire to one-eighth of the spoil was not valid.

In the distribution of the Bhurtpore prize money, one-eighth was allotted to the Commander-in-Chief with the deliberate sanction of the Government. It should be remarked that on this occasion there were several general officers entitled to share in the distribution. Finally by an arrangement sanctioned by the Court of Directors in their dispatch dated 10th April, 1833, one-eighth of the whole is allotted to the General Commanding-in-Chief, even where there are other general officers entitled to share the prize money.

To recapitulate the argument in favour of Sir Charles Napier he is entitled to one-eighth as the General Commanding-in-Chief of the Forces in Scinde and Beloochistan. He was not like Sir T. Wiltshire at Khelat, or General Marshall at Hattrass, or Lieutenant-Colonel Prother at Concan, the commander of a detached force, but of an Army over which he had the sole command, and for the operations of which he was alone responsible. No Commander-in-Chief of any presidency was ever made acquainted with the orders given to Sir Charles Napier by the Governor-General, not even the Commander-in-Chief in India, Sir Jasper Nicholls, when present in the Governor-General's camp. The original order dated Bewar, appointing Sir Charles Napier to the command in Scinde, would

have been valid without any subsidiary order from the Government of Bombay. This order dated Bewar, *which the Directors do not quote!* was the only source of Sir Charles Napier's authority,—and that resolution of the Bombay Government, *which they do quote*, is nothing to the purpose, and can only serve to perplex and to mislead.

Sir Charles Napier is entitled to an eighth, as being the sole general officer entitled to share in the prize money. Let it be conceded for the sake of argument that Lord Ellenborough's dispatch, and all the tests appealed to as proving the command of Sir Charles Napier to be distinct and independent go for nothing. What is the consequence? That the other general officers would be entitled to share in the eighth allotted to the class, and that Sir Charles Napier would be entitled to two-thirds of an eighth. But there being no other general officers the question really does not arise. Had there been other general officers, the question would have arisen whether Sir Charles Napier, like the commander at Bhurtpore, and according to the undisputed usage of the Indian Army, was entitled to one eighth,—and that question it is submitted must have been decided in Sir Charles Napier's favour for the reasons stated above.

Now, that the class of general officers is entitled to one-eighth is unquestionable; the usage in the distribution of prize money in India has generally been fluctuating and capricious, but on this point it has been uniform. In all the cases examined, none in principle is more steadily kept in view or more assumed throughout as an axiom not to be disputed, than that stated in the Seringapatam

dispatch, viz. that the Generals as a class are entitled to one-eighth of the prize money. It has indeed sometimes happened that when many Generals are employed and the booty is small, such a share would be less than that of a Colonel, and in such cases an option has been allowed such Generals of accepting a certain number of shares—1500 for instance,—in lieu of their proportion of the eighth. But the rule has never been disputed. The circumstance that Sir Charles Napier was the sole general officer commanding a force which cannot be called (and has not been called by those who resist his claim) a detachment, distinguishes Sir Charles Napier's case from all those where one sixteenth has been allotted to the commanding officer. Without reiterating the argument it is only necessary to refer to the expressions of the Court of Directors in the cases of General Harris, and of Sir Arthur Wellesley, to show that for the opponents of Sir Charles Napier this difficulty is insurmountable. If Sir Charles Napier's claim is refused a new precedent will be created of which throughout all the records of prize transactions in India there is not the least example or intimation.

For these reasons it is hoped that your Lordships will ratify the claim of Sir Charles Napier to one-eighth of the Scinde prize money—a claim in exact conformity with established usage, and ratified by every principle to which a claimant can appeal. For all those reasons of policy and justice apply to the present case which have caused heretofore that proportion of spoil to which Sir Charles Napier now asserts his right to be awarded to those who like him were subject to no superior.

He, like them, was assisted by no equal on him, as on them, the management of a dangerous war exclusively devolved. He like them could have called upon none to divide the responsibility of failure. And he like them as it is trusted your Lordships by your decision will establish, in all reason entitled to the invariable and hitherto unquestioned consequences of success.

JOHN GEORGE PHILLIMORE.

CHAPTER XI.

HAVING set forth the most prominent evils of the military service in India, and the pernicious interference of the Civil Government, my design was to make this a miscellaneous chapter, but severe illness debars execution. My task must terminate with a short memoir, written some time back, to expose the effrontery of the Directors in claiming merit for doing what they strenuously thwarted and opposed.

At a commercial assembly in Manchester a letter from Sir Henry Willock, Vice-Chairman of the Court of Directors, was read by Mr. Turner; the purport was to proclaim, the strong desire of the Court to forward British trade with Central Asia by the Indus; the advantages of Kurrachee; and the establishment of fairs in Scinde. The public shall now judge what faith can be put in any documents, or assertions, emanating from Leadenhall Street; and how entirely baseless are the pretensions of the oligarchy there collected, to the praise of good Government.

Memoir.

The fairs announced by Sir H. Willcock have been established by Mr. Frere, who now governs

Scinde admirably, so far as his proceedings are known to me; but a change has come over the Indian Government. Sir Henry Willock's letter, dated 26th June 1852, says "*The Court of Directors have sedulously turned their attention to the improvement of British commerce with Central Asia, and have been desirous that the attention of the commercial world should be turned to the advantageous position of Kurrachee.*" This he treats as a new and dazzling policy; but though pretended to be so by him and his colleagues, it is assuredly an old policy to others; Lord Ellenborough and everyone in Scinde were familiar with it ten years ago! At that time his Lordship ordered me to construct a large *serai*, or depot for merchants' goods at Sukkur, and the site was actually marked out. The pressing events of war stopped the immediate building, and when conquest enabled us to proceed, Lord Ellenborough had been recalled, and no money could be got from the succeeding Government.

My efforts were then directed to render Kurrachee the real mouth of the Indus, a matter soon brought to a successful issue. For Lieutenant Balfour, a clever officer of the Indian Navy, having heard from the fishermen, that a navigable tide creek-way along the coast communicated with the Indus, was directed to explore it with his steamer. The thing was so, and that sure communication being established has been used ever since. Kurrachee thus became the mouth of the Indus, because this creek-way is not affected by the annual inundation of the great river, and is free from the influence of raging seas.

Four of the war steamers under my orders

were immediately placed at the disposal of the Kurrachee merchants, and, despite of the difficulty of opening a new line of trade, despite also of the unsuitableness of war vessels for the carriage of goods, the merchants found this water communication to the Indus and up to Sukkur, so much cheaper and more rapid than their old land line, that they abandoned Kafilas, and poured their trade on Kurrachee by water so fast the steamers were unequal to the work.

On my departure Scinde was placed under the Bombay Government, at that time the very sink of iniquity, and it instantly took the steamers from the merchants and abolished all my arrangements for establishing and nourishing trade with Central Asia and the Punjaub, by the Indus! This line, pointed out by nature, was the best, the quickest, the safest, the cheapest; but as I had previously warred down the robber tribes of the Cutchee Hills, who infested all the country between the Bolan Pass and the Indus, the land trade by Kafilas had also become secure—cheaper likewise than before, because those tribes previous to my war on them always levied black mail, besides occasional wholesale robbery of the Kafilas going from the Bolan to Sukkur, Shikarpore and Mittenkote.

I do not altogether fasten on the Court of Directors this atrocious attempt to crush the incipient commerce by Kurrachee up the Indus to Mittenkote, from thence to strike off by the Punjaub East, West and North. It was the then Government of Bombay which did that ill turn to the commercial public—and from personal hostility to me. Falsely it represented to the world

the state of Scinde, and suppressed all information of the vast capabilities of that great and interesting country; but now Manchester pressure has extorted from the Directors a common-sense view, and acknowledgment, of the immense opening for commercial enterprise by Kurrachee, to which I vainly strove to draw Government attention when Scinde was under my rule.

Foreseeing clearly that Kurrachee must in time become a great emporium, I early commenced the construction of a quay, very considerable in dimensions; it was necessary for the commerce of the port, and very much advanced at my departure; but that also the Bombay Government stopped when I was gone, and it remained untouched from 1847 until 1852, when Mr. Frere with a proper spirit completed it. He was however supported by Lord Falkland, the actual governor of Bombay, whose council had then been purged of Reid, Willoughby, and Crawford, persons who have unceasingly endeavoured with laboured secret falsehoods, private and official, to defame me and crush Mr. Pringle my first successor: had they remained, Mr. Frere, being an honourable man, would also have been maltreated.

With these remembrances it is a subject for rejoicing, that the Court of Directors have been constrained to admit the value of Scinde as an acquisition, and to acknowledge its vast productive powers for cotton, indigo, sugar and grain—in fine for all that a fine climate, fine soil and periodical inundation can nourish; immense riches are there, and a fine race of men to work them out!

What commercial men should urge on the Directors shall be here enumerated.

1st. The employment of an engineer, to cut the bar at the entrance of Kurrachee Harbour. It is not alluvial, it is decayed stone easily pulverised, and the water will aid the work, washing away the loosened rock.

2nd. The application of science to deepen and clear the harbour.

3rd. To lay pipes from the Mullarce River to Kurrachee. The surveys levels and estimates were all taken by me, are complete for application; and the cost only £.12,000, according to the estimate of the military engineer Lieutenant Colonel Scott. From a reservoir thus formed at Kurrachee, the pipes should be continued along the quay or bund to Kemaree Point, for supplying the shipping with water.

4th. Construct another quay at the mouth of the tide creek of Ghisree.

5th. A railway from Kurrachee to Ghisree—three miles.

6th. Trace a new town to extend from Kemaree point towards Clifton.

7th. To fortify Kurrachee in the mode submitted by me, and approved of by the Supreme Government in India. My plans and estimates are in the hands of the Directors; they are not extensive, and the day may come when they will be wanted; but they should be executed at once in a country always liable to wars.

8th. Make a road from Sukkur to Shikarpore, for which I gave plans and an estimate.

9th. Send steamers to the Indus suited to its

stream. Captain Powell of the Indian Navy is conversant with the navigation of that river, and can give the proper build.

There are other things to be done, but those mentioned will put commerce in full action on the Indus and the rivers of the Punjaub. They would all have been done by me but for the interference of superior power; for the Court of Directors had not then "sedulously turned their attention to the improvement of British commerce with Central Asia." On the contrary, that Court sedulously opposed all improvements when pressed by me. I urged, but the Directors disregarded and suppressed "the advantages of the position of Kurrachee, as convenient for the introduction of British manufactures to the vast extent of countries immediately West and North-West of that province." And now Sir Henry Willock, their vice-chairman, is not ashamed to claim the merit of such conception for the men who stifled its realization when mine! But his letter shows that the Court is not yet aware of the full extent and value of the opening through Scinde for British manufactures. He forgets the North-East! Forgets that four great navigable rivers flow through the North-East countries—all rich and beckoning to Manchester! Forgets also, or likely never knew, that in the *North* also there runs from East to West, the great line of traffic between China and Russia, by which Russian goods are sold in the upper part of India cheaper than English goods!

That line passes through *Leh* or *Ladak* in Thibet, which by the map is only two hundred and fifty miles north of Simla; the Chenaub river,

a tributary of the Indus, flows within a hundred miles of Ladak, and it may be assumed that Cashmere will, ere long, become a British province, because justice and policy unite to dictate the wrestling of that miserable country from the horrible tyranny of the infernal monster Goolab Sing. When that is done the Chinese trade, now passing through Ladak, will descend on India, following the courses of the five rivers; for the devil's in the dice, if England, with water carriage the whole way from Liverpool to within one hundred miles of Ladak, cannot win the Chinese trade from Russia!

Ladak is assuredly the Eastern field of battle for a commercial contest with Russia. To use military terms, England's line of operations, having India for a base, is short easy and safe; that of Russia long, difficult and insecure. Our line will pass altogether through our own territories, while that of Russia runs through barbarous nations altogether beyond her control. English goods will indeed reach Ladak, charged with a portion of the national debt; but Russian goods will go there charged with the black mail levied by wild robber tribes at every step—impositions which would destroy the trade altogether if the caravans did not themselves pillage. Of this I have been assured by men who have a full knowledge of the subject, having travelled with the Kafilas and caravans. But whether we win this Chinese trade by forethought and enterprise, or lose it by supineness and mis-government of India—the case of Mr. Aratoon, who was unceremoniously and unfairly stopped short in a great commercial enterprise along the Punjaub rivers by Lord Dalhousie,

is a sample of the latter—it is clear that the trade from the *North-East*, will in time be immense, if India continues a British possession: much greater than that from the countries mentioned by Sir Henry Willock. Why he omitted to notice this trade is strange, probably he knew nothing of it, and his letter was merely to assuage Manchester hostility on the Indian bill.

He must now be told, that the North-Western nations of Asia have a shorter line for mercantile operations with Europe by the Oxus, which will therefore beat the Indus, and leave us only the North-Eastern trade of which he takes no notice! from the North-western countries, Persia and Russia, with their great inland waters, will carry off the rest. When I was at Peshawur Russian goods of all kinds, sugar, tea, &c. were to be had cheaper than English goods, though that place is only two marches west of the Indus; but the Russian Emperor takes more pains than the Court of Directors to assist commerce, and his line is shorter. Sir Henry Willock, while making great display of his commercial acumen, has overlooked altogether the most important source for trade viz. the territory *North-east* of Scinde, although under the rule of himself and his colleagues!

That territory *must* be the most important commercial quarter, because trade will not go round about when it can go straight forward. The Calcutta interest may writhe and twist at the growing importance of Bombay and Kurrachee, but the whole commerce of the countries North-East of Scinde will finally descend on Kurrachee; and the march of Alexander the Great from the Beas to the ocean, with the voyage of Nearchus,

marks the coming line of European trade with India: the time is not distant when it will be adopted. The commercial glory of Calcutta is departing: the Indus, the Jhelum, the Chenaub, the Ravee, the Sutledge, the Nerbudda, and railroads, will unite to give the ascendancy to Bombay and Kurrachee.

Foresceing, while still Governor of Scinde, what was to come, I urged the purchase of Soonomeanee, the only port besides Kurrachee on the Scindian Sea frontier. The Jam of Beila was willing to sell it for a very small sum, and the bargain would have been struck had I remained; since then it has dropped, but it ought to be completed and quickly; for though the security of Scinde under my rule had such attraction that the trade of Soonomeanee was drawn off to Kurrachee, the former is the better harbour, and there will be trade enough for both.

Those who desire to have the immense opening for our manufactures presented by Scinde, must urge on the Court of Directors the works mentioned; and press on the Queen's Government the reform of the India charter, recommended by Lord Ellenborough, who alone really understands the subject in all its bearings, political, military, and commercial. If England chooses to lose his services and have an enormous empire dead for commerce,—alive only for the profit of Lord Wellesley's twenty-four ignominious tyrants—be it so. But if Parliament does its duty, free from private influence, it will accept the good counsels of a man so thoroughly versed in all that concerns India.

It is now only necessary to add, for the entire breaking down of Sir Henry Willock's communi-

cation, that, under my orders and sanction, General Hunter of the Company's Service did establish a horse fair at Sukkur, which was to have been enlarged for general commerce ; but the Indian Government immediately abolished it, though through that fair he had purchased some hundreds of horses for the Bengal Army which were found to surpass all others : and he could have supplied the armies of the three presidencies with animals of a superior description, at half the price now paid for an inferior supply !

This exposition of the Director's "*sedulous attention*" is recommended to commercial men—my work is terminated. Discursive it has been, because the object was to lay bare many intricate evils, each of which demanded especial notice ; but the reforms proposed are founded, not on theories but experience—upon successful practice in war and Government. Of personal griefs so much only have been told as comported with a clear display of facts due to the people of England, who called me to command the Armies of India at a dangerous crisis. For no light matter was a command, so bestowed, relinquished. Had the matter between Lord Dalhousie and myself been of a private nature, it would have been left to struggle as it could to light from under my contempt ; but it is essentially of public interest, and not peculiarly affecting me. I am the ninth or tenth Commander-in-Chief who, in a short period, has been driven to resign by the inter-meddling of overbearing and not over-wise Governors-General ; and the well-being of our Indian Empire demands, that so great an office should not be rendered despicable by an interference, commonly conducive to mischief,

always degrading to the general weak enough to submit.

Nevertheless a wronged man I have been—more wronged than this work tells of, for ever the public good has guided me in suffering as in action—but when falsehood is in vigorous activity, with encouragement and support from power; when even from the judgment seat insolence and oppression are dealt forth, the dignity of human nature gives a right, without imputation of vanity, to avow good services. To me also as an inspired truth has come that passionate burst of eloquence with which Charles Fox repelled foul enmity. “*There is a spirit of resistance implanted by the Deity in the breast of man proportioned to the size of the wrongs he is destined to endure.*” That spirit prompts me to vindicate a claim to better usage. I have won victories, subdued a great kingdom by arms and legislation, governing so as to enable a million of human beings to enjoy life and lift their heads in freedom. I have opened a vast field for commercial enterprise by the Indus, augmented the revenue of the Indian Government by millions; and in a moment of imminent peril saved the Anglo-Indian Empire from mutiny more formidable than ever before menaced its stability. The return has been, twice to drive me from high and honourable positions, and all but proclaim me a public enemy. In Parliament vilified by men without truth or honour, out of it libelled, and from the Bench with vulgar insult refused protection against slander, I leave my actions to history.

SUPPLEMENTARY CHAPTER.

BY THE EDITOR.

HISTORY is not asleep, she will vindicate the wronged man's fame. The solemn multitude attendant around his grave was her first record, and already she speaks in the following letter, through her servants—the highest and the lowest—the Governor-General who commanded and the poor soldier who served. It was thus he linked together the ends of society.

Letter from The Earl of Ellenborough.

Sept. 11th, 1853. " It certainly was very satisfactory to see in the spontaneous and general movements of the troops, the constituted authorities and the people, an unequivocal proof that justice was done to the great military and civil services of your brother, and to that thorough honesty of purpose and self-devotion which distinguished his character. Yet still hardly any one knows the full extent of the service he rendered in conquering Scinde.

" Few are capable of appreciating the military advantages of our occupation of that province, and many have been deceived by the disingenuous misrepresentations of its financial results. In point of fact it is the only acquisition since that

“ of the Dewanny in 1765, which has been largely
“ beneficial to the revenue.

“ It gave us the monopoly of the supply of
“ opium to China, and its financial advantages may
“ be almost measured by the enormous increase in
“ the revenue from opium since 1843. The
“ increase of the revenue from opium passes
“ (which is carried to the account not of Scinde
“ but of the Bombay presidency) is a direct and
“ admitted consequence of the closing of the routes
“ by which Malwa opium was taken to Diu and
“ Demaun, and I think this alone amounted—in the
“ last year of which the amount was furnished, to
“ the committee—to £588,723, but the price of
“ the Bengal opium has also been raised, by so
“ taxing that which competed with it.

“ In an account furnished by the Court of
“ Directors they disingenuously inserted 32 lacs of
“ military expenditure under the head of ‘civil
“ ‘charges of Scinde,’ but after defraying these
“ military charges the net surplus derived from the
“ conquest (taking credit from the improved receipts
“ from opium) is above £500,000 a year.

“ The annexation of the Punjaub does not
“ present a financial result by any means so
“ favourable. In fact, if the military expenditure
“ incurred within the Punjaub were charged to its
“ account, there would of course be a large deficit;
“ this however would be as unjust towards the
“ Punjaub as a similar line of conduct is towards
“ Scinde; if the civil expenditure alone be charged
“ to the Punjaub, there is a net surplus of revenue,
“ but it is very inferior indeed to that derived from
“ Scinde.

“ In imposing a treaty upon the Amceers your

“ brother only executed his instructions; in de-
“ posing the Ameers, after their treachery at
“ Meeanee, he still only executed his instructions.
“ The whole merit of the military operations and
“ of the subsequent civil administration is his own.
“ If demerit there be in any measure with regard
“ to Scinde, I alone am responsible. I am not
“ very uneasy under the weight of that responsi-
“ bility, but such as it is, it is fit that I should
“ bear it.

“ I can hardly yet realize my position, deprived
“ as I now am of the inestimable advantage
“ of recurring on all military questions to your
“ brother for his opinion, which he so kindly
“ on all occasions gave to me. No man ever had
“ a more faithful or a more able adviser, and I
“ cannot but feel that without him I can never
“ speak with authority, although I may with con-
“ viction upon any matter relating to war.

“ If your brother had any weakness it was that
“ of entertaining too great a partiality for me. I
“ was sensible of this, and laboured to correct and
“ control my judgment of all I said and did, so as
“ to bring it nearer to the truth than entire reliance
“ upon his too indulgent opinion would have
“ allowed it to be.

“ The greatest advantage I have had through
“ life has been that of always living with the fore-
“ most men of the time. I am now compelled to
“ endeavour still to retain some portion of that
“ advantage by considering what their opinion
“ would have been on the new questions which
“ may arise—and to no one will my mind more
“ frequently recur than to your brother, my last,
“ my best and my most devoted friend.

“ ELLENBOROUGH.”

“ *Ballinafeigh, Belfast 15th September 1853.*
 “ Sir,—With feelings of deep regret I learnt from
 “ the public papers the decease of our dear General
 “ on the 29th ultimo. I humbly beg leave Sir,
 “ you will be kindly pleased to accept my humble
 “ condolence on the sad bereavement it has pleased
 “ Almighty God to inflict on his illustrious family
 “ particularly, and on the British nation generally.
 “ I cannot Sir withhold my humble sentiments of
 “ devoted affection for the renowned chief who led
 “ me to battle and to victory, on the hard fought
 “ fields of Meeanee and Hyderabad; and not only
 “ so, but who subsequently, on being discharged
 “ from the 22nd regiment on a pension of one-
 “ shilling per diem (labouring under general para-
 “ lysis and debility) made application to the
 “ Chelsea Board in my favour and procured me an
 “ increase of sixpence per diem. Sir, I mention
 “ these circumstances; the former you are well
 “ acquainted with, the latter impresses on me a
 “ sense of gratitude which time can never efface.
 “ I assure you Sir, it afforded me no small degree
 “ of satisfaction to learn that you were present
 “ when the spirit of the mighty dead took its de-
 “ parture from this vale of tears, to (I fervently
 “ hope and trust) the regions of eternal bliss. I
 “ humbly trust Sir, you will be kindly pleased to
 “ excuse my troubling you with a correspondence,
 “ all I can offer as a palliation is, my devoted
 “ affection for and heartfelt gratitude to the
 “ memory of our dear dear General Sir Charles.
 “ I remain Sir &c. JOHN A. CASEY,

“ Late colour-sergeant 22nd Foot.

“ To Major McMurdo.”

Let the following testimony to excellence of another kind be added.

Extract of a letter from the Reverend Edward Coleridge.

" *Eton College, September 18th 1853.*—Some time in 1843 or 1844 Sir Robert Peel said to me, 'You are acquainted I think with the Napier family?' Yes! in some degree with three members of it. 'To which of them do you award the palm in literature?' Expressing surprise, I answered that I had never regarded Sir C. Napier as a writer, but as the most heroic and generous of soldiers.—'Well,' he said, 'I can assure you that I am much inclined to rank him above his brother. Not I only, but all those of the Government who have read his letters and dispatches from Scinde are immensely struck by their masterly clearness of mind and vigour of expression; and feel with me, that he is as great with his pen as he has long proved himself with his sword. I have no hesitation in placing them in comparison with the Gurwood dispatches, or with the best things of the kind which have ever been written.'

EDWARD COLERIDGE."

Sir Robert Peel's judgment was just; it will be so found, if the dispatches and letters spoken of ever see the light. Yet Sir Robert, speaking thus of his literary talent, and equally forcibly of his administrative and legislative powers, as may be seen in the "History of the Administration of Scinde." Sir Robert, who in Parliament and in private society expressed unbounded admiration of Sir Charles Napier's exploits; he who, even before the command of the Indian Armies was bestowed, at an honorary banquet told him, in presence of a great company, English and foreign, that his services had not been adequately honoured, was Minister

when the Tower guns were silent on his victories, when the thanks of Parliament were kept back for a year, and those honours, privately admitted to be nobly won, were altogether withheld! The Directors' Parliamentary interest was strong, and other Ministers gladly followed Sir Robert, in debarring the rewards, without the grace of admitting the claim. But the object of their neglect, like Wolfe and Moore, knew how to make his name glorious without a title. Charles James Napier engraved on his tombstone shall say to inquirers—read history! Living, his spirit yearned only for the grateful praise of his countrymen; living and dead he received it—in that happier than Scipio!

It is however strange that Sir Robert Peel, who is said to have evinced when dying a like sense of native dignity, should not have repelled such ignoble influence in defence of a great man.

JUSTIFICATORY AND SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS.

No. 1.

Memoir on the Defence of India, and the Military Occupation of the Punjaub.*

THE Punjaub question involves in some measure that of whether the Indian army shall be increased or not. That must be determined by the political state of India with regard to surrounding countries, and by the internal duties which the troops are and may be called upon to perform. This is the broad statement of the case, embracing not merely the Punjaub but all India. It is a wide question, calling for immediate and vigorous decision, or great inconvenience may befall the Indian government.

* Some necessary verbal corrections have been made in this memoir, but in no manner affecting either the tone or matter.

Let me begin with an outline of the political state of India, taking only a general view, for to enter into details would require volumes.

State of India.

The political state as regards foreign powers is this:—In the South is the large kingdom of the Nizam, whose capital is Hydrabad of the Deccan, where a sovereign with twelve millions of subjects has his government in confusion; but writing for one whose position gives him full knowledge of this matter, it is only necessary to call attention to the dangerous aspect of this state, sufficiently powerful to wage a very mischievous war against us. To the South and Westward this power links on as it were to the Southern Mahratta States, which, in 1845, singly made war upon us for many months, though we had ten thousand men in the field, and among them five or six European regiments; and they will again do so when opportunity offers—other tribes there also hate us.

North Eastward of the Nizam's country lies a wild tract, held by lawless barbarians bearing various names—Goomsoor, Colcs, &c. Some of these are, even *now*, in a state of hostility with the Madras presidency. All south of the Nerbudda river is therefore unsettled, unsafe, and ready to rise against the British rule; and, in addition, those two great presidencies do not cover their own expenses, though if properly ruled they would yield a large revenue to the Company. No state of things more unsettled or more dangerous than this can be conceived, and these two mismanaged presidencies amount to somewhere about one half of our eastern possessions, including Scinde, which

is unwisely attached to the Bombay government. However, as these two presidencies have each an army of its own over which I have no other control than the command when in the field, no more need be said about them, and the subject has been touched merely to show that in case of distress Bengal cannot expect much support from that quarter. The whole country lying to the South of Nerbudda river is *unsafe*, and that to the North very little better, if at all!

Now take a view of our Eastern frontier. There we have the Barrampootra river, which descends from the Hymalaya mountains to join the Ganges near its mouth. The Barrampootra curves towards the west; and our territories which lie on its left bank, are shaped thereby like a crescent moon, one of the horns of which is formed by Assam, and the other by Arracan. I have no local knowledge of these parts, but this strip of territory lies along the powerful and unfriendly kingdom of Ava, and a war with that strong kingdom would expose our whole Eastern frontier to attack; the distant posts in Assam would also be in peril. The close frontier of Burmah enables that power to press suddenly and dangerously upon the capital of our Indian Empire, and such events are no castles in the air, but threatening real perils; the Eastern frontier, therefore is not safe.

Come now to the North. The kingdom of Nepaul, hostile and ready to strike, runs along and forms our Northern frontier for five hundred miles, and is most dangerously placed upon our line of communication between Calcutta and the North West provinces. It can bring about three hundred pieces of cannon and one hundred thousand fighting

men into the field. Should danger arise in the North West provinces, and they are all hostile to us; or, should we have war with Ava, or with *any* Indian power, Nepal is upon our rear! Does any man, knowing India, doubt that, if a reverse had befallen us on the Sutledge Nepal was ready to attack our rear? Does any man doubt, that all the good people in and around Patna would not have joined them? The war would have run South like wild fire and all those tribes would be in arms. These are serious matters, claiming timely consideration; for were danger to gather it would find our troops widely scattered from the Indus to the Barrampootra, a distance, which it would take troops six months* to march over! and for five months in each year the European portion of our army cannot march at all! Such things render war ruinous, and victory doubtful.

The North West must now be considered, that is to say, the country between the Jumna and Sutledge, the Punjaub and Scinde, and the line of the lower Indus. Their state demands much attention. But while discussing these North Western Provinces, we must not forget that the South, East, and North are teeming with dangers; each has fought us singly and handled us rudely; what could they not do if combined? That they have not yet combined is almost miraculous, and gives no security for the future.

The Punjaub has been twice occupied, but it is not conquered. We now hold it with fifty-four

* As there is now a tendency to construct railways in India, it is satisfactory to observe that the structure of the country is calculated to combine the various important requirements of traffic, political objects and military defence, if the right course be pursued.

thousand fighting men*, and it is very dangerous ground. Scinde has hitherto been safe under the system established by Lord Ellenborough; but that has been changed, and should risings take place in Scinde simultaneously with the Punjaub, the Bolan Pass will be open to invasion from Affghanistan in concert with an inroad through the Khyber. Multitudes would pour through the Bolan and be joined by all the tribes to the East of that Pass, rising in thousands among the surrounding hills, and rushing down upon Scinde, which could not then march a man to the aid of the Punjaub as it did in 1846 and 1849.

Under the Bombay Government Scinde is not likely to be safe as it has been hitherto. The government being changed, results will probably change also, and a civil form of government is uncongenial to barbarous Eastern nations. There is no probability of the Punjaub becoming safe. Both it and Scinde are now governed by a system unsuited to the people. It is the same system which has for a hundred years prevailed in India without making it tranquil or prosperous. India has only prospered by conquest, and these conquests are most assuredly not due to the *system* of its government, but to the courage of the troops. The present system in the Punjaub will produce among the people neither peace nor attachment to our rule: no barbarous people will endure a civil government.

Under Lord Ellenborough Scinde was conquered, and he established a cheap military government which lasted five years, and has continued so under

* Since this was written, eighteen thousand irregulars have been added, making seventy-two thousand fighting men.

nearly the same system up to the present moment in perfect tranquillity.

Under the government of Lord Hardinge the Punjaub practically fell into our hands. His system, diametrically opposed to that of Lord Ellenborough's, made civil government, not military, the rule, and it produced another war. However the Punjaub was again subjected by our courageous armies, and there was a choice between Lord Ellenborough's and Lord Hardinge's systems—that is between military and civil—and Lord Hardinge's civil government was adopted with one difference—he *subsidized*, Lord Dalhousie *annexed*. The two first-named Governors-General acted from their own opinions, the third was controlled. My decided opinion is that Lord Ellenborough's system was right, and events bear that view out; but the object is only to show that facts lead me to believe the present system of government will break down.

Possibly there may not be *another war* in the Punjaub, but the country will be unsettled, dangerous, and a vast weight on the finances of India, which they cannot bear; for we must maintain a large army in the Punjaub, and compared with Lord Ellenborough's, an exorbitantly paid civil establishment, where a small military force and an economical civil establishment ought to suffice. After governing Scinde four years, I offered to hold it with three thousand men and the police. All beyond that number were maintained, not by me but the General Government in expectation of a war in the Punjaub; and were the Punjaub governed in a similar manner thirty thousand would be *now* sufficient for its occupa-

tion, and in two years *half that number* would suffice. It is impossible to form opinions on the force required to control any country without a full consideration of the mode in which it is governed, that is the foundation of everything! Taking, therefore, all these matters into consideration, giving each its just weight, and having some experience of the people and country, my opinion is, that after victories, which ought to have decided everything, the *North West* is not more safe than the *South*, the *East*, and the *North*.

Having now noticed all our frontiers, it must be acknowledged that there is a belt of powerful *external* enemies around India, and plenty of internal foes besides. That is to say, every native prince or chief within or without our frontier—there is not a single exception—our colour, our religion, our deeds, our words, our thoughts, our manners, are *all* odious to them! There is nothing unreasonable, nothing unnatural in this, but we should look at it as dangerous, and examine the strength of each enemy separately; and as the Punjaub, so recently annexed, may at this moment be considered the most dangerous, let us begin by investigating the state of that province.

The defence of India is confided to four distinct armies, viz., Queen's, Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, consisting collectively of about three hundred thousand fighting men, and four hundred pieces of artillery ready for war, without including guns of position, or mounted on forts and lying in our arsenals. This is a vast army, and in good discipline, complete in its equipments, full of courage, with a high military spirit running through all ranks. It is also necessary to say that this force

could be doubled without any injurious pressure on the population ; every part of India would furnish recruits in abundance for our popular service, and as troops they are proverbially faithful. There are things which admit of correction, and may be put right when the Commander-in-Chief's office is placed on a proper footing, not till then. But that matter shall be treated of in another letter : here it must suffice to give a decided opinion that this magnificent army is sufficient to guard India at present, and the annexation of the Punjaub does not, or at least need not, impose the raising of one additional regiment.

Punjaub.

This country presents an equilateral triangle, of which each side is about four hundred miles. The *north* side, or base, is bounded by the southern ranges of the Hymalaya mountain ; the western side by the Indus ; the southern side by the Sutledge and Beas Rivers. These great rivers join at Mittun Kote, which forms the apex of the triangle. The northern part is mountainous ; the centre and southern portions are flat, and traversed by many rivers, large and small, but all united at Mittun Kote. This description, sufficient for the present purpose, gives about eighty thousand square miles of territory to defend ; territory filled with rivers, deserts, mountains, marshes, jungles, and all the adjuncts for a Vendeean warfare, should the Sikhs rebel : and that their courage has been no way abated by the last struggle is confidently asserted.

The number of Sikhs lately in arms, and now in the Punjaub, is estimated at one hundred thousand fighting men, and they are not likely to " turn " their swords into ploughshares." But they laid

down their arms! Yes; a portion did; that signifies nothing; brave men soon find arms, and there are arms to be had. But their cannons were all taken! So it was confidently said, but they were neither *then*, nor are they *now* taken! The credulity which believes that they were, will believe anything. However, my calculations are founded on their not only having arms, but that they are casting guns daily in the jungles. A *Sikh foundry* is not like our foundries. A dozen men make holes in the earth, melt the metal, cast the gun in sand, and our people know it not! How can they? Can they watch eighty thousand square miles? It is not done, and it cannot be done. The Sikhs may want money, but the Irish, in 1798, made a fierce war without money; the Vendeeans had no money; the Greeks had no money; and, doubtless, the Sikhs can do without money: moreover, Goolab Sing may join them, and he has money. The Sikhs have means and some day they may unexpectedly use them; and we must take *possibilities* into our consideration, leaving nothing to chance which can be provided against by foresight.

This is not all we have to look to in the Punjaub. Goolab Sing will probably be faithful to us, he knows our power; yet he has also seen our weakness in the two wars of the Punjaub; and no man in his senses will deny that India was in great danger from both, or that the country was scarcely saved by the victories of Sobraon and Goojerat. A *third* war may be more ably and more violently contested: for a third we must therefore be prepared.

Two cases may arise. Goolab may be irritated, or he may die; in either case we shall have war

with the Punjaub; for it is supposed certain that his son and nephew will draw the sword. Their abilities are unknown, but Goolab Sing has great capacity, four hundred pieces of artillery and an army; all the Sikhs will rally round him and give the power of doubling that army with extraordinary rapidity; and, as to treasures, he has been accumulating money all his life most avariciously, and fame says by means most unscrupulous. There is therefore no sound reason to doubt his ability to maintain a numerous army for two years. His country is perhaps the strongest in the world for defence; he can ensconce himself in snow for half the year; he has forts of various strength, quantities of small arms, and in the depths of his jungles and snows can conceal his preparations. To quell such an enemy will not be easy, especially if his intriguing genius persuades the Nepaulese to war at the same time. This combination is the greatest external danger we have to apprehend; and if it comes the Indian army will need all the courage of the troops, and all the skill of their leaders.

This view of the subject must guide us as to the disposition of the troops, so as to war with fair prospects of success against those two dangerous powers. And for that, and indeed every purpose, Delhi is the proper place for our great arsenal and place of arms. It lies in a central position to supply troops and reinforcements, and is at hand either for Nepaul or the Punjaub. The head quarters of the Artillery should be at Delhi or Meerut.

Mussoorie, Landour, Bareilly, and Almorah, should be made strong. I have much to learn about these places, and mean to acquire information; at present, it is only necessary to say they

appear important points as to an attack from Nepaul; for if such be threatened from the western frontier of that long kingdom, the troops at these stations could be instantly supported from Delhi, Meerut, Umballah, and Simla; and if the Nepaulese moved out from their capital against Dinapore, we could from these stations, at once penetrate in their rear, and oblige them to retrace their steps in defence of their own country.

Dinapore should be at all times strongly occupied by a powerful garrison and have a fortified magazine, so as to be ready to meet an inroad from Katmandoo, or to attack that capital, from which it is about twenty marches; that is, nine to Segowlie which should always have a strong body of cavalry, and eleven more to Katmandoo. Segowlie should have a cavalry force, because it is generally supposed the Nepaulese dread that arm, and the country around furnishes plenty of forage. But it ought to be so strongly occupied by troops, whether of cavalry or infantry, and even protected by works, as to maintain itself till succour arrived from Dinapore. Dinapore itself is one of the most important places in India for a grand magazine. For on the north it holds Nepaul in check, and will support a force acting against Katmandoo; and on the west it is well placed to forward stores by water to Allahabad and Delhi. In the event of reverses, it will supply the Bengal army when defending the line of the Soane River, in combination with the armies of Madras and Bombay, which would co-operate along the Nerbudda River. Each Army would thus cover its own presidency and yet be in communication with the other; and the whole in case of need be able to unite in one mass. This

outline must suffice at present for those important districts, in which, however, the number of stations may be diminished, so as to concentrate the troops on strong points in case of coming wars.

The great principle as regards the forces of India is this. Have a large, well-organized police, to do all those duties for the civil branches of the Government which require armed men; such as occasional guards for civil servants, escorts of treasure, putting down robbers, arresting men for the civil powers; in short, a constabulary force, leaving the military to their own duties: this was Lord Ellenborough's design, and he partly executed it. On this plan the troops would be concentrated in large bodies to bear upon any enemy, whether foreign or domestic. I will return to the subject hereafter.

With regard to the Punjaub, it is my business to consider the feelings and habits of the various tribes we may have to deal with. In the Jullunder the people of the plains, south, are quiet and agricultural, while those to the north, among the hills, are warlike dissatisfied Sikh soldiers; food and money are very scarce, but swords are plentiful; and they are ready for any outbreak—war is their vocation! Many reports received agree in this, and these turbulent tribes are close on Goolab Sing's frontier!

As to that able upstart,—whose progress has been from Catamite to Cabinet Minister, and, finally to a throne—all is, and must be, conjecture; he has his choice of peace or war. Which he will decide upon no man can tell; but he has made his peace with the Sikhs, and though he does not now enrol these discontented soldiers he is able to do so when it pleases him. His great

power and doubtful designs have a strong moral influence over the Jullunder; and from that district his dominion trends in a north-western direction towards *Attok* on the Indus, where he links on to the Hazara country and to the Peshawur district, *which is ever troubled by the Affghans. These, and the tribes of the Khyber Pass, and their habits are well known, and if commotions happen in the Punjaub the Peshawur country will probably at once become the seat of warfare.

South of Peshawur is the Kohat country, with all the wild tribes of Bunnoo and of the Salt range. The men of Bunnoo are unruly and warlike; and we may consider the *Jullunder* Doab, and the *Peshawur* districts, as the most dangerous points within our newly acquired frontier.

First of the Jullunder Doab, by far the most important of the two, for the loss of Peshawur would be trifling; it is a mere out-post guarding the Khyber Pass,—an advance guard waiting for the day, and come it will, when with all our “*moderation*” we shall conquer Affghanistan and occupy Candahar. But to lose the Jullunder would cut our line of communication, and place an enemy between the Punjaub and our Indian provinces. In this general view must be noticed a tract of very high importance, viz., that contained between the Upper Indus and the Upper Ganges, embracing a portion of the Jullunder. Of this tract Simila is the proper head-quarters and centre, and a strong body of troops ensconced there amongst mountains, effectually cuts off the communication between Nepaul and the territories of Goolab Sing. Should a war arise with him, the troops in this district would form the right flank of an army marching against Jummo; and in a war with

Nepaul, would reinforce the left flank of a force marching from Delhi upon the Upper Gogra river.

There is also another thing not to be overlooked. Goolab Sing is reported to have said, at the time Lord Hardinge was at Lahore, that, "had *he* conducted the war, it would have been carried on very differently; that he would not have been shut up in Sobraon like a rat in a trap, but would have turned eighty thousand Cavalry upon the country between Ferozepore and Delhi." Had this happened, our Army, scattered as it then was, would have stood a fair chance of being cut to pieces. There was nothing to meet foes in the rear! If an enemy again got those hills, as they once had, we might not have a second Ochterlony to put them out! The disasters of Kulunga might be repeated. This important mountainous district—the key equally to the Punjab and to Nepaul—should not be left exposed as it has hitherto been.

The advantage of the healthy air for European troops in those hills adds to the value of their good military position; and for that reason my intent is to gather the greatest portion of the European troops between the Jumna and the Beas, hoping the Government will cause permanent barracks to be built for them in a becoming manner: for to *bad barracks* may be attributed the enormous loss of men which the 29th regiment has sustained, and every other regiment that has suffered in the Bengal presidency. There is scarcely any illness which assails the troops that may not be traced to want of room in barracks. Lately the 1st Europeans were afflicted with cholera in the barracks at Cawnpore; they were moved into tents and the cholera ceased! The

2nd Europeans are assailed by scurvy, and it is justly attributed by medical men on the spot to the crowded state of their barracks. But of this more hereafter.

It is now to be decided what number of troops should be cantoned on each bank of the Sutledge. I shall consider them under the heads of regiments of Cavalry, battalions of Infantry, and pieces of cannon, without entering into greater detail; and when speaking of so many battalions or regiments, I will draw a line under the number, placing a figure in a fractional form, to designate Europeans: thus, 10 battalions, will signify $8\frac{2}{3}$ battalions of Native Infantry, 2 *battalions* of Europeans.

On the left bank of the Sutledge, above its junction with the Beas, there are six stations:—

- | | |
|---------------|--|
| 1. Loodiana. | } I would not quarter Europeans there. |
| 2. Sabathoo. | |
| 3. Kassowlie. | Ditto, <i>a slaughter-house!</i> |
| 4. Dugshai. | Excellent. |
| 5. Jutog. | None. |
| 6. Simla. | None. |

Barracks for a European regiment should be constructed at five of these stations, from which, in a fortnight they can reach either the Ravee or the Ganges, and the men would be very healthy if the positions are well chosen, and the barracks good: *the last being imperative.*

The Goorka regiments should be kept in the hills. There are 5 battalions on the left bank of the Sutledge above its junction with the Beas, and as there is but the one station, that of Ferozepore, below the junction of those rivers, the

5 battalions ¹ *there* cantoned being included, would make in all, 10 ¹ along the bank of the Sutledge, with two regiments of cavalry, and twelve pieces of cannon.

Jullunder.

On the right bank of the Sutledge, between it and the Ravee, there are 13 battalions, 5 regiments of cavalry, and 18 pieces of cannon. Thus, 23 battalions ² of infantry, 7 regiments of cavalry, and 30 pieces of cannon are disposed for what may be denominated the *mountainous district*. Wherefore, averaging each regiment of cavalry at 420, and each battalion at 800, we have about 26,000 fighting men.

This number is absolutely necessary when the character of the people between the Upper Beas and the Upper Ravee is taken into consideration, in connection with Goolab's confining frontier, embracing the East and North from Shipree to Jummoo—but for this district *more* European troops, and *fewer* Native regiments are required, and barracks will be wanted; where, cannot be decided till we know the places which are most salubrious.

Lahore.

The garrison of Lahore is for me a question of difficulty, and I must trust to others. The present garrison consists of 7 battalions ², 3 regiments ¹ of cavalry, 24 pieces of cannon. .

Sir W. Gilbert, Sir Colin Campbell, the Adjutant-General Grant, the Quartermaster-General Colonel McSherry, and myself, are of one

opinion, that the garrison of Lahore cannot be safely reduced below its present force, but one regiment of Europeans shall be removed until the barracks are more ample. It is now destructive to have them there.

Wuzzeerabad.

The garrison of this station consists at present of 2 troops horse artillery, 2 field batteries, manned by 2 companies foot artillery, 24 guns, 2 companies pioneers, 3 regiments of cavalry, 6 regiments of infantry. Wuzzeerabad, or Sealkote, which is said to be a far preferable position for a station, dominates two Doabs; holds Jummoq in check; commands the passage of the Chenaub, and supports the garrison of Lahore and Jhelum. Martello towers should be constructed at the ford, if the river does not change its bed there. We do not use fortifications enough—they double our forces, and in a large country like India are of great advantage, *if properly placed*. Perhaps a Martello tower is the best work for guarding this ford of the Chenaub, but it must be secured; and in existing circumstances no reduction should be made of the force at Wuzzeerabad, beyond my present act of withdrawing a battery, and possibly a regiment of infantry to reinforce other points.

Jhelum.

This station guards the fords of the Jhelum, which are generally practicable from November to March inclusive. Being close to a large town, it should not consist of less than a brigade, which is exactly the same force as the Supreme Government deems it requisite to have at *Saugor*, in the

centre of the three presidencies! How, then, can we reduce troops guarding the passage of a great river, and watching the passes through which a powerful and not well-disposed neighbouring sovereign can pour down forces into the plains below? It is impossible.

Rawul Pindee.

At this station there are 3 battalions of infantry and 1 regiment of cavalry, with 1 troop of horse artillery and a company of pioneers. Its greatest advantage is the reputed salubrity, being high land with rivers flowing from it on the West into the Indus, on the East into the Jhelum. That it commands the road from Mozufferabad to Attok is true; but this is equally done by uniting it to Attok and so massing our troops. If the ruler of Cashmere formed a design to attack Attok he could do so before the commanding officer at Rawul Pindee was aware of it; whereas, if both stations were united at Attok they would be safe; or at least able to resist until reinforced; and an enemy could not march on Jhelum, leaving the troops at Attok in his rear.

Attok.

This place commands the passage of the Indus. The force now there is sufficient at *present*; but not so for a permanent cantonment, which should be prepared for a much greater force and that force strongly entrenched. At present, there are three companies of infantry, one company of artillery, one company of sappers and miners; but the Rawul Pindee cantonment should be removed

there, unless consideration of health forbids, which shall be ascertained on reaching the spot. The bridge at Attok should be defended with a double bridge head, to secure a retreat from Peshawur, or to support that place; but the works required cannot be determined without seeing the place.

Attok is two long marches from Peshawur. That an iron bridge should be thrown over the Indus there no one can doubt. It commands all that Rawul Pindee does and supports Peshawur into the bargain. It should be a large station, and might perhaps enable us to withdraw the regular troops now at Peshawur.

Peshawur.

The force here is 4 batteries, 1 company of pioneers, 3 regiments of cavalry, 7 battalions of infantry, or somewhere about 9000 men; and assuredly not less can be kept in this isolated position, within three marches of Jellalabad. It is said Sir H. Lawrence thinks all this territory can be defended by irregulars; my wish is to give it up and remove the station to Attok.

Having now taken a review of the whole disposition of the force, which amounts to about 54,772* men of all arms, it does not at present appear that any reduction can be made. My opinion that Lord Ellenborough's policy of giving a military government to Scinde was right, remains unchanged—it succeeded. A different policy in the Punjaub has once failed, and it is to be feared that another failure may occur in the course of a couple or three years, if not sooner; wherefore, at present, any

* Since increased to 72,000.

reduction of the force occupying the Punjaub would be premature.

Irregular Cavalry.

There are 10 regiments now forming under the Board of Administration in the Punjaub; of these 5 are cavalry and 5 infantry. My recommendation is, that they be employed as a military police in parts remote from the great stations and across the Indus; and as Sir Henry Lawrence thinks they can defend the Peshawur district, I shall be glad to give that up to him; first declaring explicitly that from my knowledge of all irregular corps, except those extremely well commanded—and even those are not always very safe—they will plunder the people more or less. The few European officers with them are unable to control their men when detached. If these irregulars take the trans-Indus districts, the whole Peshawur force may be withdrawn to Attok, where it will form a reserve to protect the irregulars in case of need; but on these matters my opinion shall be reserved until Peshawur has been inspected.

That the force in the Punjaub is enormous must be admitted, but it may have to contend with 150,000 or 200,000 men. Those whose position and abilities enable them to judge, reckon that 100,000 were opposed to Lord Gough, and to estimate Goolab Sing's army at 50,000 men is a very low figure; he has plenty of money, and whoever has *money* in India has *armies*.—They are synonymous!

Police.

With me the following postulates have always been axioms. The revenue of a country can never

be collected without force. In a civilized country, this force is *the law of the land*; in a barbarous country, *the law of arms*. Any force which compels people to pay taxes must be odious; in a newly conquered country, the soldiers ought to be feared not hated, and to bring them into daily contact with the people as tax-gatherers gradually wears away fear, engenders hatred, and destroys discipline. When Governor of Scinde, this reasoning led me to establish a force apart from the military, to support the collectors of revenue and to repress vagabonds, spreading like so many eyes over the land and relieving soldiers from work not military and injurious to their discipline and spirit. There was fear however, that this vigorous police force might oppress the poor people; and to prevent that it was not placed under the magistrate, but under officers of its own. The examples of Bombay and Bengal showed me that all troops or paid persons put under a magistrate are spoiled, lose discipline, and become very dangerous to the people unless a counteracting power prevented the abuse. So my magistrates and their attendants formed one body, the officers of police and their men another; each had its point of honour, but without power over the other, and in all quarrels the Governor alone was arbitrator.

The police had their rules. Being created to support the magistrates and the laws, they were at the call but not under the command of the former; their pride was to maintain peace, catch thieves, fight bands of robbers, and support the magistrates, *under the orders of their own officers!* And if a European or Native magistrate, a European or a Native officer of police oppressed the poor, the

others took part against him. If they joined, a petition from the people was sure to reach the Governor, who held a court of appeal, the punishments of which were severe. Twice such grand courts were assembled, which kept all straight; for in both instances the people were victorious against the English officers; it being a point with me not to bolster up any authority assailed, leaving it to stand on right, and that alone! The poor thus knew where to find redress, the police and magistrates of all ranks knew it also, and were diligent and active in their respective duties. Each department had a British officer of zeal and activity at its head, each kept the duties of his own corps separated from the other, and the whole worked well for the poor. Oppression was resisted in all directions, and the soldiers having no concern in disputes were viewed with awe and dread, yet with amity by the people. Crime, trial, acquittal, or punishment, followed in rapid succession, with a vigor that never does, and never can exist under a civil government,—though the course most pleasing to a barbarous people.

For the Scinde police, the country was divided into three collectorates—*Hydrabad*, *Kurrachee*, and *Shikapore*, the governor being chief of all. Two thousand four hundred policemen were organized in three divisions, answering to the collectorates, and at the head of each was a British officer. Over these three lieutenants of police was a captain of police, always at my head-quarters, who received from his lieutenants daily reports; and his own diary, and those of every lieutenant of police, collector and deputy collector were periodically read by me:—thus all that passed in Scinde was

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made known to me, exclusive of secret information, on which however no action was ever founded, except in preparation for evil or with a view to open inquiry. In no instance was punishment awarded without trial, and no trial but under open accusation. No man was ever treated in Scinde during my military administration as Ali Akbar, my moonshee, has been since treated by the Civil Government of Bombay.

These three divisions of police were subdivided : First,—*Cavalry*, armed and mounted like the irregular horse, their pay being about twenty-five rupees a month. Second,—*Rural Police*, men on foot, armed and drilled like troops of the line ; they acted as regular troops in the Hill Campaign. Third,—*City Police*, drilled and armed, yet exclusively employed in the large towns, Hyderabad, Kurrachee, Shikarpore, Sukkur, and Larkana.

No man of the police could be dismissed without trial, unless by my authority as Governor, which was self-restricted by published rules. The Captain of Police had a Native Adjutant on two hundred rupees a month, and under these officers were Havildars and Naiks, as in other irregular corps. Nothing occurred in Scinde that was not reported daily by the Captain of Police if it were of an extraordinary nature, and his diary gave all the ordinary intelligence at the end of the week. These various diaries coming in from all parts of Scinde confirmed or refuted each other, and thus the police was kept to its duty with a tight rein, though with much labour to me.

At first, the Rural Police and Cavalry had some stiff fights with bands of robbers, and six policemen were slain in one encounter ; but in nearly all they

were victorious and finally cleared the country of robbers. No man travelled *with a guard* in Scinde under my rule ; whereas, before the conquest, no man travelled *without a guard* ! This was all done by the police ; nor was any soldier ever called out by my orders to arrest a man, to execute a man, to furnish a treasure escort, or to quell a riot. What has occurred since my departure is to me unknown. Now, if such a police had been established in the Punjaub a smaller body of troops might suffice. If placed at the head of the Punjaub Government at first, I should not now demand more than 30,000 soldiers, and even greatly reduce that number after three or four years ; but to do this would demand a very different system from that which prevails, and, truth to speak, appears to me very dangerous and defective in principle.

I repudiate the idea of casting reflections on the abilities or zeal of officers employed in the Punjaub ; but if danger arises the civil and military authorities will not agree and all the operations will be weak. Neither have these observations been made from any desire to govern the Punjaub. Any government would be by me refused, unless under very extraordinary circumstances, and then undertaken with sore regret and displeasure, only from a sense of duty. My assertion that the system of government in the Punjaub is a very dangerous one, is, therefore, merely the expression of an opinion springing from Scinde experience ; but on that opinion my calculation that the force in the Punjaub cannot at present be reduced is founded. The government of the Punjaub appears feeble and expensive when it ought to be strong and economical. A large revenue and a quiet

people will make me out a false prophet, but my opinion is shared by others. Nearly all persons who give vent to their thoughts look for another rising of the Sikhs; and few doubt that, at Goolab Sing's death, his son, having now the desire will then have the means of making war upon us. However, be this judgment sound or unsound, it rules my view, and my duty is to state it honestly; it has so been done, inoffensively it is hoped.

The forces left for the defence of the remaining provinces of India are now to be considered, that is to say of the Bengal Presidency, for the Madras and Bombay Presidencies have each their own armies.

Bengal Army.

This consists of 158,659 fighting men, from which number deduct 54,772 in the Punjaub, and 103,887 men are left for the defence of Bengal, exclusive of the Punjaub. Taking an approximation, the remainder of the Presidency of Bengal is about four times the area of the Punjaub, which gives about 25,000 men in the other parts of Bengal for the same area, occupied by 54,772 in the Punjaub. Common sense declares we ought not to require half as many men to occupy a country that has been many years under our rule, as are required to occupy a warlike country which has only been subdued five months. After governing Scinde four years the proper garrison for that province was by me set at 3000 men, and Scinde is not much less than the Punjaub. Now, extent is one of the chief difficulties in the military occupation of a country, and more particularly one like India. Moreover Scinde is an isolated country, entirely surrounded by foreign states.

Scinde is brought forward too often it may be said; but no better guide offers for judging the number of troops required for other provinces than a reference to what was done there. All India is a conquered land. The Punjaub and Scinde are merely provinces added to the rest, but are inhabited by a more warlike race than the Bengalce. If then measures and number which sufficed for Scinde are applied to the more gentle race of Bengal, that number should be ample, and would give 3000 men to each space equal to the Punjaub; or 12,000 for the whole of Bengal. Wherefore, it is here maintained, that eight times that number, or 100,000 men, are sufficient to occupy Bengal, and no increase to the military force of India is required; but, emphatically, to render *that force efficient, a good military police is necessary*. A very high authority, Lord Ellenborough, assures me that Chupprassees and Birkendauses, &c. are now employed in numbers equal to the Indian Army! Here is the whole passage of a memorandum given to me by that authority:—"The Birkendauses, Chupprasses, and " civil servants of the Government, are almost as " numerous as the Army. They are utterly " inefficient for the suppression of any more than " a street row; they are not to be trusted in " the escort of treasure; they cannot take the " ordinary duty of guarding public and private " property in a cantonment, when a regiment " moves out. Their inefficiency is a main cause " of the dispersion of the Army, and its occupa- " tion in duties not properly of a military " character. I was introducing military police in

“ lieu of them, and had already a battalion at
“ each of the great stations above Allahabad: the
“ whole civil duty of Bundelcund and Saugor was
“ performed by other similar battalions, and the
“ presence of these police battalions in the upper
“ provinces enabled Lord Hardinge, in 1845-6, to
“ move to the Sutledge four more regiments than
“ he would otherwise have had disposable.”

Suppose then the number of Chupprassees, Birkendauses, &c. equals the number of the Bengal Army, we have idlers equal to 158,659 fighting men, who will be made on my plan to do their duty to the public! Allow 58,000 of this number to continue in their present capacities, there will be 100,000 at the disposal of Government as military police, to do those duties which are now thrown upon the Army, to its great detriment and disorganisation.

It has been shown, that the occupation of the Punjaub, reduced the Bengal Army, south of the Sutledge, to 103,000 fighting men; and they are not concentrated in masses, either to meet invasion or quell rebellion: they are scattered over an enormous space in small bodies, and for the sole purpose of protecting civil servants, who ought to be protected by a just and good government, by gaining the affection of the people, and by those 158,000 servants called Chupprassees, and what not, who now afford no protection at all to the civil magistrates. Yet they were originally entertained for such service, but do it not, as the employment of troops proves. But suppose we get the disposal of 100,000 of these men. Let them form eight divisions, each division consisting of 12,500 men,

and the whole Army is at once set free from civil duties and given up to its own, viz. the defence of our vast and dangerous frontiers.

There are, as shown, 103,887 soldiers disposable for the provinces, exclusive of the Punjaub Army ; of these should be stationed,—

5000 at Dacca, to protect the Eastern frontier.

5000 at Barrackpore, to protect the capital.

3000 at Bhagulpore, sending 1000 cavalry to Titileca. This force of 3000 has to watch the Nepaul frontier, to support the Dinapore force, and to support the capital. It also holds a connecting post between Dinapore and Calcutta.

14,000 at Dinapore, sending 2000 cavalry to Segowlee to protect our frontier against Nepaul, and to send troops eastward, in case of a war with Ava.

4000 at Allahabad, as a reserve to support either Dinapore or Cawnpore, as occasion might require.

2000 at Cawnpore and Lucknow.

4000 at Agra, to support either Delhi or Cawnpore.

12,000 at Delhi, as the magazine there must be powerfully defended and that great Mahomedan city powerfully controlled. The force there stationed should also be able to escort convoys, and resist any sudden danger, should such arise, from the Ajmeer side, or in any other direction. Delhi should be the grand magazine for supplies to all the troops stationed between the Upper Ganges and the Upper Sutledge, and those troops should be on the circumference of a semi-circle passing through Agra, Almorah, Simla, and Ferozepore. To all these Delhi is central; and from it supplies must be sent to the magazines in the Punjaub and

the Jullunder, until the more convenient route, from Kurrachee by the Indus be arranged, to Ferozepore, Lahore, and Wuzzeerabad.

10,000 at Meerut, to support Delhi, and to form a reserve in case of a war either with Nepaul, or with Goolab Sing. Meerut should also be the headquarters of the artillery, if Delhi be not accepted.

10,000 at Umballah, to support either Deera or Simla, in case of war with Nepaul, or the Maharaja.

5000 at Almorah, to guard the North West frontier of Nepaul.

4000 at Bareilly, to support Almorah.

Recapitulation.

Dacca, . . .	5,000	} All these could be reinforced, in case of need, by large bodies of police.
Barraekpore, . . .	5,000	
Bhagulpore, . . .	3,000	
Dinapore, . . .	14,000	
Allahabad, . . .	4,000	
Cawnpore, . . .	2,000	
Agra, . . .	4,000	
Delhi, . . .	12,000	
Meerut, . . .	10,000	
Umballah, . . .	10,000	
Almorah, . . .	5,000	
Bareilly, . . .	4,000	
	<u>78,000</u>	

Seventy-eight thousand men thus disposed, would enable Government to reduce 25,000 of the 103,000 now scattered, as if with a pepper-box, all over Bengal; for what purpose? It is difficult to say, unless to do those duties which no government ought to require; duties which under a good

government the civil service ought to perform with the 158,000 paid idlers now at its command*.

The reasons for forming each station have been given, and the numbers so calculated as to make each station, assisted by the police, equal to its necessities until aid arrives. For example. Should a war concerted between Nepaul and the Maharaja suddenly break out, 20,000 men could within ten days assemble at Dera from Meerut and Umballah, to support Almorah or Simla; the troops at those places being, meanwhile, sufficient for a good defence. Delhi with its strong garrison could forward convoys of supplies to Hurdwar in eleven days; and if circumstances placed Almorah in most danger, Meerut and Bareilly could send 15,000 men to its aid.

To lay down a conjectural campaign is unnecessary, but this disposition of the troops would meet danger from Nepaul, or the Punjaub, or both together, or from Ava. A large force could be rapidly assembled at Dinapoor to support Calcutta in a war with Ava, or to cover it from Katmandoo. Another large force could be thrown from Umballah and Meerut into the mountainous district, so as to cut all communication between the Punjaub and Nepaul, and form a powerful reserve for reinforcing our army, whether to invade Nepaul by Almorah, or the Maharaja by Noorpoor. These masses would also have the aid of the police battalions, to the number of 12,000 in each district, for keeping the country tranquil or forming reserves, for in war they would be of no less use than in peace. They

* Many of these men are said to be used as domestics by the civil servants. This is the general opinion, often asserted, and never denied.

would form a nucleus for the villagers to rally round in cases where clouds of irregular cavalry might try to devastate a district, for such troops could be defeated by police; the Scinde police defeated them, and did good service in the hills against the Boogties, they also guarded convoys and acted as out pickets. Moreover, the police battalions in question could guard the towns when the troops moved to battle; for as 2000 did those duties in Scinde 100,000 could do them in Bengal! A third of that number could do so, working, as they would according to my arrangement, under the protection of great military masses.

The most important point next to the location of our troops is now to be considered, viz. The immense enhancement of military discipline and the perfection at which large masses of troops arrive by being collected in numbers. Men and officers, more especially commanders, thus acquire the habit of acting in great bodies, of manœuvring, of drawing their supplies, of knowing and emulating each other, occupying ground, judging distances, and rates of march; the necessity of moving well closed up when heavy columns are in march, of good lines being preserved, &c., all matters well known in theory, but in execution only to be effected by practice. All the moral feelings of an army, and its physical powers, are increased by being assembled in large masses. It was said Lord Hardinge objected to assembling the India troops for fear they should conspire. This reason I cannot accede to, and have never met an Indian officer who did accede to it; and few men have had more opportunities of judging the armies of all three presidencies than myself.

Lord Hardinge only saw the Bengal army as Governor-General, and for a short time. I have constantly commanded and studied Bengal and Bombay Sepoys for nearly eight years, and could find nothing to fear from them, except when ill used; and even then they are less dangerous than British troops would be in similar circumstances. There is, it seems to me, no danger in their being massed, but very great danger in their being spread over a country as they are now. By concentrating the Indian army, its spirit, its devotion, its powers, will all be increased. By dispersion our safety hangs on the want of combination between two or more of our surrounding enemies; and such a combination is so far from being improbable that its not yet having taken place is almost miraculous.

One more remark is necessary previous to closing this subject of defence against external and internal foes. It relates to railways. They can be of no use in war, except in one case, which however is precisely that of India—namely, when an immense distance separates detached bodies of troops. From Peshawur to Calcutta is such a vast distance that no enemy could entirely interrupt the rail communication. Let us take from Loodiana to Calcutta, about twelve hundred miles. In a war with Nepaul, a small portion of rail might be destroyed by an active enemy, and no doubt would be so; but still, when guarded by an active police in its whole length, the railway would, notwithstanding the interruption, enable large bodies to assemble rapidly on many portions. If in one thousand miles for example, *one* mile be interrupted, and to interrupt one mile, even by ten feet being

destroyed here and ten there, would be dangerous and difficult when vigilantly guarded; and in such a crisis the guards would in number and watchfulness be trebled. But even this one mile, or one hundred, would leave nine hundred miles for rapid travelling—a distance which in India will require two months, if not three, to march a regiment over, but by railroad thirty-six hours!

There is therefore an immense saving of time, even with a portion of rail destroyed—time even for repairs, and still with gain of *days, weeks, months!* Very different this from railways traversing the seat of war in a hostile country which cannot be guarded, and bear only accidentally on military movements with advantage. In India, there is one fixed line of communication, along which one line of railway would run without interruption, everywhere guarded by moving armies and thousands of police. The cost of moving troops would also be greatly diminished by a railway.

The advantages of my plan may be thus summed up:—

1st. The army so placed as to be able to concentrate rapidly on points of military importance.

2nd. Its moral and physical powers greatly increased.

3rd. Its numbers reduced, and while less numerous and consequently less expensive its power increased; for, after a few years, three perhaps, the Punjaub ought not to require 20,000 men. Wherefore, 34,000 might be spared in addition to the 25,000 already indicated for reduction South of the Sutledge, 59,000 in all.

4th. A great diminution of expense in many

other obvious ways, exclusive of the disbanding troops.

5th. The embodying of an active police out of those numerous and mischievous petty tyrants, the Chupprassees, and Birkendauses, whom all men seem to concur in considering as not merely useless, but a curse to the country, and to the character of our civil government so far as the poor people are concerned. These Chupprassees and Birkendauses, instead of being under magistrates, many of whom are young and too inexperienced to keep order and who have besides other avocations, would on my plan be under officers whose sole occupation would be police duty; and both men and officers, having their work defined and themselves responsible, would take a pride in doing well.

This arrangement may or may not suit the high authorities, but they are, on a larger scale, what answered well in Scinde, and may therefore be taken as of proved efficacy if properly conducted; for all rules and regulations are idle things if not well and vigorously enforced.

Fortifications of Lahore and Mooltan.

These can only be treated generally, yet present two questions:

1st. Is there any occasion to fortify those cities at all?

2nd. Are the new works proposed good or not?

Let those who want expensively fortified places answer the following questions:—

As military works are thrown up against *some* enemy, *who* is the enemy that can besiege either Lahore or Mooltan? The answer to this will be difficult! There is no enemy, nor can there be

one for a hundred years, capable of *besieging* either of those cities! We may be beaten in the field by a coalition of nations, but then neither Lahore nor Mooltan would be held. Our rallying point would be Delhi, not Lahore. If we are not beaten, who is to besiege Lahore or Mooltan? No one! We do not want fortified towns in the Punjaub: we do want barracks—good barracks, not the vile murderous places into which soldiers are thrust, and there daily perish.

As it is most unwise to throw up fortifications at enormous expense while the hospitals and graveyards are filled from bad barracks, I oppose the plan for fortifying either Lahore or Mooltan. Some small repairs may be necessary, but there the fortifying Lahore and Mooltan should stop; more would be unnecessary and expensive. Every shilling which the government can possibly afford, and even more, are required for barrack constructions; not such expensive mischievous edifices as the Military Board have built at Loodiana, by which the 50th Regiment was destroyed in one terrible night; but really good barracks, on arches, with rooms thirty feet high and twenty feet wide.

The second question as to the goodness of the works proposed, cannot be answered until both places have been seen.

Forts.

There are some hundreds of Forts in the Punjaub, large and small. Are they to be repaired or destroyed? Neither, unless some of them are good for police stations—such should be repaired. The same question arose about Scinde. The Court of Directors sent a letter to Lord Hardinge

asking my advice, which was then, as now, to let them alone. There can be but two kinds of war in the Punjaub. A war made by regular invading armies or an insurrectionary war. In the first case the forts can do us no harm; nothing better than the enemy should disseminate his army to hold these petty forts. The principle of regular war is to concentrate. The nature of an insurrectionary war is the reverse; the people suddenly congregate and falling on some weak part destroy it and disperse; and the troops, sent hurriedly to support the part attacked find the mischief done, with nothing to show how or by whom! Now what leader in such a war would shut himself up in one of these forts? His game is freedom, is enterprise. He who would occupy forts would be a fool! They are of no importance, and may be safely left to themselves. If ever available in war, it would be as a temporary refuge for a detachment of our police until relief came. Finally, to destroy them will cost a large sum, which would be more usefully expended in saving the lives of Europeans, by giving them better food and good dwellings.

Barracks.

I have, while writing the above, visited the barracks at various stations, and find *most of them disgraceful, and the cause of disease and death to thousands of European soldiers*. Those of Kassowlie are slaughter-houses, and there are others not much better. However, endeavours have lately been made to improve these buildings. It is an imperative duty that proper barracks should be built, and an especial report shall be made to the Governor-General as soon as the requisite docu-

ments can be collected to prove the evils which arise from building bad barracks. Those at Dug-shai are the only good ones I have seen; they are really excellent, and it is to be hoped the Governor-General will give orders for their being immediately completed.

This report has been drawn up with an imperfect knowledge on many points, because my stay has been short in this part of India, and many and various matters have had to be dealt with on assuming the command of this great Army: it may be hereafter amended.

C. NAPIER,

HEAD QUARTERS,
27th Nov., 1849.

General, Commander-in-Chief.

On this memoir Lord Dalhousie made the following comments placed in juxtaposition with my replication.

No. 2.

Lord Dalhousie's comments.

A.

"The Commander-in-Chief, in the several portions of his Report, reviews the natural features of the Punjaub with its adjacent districts, and dwells on the character and condition of the Sikh population. His Excellency sets forth the view he has taken of the power and disposition of the neighbouring states, and adverts to the form of administration, and to the mode in which the province is governed."

Replication by Sir C. Napier.

A.

Yes, I do in my Report advert to the form of administration, and to the mode in which the province is governed; for on the mode in which a newly-conquered country is governed everything depends—it is the Alpha and Omega—it embraces everything, as it is good or bad so does it create or prevent rebellion. Therefore, did I advert to the Government in the Punjaub as the foundation on which all military disposition of the troops must mainly depend. Where a good Government

rules, the people are content, and few or no troops are required. Where a bad one rules the reverse is the case. It is impossible for me to shut my eyes to these truisms, and, neglecting them, pretend to make military arrangements of any soundness and sense.

B.

" His Excellency gives it as his opinion, that the system of Government in the Punjaub is 'very dangerous and defective in principle, feeble, and expensive,' and, as the consequence of that opinion, and having regard to the character of the population, to the position and power of the Maharaja of Jummoo, and to the amount of force by which he thinks we are liable to be opposed, His Excellency has formed the conclusion, that he cannot at present recommend any reduction of the force now occupying the Punjaub, and amounting to not less than 54,000 men."

B.

All this I am bound to admit to be my opinion, and my residence of three weeks at Lahore and tour through the Punjaub have confirmed my opinion. I consider that a powerful police ought long since to have been formed; none has yet been formed. The Civil Government at the capital could not even relieve the gate-guards of the town! They had no arms! Were not formed! There is no head of police to form them. A strong and vigorous Government in the Punjaub would, long since, have had a powerful police all over the country, controlling troubled spirits, protecting the well-disposed, and collecting information as to the state of the people in each district; also collecting information relative to the unquiet spirits, and thus doing all that foresight can do to *prevent* insurrection. If, in despite of such a necessary precaution an insurrection breaks out, and the police give information of the coming evil, the troops can deal with it; but the troops cannot *prevent* insurrection if the country is resolved upon it in consequence of being discontented with its

Government The absence of an efficient police makes me consider that the 54,000 men, which I found in the Punjab, are still requisite. It would be madness in me hastily to reduce the number of troops which my predecessor thought necessary after six years' experience in this command, and in which opinion all officers of high rank with whom I have conversed on the subject concur.

C.

" While I think it right to
 " state, that I by no means
 " concur in the opinions His
 " Excellency has expressed
 " respecting Civil Government
 " in India generally, or admit
 " the justice of the terms in
 " which he has conveyed his
 " judgment on the system of
 " Government established in
 " the Punjab, I yet do not
 " feel myself called upon in
 " this place to vindicate the
 " measures which have been
 " taken, and which have re-
 " ceived the approbation of
 " the Government I serve."

C.

I did not expect to alter the opinion of the Governor-General, nor was my opinion given with that object. I merely stated my own opinions, which, as Commander-in-Chief, and one of the Supreme Council, I am bound to do honestly. The Governor-General has a right to honest opinions from me in both capacities; an honest opinion may be a wrong opinion, even dangerously so; but whatever it be, the person who gives it is answerable for its honesty, which alone is in his own power. The Governor-General is assuredly not called upon to vindicate to me the measures which have been taken; and I can assure him that my Report was not intended as an attack upon those measures, but merely the expression of my own opinion, which was called for by him.

D.

" Neither do I concur with
 " His Excellency in the estimate
 " he has formed of the actual
 " power for attack possessed by

D.

I am very glad that the Governor-General does not think my estimate of the power of the Maharaja correct. He has

"Maharaja Goolab Sing, or more information than I have on the subject, and is probably right.
 "coincide with him in the
 "anticipation of events which
 "he regards as probable."

E.

"Nevertheless, I entirely
 "agree with His Excellency
 "as to the expediency which
 "he urges of maintaining the
 "army on a footing of full
 "preparation against all pos-
 "sible risks, in a country whose
 "warlike population has been
 "but recently subdued, and
 "where internal insurrection
 "as well as frontier disturb-
 "ance, must be regarded as
 "probable contingencies."

F.

"The force of 54,000 men,
 "which His Excellency has
 "named as essential for the
 "occupation of the Punjaub,
 "including the Jullunder Doab
 "and the banks of the Sutlej,
 "is indeed enormous."

G.

"But when the Commander-
 "in Chief of the army, after
 "a very mature deliberation,
 "submits it to me as his pro-
 "fessional opinion, that a
 "smaller amount of force can-
 "not at present be employed,

E.

The Governor-General and myself agree perfectly in this grand principle of preparation, whatever difference there may be in other points; and this is the essential one to cope with fortune.

F.

The Governor-General seems to think the force in the Punjaub enormous. I think so too; but His Lordship will no doubt recollect that many think the army should be increased, and that I not only said it was enough, but in my Report have pointed out the means of great reduction, grounded upon the very high authority of Lord Ellenborough.

G.

I believe that there is scarcely a man in India that thinks the army in the Punjaub is too large, except myself, and I think it could be reduced; but I cannot recommend its reduction under the

D D

“founding his opinion on the
 “circumstances of our position
 “in the Punjab, and more
 “especially on the formidable
 “character of the people who
 “have passed under our rule;
 “and on the means possessed
 “by neighbouring princes for
 “our injury, I consider it to
 “be my duty at once to confirm
 “the arrangements, which,
 “under this head, His Excel-
 “lency has suggested.”

H.

“In pages 29 to 37 of the
 “Report, His Excellency ex-
 “plains in detail the distribu-
 “tion which he desires to make
 “of the troops that are to be
 “stationed within the new
 “territory for its occupation
 “and defence.

I. “His Excellency recom-
 “mends that the army in the
 “Punjab shall be stationed
 “at the following places, viz.:
 “Lahore, Wuzzeerabad, or
 “Sealkote, Jhelum, Attok, and
 “Peshawur,—Mooltan is not
 “mentioned; but I presume
 “that it is intended to re-
 “tain there permanently the
 “amount of force which has
 “lately been sent there in re-
 “lief.”

the means of giving. But I think that Mittun Kote is a preferable position for a cantonment. I would not re-build the walls of Mooltan if they are down.

present form of Government,
 and other existing circum-
 stances.

H.

I explain in my report the *actual distribution* of the force. This I have no power to change. I think the distribution a good one, but were it the worst possible I have no power to change it *now*, for we have no cover anywhere else to put the troops under. When I see the various stations—when I hear the reports of experienced men as to the health of these stations, then I shall be able to say whether or not I desire any change. Circumstances must decide these matters. What is right to-day may be wrong to-morrow. As to Mooltan being a fortified place, I intend, if possible, to visit it and make a special report from actual observation; for I considered the position to be one demanding a more decided opinion than I possess

I.

II. " His Excellency recommends that the five regiments of irregular cavalry, and five of the irregular infantry, which have been raised in the Punjaub, shall be employed as a military police in parts remote from the great military stations, and across the Indus." He adds, " As Sir H. Lawrence thinks they can defend the Peshawur districts, I am very glad to give that up to them.

" The two preceding paragraphs sum up, briefly, the recommendations of the Commander-in-Chief under this head.

" The distribution of the regular troops in the new province, is a question so purely military, that I should desire to rely upon His Excellency's judgment, and to accept his recommendations as conclusive in this matter."

K.

" But I consider it necessary to direct His Excellency's especial attention to that portion of the Punjaub which is designated the Manjha, and which lies be-

I.

I only recommended that the Board should have the defence of the trans-Indus territory :

1st. Because it was volunteered.

2nd. Because, in those territories, I considered there was very little danger of invasion, except at Peshawur, which was provided for by placing a large body of regular troops at Attok.

3rd. Because I thought so large an irregular force ought to do something, and I have hitherto seen this force do little or nothing, though nearly a year has passed since the conquest, and it yet seems to be without order or arrangement. To speak the truth, I see very little prospect of its being organised. The organisation of such a body is no easy operation. It requires a skilful military head. I see no such head at work. The distribution of these irregulars is as purely a military question as that of the regulars ; and I will hereafter touch upon it.

K.

His Lordship directs my especial attention to that portion of the Punjaub designated the Manjha, lying between the rivers Beas and Ravee. This I shall attend to ; but I must

"tween the Ravee and the
 "Beas or Sutlej. The whole
 "of that district is occupied
 "almost exclusively by Sikhs,
 "and within its bounds the
 "Sikh population as a body,
 "is for the most part col-
 "lected. If formidable insur-
 "rection is to be apprehended,
 "it is most probably within the
 "Manjha, to the North of the
 "city of Umritzer, that it will
 "take place. The character
 "of that population generally
 "is far too warlike, especially
 "after the addition which it
 "has lately received of large
 "bodies of discharged or fugi-
 "tive soldiers, to be securely
 "left to the control even of
 "the military police, which I
 "have intimated my intention
 "of forming. It is hardly
 "necessary for me to add that
 "it is of the utmost import-
 "ance that any attempt at
 "actual insurrection should be
 "dealt with speedily as well as
 "vigorously; and that the
 "means should be at hand of
 "bringing promptly to bear
 "upon the insurgents a force
 "so constituted as to ensure
 "immediate and entire suc-
 "cess.

"I apprehend that this will
 "not be the case, if the regular
 "troops within the Baree
 "Doab are stationed exclu-
 "sively at Lahore; especially
 "since it is now intended to
 "hold the fortress of Govind-

be allowed to call his attention
 to a few facts, as being very
 important, because his minute
 throws upon me a very great
 proportion of responsibility,
 which his sense of justice will
 tell him I can only accept, if
 the confidence placed in me,
 and the power entrusted to me
 are commensurate to this re-
 sponsibility. His Lordship's
 observation, calling my atten-
 tion to the state of the Manjha,
 does three things:—

1st. It implies that I know,
 and have all along known, the
 dangerous state of the Manjha.

2nd. That I could make
 arrangements to prevent a
 rising there, and that I have
 not done so.

3rd. That if one should
 hereafter occur, I am respon-
 sible.

Now, in justice to myself, I
 must protest against the as-
 sumption of any such respon-
 sibility (if I am correct in
 assuming that it is implied by
 His Lordship's expression), I
 will therefore state why I pro-
 test against this responsibility,
 by answering these three points
 seriatim.

1st. I have had no informa-
 tion given to me relative to
 the state of the Manjha till I
 received a letter from the
 Board of Administration, dated
 20th December, 1849, which
 improperly writes to me, to
 propose an arrangement of the

"ghur by a wing, instead of troops, because the Manjha is
 "an entire regiment, as hither- unsafe.
 "to."

Now the Board's "*suggestions*" are of no use to me as to the placing of troops; none in the world! But the Board, in this letter, for the first time, give me information of danger; and information of danger is what I want—not suggestions how to meet it.

The next information which I get, and it is more full and more detailed than that which I received from the Board, is this Minute! Had his Lordship, while at Lahore, either by letter or by word of mouth, given me the information I have now received, I would have explained all that I had done without having the information I ought to have had from the Board, and taken His Lordship's orders on what he wished if he thought my arrangements deficient, which I do not think they are, as far as circumstances permit. Had I been summoned to his presence with Sir H. Lawrence, I could have replied to all I now do, for His Lordship's observations I had before heard from Sir H. Lawrence, though *not* the detailed information of danger now said to exist. I have already said, that I had no information confided to me as to the dangerous state of the Manjha till the date of the Board's letter, and His Lordship's Minute; and that unless full information is given to me (as far as Government possess it) of the real state of the country, it is impossible for me to make other than general preparations for war, namely, the location of the troops so as to support each other. The improvement of the tone of honourable feeling in the army, the maintenance of rigid discipline and the drill.

Answer to the second observation.—To the second observation, implying, as I read the Minute, that I could make arrangements to prevent a rising in the Manjha, I reply thus: It is *possible* that, if I filled the Manjha with troops it might prevent a rising; it is not *probable*, because if men are resolved to rise they can always find a place of rendezvous, where no force can prevent their assembling. "Where there is a will, there is a way." However, it is, I admit, *possible*. But will the Board, which has made the suggestion be pleased to say where the soldiers are to be lodged? The placing troops at Adcenanuggur

is to murder them. By removing the troops from that place last autumn I saved many lives which would have been lost had His Lordship taken the opinion of the Board, instead of a much more competent opinion, that of Brigadier Wheeler. Well, failing in the inconsiderate attempt to lodge soldiers in the noxious district of Adeenanuggur, the Board called for them at Buttala, and said there was ample accommodation for two companies. These companies were sent. They found no accommodation at all! and, after much suffering, and, for aught I know to the contrary, loss of life by being exposed to the weather in tents during the rainy season, these two companies were obliged to return to Umritsur.

It is easy for the Board to say "put 2000 men in the Manjha," but the Board's words are not soldiers' barracks, and therefore, it is not so easy "to put 2000 men in the Manjha," without a much greater loss of life than putting down a rising by force of arms would cost. Believing as I do most sincerely, that his Lordship and the Board are as anxious to protect the soldiers from pestilence as I am, I am sure that both will admit that I cannot pour troops into the Manjha without barracks are amply provided—and none are provided! But why should troops be poured into the Manjha? Merely because the Board say there is danger of a rising! I have assertions. I have no proofs. No detailed information from spies to enable me to form my own judgment how to act on an emergency, when, if it occurs, all must depend upon that very knowledge which is withheld from me even at this moment! I ought to have daily information from the Board, of all that passes in the Manjha and in every part of the Punjaub; or I should have means given to me to acquire information for myself, which I could do, I believe, more effectually than the Board can! However, *I cannot put troops into the Manjha without cover.*

But I have done all that I could do. I have placed troops all round the Manjha. Troops at Noorpore, at Kangra, at Hajeepore, Mookerian, Bodeepind, Ilcoshearpore, Kurtarpore, Jullunder, Loodiana, Ferozepore, Lahore, Govindghur, and soon at Sealkote. Thus the Manjha is the centre of a girdle of troops, which can in a few hours, and the most distant in two marches, be poured in rapidly from the Jullunder and Lahore, under two of our ablest general officers, Sir W. Gilbert and Brigadier Wheeler. I therefore affirm that I *have* made all the preparations in my power, for "*speedily and rigorously*" suppressing an insurrection;

and I place full confidence in the experience and abilities of the two general officers above named. On all these grounds I maintain that I am not responsible for any insurrection, but am responsible for putting any such rising down, for which I have made the proper preparations. I also maintain that the proper means of preventing such insurrections, viz. a well ordered police, has not been established, which is one of my reasons for thinking the Board of Administration is a feeble government.

I maintain that a well organised police and a well conducted system of espionage are the two most powerful means of *preventing* an insurrection; and should the police prove too feeble, then the works of the troops is to quell such a rising, the government keeping the commander of such troops constantly and fully informed, leaving it to him to take his own measures. A government that keeps me informed assists me in my duty. A government that "suggests" only, impedes me, and is more dangerous than an enemy. It destroys all system, and produces patch work without plan or definite object. The Manjha is on my plan surrounded by troops, and the heavy force in the Jullundur has a bridge and many fords through which that force can pass into the Manjha. The Government can also provide boats when the river swells. I was asked what force was required in Govindgur? I said, and say still, the wing of a regiment; but I was not told till now, that large bodies of soldiers had entered the Baree Doab. This information, however, does not alter my opinion that a wing is sufficient for Govindgur; but I shall be glad if quarters are constructed for a whole regiment, not at all as regards the defence of the Baree Doab, but because there is a want of barrack-room *everywhere*, and the more barracks that are constructed the greater will be the saving to Government.

I say that for the defence of the Doab no more men are wanted at Govindghur than are wanted for the defence of the fortress. Gentlemen who wear red coats, but who are not soldiers, are always for a small force to march here and another there, so as always to bring British troops into battle with inferior numbers, when proper management may give an equal or superior number. The courage of our troops may sometimes prevent disaster, but a commander has no right to make such arrangements as require such dangerous proofs of their bravery. If a regiment is quartered at Govindghur it could send a wing promptly, no doubt, against neighbouring insurgents, and that wing *might* beat them and suffer great loss in doing so; but it might also

get cut to pieces, or it might be cut off, or the whole regiment might be blocked up in the fort. All these small detached bodies, scattered here and there, as with a pepper-box, are common devices, but are dangerous, and proofs of extreme ignorance in military matters.

My object, as I endeavoured to explain in my Report—I fear unsuccessfully—is to have the power of attacking any enemy that presents himself with an overpowering force, and also a healthy force of strong men. I cannot undertake to prevent insurrection as matters are in the Punjaub; and I would on no account be held responsible for what I cannot do. If that is to be done it must be done by a well-organised police, well supported by a regular force. Should it arise I am ready to put rebellion down; I have not the least doubt of doing so; but it must be by concentrating the forces not by dispersing them; at least I cannot do so in any other way. If it is thought I am wrong, I am ready to obey any orders that I receive, but I will not act on opinions which I think erroneous unless I am relieved from responsibility; then indeed I am ready to send troops any where that the Board of Administration may advise.

The troops defending the Baree Doab are not merely those forming the large force at Lahore. Troops can march from Noorpore, Hadjeepore, Mookerian, Kangra, Boodeepind, Hosharpore, Kurtarpoor, Jullunder, Loodiana, Ferozepore, Sealkote. The most distant post being within a circle of about sixty miles radius; that is to say, two forced marches. I have marched the distance in twenty-four hours; and we have within these limits forty-seven regiments with a due proportion of artillery.

L.

“ I am not aware whether
“ His Excellency has in view
“ any particular station for the
“ camel corps, which, at his
“ request, I transferred to the
“ Bengal establishment. My
“ consent to the transfer was
“ grounded on those considera-
“ tions of its peculiar consti-
“ tutions and capacities, which
“ would appear likely to render
“ it of the greatest value in

L.

The camel corps is to be applicable wherever there may be sudden danger. It is, and has been, ever since it came into the Punjaub, within a march (for the camel corps) of the Manjha. If the civil service do their duty, as I dare say they do, there can be no armed insurrection beyond their own strength to put down without their being able

" this quarter, where disturbances are more likely to occur than anywhere else in the plains, and where force and rapidity of action would be of the greatest moment. I shall beg His Excellency's consideration of this subject, and shall be happy to be favoured with his views thereon."

M.

" It certainly would have been satisfactory to me, if His Excellency's scheme for the distribution of so large a force had provided for the occupation by the regular troops of the frontier districts along the right bank of the river Indus. These districts, His Excellency proposes to leave to the irregular regiments, which have been recently raised.

" With reference to the relinquishment of the Peshawar valley, also, to an irregular force, I conceive, that I am right in stating that Sir H. Lawrence never contemplated undertaking such a duty with the comparatively small amount of force, which has been sanc-

to give timely information to the Government; and the camel corps, like other troops, would march towards the point of danger. I have no other views about it than to quarter it where there is good forage for the camels, and where its great powers may be useful. It is ready for service when called upon, and as reported to Government. I have now ordered it to the Derajat, where it will find good forage; and I think will be more useful than anywhere else.

M.

The principle of concentrating large bodies of troops in masses is that of strength. It is the application of the fable of the bundle of sticks applied to military operations. Were I to provide for the occupation, by the "regular troops, of the frontier districts along the right bank of the Indus," more than I have done, I fear I should weaken the regular force, injure discipline, which grows lax in detachments, and thus do harm instead of good. Both His Lordship and Sir H. Lawrence think, that, to relinquish to the irregular troops the districts beyond the Indus, would be unadvisable,—so do I. I did not propose to do so. I proposed to keep a large force at

"tioned as *permanent* by the Government."

Attok, on the *right* bank ; but I have no other name to mark the spot so well as *Attok*, as a support to the irregulars.

This force would support every thing down the river, and Mooltan could support, by a meeting force, every thing up the river. I also told Sir H. Lawrence that I proposed to place the camel corps somewhere about Munkera, and he was to give me all the information he could collect ; but, some years ago I knew pretty nearly all he can find out. With Peshawur on the North, Mooltan on the South, and the camel corps in the centre, at Dera Ismael Khan, we have also the grand support of 54,000 men dominating over the whole country, and by their influence supporting every thing every where !

Let me now ask, what enemy would the troops in the Derajat have to encounter ? We are not in danger of invasion, unless from Afghanistan ; and the Affigans would come through the Bolan and Khyber Passes. Met at the Bolan by the force in the north of Scinde, also met by those in Mooltan, or, if matters are properly managed, by a force at Mittenkote which I believe to be a superior position to Mooltan. At the Khyber the Affigans would be met by the troops at Peshawur. The troops have been all exceedingly well posted by my predecessor to support these regular troops at Mooltan, and in the Peshawur districts : but it may be said, we have wild tribes in Derajat to oppose. I cannot believe that these tribes will rebel if the civil officers govern well. I have dealt with the wildest of them and found no difficulty ; but say, there may be partial disturbance from Bunnoo, and inroads from the Hills. Well, we have an *army* of irregulars, and these would put down insurrection, and repel invasion by wild tribes, even although they were without support from any other troops. But they are *not* without support. They will be well supported, as I have shown ; and when I learn more, I can reinforce the camel corps at Dera Ismael Khan if necessary. This corps is in beautiful order, equal to any regular corps in the Indian army, and all tried soldiers. I must have a report on Dera Ismael Khan, as to its feelings, its means of defence, its health, &c., all which I shall take means to procure.

N.

"But, however, this may have been, I have now to state, on the part of the Government, that I cannot consent to confide the defence of a post, whose security is of the highest political importance, to any irregular force. Whatever it may be practicable to do, when an iron bridge shall have been completed across the Indus, I hold strongly now the opinion which the Commander-in-Chief has expressed in page 35, and I would request that the regular force, stationed across the Indus, beyond Attok, may, at present, be one capable of maintaining itself in that 'isolated position,' as His Excellency appears to have originally intended."

N.

With reference to this paragraph, I do not clearly understand what is meant by "I cannot consent to confiding the defence of a post, &c. to any irregular force." I never proposed in my Report to leave the district solely to the defence of the irregular force! On the contrary, there are ten regiments, and twelve pieces of cannon, stationed in the Peshawur district to support the irregular force; and I have expressly said that I would not withdraw a man, but station them on the river and establish a *tête du pont*.



The ten regiments at *A* or *C*,—reserving to myself to fix the station when I saw the ground,—and 4000 at *B*, form an army ready to march to the support of any part held by irregulars that might be attacked; but who is to attack them? People like the Eusofzyes, 10,000 of whom were defeated by 2000 of our own men, the latter losing but five men killed! I cannot help thinking that my using the word "*Attok*," to mark the point for a bridge and large cantonment, has made His Lordship imagine, that I propose drawing the Peshawur Station, *altogether to the left bank of the Indus*, which never came into my head, not even if an iron bridge existed.

O.

" While, as I have before
 " observed, I should have been
 " glad if His Excellency had
 " contemplated the occupation
 " of the lower trans-Indus
 " districts by the regular
 " troops, I am prepared to
 " assent to their defence being
 " undertaken, if necessary, by
 " the irregular and local
 " corps."

O.

If His Lordship will place
 the whole of the irregular
 force under my command, I
 will do my best immediately to
 form them and support them
 effectually by their own high
 state of discipline. The Scinde
 Horse and Camel Corps are
 irregulars, and I know of no
 regiments of cavalry or in-
 fantry superior to them. There
 is no reason why all the new
 corps should not be equally effi-
 cient; I think I could quickly
 make them so if His Lordship
 places them under my orders,
 and gives me the means; but

in their present state they appear to me an inefficient, dangerous,
 and consequently a costly force.

I am prepared should His Lordship wish me to take this
 force in hand to organise it, so that the ten new regiments shall
 give full and efficient support to the Magistracy of the Punjanb,
 and be equal to deal with any local disturbance. I should model
 them upon the same system that I did the Scinde Police, with
 such modification as their having been already formed into
 regiments requires. It would be better otherwise, but it is not
 good to make changes when it can be avoided. I should keep
 them distinct from the military, and call them Police Regi-
 ments. I should require to have an officer to command
 them, with the rank and pay of a brigadier, who ought to have
 a brigado-major and a clerk. This I think would be quite
 enough. The officer I should recommend for this would be
 Lieut.-Colonel Hodgson, as he is said to be a strict and able
 officer, somewhat severe, which is so much the better for such a
 command. His regiment is said to be in excellent order. His
 Lordship knows more of him than I do, but I judge from his
 general character among military men, and I have neither met,
 nor can I hear of one with sufficient rank more fitting.

P.

" But this frontier is of
 " very great extent. His Ex-

P.

The frontier referred to by
 His Lordship in this paragraph

"celleucy correctly describes
 "the population of Bunnoo,
 "and the neighbouring dis-
 "tricts, as 'warlike and un-
 "'ruly,' and, in the time of the
 "Sikhs, a little army was re-
 "quisite to keep them in
 "submission. The passes in
 "the hills must be secured,
 "and the forts which it has
 "been found necessary even
 "of late years to build, in
 "order to overawe these tur-
 "bulent tribes, must be gar-
 "risoned. For all this, the
 "irregular corps, weakened as
 "they must be by providing
 "for the control of Huzara
 "and other points, will afford
 "a very inconsiderable force."

is about 400 miles in length. In the time of the Sikhs, the tribes were warlike and unruly; and having been, as I have known them to have been for many years, horribly tyrannised over by the Sikhs, even past the endurance of human nature, a "little army" *was* necessary to hold them in check, as his Lordship justly observes. Writhing as they were under such cruelty six years ago, they sent to ask me to relieve them from their sufferings, and I would go alone among them to-morrow and rule them without a British soldier. With this conviction and experience I cannot think that there is any great difficulty in our holding the Derajat. The passes need not be secured, but they must be made passable by good roads.

Why forts should have been built by us I do not know. I did not know that they had been. I know the moral feelings of the people, and the general topography of the Derajat, but I do not know the topography of this country *in detail*. The first knowledge tells me that good government will do more than forts to keep those tribes in order, however turbulent they may now be. However, it is very possible that one or two forts may be required: one, for instance for a magazine in some central point, as Dera Ismael Khan. I hear that the Governor-General has made a tour there. If this be true, it is worth a hundred forts towards quieting the people. As I know nothing of the disposition of the irregular force alluded to by his Lordship, I cannot say where it is weak, or where strong; but I know that if well organised and well placed this force is numerous enough to keep the whole Punjaub in obedience, the Derajat included. If it cannot do this, the force is either badly placed, or badly commanded, or there must be a general resolution to rebel

against our rule, which cannot be prevented and must end in another war; which of the three is the case I am not able to say.

I have seen Major Abbott, who is in civil charge of the Huzara country, and he is decidedly against any additional troops, whether regular or irregular being sent into his district*.

Q.

"It is true that a military police, amounting to 3000 horsemen, and 6000 foot, has been sanctioned. The number appears in the aggregate considerable; but when applied to the vast area included within the new territory, the extent of aid which it can give in dealing with rebellion or invasion beyond the Indus, would not be great."

Q.

A military police of 9000 cavalry and infantry, his Lordship says has been sanctioned. I do not know if this be in addition to what I hear is the amount of irregulars (18,000), or that this 9000 men make a portion of the 18,000: it is not material. His Lordship thinks the number "in the aggregate considerable; but when applied to the vast area included within the new territory—the extent of aid which it can give in dealing with rebellion or invasion beyond the Indus, would not be great." In answer to this I have to observe:

1st. That the extent of our new territory is thinly populated, and the Mahomedans form half of that, and are probably friendly to the British rule in the Punjaub.

2nd. That there are vast tracts, nearly deserts in this new territory, which require no troops at all! For example, all the interior of the tracts between the rivers generally, whose banks only are populous.

3rd. That the policemen, or irregulars, would have to deal neither with rebellion nor invasion, both of which would be met by an army of above 54,000 men. The whole duties of these 18,000 military police would be simply to support the local civil authorities against any turbulent individuals or small bands of robbers that might infest a district. The Irish constabulary force does this. The Scinde police did this in my time, and the

* Major Abbott held this whole district in perfect subjection during the war, and without any troops. He won the confidence of the people and they stood by him!

villagers generally obeyed the call, if assistance was required by the police. The same ought to take place in the Derajat,—the whole right bank of the Indus is inhabited by people whose habits and manners, and language are similar from Kurrachee up to Attok. I know their general character perfectly. I held about four hundred miles of this district in perfect subjection for years.

R.

"I repeat that it is of the highest political importance that we should secure ourselves against any circumstances which could cause even a temporary relinquishment of the ground we have occupied. However temporary the withdrawal might be, its mere occurrence would spread over the country, as we have before seen, and would be deeply injurious to our position and to the public tranquillity."

R.

I perfectly agree with his Lordship that it is dangerous to abandon territory even for a time. I think when at Meeanee I attacked an army of 35,000 men with 2000, I gave a pretty decided proof of my conviction of the danger of retiring before these very people! To prevent such an occurrence as the abandonment of territory is the great object of my Report, and of all that I have said on the subject! There is but one system in my opinion by which this can be prevented: good and conciliatory government; a well organized police; troops kept in masses, well disciplined,

and well placed for meeting invasion or supporting the police.

His Lordship states the danger of *temporary* withdrawal. I quite agree with him, and for that very reason have opposed the withdrawal of a single man from the Punjaub generally, or from any part of it; and so afraid am I of such a misfortune taking place, that I am now opposing the very mistaken plan which the Board of Administration seem desirous of seeing adopted, viz. spreading detachments all about the country; which is far more calculated to ensure the abandonment of territory, or some such disaster, than to keep the country quiet. This system, as I have before said, indicates small knowledge of military matters. I opposed this system, which several magistrates wanted when I

commanded the northern district in England in perilous times, and thus saved Manchester and Nottingham from being attacked, and enabled the garrison of Sheffield to resist an attack at the same time that the 45th detachment fought the rebel Frost in Wales.

In 1842, I found it established by the politicals in Scinde, and by overturning it I held the country safe. I must always oppose a system of scattering troops as destructive to the discipline and safety of the army, and admirably calculated on the occurrence of any outbreak to cause the abandonment, with disgrace, of large tracts of territory. The reason is very simple—the enemy breaks out prepared in masses, and finds us spread out and prepared for defeat in detail! But in any case we must *abandon territory* to concentrate. This alone, without referring to the destruction of discipline caused by such a dissemination of the troops, is of itself an immense evil, and full of danger.

S.

"If then the trans-Indus districts are to be held by the irregular corps, it is, in my judgment indispensable that they should be aided by the presence of artillery across the river, and provided with sufficient support upon this side."

S.

Of course no one can doubt it for a moment.

T.

"As the distribution stands at present, no support, however urgently required, could be given, without a very considerable delay. It has not been proposed to place any troops in the Scinde Saugor Doab, from its extremity to the Salt range. None in the Chuch Doab; none in the lower Rechna Doab;

T.

I have already shown that *full* support can be given to the troops in the Derajat, if those troops are well disciplined and properly placed. This is one of those places for which I wanted the camel corps, and only kept it at Goojerat till I could see it, to ascertain the state of discipline it is in, which I have

“and I presume that not
 “much could safely be spared
 “from the force at Mooltan.”

done, and find it excellent. It has now marched for Dera Ismael Khan,—its remaining there cannot be finally settled till I know more as to the health of the place, and what forage these is. It must be re-

collected that I have no information given me. I knew *nothing*, absolutely nothing of these irregular corps; and I cannot arrange for the support of troops of whose state and locality I am utterly ignorant. The thing is impossible. I can either take the whole under my orders, or I can defend the Derajat with regular troops by establishing new stations—a work of time, and care, and cost; or I can give up all interference with the right bank and merely place reserves where the Board wish: so doing I cannot be responsible for what may happen, whether good or evil, but I will do whatever the Governor-General orders to the best of my ability. I cannot, and am sure he does not expect me to take responsibility except for my own measures. If the Governor-General gives over the whole defence of the Derajat to me, I will immediately recall all ill-formed regiments and relieve them by good troops. As to the Doab mentioned by his Lordship as defenceless, I have to observe,—

1st. That “the Scinde Sangor Doab, from its extremity to the Salt Range,” is, generally speaking, *a desert*. It requires no regular force, nor would it be possible there to station one without an enormous expense, which outlay would in no shape be remunerated by any advantage of which I am aware.

2nd. “None in the Chuch Doab.”—No,—none, and for pretty nearly the same reasons. No invader can enter *there*; it has much desert, and is dominated by Lahore, Wuzerabad and Jhelum. What large body of insurgents could collect there? None. The Board and his Lordship’s minute both say, that all the dangerous Sikhs are in the Manjha, far from, and unconnected with the Doab between the Jhelum and Chenab. I repeat that no danger can arise there, and no regular troops can be *there* placed, without great expense.

3rd. “None in the Lower Rechna Doab.”—No,—none. It also is nearly a desert; and no regular troops could be there placed without great expense, and there is no object to be gained—Mooltan and Lahore completely command this waste, for such it has been from the time of Alexander to this day.

The inhabitants of all these Doabs live along the banks of the

rivers which bound them; and along the banks alone are people and cultivation found.—These long strips of population must be kept in order by a police, and this is easily done; but surely stations of regular troops would be utterly misplaced in such positions. The character of these Doabs is to be high between the rivers, deficient in water, and therefore without much cultivation.

U.

“ Guided by past experience,
 “ and by a knowledge of the
 “ nature of these districts, I do
 “ not consider that they can be
 “ safely held, as suggested, by
 “ the irregular corps, unless
 “ these are accompanied by
 “ a field battery in Bunnoo
 “ and the Northern portions,
 “ and by another field battery
 “ at Dera Ghazee Khan and
 “ the Southern portions;—the
 “ whole being supported by a
 “ station resembling that at
 “ Jhelum, at some point upon
 “ the Eastern side of the river
 “ Indus.

“ The position of canton-
 “ ments, the maintenance and
 “ repair of forts to be occupied
 “ by troops, and the fortifica-
 “ tions of Lahore, &c. are de-
 “ tails on which his Excel-
 “ lency proposes to report
 “ officially, after he shall have
 “ visited them severally. They
 “ need not, therefore, be ad-
 “ verted to at present.

“ I am very desirous of
 “ coming to a definite conclu-
 “ sion on this subject before I go to sea. The necessity for
 “ my going has already been the source of much vexation to me,
 “ and the feeling is greatly aggravated, by my finding myself
 “ unable to remain at Lahore, in order to settle these details in

U.

It is not for me to dictate to the Governor-General, if he thinks that the 18,562 irregular troops and some twenty or thirty pieces of cannon are not sufficient to hold these miserable tribes in subjection. I can only say, that those whom he has entrusted with the direction of this Army must mismanage their troops; for I would stake my life upon doing it with half this force, with proper civil government. While writing this a return has been sent to me, from which I now see the numbers and stations of these troops. But I have as yet had no time to study them, or form any idea of the propriety of the latter; neither do I know the state of their discipline, drill, arms, appointments, clothing and composition.

" more close communication than is now practicable I trust,
 " however, that the several points, which, as yet remain un-
 " decided, may be speedily adjusted. They are as follows :—

V.

" 1st. Having acquiesced in
 " the recommendations of the
 " Commander-in-Chief, respect-
 " ing the amount of force to
 " be stationed in the Punjab,
 " and the general distribution
 " thereof, I beg to be favoured
 " with his Excellency's con-
 " sideration of the views I have
 " expressed, as to the suffi-
 " ciency of the force, as now
 " placed, for acting speedily on
 " any formidable rising among
 " the Sikhs in the Upper
 " Manjha,—an event which I
 " do not regard as probable ;
 " but which is very possible."

V.

His Lordship desires me to
 say, what consideration I have
 given to the defence of the
 Upper Manjha. My answer is
 as follows :—

1st. There is a large body
 of troops at Lahore.

2nd. There are other large
 bodies of troops in the Jul-
 lundur.

3rd. There is the wing of a
 regiment at Noorpore, and
 another at Kangra. These,
 and all beyond, north of the
 Beas, are placed under Sir
 Walter Gilbert, who has a per-
 fect knowledge of the country
 and the people ; whose head
 quarters are at Lahore, and he
 can, in two marches, reach any
 point of the Upper Manjha.

4th. Being at Lahore, he is
 at the seat of Government ; and, if kept properly informed of
every thing that passes, of *all* the Board of Administration
 hear, and of *all* they report to the Governor-General—as he
 certainly ought to be or he cannot make his arrange-
 ments—then he can before an outbreak occurs move in force
 with his troops to the point in danger, of which he must be the
 best judge. If he is to consult with the Board of Administra-
 tion, I have no doubt that all kinds of accidents will happen,
 as is generally the case when a council directs the movements of
 troops.

5th. I have given both Generals Gilbert and Wheeler distinct
 instructions to seek for and attend to all information which the
 civil authorities can give to them ; and to be prompt in putting
 down insurrection, keeping a sharp look out as to what passes in
 the Manjha.

6th. There is one bridge and eight or ten fords over the Beas; and Brigadier Wheeler can pass his force at one or many points, over the Beas, into the Manjha during the winter.

7th. I have ordered the American pontoons also to be sent to him, which will arrive before the swelling waters destroy the bridge and fords. There are also boats in abundance.

8th. To station forces in the Upper Manjha *after* the waters rise would be to destroy the troops by disease; *before* that time, there is no need! However, this must be as the Governor-General pleases, and if he decides on the plan of the Board of Administration new stations must be built in an unhealthy district. I will, on my return from Peshawur—when I mean to go through all that country—make my report to his Lordship. I have always said that, if healthy, I consider Noorpore a proper position to station a strong force, as being a frontier post on the Maharajah's territories. It is with regard to his Highness's power that I propose this, not to insurrection, which I never cease to repeat, is only to be prevented by good government.

W.

"2nd. If his Excellency should still prefer, that the trans-Indus districts of the Derajat and Bunnoo should be held by the irregular corps, under the conditions which I have stated, as those on which I could consent to the measure, I should wish to know where the support-ing force would be placed."

W.

I can, at present, see no better position than Dera Ismael Khan for a central force in the Derajat. To this place I have, as before stated, ordered the camel corps; and ordered Major Michell to make his report to me upon it.

There should be a report made by some experienced medical officer upon this place, but I have no power to send them. The Commander-in-Chief in India has not the authority necessary to fulfil the duties of his position in this,

and many other matters, as I have personally stated to his Lordship more than once; but I do not mean by this, that I am denied any support—quite the contrary. I complain of the *system*, which I think objectionable; and, had not his Lordship given me the support which he has, I would not have remained

a month in India. But I have to thank him, not the system, for that support! If his Lordship requires that new stations should be formed in the Doabs and in the Derajat, he has only to order them; but it is clear that it was impossible for me to form these since my arrival, as there are no means within my reach, even had I thought they were necessary, which, as before said, I do not.

The military occupation of a country, *if it be done at once*, requires the full and uncontrolled power of the commander, with full means at his disposal, and it requires also very great experience and ability to do it. *If it be done by consultation*, as in the present case, *after a year has passed*, the troops holding the ground on which the accidents of the war had placed them, then the affair is one of time and examination, and the Governor-General has two sources of information, the Board of Administration and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. I have, personally much respect for the Members of the Board, and in their civil capacity, for aught I know to the contrary, their abilities may be great and their exertions successful: but I consider their military views to be erroneous and dangerous; for, though I have no doubt but that the bravery of the troops will carry them victoriously through all encounters, it is my business to place them so that their known valour may not be put to such unfair, and at times disastrous trials. We have seen some 20,000 men at the lowest calculation destroyed at Cabul,—a small force cut off to a man in the Boogtee Hills—another force utterly defeated in the same hills with other disasters equally shameful, all arising from civilians or ignorant officers in civil employment pretending to direct military operations, which, wearing a red coat and holding a commission does not make every man capable of doing; on the contrary, very few men are capable of this. I do not know one man among the military employed in political situations under Government who has an idea of conducting military operations. There are many clever men, and I believe they are all brave soldiers, but they are not, in my opinion, either generals or statesmen.

Witnessing the disgraceful and melancholy facts above alluded to, and which have happened in the last ten years, it is impossible for me to conceal from his Lordship a single opinion which I hold, or I should render myself responsible for any misfortune that should hereafter happen to our arms. The Board of Administration have, apparently, called out to his Lordship for

troops here, and troops there; but I ask where are the barracks for them? I have already said, that the Board once stated to his Lordship that there were barracks for two companies at Battala. On the faith of that statement, two companies were sent to Battala, and there was not accommodation for a man! These companies after much suffering returned to Umrizur! I reported this to the Governor-General, but I never heard more upon the subject! Of course, I cannot now attach faith to any statement made as to cover for troops by the Board, as I cannot risk the health and the lives of soldiers upon reports so ill-judged and groundless as that relative to Battala.

The supporting force for the Derajat is the chain of stations, Peshawur, Attok, Rawul Pindie, Jhelum, Wuzzeerabad, Lahore, and Mooltan; and the proper discipline and location of the large body of irregular troops quartered in the Derajat, which is sufficient, if properly handled, to keep a country double the size of the Derajat in subjection.

X.

"3rd. In that event the question must be determined, under whose orders the irregular corps are to be.

"In the minute, authorising their organization, I stated that, on their completion, they should be considered as under authority of the Commander-in-Chief.

"Expressions in His Excellency's report induce me to suppose that, in the event of their being employed as he has suggested, he contemplates their becoming what are called civil corps, and being placed under the orders of the Board of Administration.

"It is necessary that this point should be clearly ascertained, and I therefore

X.

This rests with his Lordship. His "*minute authorising their organization* places them, on completion, under the Commander-in-Chief," and I am perfectly ready to take them.

The expressions in my Report refer to circumstances which can only be determined by the Governor-General.

They are these:—

1st. If there is to be a *police* under the civil power, and I hold that such a force is necessary, for without it the Punjab will sooner or later be in disorder; then I think the whole irregular force ought to be under the exclusive orders of the Commander-in-Chief, because *I know*—I do not think, or imagine, or conjecture—but *I know* that if the civil power

" request to be favoured with
 " his Excellency's opinion,
 " whether the corps in question
 " should be placed, as con-
 " templated in the original
 " minute, under the orders of
 " the Commander-in-Chief, or
 " under those of the Board of
 " Administration ?

(Signed) " J. DALHOUSIE."

in India may interfere with the military the public service will suffer by their jarring. This ought not to be, neither ought any evil to exist; but so it is, and no human power can prevent it.

2nd. If there be *not* a police, let the irregular force be applied to the duties which police battalions ought to perform; and let a brigadier be appointed to command the whole as head of the police; and let him be under the control of the Commander-in-Chief, or of the

Board of Administration, as his Lordship thinks best. My own opinion is that the Commander-in-Chief is best, because he will maintain a system of regularity and discipline that the Board will not be able to do; and I always considered that the value of the police in Scinde depended more on the tone and spirit instilled into the corps than on any thing else, and that no body of magistratos can effect—it is impossible. I speak with perfect disinterestedness, for the formation of this body of irregulars will give me much trouble; but which trouble I am ready to take as an imperious public duty; for as matters now stand I do not think that this large body of irregular troops is of much use. On the contrary, I think they are dangerous. If made over to me, as in the first minute of the Governor-General was contemplated, I should at once organize and place them in proper positions for securing the tranquillity of the country.

I hear there has been a battle in Bunnoo, but I have as yet had no report of it: all these matters I will endeavour to regulate.

Knowing the character of the whole of that tract of country called the Derajat, I can assure his Lordship that he may always expect inroads from the mountains. Having full power I prevented this in Scinde; but I do not think, with less power than I possessed in Scinde, it can be prevented by any one, in the mountains which bear upon the Derajat; *nothing can prevent it*, short of systematic attacks on the hill tribes, such as

I made on the Boogtee Hills, and a system of government suited to the Punjaub. If the Governor-General orders me, according to his first intentions, to take the new corps under my orders, I will—

1st. Appoint a proper officer selected for the service as brigadier to the whole force, and give him an active brigade major and a clerk. This will ensure the exact execution of my orders.

2nd. I will complete and organize these regiments, reporting to his Lordship any officers who are either incompetent or without zeal, and whose regiments are, therefore, not in the state of discipline which they ought to be.

3rd. I will apply to the Board of Administration to say, where it apprehends danger. I conclude the Manjha and Bunnoo to be the two where there is apprehension. However, where they apprehend danger there shall they find support, as far as a government so unsuited to the people are supported.

4th. I will study the question as to the security of the Derajat, a question with which I am tolerably familiar, because, as I have before said, it is a continuation of that strip of territory which runs along the whole western course of the Indus from Attok to Kurrachoe. I refer to the right bank; there neither is nor can be danger on the left; if the people are well treated they will not rise; they have no support from mountaineers and no mountains wherein to seek refuge however discontented they may be. Having now seen a good deal of this province I feel satisfied that it is much more easy to govern than Scinde, because on the left bank of the Indus there are no mountains for refuge, except in the Huzara district. The influence of the troops dominates over the whole. Goolab Sing is detested, and can influence none but the disbanded Sikh troops! From him, and him alone, may danger be expected on the eastern side of the Indus at the present moment—no one else has *means*. I think him powerful and dangerous in the extreme: he will oblige us to keep a large force in the Punjaub, and this force will drain the Indian treasury; it would be wise, on the first occasion, to undo the injustice which we committed on the unhappy people of Cashmere when we placed them under this man's rule; we ought to pay him back the purchase money, and take Cashmere from him. The bargain would be a great gain to the Company, and a blessing to the people of that unhappy valley.

Conclusion.

When the post of Commander-in-Chief was accepted by me, expecting war in the Punjaub, I applied through the Duke of Wellington to the India Board, for the services of Lieutenant Wood of the Indian Navy, to form a pontoon train, and his Grace took great pains to obtain for me the services of that skilful officer, but the Court of Directors refused! I was, however, allowed to send out some newly-invented inflated composition rafts, which the Duke saw, and approved of for experiment. They are now come, and answer so far that I have been on them with a gun, and they seem capable of bearing a great weight. Whether they will eventually be found to answer, or not, I am not prepared to say.

In the meantime, and after having seen most part of the Punjaub, and crossed all its rivers, my conviction is more strong than ever, that both for peace and war, for military movements, and for the demands of the Civil Government of the Punjaub a large and effective pontoon train should be formed under the command of an expert naval officer, with not less than seven divisions of seamen under his command, each division consisting of as many men and boats, &c. as may hereafter be decided :

1st Division,	stationed at	Attok.
2nd	"	" at Jhelum.
3rd	"	" at Wuzzecrabad, or Senkote.
4th	"	" at Lahore.
5th	"	" at Hurreekce.
6th	"	" at Kallabag.
7th	"	" on the River Beas.

The station should always be as high up the current as found convenient, as boats could be the more easily floated down. The boats, the armament, and all belonging to such an establishment, should be arranged in the most perfect manner; and till such a pontoon train be formed the full resources of the Punjaub will not, in my opinion, be drawn forth; nor will an army be able to act with the freedom which such an establishment would give to its operations.

To bridge the rivers in the Punjaub may be practicable by means of arched viaducts for one hundred, or one hundred and twenty miles, running down from high-water mark to the low-water mark, and then connecting these viaducts with a bridge; but it is not in these days that such great works can be performed,

and until they be performed, an establishment for pontoons, that can place and remove floating bridges rapidly when the water is low and attend to the ferries when the floods come down, is, in my opinion essential to the good government of the Punjaub.

ATTOK, PESHAWUR, AND KOHAT.

Peshawur.

I have examined carefully all this country, and have made up my mind that Peshawur is the only proper place for the military station in this district*.

1st. Because the town is a very large one. The civil power must therefore reside there.

2nd. The magistrate and the town must be protected from the mountaineers of the Khyber and Affreede hills; all living by plunder.

3rd. If the station was anywhere but in Peshawur a *second* station must be formed to protect it. Thus would the troops be divided and the expense be doubled.

4th. It not only guards the entrance to or rather exit from the Khyber Pass, but also that to Kohat. If placed elsewhere it would be inconvenient.

5th. The recent quarrel with the Affreede tribes has rendered all communication with Kohat dangerous; and it is likely to continue so, unless proper means are taken.

6th. I therefore decide on Peshawur as the proper position for the station across the Indus in this district.

7th. I also decide that the west side of the town is the proper place for the cantonment. It appears that all the troops there quartered were very healthy all the past year. Whereas those quartered in the fort and the Wuzzeera Bhaug were very unhealthy. Everything concurs to make the West side of the town the proper place for troops, as far as our medical men's experience goes.

8th. The Citadel of Peshawur ought to be *immediately* repaired. To do this will not be expensive, and I have desired Lieutenant-Colonel Tremcheere to make a report and estimate of the work.

* If it be wise to hold any territory beyond the Indus, which is a doubtful question.


Kohat.

I visited Kohat. It stands in a plain, has an old citadel which completely protects the town, and ought to be immediately repaired, without much expense. A few guns should be mounted, the fort well cleaned out, and a small magazine built. The idea of building a work farther advanced in the plains is too puerile to need remark. I have desired Lieutenant-Colonel Tremenneere to make a report on, and an estimate of the expense of repairing the Citadel of Kohat.

The Pass.

The Pass must now be fortified. I see no reason why we should have had any quarrel with the Affreedee tribe. But the mischief is done; blood has been foolishly shed and no choice is left. We must command the Pass and the defile leading thereto for many miles, or the communication with Kohat is lost!

I have therefore, after much consideration, ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Tremenneere to prepare the plan of a *Serai* with two towers, thus:—



Each tower is to hold twelve men, &c., and be prepared for its own separate defence, so that the Serai may be abandoned, and the towers prevent any one entering, as they would be shot from the

towers. Each tower would have a piece of cannon, so that twenty-four men could defend the Pass. While, if danger pressed, the wing of a regiment of infantry could be quartered in the Serai. I much fear that twelve more towers at least will be required to secure the communication along the defile. However they will not be expensive, but they will demand a police to occupy them. If my opinion is of any weight, I should say, pay the Affreedee chiefs *double* what they ask to defend the Pass.

They ask 6000 rupees a year; I would give them 12,000. It is only by generosity that such tribes can be kept in order, in such circumstances. These people will give trouble unless this course be taken, and the salt tax placed on its ancient footing. These are civil matters, but unless well regulated Kohat is cut

off. Nothing can pass that defile without being fired upon by the mountaineers.

Attok.

This town is defended by a mere wall with towers and is commanded on all sides; but it is important as being placed on the most suitable position for passing the Indus, and for the construction of a bridge, for which this is generally allowed to be the most eligible place.

I proposed that six Martello towers should be placed on the heights which command this fortress and town, which I have marked in the plan A, B, C, D, E, F.

A commands the fortress at 1450 yards distance, and all the other adjacent heights on the left bank of the Indus.

B commands the fortress at 620 yards distance, and a small tower there would, I think, be useful.

C commands the fortress at 540 yards, and a low hill under it, from which the enemy breached the western side of the fortress when defended by Lieutenant Herbert*. This is an important place I think for a large tower, to hold four or six guns. It commands the road from Rawul Pindee, and the gorge G, between the heights H, K.

D. On this height I would also place a small tower with one gun, because, unless occupied, a besieging force would in the night pass a force under cover of the heights D, H, and place a battery to play upon the bridge, M.

On the right bank of the river I would place a strong tower at E, which commands, in reverse, the whole fortress of Attok, at 1580 yards. This height also commands all the others, in reach of fort, on the right bank of the Indus.

E. This height commands the town and fortress, and also the fort of Karibad, on which the besiegers established a battery against Lieutenant Herbert. This tower I would make strong.

I would repair the fort of Kairabad, and fortify the Serai on the left bank.

I also consider that a large *tête-de-pont* ought to be thrown up on the right bank. This need not be expensive. A mere high wall of stone, with loop-holes, would be sufficient. The

* An intrepid young officer distinguished by his defence of Attok.

stone abounds on the spot, and of that strong slate which requires no cutting or blasting.

The whole expense of these works I have requested Lieut.-Colonel Tremeneere to estimate, and I will forward it, when received to the Governor-General: I apprehend that a lac of rupees would cover all.

I think that barracks should be built here for three regiments of Native Infantry. One in the fortress, and two on the right bank of the river. They should be divided between the fortress, the Serai, the tête-du-pont, and the towers.

By the foregoing means the passage of the Indus at Attok will be made safe, whether war should come from Goolab Sing in the east, or the Affghans on the west, or both together. The vast importance of this passage requires no comment, it is obvious; and its importance becomes tenfold, if the Government means to keep the district of Peshawur.

I should have made a sojourn of some days at Attok but the expedition to Kohat has delayed me, and the hot weather approaches fast, so as to leave me but little time for examining the Manjha and Jullunder Doab.

In concluding these remarks I have to observe, that there may be some discrepancies in them, and some differing in degree from those given in my original Report. If so, those arise from my having *seen* the localities of which I speak; whereas, in my Report, and in the commencement of these remarks, I had not, and was obliged to speak from what I heard from others.

I will not detain this paper to examine and compare it with the Report, as it would add to the delay which has, *necessarily*, taken place, for a subject so serious cannot be written off without due consideration and examination. CAMP, 26th February, 1850.

It may be here observed in support of the views taken in this memoir and maintained in the replication, that some of the dangers pointed out have been since incurred on the eastern frontier. A war with Burmah has taken place. On the western frontier the mountain tribes have been provoked to hostilities, not only in front of Peshawur but along the Derajat; isolated expeditions have been, and continue, to be sent against

them, with the barbarous instruction to slay and burn but without any solid success; and it is probable that this petty but tedious, harrassing and cruel warfare, which has now lasted more than three years will finally demand a great and regular invasion of their fastnesses, perhaps an unavailing one, or the abandonment of the right bank of the upper Indus. Here however are two wars going on at opposite frontiers of India—one of them a great war—and in neither has the Commander-in-Chief appeared as leader or adviser. Are then the great military interests, of which the Commander-in-Chief is the legitimate guardian, still made the sport of ignorant civilians and beardless politicals? It would seem so by the results, especially in Burmah, where the Dalhousie generalship has certainly not triumphed over the enemy, whatever it may have done over friends.

No. 3.

Extract of a letter from Lieutenant Wood. “ I
“ feel it a duty I owe to tell you a plain story, and
“ that in a few words. After you left I waited
“ on the authorities of the Horse Guards. Lord
“ Fitzroy Somerset gave me a letter to Mr. Water-
“ field of the Board of Control, and that gentleman
“ sent me with a note to the India House. There
“ I was told that the Directors had no power
“ to originate a single appointment in India,
“ but that every new appointment there must
“ emanate in the first place from the Governor-
“ General. On returning to the War Office
“ Lord Fitzroy Somerset said ‘ Tell Mr. Water-
“ ‘ field that we think the President of the Board

“ ‘should give Mr. Wood a letter to the Governor-
“ ‘General with a copy of the Duke’s letter, for
“ ‘(he added) we think Sir Charles Napier entitled
“ ‘to every assistance which can be given him.’
“ The reply was, ‘Sir John Hobhouse will give
“ ‘Lieutenant Wood such a letter, but thinks
“ ‘Lieutenant Wood had better not take it.’ I
“ will not trouble you with further details Sir
“ Charles, *a host of difficulties are conjured up to
“ deter me from going*; the meaning of all which
“ amounts to this. ‘Lieutenant Wood may go if
“ ‘he likes at his own risk and expense, but we
“ ‘will do nothing to aid him. Had it rested
“ ‘with the Horse Guards I should have followed
“ ‘you out next mail; but the Board of Control
“ ‘chose to view it as a mere personal matter of
“ ‘my own. Not so Lord Fitzroy Somerset.’ ”

No. 4.

Extract of a letter from Lieutenant Herbert Edwards to the President at Lahore.

“ *Sep. 2nd 1848.* Under these circumstances,
“ I have thought it my bounden duty to take on
“ myself the very great responsibility of assuring
“ all the regular troops of Maharajah Duleep
“ Sing, now under my command, that if the
“ conduct of the Sikh nation should oblige
“ the British Government to declare the treaty
“ null and void, and to annex the Punjaub to
“ Hindostan, every soldier who to the last shall
“ have faithfully performed his duty to the
“ Maharajah *shall pass as a matter of course into
“ the service of our Government, and enjoy the
“ same privileges as he now does.* I beg to assure

“ you that I have not been induced to take this
“ step from observing the smallest sign of disaf-
“ fection in the troops alluded to.”

No. 5.

The following documents exhibit the interference of the civil with the military service on the most delicate points; and the presumptuous conduct of military men invested with civil power, independent of their commanders. The dates and subjects show that the reduction of the Sepoys' pay which caused the mutiny, was here entrusted to a captain who was to act without the cognizance of the General commanding. (Mere formalities are suppressed.)

Station orders by Brigadier Hearsey, Wuzzeerabad, Friday 6th July 1849.

Captain Campbell, Paymaster of the Punjaub, will for the future make known to the Brigadier commanding all orders or circulars he may receive from the Auditor-General, regarding any change that may be contemplated in the pay and allowances of the force now stationed at Wuzzeerabad; and if no reference to higher authority on these points is necessary the Brigadier will make known such charge in station orders to officers commanding corps and attachments; until such are published in station orders any circulars commanding officers may receive from the Pay Office are not to be attended to, but are to be forwarded for the consideration of the Brigadier.

Those lately sent by the Paymaster, as directed by the Auditor-General to commanding officers, regarding Scinde allowances, &c. have been referred

through Sir W. R. Gilbert to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. When a reply is received it will be published to the force.

Brigadier Hearsey to the Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General.

Cantonment, Wuzzeerabad, 12th July, 1849.—I have the honour to acknowledge your letter, &c., enclosing one from Captain Campbell, and calling on me for an explanation of the circumstances therein adverted to, for the information of Sir W. Gilbert, commanding the Punjaub division. I enclose copies of letters and orders prepared some days ago to forward, but a severe illness (cholera) prevented my so doing.

May I be permitted humbly to state, that either I must consider myself responsible for the contentment and good behaviour in all respects of those under my command, as far as insuring it is in my power, or I must be relieved of that onus.

If an authority is permitted to be in the vicinity of my cantonment, having power to issue orders to officers commanding regiments on so delicate a point as the pay and allowances of the men, of which *I am not even to be apprised—nay! such orders are expected by this authority to be circulated in my station orderly book without my consent being asked or granted*—I have only to consider myself a nullity instead of commanding officer.

It was on this point I first made known my sentiments to Captain Campbell, and then sent him my letter 26th June. I received no reply, but the Military Auditor-General's last circular was sent to officers commanding regiments to act upon, without any public report being made to me by Captain Campbell of his having done so.

Finding this had occurred I issued the station order 6th July he complains of, deeming myself fully justified in doing so. A copy of it was sent to Captain Campbell. He has thought proper to deem my issuing orders an interference with him in his Divisional capacity of Paymaster, and as setting aside instructions he has received from Lieutenant-Colonel Goldie, Military Auditor-General.

If Lieutenant-Colonel Goldie, or Captain Campbell are responsible persons for the contentment and good behaviour of the troops I bow obedience, and own I am wrong ; but if the men refuse their pay and allowances in consequence of deductions being made without orders sent from the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief, and such orders, under the instructions from the Major-General commanding the division being fully explained on parade to them, I must either acquiesce in such mutinous conduct, until reference on the subject is made to head quarters, or I must make them take it under terror of military punishment.

The onus or responsibility would then fall on me, and the cause of such disobedience (the Auditor-General's circular) would not even be adverted to.

May I be pardoned if I honestly avow I do not understand this Government within a Government. I am ready and willing at all times to obey authority, but I do not deem Colonel Goldie such authority until the Governor-General or Commander-in-Chief directs all orders from that officer, regarding pay and allowances of the men, addressed to commanding officers of regiments without my knowledge are to be immediately obeyed.

I now deem it my duty after two months' expe-

rience to bring publicly to the notice of the Commander-in-Chief that Captain Campbell's residence is six and a-half miles from the cantonment, thus causing double guards over treasure—here and at his quarters ; double responsibility for treasure ; which I have been informed by the Adjutant-General—should any loss occur—would fall on me ; besides the continual small escorts passing to and fro from his house with pay for troops, as also with treasure tumbrils.

All this responsibility is on my shoulders for his personal convenience, and I beg to be relieved from it, by Captain Campbell being ordered within the limits of cantonment, or being permitted to go to any other station in the Trans Ravee territory he may fix upon.—J. R. HEARSEY, Brigadier, &c.

No. 6.

In " the Statistical Papers relating to India," presented to Parliament 1853 will be found, page 85, the following passage.

*" The attention of Government has been extended
" to the improvement of the newly-acquired province
" of Scinde, and amongst the public works constructed in this territory may be mentioned Kur-
" rachee Mole and road at an expense of
" £30,961."*

The effrontery of this is almost incredible. Sir C. Napier designed, commenced, and nearly finished the mole and road ; but when he left Scinde, " Government," with scoffs through their organs at the ruin of his projects, stopped the work !

Again, at page 87.

" On the Indus also the Government have esta-

“ blished steam-vessels for the conveyance of both goods and passengers from Kurrackee to Mooltan, and purpose extending the line to Kalabagh on the Indus, and to Jhelum on the river of that name.”

Sir C. Napier established steam-vessels for the purpose above-named, they were in full activity with an enormously increasing trade when he left Scinde; but then, “*Government*” immediately took away the steamers and stopped the trade!!

Can effrontery go further? Yes!

The Directors and their partizans, have diligently inculcated, publicly and privately, the notion that Scinde is a heavy burthen on their revenue. The habitual expressions are “*The costly annexation of Scinde,*”—“*The Directors owe nothing to Sir C. Napier for fastening an unprofitable province on them.*” Yet with these words on their lips their hands have presented to Parliament without trembling the following report relative to only one branch of the many profits derived from the decried conquest, viz, opium. The smuggling of that drug through Scinde had reduced the value of their passes for private traffic to 125 rupees per chest in 1835. Mark the rise after the conquest of Scinde, as admitted in the following extract from the same statistic papers, page 74.

“ The subjugation of Scinde afforded opportunity for the levy of a higher rate. Down to the period of that event a large portion of the opium of Malwa had been conveyed through Scinde to Kurrackee and thence onwards to the Portuguese ports of Diu and Demaun. The route was now closed and it was reasonably expected that an advance might be made in the charge of passes,

“ without risk of loss to the revenue from a diminished demand for them. The rate was accordingly increased in October 1843, from 125 rupees to 200 rupees per chest; upon the principle that it was desirable to fix the price at the highest amount which could be levied without forcing the trade into other channels, a further increase was made in 1845, when it was determined that the charge should be 300 rupees per chest. Under the like views it was in 1847 raised to 400 rupees per chest.”

It is also admitted in the same papers that the net receipts from Bombay

	£.
In 1840 were	11,701
In 1849	887,506
Increase.....	<u>£.875,805</u>

Sir C. Napier's conquest and Government of Scinde had therefore augmented the Company's opium profit, in one year, on the one line of Bombay, nearly a million sterling—the previous years having also been successively and enormously increased. But the price of Bengal opium was likewise proportionally raised from the same cause, and therefore the gross profit has been many millions.

With this money in hand, the Directors sought to deprive the conqueror of his prize money, did deprive him of a portion, and vilifying his actions call his conquest barren !

END.

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